FORMER CIA CHIEF SUPPORTS ARMS FREEZE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000201040018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 29, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

__ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/16: CIA-RDP9
ARTICLE APPS; R ;i)
ON Pr GE
chief s
Br Mike Feinsilber
7?a; iated I r, s
'WASHINGTON - Former CIA Di-
reror William Colby yesterday en-
dorsed the idea of a 'weapons freeze
between the United States and the
Soviet Union, saying it would pose no
significant danger of undetected So-
viet cheating.
In fact, he said, any nuclear arms
accord with Moscow would make it
"easier rather than harder" to keep
tabs on what the Soviets are doing by
empowering the United States to de?
mand to know the nature of any
suspicious Soviet arms behavior.
And if the Soviets cheated, they
always would have to worry that so
many officials would know of it that
any one of them, repelled by the
threat to world peace, might tell the
West, Colby said.
The former intelligence officer,
who served during the Nixon and
Ford administrations, discussed the
prospects of a verification ' freeze
during a breaksfast meeting here
with reporters.
He said the Soviets could surrepti.
tiously violate an agreement to
freeze the production, deployment or
testing of new nuclear weapons for a
while, but not long enough to endan-
ger U.S. security significantly.
"It is conceivable they can go into
one of those salt mines and produce
something and hammer it out all
very quietly and secretly and nobody
will be able to see it or know about
it," he said.
"But the question has to be asked,
can they do that in a way that has
any strategic significance? And
there I think the answer is basically
no. In other words, successful viola.
tions will almost surely be marginal
in their real effect."
His position on verification differs
from that of the Reagan administra.
tion. In April, a State Department
policy statement said:
0-00806 R000201040018-5
THE PHILADELPHIA IIN"~,UIRER
29 June 1.982
"A freeze on all testing. production
and deployment of nuclear weapons
would include important elements
that cannot be verified. The practical
result is that the United States would
live up to a freeze in all its aspects,
while there would be considerable
doubt that the Soviets would also live
up to it: We simply cannot afford to
base our national security on trust of
the Soviets."
President Reagan opposes a freeze.
but the idea has support in Congress
and was endorsed by the Democrats
last week at their party conference
in Philadelphia. Both the House and
Senate are expected to vote this sum-
mer on resolutions asking Reagan to
propose a freeze to the Soviets as a
first step toward disarmament.
Opponents have raised the ques-
tion of verifying Soviet compliance
as one objection to a freeze. But
Colby argued that a 'freeze treaty
would allow the United States to de-
mand to look into, any suspicious
activities detected by intelligence
means. Without a treat; . he said, the
Soviets can simply say, "That's none
of your business."
Colby said normal CIA intelligence
checks on Soviet corr,rl'ance would
come into play. But in addition, he
said, the Soviets would have to con-
sider whether someone l:nowledee-
able about the cheating would reveal
it.
Colby said U.S. security cannot de-
pend on such an off-chance episode.
But when that possiN..,,,.- is placed
alongside other intelligence-gather-
ing means, he said. it is safe to cor.-
clude that U.S. securitti would' not be
endangered by a freeze agreement or
any other disarmament accord.
He said that either a freeze or an
arms limitation agreement "is ade-
quately verifiable for t'.;c sefcty of
the country and the c ,ance of viola-
tion is minimal."
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/16: CIA-RDP90-00806R000201040018-5