BEHIND SPY ARREST OF RUSSIANS; CONCERN OVER MISUSE OF U.N.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000201100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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hN PAGE_ _' - -361 - 13 September 1986
Behind Spy Arrest of. Russian:
Concern Over Misuse of U.N.
STAT
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York TImi
WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 - The es-
pionage arrest of a Soviet employee of
the United Nations was carried out for
a number of reasons, including a deci-
sion to confront the Soviet Union over
the use of., the United Nations for
spying, according to Reagan Adminis-
tration officials.
They said other reasons for the deci-
sion to arrest the Russian, Gennadi F.
Zakharov, despite the possibility of'!
Soviet retaliation, included a judgment
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
that he was a relatively minor opera-
tive who could not be turned into a dou-
ble agent or profitably fed false data.
In addition, there was a strong feel-
ing in the Administration that any spy
caught "red handed" should be prose-
cuted, just as morethan a dozen Amer-
icans have in the last year.
Double Agent Involved
The precise timing of the arrest, offi-
cials said, was based on Mr. Zhaka-
roe's requests in early August for clas-
sified information from the double
agent he thought he was using, officials
said.
The arrest was approved at least a
week in advance by the State Depart-
ment and White House, but the move
was made without the advice of some
of the Administration's most senior of-
ficials.
A reconstruction of the events sur-
rounding the case, based on interviews
with dozens of Administration officials,
shows that in mid-August, the F.B.I.'s
request to make the arrest was re-
viewed and approved by such senior of-
ficials as Adm. John M. Poindexter, the
President's national security adviser,
and Michael H. Armacost, the No. 3
man in the State Department.
One official said President Reagan
was also told in advance that an arrest
was expected soon of a Soviet em-
ployee of the United Nations.
But other senior officials were not
consulted in advance about the arrest,
which touched off a major confronta-
tion between Washington and Moscow
when the Soviet Union responded by
bringing espionage charges against
Nicholas S. Daniloff, an American jour-
nalist.
Asked whether the White House had
either approved or taken part in the
decision to arrest the Russian, Donald
T. Regan, the White House Chief of
Staff, said today: "We don't go around
approving what the F.B.I. and the curt,
system do. The courts of the United
States and the prosecutors of the
United States act under the laws of the
United States. The White House hasn't
anything to do with spies and catching
spies. That's not our job."'
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
endorsed the arrest of Mr. Zakharov.
But be said he had not approved it in
advance. "The details of what the
F.B.I. does in the arrest of a particular
individual is typically not racketed
through, every time they do something,
the entire hierarchy of Government,"
said.
Administration officials said F.B.I.
arrests of Soviet nationals must always
be approved, in advance, at high levels
of the State Department and the White
House. In this case, officials said, Mr.
Zakharov's arrest was approved in
mid-August without significant inter-
nal AdmWstrration expert on Soviet
affairs, who was not involved in the
case, speculated that the vacation
schedules of Mr. Shultz and others
might have been one reason Mr. Zakha-
row's arrest was approved with so little
debate. "It was a typical late-August
decision," he said. "Look around,
where were the debaters? They were
out of town on vacation."
Misread Moscow#$ m2nd
But other officials said the der!islon
reflected longstanding Administration
policies, although they acknowledge
now that they underestimated Mos-
cow's willingness to chill the entire
range of superpower relations in its ef-
forts to assist an accused spy.
Administration officials said foreign
policy questions such as the planned
summit meeting between Mr. Reagan
and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet
leader, were weighed in the decision to
arrest Mr. Zakharov.
"Of course, thought was.given to the ;
foreign policy considerations," a State
Department official said. "Every per-
son involved in these kinds of decisions
knows that there are always conse-
quences and that there's a possibility of
retaliation. That isn't to say that any-
one predicted what would happen."
The officials said they did not con-
sider handling the case quietly, without
a prosecution, by expelling Mr. Zakha-
rov from the country. They said that
since two Soviet employees of the
United Nations were arrested, con-
victed and imprisoned in 1978 under
the Carter Administration, the F.B.I.
has not quietly resolved or ignored any
similar case in which prosecution could
have been brought The two Russians 1
were eventually traded for five Soviet
dissidents.
American officials said that although
they expected a Soviet response they
were surprised when Soviet agents en-
trapped and arrested Mr. Daniloff in
Moscow.
Over the next two weeks, high-level
officials at first took a hard line, ar-
guing that' Mr. Zakharov should not
even be granted a release on bond until
Mr. Daniloff was returned to the
United States. One senior official said
early in the confrontation: "In the past,
we gave them the signal that we are
soft on this syndrome. We want them to
understand, we won't do it."
In the face of an unbending Soviet
position, however, the Administration's
position shifted, and it was announced
today that the two men would be re-
leased to the custody of their ambassa
dors. Some involved said there had
been a growing feeling that the issues
of principle and precedent involved in
the Zakharov case paled in comparison
with the need to preserve chances for
diplomatic initiatives like the summit
'm
aAnlysts and experts on Soviet af-
fairs inside and outside the Adminis-
tration said the arrest of Mr. Zakharov
and its aftermath demonstrated the ex-
tent to which the two nations are un-
able to forecast the behavior of the
other, despite decades of experience.
Soviet analysts said it was not sur-
prising that the Moscow would view the
arrest as a provocation, particularly
since Mr. Zakharov had been dealing
with an agent controlled by the F.B.I.
for nearly three years.
They said the espionage charges
against Mr. Danlloff followed a pattern
of arresting Americans in retaliation.
In the 1978 prosecution of the two
Soviet employees of the United Na-
tions, for instance, Moscow, arrested an
American businessman, who was freed
only when the accused Russians were
released on bond to their ambassador.
The Soviet, in turn, appears to have
underestimated the anger in the Ad-
ministration over the use of the United
Nations as an espionage outpost and
over the entrapment of Mr. Daniloff.
"The Soviets are very bad at predict-
ing American reactions," a Govern-
ment expert said. "They look at past
performance and assume that this how
things will go again, which totally mis-
reads the American psychology, which
is to. take a lot of crap and then blow
up"
American officials have concluded
STAT
Wrntinued
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that the Russians were planning t07
stage an incident in retaliation almeel"
immediately after Mr. Zakharov's ar-'
rest. They disclosed that shortly after-
the arrest in New York, the American -
Embassy in Moscow received from a Soviet citizenoffering call
informs-
tion. The offer was rebuffed, and the'
embassy refused to send a diplomat to-
meet the potential source.
Administration officials now speaa-
late that Mr. Daniloff s arrest might
'have been a "second choice" that wasr
hastily arranged after Soviet agents;
fail ":V to lure an American diplomat
into a compromising situation.
A broad range of Administration offi-
cials at the White House, State Depart-
ment and Justice Department said one
of the key factors in their final ap,
proval of the arrest was longs
concern over the Soviet Union's use of .
United Nations employees for intelli.
gence gathering.
That position, officials said, pro-
ceeded from Mr. Reagan's personal
view. The officials. said the President,
believed that spy cases should be.
prosecuted vigorously whenever they'
occurred, whatever was going on in
American-Soviet relations on other
fronts.
Began Nearly 4 Years Age
The case against Mr. Zakharov, a,
physicist, had its beginnings nearly
four years ago when he came to New-
I York as a scientific officer in the
United Nations Center for Science and
Technology Development.
According to the F.B.I., in April 1983;
Mr. Zakharov went to the campus of
Queens College and approached a Spy'
dent who has been - identified only by
the code name "Barg." Officials have
said Birg is a permanent resident alien
of Guyanese descent who is in his mid- '
20's.
Birg reported the contact to the
F.B.I. and was immediately enlisted as
a double agent. At his second meeting,.
he received an unspecified amount of-
money from Mr. Zakharov, and over.,
the next two years, the two men met re
peatedly. Mr. Zakharov paid Birg to
steal unclassified microfiche on com-
puters, robotics and artificial intelli-
gence from various libraries, the F.B.I.'
Administration officials disclosed
that at the same time Mr. Zakhar
was meeting with Birg, he was also'
trying to develop other Americans as
sources of information, some of whom
were also working as double agents for
the F.B.I.
' Not all the contacts conthwed. In ens.
instance, a double agent who had vohm., .
teered to work with Mr. Zakharov
out because his role was
summa' Admin-
bec.tton too titims said.
Istra January 1985, after Birg gradu-
aated from d him college, Mr. Zakharov en-
with i
high technology comp for a job a paid
o have ~R andh pd
professional rftumds pre-
pared Mr. Zakharov, according to the
F.B.I., also offered to pay for his gradu-
ate education.
A year ago, Birg took a job with a
company in Queens that manufactures
components for military aircraft en-
gines. In January of this year, Mr. Zak-
harov asked Birg to photocopy the first
few pages of operating manuals for his
company's tphave autd Blrg th that "their
relationship was no longer as innocent
as it had been previously." the F.B.I.
said in its affadavit.
Case Takes a New Turn
According to Administration offi-
cials, the F.B.I. agents managing the
case in New York were convinced that
Mr. Zakharov could well violate Amer-
ican espionage laws. F.B.I. headquar-
ters was notified that the cast had
taken a new turn.
It was at this point that Mr. Zakharev
began to verge over the boundaries Of
what some officials call the "rules of
the game" as they are tacitly under-
stood by American and Soviet intelU-
gence services.
As an employee of the United Na-
tions, Mr. Zakharov held limited diplo-
matic immunity, meaning that she
could not be prosecuted for his official
activities. He was, however, otherwise
subject to American espionage laws.
Generally, Soviet nationals like Mr.
Zakharov who lack immunity are used
as "spotters," according to intelligence
sources. They identify potential
sources of information,, nd then leave
the actual passing of 'Information to
diplomats, whe hold immunity.
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