STATE DEPT. AND CIA 'INDULGE THEIR EMPTINESS'
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00806R000201060026-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2010
Sequence Number:
26
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 23, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Attachment | Size |
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Body:
STAT
ARTICLE APPEARFn
ON P
The following is excerpted from an
April 19 speech by Sen. Malcolm Wallop
(R., Wyo.) at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
The absence of intellectual and moral
principles allows tastes and personal con-
siderations to drive American officials into
doing some awful things. Today they want
to give military aid to the communist gov-
ernment of Mozambique to crush a demo-
cratic resistance. Today these officials aid
Afghanistan's mujahedeen against the So-
viets with the same conviction with which
they aided the Kurds against Iraq. T y
some of the highest officials in the CIA re-
joLoice that they are finally rid of the burden
of supplying arms to Nic
Indeed, for several years they have been
discussing with lawmakers who share their
tastes at what point they should be
"dumped." It is no passion for the Sandin-
istas at CIA or State, just a dull desire to
rid of the arduous; task of confronting
WALL STREET JOURNAL
23 July 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-R
D P90-00806 R000201060026-4
State Dept. and CIA `Indulge Their Emptiness'
them, and to return to routine. Their "rep-
u a on, meaning their ease, represents a
higher scale of values than their mission.
No wonder that such officials are un-
comfortable discussing right and wrong,
better and worse as though these terms
mean something objectively. Thus last
year the CIA refused m request to com-
pile sets of unclassified biographies of the
Sandinista leaders and of the contras be-
cause, responsible o ci a THEY ala
not want to be party to a debate about
which side in that civil war is inherently
preferable! So much for the words of
Christ so eroudly carved on the CIA s
building: "You shall know the tru and
the truth shall make you free." a biogra-
phies of the contras finally compiled, I put
them into the Congressional Record. This
year a few dedicated foreign-service offi-
cers expanded the set. But the State De-
partment's Bureau of Public Affairs
blocked their publication, until pressure
from the White House allowed it to pro-
ceed.
There is no reason for surprise here. If
the contras are indeed "our brothers," as
President Reagan said, if their cause is ob-
jectively better than that of their foes, then
the duty we have in their regard is both
clear and strict. After all is said and done.
we simply cannot allow them to be crushed
and the worse side to triumph. At last,
then if this be so, there is an objective
standard against which the CIA's and the
State Departments performance can
lUdy&d. That standard makes-rm-p-ossMe
accommodation with the Sandinistas. But
that standard is inconvenient because liv-
ing by it displeases friends of so many high
officials.
For that reason, such officials describe
the world as too complex to be painted
black and white. Within a standardless
spectrum of gray, they can.indulge their.
emptiness. Another manifestation of this
emptiness is the ability of so many high of-
ficials to- give good causes their due in
speech, but to betray them in action. Sec-
retary of State George Shultz is as good an
example as any of one who rejects the
Brezhnev doctrine with eloquent words but
has never been known to oppose it with
any concrete actions. Such officials have
learned from Helmut Sonnenfelt's experi-
ence in 1976 that when their words reflect
their de facto preference for accommoda-
tion with totalitarians, the American politi-
cal system will produce a Ronald Reagan
who will discredit them before the Ameri-
can people, and make it impossible for
them to hold public office.
So they talk brave talk, formulate half-
baked plans, and present them to the Con-
gress in ways that subtly signal that they
would not be so upset if the Congress dis-
approved. Thus they project upon the Con-
gress and on the American people their
own confusion and lethargy. Thus do they
bring out the worst in the Congress. Re-
grettably, that is easy to do.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000201060026-4