DEBATE OVER U.S. STRATEGY A MIXED RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980150-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 150
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980150-6
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STRATEGIC REVIEW
Summer 1980
DEBATE OVER U.S. STRATE
A MIXED RECD
LES ASPIN
THE AUTHOR: Congressman Aspin is Chairman of the
Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and serves on the House Armed
Services Committee and the Government Operations Com-
mittee. He was first elected to Congress in 1970. Aspin
served in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1968 as an economic
adviser in the office of the Secretary of Defense. He is a
graduate of Yale University, received a Master's degree from
Oxford University and a Ph.D. in economics from the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
' IN BRIEF
The charge has resounded in recent times that the United States intelligence community has chron-
ically and woefully underestimated both the pace and- magnitude of the Soviet strategic build-up.
Yet, an analysis of the available record of forecasts with respect to eight major Soviet weapons de-
velopments-extending from the first Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949 to the improvements in So-
viet ICBM accuracy and yields in the 1970s-shows that the performance has been mixed, consist-
ing of overestimates as well as underestimates, and in at least two instances of predictions that
were on or close to the target. Few of the mistakes that have been committed in forecasting can
be attributed to errors in intelligence gathering; most of them have been the function of more-or-
less inevitable human foibles. With the demise of SALT, estimates of future Soviet strategic pro-
grams are apt to be wider off the mark than they would have been under a SALT II Treaty, because
the reference points provided by the Treaty for U.S. intelligence have been removed, and precisely
because the human element in intelligence evaluation and forecasting is thus again maximized.
"It is ... a matter of record that the growth of
the Soviet ICBM force was underestimated for a
decade after the 'missile gap' by the entire intelli-
gence community-including Pentagon 'hawks."'
Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.)
"But the history of the past twenty years shows
quite the reverse. Few indeed are the instances
when the Soviet military threat later turned out to
be greater than the estimated 'worst case: Usually,
the government's experts overestimated the danger."
George B. Kistiakowsky
he death of SALT II turns the focus of
U.S. strategic intelligence away from
"verification" and back to the old busi-
ness of "forecasting." SALT provided for some
degrees of restraint and certainty: We knew
how far the Soviets were allowed to go, and the
task was to verify their compliance with these
restrictions. Without SALT, there are no limits
or guidelines. The United States must rely
purely on its skills in strategic forecasting-in
projecting the future, including future Soviet
strategic intentions and capabilities.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980150-6
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