US CONSIDERS ALTERING PLAN IN ARMS TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000201040007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 16, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/16: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201040007-7
BOSTON GLOBE
ARTI C'_' LN~:.f 16 APRIL 1983
o PrG
US considers
altering plan
in. arms talks
By William Beecher
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - The Reagan Administration is
considering placing a significantly revised strate-
gic arms control proposal on the table when the
Geneva negotiations with the Soviet Union resume
on June 8, according to well-placed officials.
The revision, reflecting the recent recommenda-
tions of a bipartisan presidential commission on
the MX missile, would drop any attempt to count
missiles, and would instead concentrate on negoti-
ating sharp reductions in the number of warheads
and the overall missile payload in each side's stra-
tegic nuclear arsenal.
[Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany,
talking to reporters after conferring with President
Ronald Reagan. said he had urged the President to
make "personal contacts with Yuri V. Andropov.
the Soviet leader, because he believed Moscow had
not locked the door on US nuclear arms proposals.
Officials say that even though Reagan has not
yet formally endorsed the commission's recom-
mendations, an interagency panel of senior offi-
cials from the State Department, the Pentagon. the
CIA and the National Security Council is already
weighing arms control alternatives.
The President is expected to announce on Tues-
day his agreement with the commission's findings,
stressing the interdependence of all three of its
principal conclusions: that 100 ten-warhead MX
missiles be deployed in existing Minuteman silos,
that a small, single-warhead missile, capable of be-
ing deployed in mobile form, be developed, and that
the strategic Arms Reduction Talks proposal be
modified to focus on warheads and payload, not
missile launchers.
Some officials point out that since the small
missile is not expected to be reAdv for testing for at
least three or four years, there is no urgency
In revising the American START proposal -
which calls for both sides to reduce to 850 mis-
siles carrying no more than 5000 warheads.
Others, however, argue that since the Presi-
dent will endorse the Scowcroft panel's recom-
mendations and since the case for proceeding
with the MX missile would be strengthened by
moving ahead with the START revisions, it
makes sense not to delay implementing that
proposal.
Proponents also note such a move would
probably be popular in Western Europe. sug-
gesting that the United States was seeking a
strategic treaty at reduced warhead levels and
offering greater stability in a crisis. This, in
turn, should bolster the- determination of the
governments-of West Germany. Britain and Ita-
ly.- where antinuclear protesters seek to delay
or prevent deployment of medium-range mis-
sifes - to proceed with Initial installation in De-
cember if no.arms control agreement covering
such missiles is in sight by then.
Finally, they say that since both the United
States and the Soviet Union will be compelled
over the next decade to restructure their strate-
gic forces because of the mounting vulnerability
of missiles in silos. it Makes sense to provide an
arms control'conte't to limit the size and cost of
the nuclear deployments on each side.
It is understood that most officials involved
in considering a shift in the START position fa-
vor sticking with the 5000-warhead proposal,
while urging that total missile payload or
throw-weight be reduced to less than two mil-
lion kilograms. The Administration had intend-
ed to make a specific payload reduction proposal
in the second phase of its START position.
The Soviets can be expected to object to such
an approach, at least initially, because it would
call for much greater reductions on their part.
Russian land-based and submarine-based mis-
siles with a total payload of 5.5 million kilo-
grams carry about 7500 warheads. By contrast,
US missiles with 2.1 million kilograms of throw-
weight carry about 7200 warheads. Most Soviet
missiles, warheads, guidance packages and oth-
er-payload are much larger than comparable US
systems.
7 However, Soviet military officials have re-
cgntly conceded they expect their missile silos to
become vulnerable to American missiles, such
as the MX and the Trident 2. And they began
te,~st firing in February of a new, solid-fuel mis-
sile that is expected to be deployed on a mobile
launcher, much like the medium-range SS20
rtlissile. -
4 Since it now appears the United States, too,
will probably make a significant part of its
ICBM force mobile, some planners say American
negotiators should urge their Soviet counter-
parts to consider sizable reductions, phased
off er a long period of time as both sides restruc-
ture to more survivable forces.
.; After all, they point out, in the absence of
agreed limits and constraints it is likely both
vuould have to field much larger, costlier forces.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/16: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201040007-7