STATE DEPT. AND CIA 'INDULGE THEIR EMPTINESS'

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00806R000201060026-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2010
Sequence Number: 
26
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 23, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00806R000201060026-4.pdf77.19 KB
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STAT ARTICLE APPEARFn ON P The following is excerpted from an April 19 speech by Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R., Wyo.) at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The absence of intellectual and moral principles allows tastes and personal con- siderations to drive American officials into doing some awful things. Today they want to give military aid to the communist gov- ernment of Mozambique to crush a demo- cratic resistance. Today these officials aid Afghanistan's mujahedeen against the So- viets with the same conviction with which they aided the Kurds against Iraq. T y some of the highest officials in the CIA re- joLoice that they are finally rid of the burden of supplying arms to Nic Indeed, for several years they have been discussing with lawmakers who share their tastes at what point they should be "dumped." It is no passion for the Sandin- istas at CIA or State, just a dull desire to rid of the arduous; task of confronting WALL STREET JOURNAL 23 July 1985 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-R D P90-00806 R000201060026-4 State Dept. and CIA `Indulge Their Emptiness' them, and to return to routine. Their "rep- u a on, meaning their ease, represents a higher scale of values than their mission. No wonder that such officials are un- comfortable discussing right and wrong, better and worse as though these terms mean something objectively. Thus last year the CIA refused m request to com- pile sets of unclassified biographies of the Sandinista leaders and of the contras be- cause, responsible o ci a THEY ala not want to be party to a debate about which side in that civil war is inherently preferable! So much for the words of Christ so eroudly carved on the CIA s building: "You shall know the tru and the truth shall make you free." a biogra- phies of the contras finally compiled, I put them into the Congressional Record. This year a few dedicated foreign-service offi- cers expanded the set. But the State De- partment's Bureau of Public Affairs blocked their publication, until pressure from the White House allowed it to pro- ceed. There is no reason for surprise here. If the contras are indeed "our brothers," as President Reagan said, if their cause is ob- jectively better than that of their foes, then the duty we have in their regard is both clear and strict. After all is said and done. we simply cannot allow them to be crushed and the worse side to triumph. At last, then if this be so, there is an objective standard against which the CIA's and the State Departments performance can lUdy&d. That standard makes-rm-p-ossMe accommodation with the Sandinistas. But that standard is inconvenient because liv- ing by it displeases friends of so many high officials. For that reason, such officials describe the world as too complex to be painted black and white. Within a standardless spectrum of gray, they can.indulge their. emptiness. Another manifestation of this emptiness is the ability of so many high of- ficials to- give good causes their due in speech, but to betray them in action. Sec- retary of State George Shultz is as good an example as any of one who rejects the Brezhnev doctrine with eloquent words but has never been known to oppose it with any concrete actions. Such officials have learned from Helmut Sonnenfelt's experi- ence in 1976 that when their words reflect their de facto preference for accommoda- tion with totalitarians, the American politi- cal system will produce a Ronald Reagan who will discredit them before the Ameri- can people, and make it impossible for them to hold public office. So they talk brave talk, formulate half- baked plans, and present them to the Con- gress in ways that subtly signal that they would not be so upset if the Congress dis- approved. Thus they project upon the Con- gress and on the American people their own confusion and lethargy. Thus do they bring out the worst in the Congress. Re- grettably, that is easy to do. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000201060026-4