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Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Sept.- Nov. 1983 Vol. 8 No.1 $2. THE MAGAZINE FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED TO KNOW Secret Documents on South Africa South African soldiers receiving combat training near Johannesburg. Also in this issue: Atomic Veterans ? Eyewitness Afghanistan ? "Yellow Rain" ? CIA in Chad ? Pershing II ? U.S. Naval Buildup in Pacific ? Northern Ireland ? Thatcher Arms Pinochet Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Counterspy Statement of Purpose The United States emerged from World War II as the world's dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. government created a variety of in- stitutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these institutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systematically violated the funda- mental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947. Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in creating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporations-intelligence agency link- ups, and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view is that while CIA operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand in a complex web of interference and control. Our motivation for publishing Counterspy has been two-fold; ? People in the United States have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their government's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend themselves and most effectively change the'institutions. ? People in other countries, often denied access to information, can better protect their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information. Counterspy encourages the use of its articles in not- or-profit publications. Other publications interested in reprinting Counter- spy must request permission in writing. All reprints of Counterspy must be credited and include Counterspy's address. Similarly, researchers and journalists using documents originally obtained by Counterspy must credit Counterspy magazine. Counterspy is available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR, Ann Arbor, MI 48106; or 30-32 Mortimer St., Dept. PR, London W19 7RA, England. Counterspy is indexed in Alternative Press Index, P.O. Box 7229, Baltimore Md 21218. Attention Subscribers If your label reads "R81" or "L81," this is your last issue of Counterspy. Please renew right away -- don't miss a single issue. Attention prisoner subscribers: Subscriptions to prisoners will remain free of charge. However, we are asking prisoners to renew their subscriptions. If your label reads "FP81" please renew to let us know that you have been getting Counterspy and wish to receive it in the future. Address changes: When notifying Counterspy of a change of address, please include your old label. NOW AVAILABLE: Reprint from Counterspy U.S. NUCLEAR THREATS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 50c each for 1-4 copies; 40(~, each for 5-25 copies; 30t each for 26-99 copies; 20( each for 100 or more copies. Add $1.00 postage for first 20 copies, and 50(~ for each additional 100 copies. For sample, send SASE (37C postage) to Counterspy, P.O. Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Konrad Ege John Kelly Dr. Walden Bello Congressional Lobby Director, Philippine Support Committee Dr. Robin Broad Economist John Cavanagh Economist Dr. Noam Chomsky Professor at MIT, Peace Activist Dr. Joshua Cohen .Assistant Professor, MIT Ruth Fitzpatrick Member, Steering Commit- tee of the Religious Task Force on Central America Dr. Laurie Kirby Professor, City University of New York Tamar Kohns Political Activist Annie Makhijani Chemistry Student Dr. Arjun Makhijani Consultant on energy and economic development Martha Wenger Office Worker, Counterspy's copy editor [Organizations for identification only] Cover Design: Johanna Vogelsang Counterspy magazine P.O. Box 647 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 X-523 in 4 10 14 35 46 Contents News NOT in the News GAO Censors for Israel ... U.S. Army Will Evacuate Pets in Case of War ... Nuclear Weapons Not All That Dangerous, Army Says .. . Thatcher Arms Pinochet ... CIA Keeps Its Man in Power in Chad ... First Strike MX Missiles CIA War in Central America DIA Report Shows Reagan Lies About Nicaragua Eden Pastora Unmasked as Long-Time U.S. Agent Israeli Militarization of Costa Rica Features Atomic Veterans: Victims of U.S. Nuclear War Strategy by Arjun Makhijani and Annie Makhijani The Reagan Naval Buildup: Preparing for War in the Pacific by Walden Bello, Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky Caution, Yellow Rainmakers at Work by Martha Wenger Growing Supergrass: The New British Strategy for Northern Ireland by Kathleen O'Neal British Intelligence Manipulates the News by Morris Riley General Claims U.S. Plans for "Limited" Nuclear War Secret Documents on South Africa itimate Embraces: The IMF and South Africa by John Kelly U.S. Consulate: Labor Repression Increasing in South Africa Eyewitness Afghanistan The First Two Years: From Revolution to the "Dark Night" A Political Solution? Rebel Defections and Negotiations by Konrad Ege The Reforms CIA Aid to the Rebels Who Are the Rebel Leaders? Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 News NOT in the News ,GAO Censors for -I sra e l The CIA believes that U.S. arms sales to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries could "exacerbate Israeli concerns about the Arab threat and could foster Israeli preemptive attacks in future crises." But the CIA apparently didn't want the public to know that, because its comments and many other portions of text were deleted from a new General Accounting Office report, "U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel." This censored GAO report was released publicly on June 24, 1983, almost three months after it was completed and distributed within the government. Subsequently, the American Arab Anti- Discrimination Committee (ADC) in Washington, D.C. released an uncensored draft of the document. The uncensored version illustrates that the deletions were not made to hide U.S. military secrets, but because they are, in the words of the ADC, a "damning indictment of both the United States and Israel." According to the ADC, the censored segments of the General Accounting Office report are significant because "they tell the story of how the; United States has... allowed Israel to order whatever mix of economic and military assistance it chooses at the expense of America's unemployed, poor and elderly." The secret segments of the GAO study reveal that: ? According to the CIA, "Israeli expectations are that the United States will fund half of its defense budget. Israeli documents show that U.S. assistance funded 37 percent of its defense budget for fiscal year 1982." ? The Pentagon believes that Israel is "overemphasizing" the Arab threat. The Pentagon also told the GAO investigators that "Israeli force modernization can be met at levels of $1.4 billion annually whereas Israel believes it needs higher levels of military assistance." ? In spite of their assessment that $1.4 billion is sufficient, the State Department and the, Pentagon will increase military aid to Israel because, they say, "it is not politically possible 4'-- CawiteJcapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 to submit to the Congress a lower [ Foreign Military Sales] figure than that for the previous fiscal year." The U.S. is also prepared to increase aid to Israel when significant sales of military equipment are made to Arab countries, as it did when the AWACS radar and surveillance planes were sold to Saudi Arabia. ? U.S. officials acknowledge that although the Arms Control Act provides for sanctions against a country which uses U.S. arms for offensive purposes, it has no intention of applying them to Israel. ? Israeli officials say "the Lebanon campaign will not result in any increase in aid requested from the United States," according to the public version 'of the GAO report. The next sentence - deleted - tells a different story: "However, there is a substantial foreign exchange component directly related to these activities [Israel's invasion of Lebanon] which increases Israel's balance of payments deficit. This increase to Israel's foreign exchange needs can have an effect on its request for ESF," or Economic Support Funds. ? Israeli military strategists have contingency plans for attacks against all Arab states, including Israel's "peace treaty" partner, Egypt. ? The CIA reports that Israel could make up for its $1.2 billion budget deficit by cutting its domestic programs and imports or by using foreign exchange reserves rather than seeking a further increase in U.S. assistance. ? Israel is facing a severe cash flow problem because grace periods for repayment of loans are ending and debt service payments to the United States will increase sharply over the next ten years. ? "The gap in Israel's civilian imports over exports will worsen dramatically in the next few years...Its military deficit will also grow," and it will "grow substantially if the Israelis move to replace equipment lost or damaged during the Lebanon campaign." The "financial gap," says the GAO report, "will probably force the Israelis to press for additional U.S. aid," or, as an alternative, to implement domestic austerity programs. But "Israeli policymakers prefer to make up this difference through increased U.S. aid." ? Giving money to Israel to alleviate its debt Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 problem will not help the U.S. economy. U.S. officials quoted in the GAO study say that the U.S. budget deficit will increase if the U.S. seeks to alleviate Israel's debt repayment problem by writing off Israel's military sales loans or increasing the amount of new loans. a Copies of the uncensored version of the General Accounting Office report, "U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel" are available from the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1731 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. $2.00. W You Can Take Your Pet in Case of War "It Will Be Done" proclaims the title of a U.S. Army pamphlet describing evacuation procedures for "noncombatant U.S. citizens" in West Germany in case of war and other "emergency situations." The "Noncombatant Evacuation Order" obtained by Counterspy provides for the evacuation of some 160,000 Americans living in Central Germany. The document is not classified, but it emphasizes that this "pamphlet does contain sensitive data that should be disseminated on a NEED TO KNOW basis." Disclosure of evacuation plans to "unauthorized persons" (such as West German citizens), "could jeopardize your safety," the pamphlet warns. "A sudden surge in discussion of evacuation plans could make local national officials and the general public apprehensive concerning U.S. intent to defend Europe." The Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) tries very hard to strike an optimistic tone. Everything will be done. The old, the sick, and pregnant women will be evacuated first. All families will stay together no matter what. Transport to the airport will run smoothly; the West German government will use its traffic computers to keep the roads open for the departing Americans. You'll even be able to evacuate your pet, including, the pamphlet stresses, your "pet snake" -- if you have a container. Why? "To some disposition of pets is an emotional issue.... In case of emergency evacuation, noncombatants are expected to be stretched to a highly tense state. They cannot be allowed to tip over into an uncontrollable state of hysteria" by not being allowed to take their pets. So even though it's a hassle from a "military point of view," you can take your pet. There is just one condition: "One must understand that pets will not take a scat away from a person." Even the most optimistic Army planners concede that there are two situations in which the evacuation procedures might not work: if all the airports are closed and travel by road and rail is impossible, or in case of a massive nuclear strike. What is to be done then? The Noncombatant Evacuation Order pamphlet has answers. In the first situation, the "NEO warden [will] form noncombatants in a column of two's, order 'follow me,' and lead the families westward." The NEO pamphlet sternly continues: "This is not a joke." But, in case of a massive nuclear strike, the Army runs out of bright ideas: Stay at' home and "be prepared to weather the storm." rm THE ARMY INSTITUTE FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT Fort Eustis,Virginia NUCLEAR WEAPONS FUNDAMENTALS Nuclear Weapons Not All That Dangerous, Says Army The U.S. Army wants to make sure that its corps of officers - any one of whom can initiate the process which results in nuclear weapons use - is prepared to deal with nuclear war. To reach that goal, the Army Institute for Professional Development in Fort Eustis, Virginia, has Counterspy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 developed an Army Correspondence Course on "Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals" (Subcourse ISO216, 1979). After completing the course, officers are tested with a 30-question, multiple choice exam. Since "to err is human," only 21 correct answers (70 percent) are required to pass the course. And, mercifully, there is no time limit for completing the test. Students are even invited to re-consult the text before answering a question. The "Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals" course begins with the instruction: "Your greatest responsibility will be to instill in your subordinates a sense of confidence in their ability to survive a nuclear attack." The following 100 pages are geared to instill just that confidence. A nuclear attack might not be that dangerous after all: . ? "Anything that provides protection from the sun will also provide protection from thermal radiation." ? "Dense materials, such as lead and iron, offer excellent protection against gamma rays. Soil provides fair protection against neutrons." ? "Beta particles are not hazardous unless they enter the body through ingestion. inhalation or open wounds." ? After a nuclear attack, due to fallout, "all dust and dirt must -be removed from under the fingernails, and from the hair. All exposed skin surfaces and the head should be washed, or at least wiped clean with a damp cloth. As soon as the tactical situation permits, individuals should bathe thoroughly, and change all clothing." ? "Normally, troops in vehicles may pass through the point of ground zero [the point of the nuclear detonation, or in case of airburst, right below the detonation] and foot troops may pass within 300 meters of ground zero within one-half hour after the detonation without undue risk to personnel." The "Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals" correspondence course stresses that it is important to follow all these and other directives. "A well-trained individual who observes the protective measures established can survive on the nuclear battlefield," it claims. by Robert Cavanagh r r r r r r =J r r r r r r f ==i r r r r r- Thatcher Arms Pinochet British Prime Minister 'Margaret Thatcher is sending thank you notes to Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for the aid he gave Britain during that country's 1982 war against Argentina 6 -- Couwte hpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. These "thank you's" include sales of planes, helicopters, a Magnox nuclear power reactor, and some 300 tons of natural uranium. With these supplies, Chile will have sufficient plutonium to build dozens of nuclear bombs by the end of the decade. During the war, to ensure that the Chilean government would allow British surveillance equipment and aircraft to operate from that country, Margaret Thatcher struck a deal with the junta. On April 24, 1982, just as Secretary of State Alexander Haig's shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires was collapsing, a Flying Tigers Boeing 747 took off from the British Air Base Brize Norton in Oxfordshire. Its cargo: six Hawker Hunter fighter planes from the Royal Air Force for delivery to Chile. Pinochet was anxious to replenish his Hawker Hunter contingent which a 1973 British Labor government-imposed embargo on military goods to Chile had long prevented. The Hawker Hunters are of little value in the European high- technology weapons arsenal, but for Chile, they are essential for carrying out "ground attack and close support" maneuvers. It was the Hawker. Hunters that bombed the Presidential Palace in September 1973 when Pinochet seized power. Since the April 24 shipment, British arms sales to Chile have greatly increased. Said former Foreign Secretary Francis Pym: "Chile was quite helpful to us in the Falklands conflict, and we ought to bear that in mind when we consider our relations with her now." Britain has sent additional Hawker Hunters, Canberra reconnaissance planes, and spare parts. Exactly what the British government is shipping to Chile is becoming harder and harder to determine: the Chilean Air Force has been allotted an exclusive fenced-in cargo area - free of charge - at the British Luton airport. The British troops occupying the Falklands/Malvinas are linked to Britain only by aerial and naval transport via Ascension Island, some 2000 miles distant. Clearly, Britain needs an ally closer by. Chile is an ideal candidate. It has a long-standing territorial conflict with Argentina over the Beagle Channel Islands at the tip of South America, and the Pinochet regime wants British equipment to prepare for war against Argentina. In 1980, such a war seemed imminent when both the Chilean and Argentinian dictators moved troops to their common border. The British government also knows that arming Pinochet will keep the Argentine military pre- occupied with the "Chilean threat" and prevent it from contemplating action against the British occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas. Arms sales are only part of Britain's This article is an expanded version of Dieter Maier, "Atombombe fuer Pinochet?" which appeared in the West German monthly, links, May 1983. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 w _ increasingly close relationship with Chile. The British government is already negotiating with the Pinochet regime for base rights in Chile. The Chilean Air Force has also gotten British pilots to train its crews; this secret arrangement was revealed only when a British pilot was killed in a plane crash in Chile in early 1983. Nor has Margaret Thatcher gone out of her way to publicize the nuclear deal with Chile. In September 1982, British trade minister Peter Rees visited Chile with several British nuclear industry officials in tow. Rees praised the Pinochet regime as a "moderating and stabilizing force" with which Britain was interested in "strengthening political relations." His visit was reciprocated several months later, when the president and executive director of Chile's Comision Chilena de Energia Nuclear, Lt. Gen. Herman Brady and Col. Juan Mir arrived in London. (Brady was one of the leading generals .involved in the September 1973 coup.) The two Chilean officers and British government officials agreed that Britain would sell the Magnox reactor to Chile, along with 300 tons of natural uranium. Chilean nuclear engineers and reactor operators are to be trained in England, and British officials have assured the Chileans that the reactor could be completed within five years. Chile's nuclear energy ambitions go back to the 1960s, when the Christian Democratic government bought two experimental reactors from Britain, one of them under civilian, the other under military control. The Chilean military had apparently decided early on that it wanted to preserve a "nuclear option" for itself without any interference from civilians. During the years of the Salvador Allende government (1970-73), Chile's nuclear program was virtually at a standstill. But only a year after the coup, the first controlled chain reaction took place in one of the reactors, reportedly with the assistance of West German engineers. Chile's nuclear scientist Igor Saavedra is said to have commented that Chile was now in a position to build nuclear weapons. Saavedra no. doubt had gotten somewhat carried away by the excitement - it takes years to move from the first controlled chain reaction to building a nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, General Contreras Fischer, then- chief of the nuclear energy commission, stated that the ultimate purpose of the nuclear program was to build nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the artificially created economic "boom years" in the mid-1970s prompted exaggerated government calculations for Chile's energy needs, and the construction of a nuclear reactor was said to be the answer to this energy problem. These dreams were shortlived: Chile's "economic boom" of rapid economic growth turned sour, and the atomic energy commission declared in 1980 that construction of a nuclear reactor would not begin before 1985. At the same time, the government started two large dam projects in order to take care of Chile's energy needs. (Some two-thirds of Chile's electricity is generated through hydro power.) As the economic justification for a nuclear reactor evaporated in the late 1970s, the military desire for atomic weapons grew. Neighboring Argentina was quite open about its intention to use its nuclear technology - supplied primarily by West Germany and Canada - to build nuclear weapons. Chilean-Argentinian tensions increased and brought the two countries to the brink of war. For the Chilean generals, the situation was clear: in order to keep up their side of the arms race with Argentina, they had to get their own nuclear weapons. The Falklands/Malvinas war provided an excellent opportunity to advance toward this goal. Chile was the only country in South America to side with the British, which resulted in a de facto military alliance between the two countries. Today, Britain is supplying arms and nuclear technology to a junta whose internal problems could lead it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. Pinochet's economic policy has cul- minated in disaster, popular opposition to the generals is growing, and Pinochet now faces opposition even from the rightwing. Such a government, completely isolated from its people and unable to stop its own disintegration might be tempted to drop a nuclear bomb on its external "enemies." (This holds true for Chile's adversary, the Argentine junta, as well.) Once the British reactor in Chile is Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 7 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 completed, the building of nuclear weapons could proceed fairly rapidly and without any possibility of outside intervention since the Chilean junta has an internal uranium supply over which it exercises complete control: the Chuquicamata mine produces some 40 to 60 tons of uranium a year. r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r CIA Keeps its Man in Power in Chad The Reagan CIA has helped to bring about at least one successful coup, and the administration is now spending millions of dollars to prop up the ruler it helped bring to power: Hissene Habre of Chad. Habre's forces entered the Chadian capital of N'djamena on June 7, 1982, and overthrew the National Transition Government of Goukouni Oueddi. CBS News has now confirmed that Habre's forces were backed by the CIA, which supplied at least arms and training. The operation is reported to have cost the CIA $10 million. (See Jeff McConnell, "U.S. Responsible for Famine in Chad," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1.) Reagan authorized yet another $10 million out of his "discretionary fund" (which requires no Congressional approval) for an airlift to Habre in July 1983, to strengthen him against attacks from exile forces in northern Chad loyal to the former government. These exile forces have been receiving help from Libya and would be friendly to Libya should they be victorious. Reagan informed Congress that he was supporting Habre because of "massive" Libyan support for the exile forces which have captured key northern towns and are engaging Habre's forces in heavy fighting 8 -- Countet6py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 as they move toward the capital in the south. Some of the U.S. money will also go to the more than 1,000 Zairian troops in Chad which have been there since early July 1983 to back up Habre. This is the second time the Zairian military is playing a key role in Chad. In late 1981, troops from Zaire, as well as Senegal and Nigeria, entered Chad as a "peacekeeping force" sponsored by France and the United States. Its stated purpose was to prevent further fighting between Habre, then trying to overthrow Goukouni's government, and forces loyal to Goukouni. It was a strange peacekeeping force: Prior to their movement into Chad, the Zairian government had publicly sided with Habre, and Zairian troops were reported actually to be assisting Habre's forces. Moreover, in coordination with the U.S., Zaire's contingent remained in Chad an extra month after Habre's victory, and after the Senegalese and Nigerian troops had left, to help Habre consolidate his hold over the country. At the moment, Egypt and Sudan, the other principal allies of the U.S. in the region, apparently are not involved directly in the fighting. There is evidence, though, that the CIA operation against Chad to overthrow Goukouni Oueddi was carried out in collaboration with Egypt. Western diplomats in Africa report that many of the weapons Habre used in the earlier fighting were supplied by Egypt, whose arsenals were then replenished by the United States. Habre's forces kicked off a major offensive against Goukouni's National Transition Gov- ernment in late summer of 1981, soon after they received a large airlift of supplies from Egypt. This airlift apparently was carried out in conjunction with the CIA. President Jaafar Numeiri of Sudan assisted as well, by permitting Habre's forces to use Sudanese territory as sanctuary and by providing logistical support through Sudanese military officers. The CIA operation in Chad began early in 1981 just after Ronald Reagan took office. Libyan troops had entered Chad in December 1980 at the request of Chadian President Goukouni Oueddi, and stayed there for about one year. The CIA reportedly told the U.S. Congress that the purpose of the operation against Chad was to punish Libya for assisting the National Transition Government. This CIA operation, however, was only one small part of a much larger CIA-sponsored campaign against Libya set in motion at this time. The purpose of this campaign was to isolate and destabilize Libya, thereby either reducing its influence or bringing to power an entirely different government more to the liking of Ronald Reagan. Besides the Chad operation, parts of this campaign included: ? A plan to provide financial support for anti-Libyan political figures in Mauritius. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 ? Collaboration with Libyan exiles to form a "Libyan Liberation Front" in Somalia and Egypt. ? An Africa-wide anti-Libya propaganda campaign. ? Increased CIA and Pentagon presence in North Africa. ? Military pressures on Libya's borders. ? Disruption of Libyan oil sales. ? Fostering divisions within the Organization of African Unity to thwart Muammar Qaddafi's succession to the chairpersonship. ? Talks with the French government of Giscard d'Estaing, reported by Time, over cooperation in a plot, to be carried out by Libyan exiles, to assassinate Qaddafi. Chad was thus a "sideshow" in relation to the Reagan administration's main event against Libya. But the costs to the Chadian people were enormous. Thousands died of starvation after Habre destroyed the crops and livestock of those judged to be supporters of Goukouni Oueddi. Hundreds more were executed after Habre came to power. U.S. officials now claim that the CIA did not intend for Habre to overthrow the National Transition Government. But this claim is suspect. CIA support for Habre continued for a time after the Libyan troops protecting the Goukouni government had left Chad, and support from Egypt and Sudan, with whom the CIA had been working, also continued. And later, once Habre's victory was assured, Egypt and the U.S. reportedly airlifted arms into Chad to make sure he held on to power. Although they claim it was "unexpected," U.S. officials were very encouraged by Habre's victory and are unlikely to allow him to lose power without another fight. And while fighting continues in Chad, the CIA is engaged, according to Newsweek, in paramilitary operations in at least ten other countries. Chad may have seen the CIA's first coup under Reagan, but nobody in his administration intends for it to be the last. by Je{y{y McConnell rr-r-rrrrrrrrr-rrr-rrrrr-rr- First Strike MX Missiles Representatives of the peace movement have argued for years that the MX intercontinental nuclear missiles (dubbed "peacekeepers" by Ronald Reagan) are first strike weapons. Support for that argument that the Reagan administration's MX deployment plan is geared towards achieving a first strike capability now comes from an unexpected source: Brent hazardous to your planet. Scowcroft, chairperson of Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces. Scowcroft doesn't admit it publicity. He still sticks to the administration line, claiming that by deploying "just" 100 MX missiles -- which is what Reagan says publicly he wants to do -- the U.S. will not achieve "a full first strike capability against Soviet weapons and leadership targets." Only the deployment of 200 to 250 missiles would do that, Scowcroft says. As it turns out, this is exactly what a secret Air Force document, the Program Objectives Memorandum proposes. (It is "designed to guide Air Force budgeting and planning for the five fiscal years 1985 to 1989.") The memorandum speaks of the 100 MX slated for deployment now as only a first stage, and describes a "phase 3 follow-on deployment of the MX." Phase 3 would involve stationing another 100 MX missiles, bringing the total to 200 -- the exact number Scowcroft has said is minimally necessary to achieve a "full first strike capability." (Sources: Washington Post, 6/17/83, p.A-18; 7/2/83, p.A-7.) Coun.teAopy -- Seri.-Ncev. 0. \- Dritte-Welt-Politik der CDU/CSU (April 1983) ? J- sa`'~ ~-r die Folgen (Mai 1983) ElaasibeM 2,00 00; JaIreube 20,- DM; as 10 Ea. 27% Erra0010880 Cowiie.n.apy Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 45 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan Ed. note: Konrad Ege is one of the few Western journalists to travel inside Afghanistan in recent years without linking up with any of the Pakistan- based rebel groups. In May 1983, he spent two weeks in the capital city of Kabul and surrounding areas. He spoke with many people in the street, as well as government officials, members of the People's Democratic Party, people involved in the women's movement and the youth organization, and a former rebel commander. This unique opportunity afforded new insights on the military situation and the prospects for a political solution to the conflict. For those unfamiliar with the history of Afghanistan and the events of the last few years, we include both a chronology and the following explanation of how the present government of Babrak Karmal came to power. This is followed by two reports about Konrad Ege's recent trip: one on the military situation and the prospects for peace, and one on the government's reforms. A final article gives a brief overview of the history of CIA operations in Afghanistan -- the present CIA campaign to aid the Pakistan-based rebels certainly rivals the CIA's operations to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nica- ragua. a The First Two Years From Revolution to the "Dark Night" After decades of rule by kings and a few years of dictatorship, a progressive force took power in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978: the People's Democratic Party (PDP). It was a small party at the time and if not for the extraordinary events of that month it probably would never have chosen to stage an uprising at that moment in history. These are the events that led up to the PDP takeover: On April 18, the repressive government of Mohammed Daoud, working closely with the then-Shah of Iran's secret police, saw to it that a prominent PDP leader, Mir Akbar Khyber, was killed. His funeral turned into a mass demonstration against the government, and Daoud's police responded by arresting, all party leaders. Daoud's move forced the party to choose between risking long-term imprisonment or death for its entire leadership, or using party members in the army to stage an insurrection. 46 -- Coun.tet6py -- Sept.-Nova 1983 by Konrad Ege The party, which had been organizing since 1965, decided to take power. Party members in the Army captured the important government buildings, including the Presidential Palace. The fighting between the insurrectionists and the forces loyal to Daoud was brief, but Daoud was killed when he refused to surrender. Few people mourned the old regime: when Daoud himself had overthrown King Zahir Shah in 1973, he had promised far-reaching reforms which never materialized and Daoud turned out to be a repressive one-man ruler. Only a few wealthy businessmen and feudal landlords felt the loss. Almost immediately, some of these men moved to Pakistan and called on people to rise up against the new "godless regime." Their calls remained unanswered for months. From the very beginning, the PDP government led by President Noor Mohammed Taraki and Prime Minister Babrak Karmal was confronted Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100130005-8 r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r_r r r r r r r r with formidable problems. It could not rely on the existing bureaucracy to implement its far- reaching reforms - land reform, promotion of equal rights for men and women, abolition of usury, establishment of trade unions, indus- trialization of the country, a literacy campaign - and lacked sufficient cadres of its own to run the government offices. In 1978, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries on earth. A feudal economic and social structure kept many peasants dependent on a few landlords, and the country had no industry to speak of. Medical care, especially in the countryside, was almost nonexistent, and some 95 percent of the population was illiterate. Some areas of the country had never been "governed" by any central government; tribal leaders there resisted any government intervention. Lack of unity in the party compounded the problems of the PDP government. A longstanding rift between its factions (Khalq and Parcham) which had been patched over before the April takeover, once again split open. The Khalqis, led by Taraki, advocated a rapid implementation of reforms, apparently believing that a "socialist" state could be created within years. The Parchamis wanted first to establish a national )A_."ALA-YI-NA HERA 7- 0 HERAT / NIMROZ 1?ZARANJ i Q LASHKAR GAH ?n MAZAR 1- L SHARIF democratic government under the leadership of the PDP to unite the peasants, workers, artisans, small merchants, clergy and progressive in- tellectuals. The Parchamis lost out: they were ousted from responsible government positions in the summer of 1978, and the Khalqis under President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, took complete control. Up to this point, the government had enjoyed a degree of popular support, or at least could count on a "wait and see" attitude of many Afghans. Significant resistance came from the former elite, namely the landlords whose holdings were threatened by the land reform. Today, these people, such as Sayed Ahmad Gailani, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Sebgatullah Mujadidi and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are the leaders of the "mujahidin" ("holy warriors") in Peshawar, Pakistan, who are highly praised in the U.S. media. They are the rebels who have been receiving millions of dollars from the United States and other countries to wage their war. Soon, however, Taraki's methods of conducting reforms also began to create opposition among the intended beneficiaries of the reforms. Some of these mistakes can be attributed to ignorance: it was a young, inexperienced government. Land Kun?UZ KUNDUI BAGHIA FAQASAO j BAOAKHSNAN TuG 3 IBBAK ? 2 BAMIYAN BAMIYAN BAGHLAN CHARIKASM KABUL' WgRDAK BARAKI B, URUZ(;AN ?L~ Eyewitness Afghanistan AWNAR) ?GARDEZ 50 100 150 200 MI. 100 260 300 KM Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 47 CHAKHCHARAN 1O OAND HAR Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan -rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr~re-~_. reform officials, for instance, often were not sufficiently familiar with the local situation and in some cases expropriated land from tribal leaders whom they considered to be wealthy landlords. In reality, these leaders often were not "feudal" landlords. Instead, they enjoyed a prominent position based on other social or religious factors. Taking their land away led to considerable resentment. At times, land was given to peasants without sufficiently taking into account such factors as the availability of seed and water. o The government began to resort to force to push through these reforms, apparently in the belief that once accomplished, the reforms would increase popular support. Yet even after it had become obvious that the strategy was not working, the Khalq government stuck to its tactics. This led to disagreements within the party and to popular resistance - people began to thke up arms. At the same time, the Chronology 1919: King Amanullah's rule begins. He tries to institute liberal reforms, proclaims full independence and turns to the Soviet Union with a request for aid. In response, the British invade Afghanistan; Afghan troops defeat them and force Britain to sign a truce. 1929: Amanullah is forced to abdicate because of reactionary resistance to his reforms. 1933: Amanullah's successor is killed; Zahir Shah becomes king. 1953: Mohammed Daoud, a relative of the royal family, is appointed prime minister. 1955: Afghanistan refuses to join the U.S.-sponsored Baghdad Pact. 1963: Daoud resigns. 1964: New constitution is drafted, but political parties remain outlawed. 1965: The People's Democratic Party (PDP) is formed as an underground organization. 1965: First general elections, only, scant participation in the countryside. Both Babrak Karmal (today President) and Anahita Ratebzad (today President of the Democratic Women's Organization and a member of the Revolutionary Council) win seats in. the parliament. Student demonstrations in Kabul opposing conservative cabinet. Several students killed and many wounded as army soldiers fire into the demonstration. 1966: Noor Mohammed Taraki of the People's Democratic Party begins publishing the newspaper KKhhall (Masses); closed down by the government after six issues. 1966-68: Student demonstrations and workers' strikes for better pay and working conditions continue. 48 -- Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 government had been pushed into a corner militarily: the feudal leaders who had gone to Pakistan now attacked government forces in earnest, with the active support of the Pakistani regime, and later China, Egypt and the United States. Under this dual onslaught the Taraki regime began to lose control. Amin Takes Power This loss of control made it possible for Hafizullah Amin to stage a coup in September 1979. (Amin, then prime minister, had always played a prominent role within the Khalq faction: he had been the driving force behind the ouster of the Parcham faction from the government and the government's insistence on rapid transfor- mation to a "workers' state.") In September 1979 Amin had President Taraki killed, apparently because Taraki was preparing to move towards reunification of the party, and took over the Brutal government repression. Protest movement develops in the countryside. 1967-68: Increased tensions in People's Democratic Party, eventually splits into Khalq and Parcham factions. Parcham advocates establishment of broad united front against feudal rule; Khalq pushes for more rapid transition to socialism. Parcham (Flag) newspaper formed, closed down after several months. 1969-73: King Zahir Shah refuses to sign many crucial bills passed by the parliament. Continued student demonstrations. 1973: Mohammed Daoud overthrows King- Zahir Shah while the king is vacationing in Italy. Daoud appoints himself President and Prime Minister, proclaims Afghanistan a republic,* and promises far-reaching reforms. Parcham supports his re- forms. 1975: Daoud nationalizes all banks and promises land reform. 1974-78: Daoud ousts progressive government officials and establishes increasingly close ties with the Shah of Iran. Few reforms are realized. 1975: Pakistani-financed "Afghan rebels" infiltrate the country from their training camps in Pakistan to pressure Daoud to make concessions in an Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute. 1977-78: Increasing repression, aided, by Iranian secret police. April 18, 1978: Police assassinate popular People's Democratic Party leader Mir Akbar Khyber. April 20, 1978: Tens of thousands turn Khyber's funeral into an anti-government demonstration. April 26, 1978: Daoud has People's Democratic Party leaders arrested. April 27, 1978: Uprising by PDP members inside the army. Daoud is overthrown. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 V=jT, p r=3 r=, r=3 r=3 J mW r==J J f=J r Eyewitness Afghanistan presidency. Amin filled most important govern- ment posts with members of his family or others personally loyal to him. Under Amin, the government turned into a dictatorship, though he continued to claim that he was "implementing reforms." The current Deputy Minister for Tribal Affairs, Shafi, says that Amin fulfilled all the propagandistic claims the old feudal leaders had been making about socialism ever since the 1917 revolution in the Soviet Union. "These feudals had said 'socialism' would mean massacres and torture - Amin acted that way," he says. Government and party officials today say that Amin was never interested in fulfilling the party's program; instead, he sought to enhance his personal power. Errors in the "decision-making process of the party," they say, facilitated Amin's rise to power. Amin personally controlled the secret police and a sector of the Army. He set out to crush all resistance to his rule within the PDP, and a April 30, 1978: Taraki announces new government of unified People's Democratic 'Party. Taraki is President, Babrak Karmal Prime Minister. 1978: Reforms are announced: Usury banned, many peasants' debts forgiven, equal rights for women made law, bride price abolished, land reform announced. Feudal leaders and members of wealthy families leave for Pakistan. May-June 1978: First "rebel camps" are set up in Pakistan. July-August 1978: Internal party conflicts: Parchamis are ousted and Taraki takes over Prime Minister position from Karmal. 1979: Opposition within the country to the way reforms are being carried out and to government repression. Mutinies in sectors of the army. Refugees flee to Pakistan. Foreign-financed, Pakistan-based "rebels" gain strength. March 1979: Hafizullah Amin takes over from Taraki as Prime Minister. Taraki remains President. July 1979: Amin takes posts of defense and interior min- ister. He now effectively controls both government and party. August 1979: Army mutinies and defections continue; repression in countryside and within the party escalates. September 1979: Taraki is ousted and killed. Amin takes complete power. Internal resistance to his rule grows; Amin answers with more repression. Early December 1979: Amin issues call for Soviet troops to protect his regime. December 24, 1979: Airlift of Soviet troops to Kabul. December 27, 1979: Amin killed. Babrak Karmal be- comes President. January 1980: New government announced, members mainly Parcham, some Khalq. Program includes: wave of repression, carried out by his secret police, swept through the party. More than 1500 party members are said to have been killed on Amin's orders. His attempt to stamp out the rebellion and regain control in the countryside was equally brutal - tens of thousands of people were killed. Two incidents, related to me by party members who witnessed them personally, are illustrative of Amin's ruthlessness. Amin had installed a new governor in the province of Ghur in central Afghanistan. The governor assembled the residents of one village in the village square; the peasants on one side, the village leaders and landlords on the other side. The governor claimed he was going to destroy the respect the peasants had for the landlords. He therefore told the landlords: "Put your shoes in your mouths" - one of the most degrading things an Afghan could be forced to do. The landlords begged him not-to force them. "Our children wouldn't be able to walk the streets abolition of usury, land reform, equal rights for women, equal rights for all nationalities, respect for private property and religion. Thousands of prisoners released. Karmal calls for more Soviet troops. January 1980: Carter administration decides to increase CIA aid to Pakistan-based rebels. 1980: Escalation of foreign support to counter- revolutionaries. Continued resistance in the countryside, some urban protests. Government emphasizes national democratic character of the revolution. Social organizations are formed and strengthened. December 1980: Karmal calls for establishment of Na- tional Fatherland Front. January 1981: Following Afghanistan government call for bilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan talks, the Pakistani government asks United Nations to assist in such negotiations. They begin later in the year. June 15, 1981: Founding Congress of the National Fa- therland Front. 1980-81: Major Afghan-Soviet military operations against resistance. March 1982: 841 delegates meet for the First National Conference of the People's Democratic Party. 1982-83: Fighting in countryside decreases. Afghan gov- ernment negotiates with rebel military commanders inside the country and with tribal leaders. Afghanistan-Pakistan talks continue. June 1983: Reagan administration "leaks" news that CIA support for rebels has been increased. July 1983: Secretary of State George Shultz visits Pakistan; tells Afghan "refugee" leaders that "they do not fight alone" and pledges continued ?T.S. support. Countewspy -- Sep-t.-Nov. 1983 -- 49 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan for years without being referred to as the children whose fathers put their shoes into their mouths." The governor insisted, and most complied. The governor had one of the landlords who did not comply whipped. For a long time, that landlord did not make a sound. Finally, he cried out: "What in the name of God have I done to deserve this?" The governor countered: "Fuck your God." At that, the governor's bodyguard turned against the governor and gunned him down. . The other incident: One night an army patrol was attacked in Wardak province, just west of Kabul; one soldier was killed, two were wounded. The next day Amin's governor in Wardak called together the elders of the region in which the attack had occurred and told them that such a thing would never happen again as long as he was governor. He told the elders that they soon would see what he would do. The men were frightened and decided to go to the mountains for several days to protect themselves. The night after they had left, government soldiers stormed the village in question, looted it, and raped some of the women. When the men came back, the women told them what had happened. The men then swore on the Koran that they would fight "socialism." Each man whose wife had been raped, killed her and went to the mountains. These men then attacked the governor's mansion. He managed to flee, but his wife and children were captured and cut into pieces. (Today, I was told, a truce has been established between these men and the Karmal government. I asked how the officials had managed to explain to these men that the present Under Amin, the government turned into a dictatorship, though he continued to claim that he was "implementing reforms." government was not the same as the government of Amin, and that what Amin was promoting was not socialism. It was not explaining that did it, I was told, no explaining would have done it: the party members went to the village and kissed the feet of the men.) 50 -- Coun teA4 py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 The People Rose Up By the end of Amin's rule, much of the country was in open rebellion against him. "The people rose up," is the way even some party members now tell the story. The Army crumbled. Amin had to send party members to the front to fight the losing battle. In early December 1979, Amin called on Soviet troops to help; several thousand arrived in mid-December. But Amin's days were over. He was overthrown by members of his own party, the People's Democratic Party, and Babrak Karmal and the Parcham faction took control of the government. Exactly what happened during the final days of December 1979 remains known to only a few people. "It was a dark night," says Dr. Zahir Thani, deputy editor of the party newspaper Ha i ate-En Labe-Saur (The Truth of the April Revolution). He says that the party had no choice but to call for additional Soviet troops. "We had a revolution," he says - a revolution that had been severely damaged. "We could have aborted the revolution, but we remembered what happened in Indonesia and Chile." The PDP decided to carry on. And for that it needed the protection of Soviet troops. Understanding these events that led up to Amin's ouster and the mistakes made in the first phase of the revolution, say Afghan government officials, is essential to deciphering what is happening in Afghanistan today. "The first phase of the revolution" is the period from April 27, 1978 to late December 1979 when Hafizullah Amin was ousted and killed. The "second phase" began when Babrak Karmal took over as President. The situation the new government faced in early 1980 was disastrous. Amin's brutal methods had created hundreds of thousands of internal enemies, and the government was confronted with a foreign-backed counter-revolution in Pakistan. These counterrevolutionary leaders - whose goal is to recreate the pre-1978 feudal structure - seized on the popular resistance to Amin as a means to "legitimize" their own war against the government. The new government under President Babrak Karmal took immediate steps toward recon- ciliation. It released thousands of prisoners, and Karmal moved to unify the party. At the same time, he made clear that the government intended to make good on the party's program of establishing a broad national front to promote reforms and defend against the foreign-backed counterrevolutionary groups - a very difficult undertaking given the deep distrust Amin's repression had created. M Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr Eyewitness Afghanistan A Political Solution? Rebel Defections and Negotiations "We engaged in highway banditry. We burned than 200 rebel military commanders have government-owned vehicles, and killed the drivers surrendered in recent months, bringing with them of these vehicles. We killed people just for some 20,000 armed men. wearing Western-type clothes.... We terrorized While these precise figures are impossible to the population," says a young Afghan named verify, there can be no question that such a trend Malang. He is describing operations carried out exists. Defections by military commanders in by some 250 men under his command for more Afghanistan who were affiliated with Pakistan- than two years: "We forced people to join our based rebel organizations are perhaps the single group, and then sent them to Pakistan for most important factor that is strengthening the ideological and military training. We stole money military and political position of the government. and food." Malang was then a regional commander for The Military Situation the "Islamic Party" - perhaps the most important rebel organization fighting the Afghan The government of the People's Democratic Party government of Babrak Karmal. Malang joined believes that "the backbone of the counter- the "Islamic Party" almost immediately after revolution has been broken." At the same time, Soviet troops entered his country in December officials concede that "the counterrevolution is 1979. "1 believed I was fighting an Islamic war still able to carry out sporadic attacks in most against the invaders." Malang has changed since of the country." But these attacks do not present then. Today, he is a lieutenant in the Afghan an immediate military threat. They are largely Army; committed, as he says, "to make up for limited to hit-and-run raids, attacks against my crimes." economic targets, and assassinations of individual Over time, Malang had become disenchanted government supporters. with the "Islamic Party." While commander in In Kabul City itself there have been no major Kabul province, close to the Afghan capital, he rebel operations in several months. (After I left went to Pakistan several times to pick up arms the city in late May, I saw U.S. press reports and get training - from Egyptian and U.S. claiming that there had been shooting in the city, advisors, Malang says. In Pakistan, he got to and an attack on Bela Hissar fortress less than know the political leadership of the "Islamic a mile from downtown Kabul. I have not been Party," headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He saw able to independently confirm these reports.) The that Hekmatyar and his cronies were not area around Kabul has been fairly quiet as well. interested in fighting any "Islamic" war. They Rebel operations such as an attack on a police were wealthy, corrupt and greedy for personal station several miles east of Kabul during the profit. "A good part of the money sent to the night of May 25 to May 26, when artillery and counterrevolutionaries from abroad goes right machinegun fire could be heard in Kabul into the pockets of these leaders," according to throughout the night, have become rare. Malang. But Kabul residents are reminded daily that At the same time, support for Malang's there is a war going on somewhere in the country: detachment decreased in Kabul province, and, he the 10 pm to 4 am curfew is still in effect. says, he began to change his mind about the During the day, Afghan soldiers patrol the city Afghan government as he saw that it "respects to check the identity papers of men. Relations Islam," and that its reforms are beneficial to the between these soldiers and the people on the people. In late 1982, Malang, with many of his street are not visibly tense. Army patrols meet men and arms, surrendered; the government friends and stop to talk; uniformed soldiers walk welcomed him, and he joined the armed forces. hand in hand with their male friends (as close Malang's decision to defect from the "Islamic friends often do). Kabul does not fit the image Party" and join the government is not an isolated of a wartime capital as it is portrayed in the incident. According to government figures, more U.S. media. The bazaars are full of goods, and Cow'te py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 51 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan -rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr- people seem to voice their political opinions without hesitation. How things are going in the countryside cannot be determined with certainty from Kabul. Yet there are quite a number of signs which contradict continued rebel claims that they control the countryside: ? While last year the government was forced to send self-defense groups from the Trade Unions and the Democratic Youth Organization to the front to fight, this year it has not been necessary. The Afghan Army, contrary to reports in the Western press, is not continuing to "dwindle" but is apparently at a strength of some 70,000 men. ? The safety of the highways has improved. For instance, unlike last year, this year there have been no problems with the transport of fertilizer from the country's only fertilizer factory in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Likewise, last winter the supply of firewood to Kabul from the northeast was uninterrupted. ? Government ministers, and President Babrak Karmal himself, have been travelling to many provinces. ? In May 1983, the government felt confident enough to release some 1500 men, described as counterrevolutionaries, from Pole-i-Charki Prison near Kabul. (The several hundred people I saw released were well dressed and appeared healthy. Their families had been brought to the prison in government buses to meet them.) Government officials readily concede that they do not "control" the entire country. The Deputy Minister for Tribal Affairs, Shafi, for instance, said that no government administrative units are in place in Nuristan, a mountainous region at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. A similar problem exists in part of Herat province on the border with Iran. But, says Shafi, the government's inability to administer a region such as Nuristan should not be given too much weight: "Even the monarchy, King Zahir Shah, was not able to govern there." Shafi says that the government is at present negotiating with tribal leaders in Nuristan. He expects the government to have an administration functioning in Nuristan by early 1984. Negotiations Afghan government officials, such as Deputy Minister Shafi and Col. Farooq from the Interior Ministry, emphasize that a military solution is impossible for Afghanistan. The country's geography alone precludes a complete military victory. Says Col. Farooq: "There is no way we would be able to protect every village, every peasants' cooperative, every bridge and all the 52 -- Coun.tenbpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 highways." Furthermore, the rebels can always retreat to Pakistan, far beyond the reach of Afghan and Soviet troops. In order to further strengthen its position, the government is negotiating on two fronts. There Defections by military commanders in Afghanistan who were affiliated with Pakistan- based rebel organizations are perhaps the single most important factor that is strengthening the military and political position of the government. are the talks with Pakistan in which the Afghans are demanding that General Zia ul-Haq stop sheltering the counterrevolution and maintaining their training camps. Pakistan wants the Soviet troops to withdraw and demands that the Afghan government allow the hundreds of thousands of refugees to return to Afghanistan. But that, counters a spokesperson in the Afghan Foreign Ministry, is not a problem that was created by Afghanistan. The official points out that some 250,000 refugees have returned, and says that they "have been received with open arms" and given back the land they owned before they left. The Afghan government claims it is. Gen. Zia's army and the counterrevolutionaries that are preventing the rebels from coming back, going so far as to shoot at them when they try to cross the border, "The refugees are the best assets of the counterrevolutionaries," says the Foreign Ministry official. "They give them 'legitimacy."' While these bilateral talks have made some progress and might well eventually lead to an agreement, the Afghan government does not seem to be overly optimistic. "The problem is, with the United States," said one official. "They are arming the counterrevolutionaries [in Pakistan] . They have created the problem, and they are not interested in solving it." Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 i r-FEr== == JTFJ~ - - - - - - - - r r r Eyewitness Afghanistan The second negotiating track the Afghan and to emphasize the "national democratic government has pursued - talks with former character of the revolution" the government also military commanders and tribal leaders once stresses its respect for Islam. Important opposed to the government - is showing much government meetings begin with prayer, and more progress. In May 1983, for instance, the proclamations are issued "in the name of Allah." government scored one of its biggest successes The government's extensive program of to date: Ahmad Shah Massoud, the rebel chief renovating mosques and constructing new ones is in the Panjsher Valley, agreed to a truce. For making it difficult for the counterrevolutionaries the government, this valley, just a few miles to claim the government is anti-Islamic. Calls north of Kabul is probably the single most to prayer are aired on the radio; so are daily strategic region in the country. Until Massoud religious programs. One of the biggest jobs at agreed to a truce, it had been one of the most the Government Printing Office is printing copies secure rebel strongholds. of the Koran. (Before I left the United States for Kabul, I Planning read a number of reports in the U.S. media Economic claiming that the Soviet air force had heavily When the People's Democratic Party took power bombarded the Panjsher Valley area in early May. in 1978, Afghanistan was among the ranks of the No one I spoke to in Kabul, including natives of orest countries on earth. Per capita income the Valley who were openly anti-government, had ~ was around $100 a year; infant mortality 270 per heard anything about a recent stream of refugees thousand. Many peasants had no land, or less coming ming into the city.) The government of Babrak Karmal makes a land than they needed to live. They were sharp distinction between the foreign-backed absolutely dependent on the large landowners. opposition in Pakistan. and the resistance that Industry was practically non-existent, and the grew inside Afghanistan as a response to the monarchy and Mohammed Daoud's regime (1973- mistakes and repression primarily under the rule 78) had done virtually nothing to prepare the of Hafizullah Amin in 1979. Upon taking power nation to utilize its rich natural resources. in December 1979, Karmal emphasized that his Only now is Afghanistan beginning to build government was about to move forward with a essential industrial facilities, and it will have to national democratic revolution. To that end, the make up for decades of inaction and neglect. People's Democratic Party has established a According to the State Planning Committee, the National Fatherland Front (NFF), described as "a establishment of heavy industry will have to wait. broad spectrum of mass political and social Instead, government planning concentrates on organizations whose backbone is the alliance of increasing agricultural production hand in hand workers and peasants." with the buildup of light industry which is to Today the Front has 600,000 members and 410 make use of agricultural improvements. For councils around the country. Besides the People's instance, two textile factories are being Democratic Party, it includes several social and completed in Herat and Kandahar which will be professional organizations such as the Union of able to go into operation because of an increase Agricultural Cooperatives, the Trade Unions, the in cotton production, primarily in the agricultural Democratic Women's Organization and the cooperatives. Democratic Youth Organization; representatives The government welcomes private invest- from the tribes; religious scholars and mullahs; ment. In fact, the State Planning Committee and individual members. According to PDP has set up a special commission to aid private Central Committee member Baroq Shafi, the business. Over the last five years, the number Front's task is to explain government policies to of major private enterprises has increased from the people and to aid in the practical realization 135 to 235. (According to Babrak Karmal, of those policies: land reform, water and Afghanistan does not now provide an atmosphere fertilizer distribution, and construction activities. in which "monopoly capital" and "parasitic In areas where there is still fighting, the NFF families could come into being" or in which "big sets up peace committees to resolve the conflict. national capital" could link up with multinational The present government's approach to corporations to dominate the country. This promoting reforms differs fundamentally from the unique situation, says Karmal, makes it possible, hasty and often violent measures of 1978 and at present, for the "small and middle industrialists 1979. Instead of confronting the establishment and merchants who are interested in the progress power structure at every possible opportunity, of the country" to be part of the national the current government is attempting to work democratic revolution.) with it. As many people as possible are drawn The government's economic planning pays into the reforms. In order to broaden its base special attention to the transportation problem, Couwte.nbpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 53 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan - r r r r r r r r a weak link in Afghanistan's economy even before the counterrevolutionaries concentrated their attacks on trucks rolling on Afghanistan's few highways. A "Supreme Council on Transportation" is now coordinating the protection of private and government trucks. Attacks on the transport system are said to have decreased during the last year; the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are donating 2,200 heavy trucks to make up for those which have been destroyed. The rebels have done considerable economic damage not only in the field of transportation. Official statistics put the damage over the last five years at 28 billion Afghanis - about one- fifth of one year's Gross National Product. This figure apparently represents only direct material damage caused by rebel attacks. Hassan Rashiq, Deputy President of the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, says, for instance, that no complete survey has been made of the damage done to the cooperatives. It is very difficult, he says, to compute damage from 'actions such as the destruction of irrigation systems. Or, asks Trade Union President Satar Purdeli, how does one put a number on the losses incurred by some textile factories in 1981 which did not receive enough cotton because the counterrevolutionaries killed many cotton farmers or threatened retribution if they grew cotton and other industrial crops? Economic facilities are a favorite rebel target. The destruction of power lines has caused much damage. For instance, says Purdeli, in early 1983 the production at the Gulbahar textile factory in Kapisa province dropped by 72. percent Who Are the Rebel Leaders? President Reagan considers the Afghan rebel leaders based in Pakistan "freedom fighters." And in fact, they are fighting for very much the same kind of "freedom" as are Reagan's Somocista "freedom fighters," armed by the CIA to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. Both are fighting to re- establish the status quo before the revolution. The Afghan rebel chiefs are fighting for the "freedom" to regain their feudal landholdings in Afghanistan, the "freedom" to keep women illiterate and oppressed, and the "freedom" to overturn other social reforms brought about by the People's Democratic Party. A glance at the careers of some of these rebel leaders sufficiently illustrates what interests they represent and fight for. Probably the most important of these counterrevolutionary leaders is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the head of the "Islamic Party." He was convicted of murdering a progressive student at Kabul University in 1972.1 After serving a short sentence, he went to Pakistan and became commander of a 5000-man, Pakistan-sponsored armed detachment which infiltrated into Afghanistan in 1975 to create trouble for the government of Mohammed Daoud. (See sidebar, "The CIA and The Rebels.") Today, the "Islamic Party" uses extremely cruel methods. It forcibly recruits young men and collects "taxes" from villages, assassinates people who refuse to aid its cause and makes literacy campaign teachers a prime target. Journalist Gerard Chaliand, who traveled with the rebels and is generally sympathetic to their fight, writes that Hekmatyar's group consists of people "who have no qualms about torturing or killing anyone who disagrees with them." "Quite honestly," said Mangal Hussain, a spokesperson of the "Islamic Party," when asked what his organization would do with the current government officials if it took power, "we would kill them."3 ? Like Hekmatyar, Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader of the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan" was involved in ' the Pakistan-financed campaign in the mid-1970s. He is a former landlord, and an exporter of carpets and karakul pelts. ? Sayed Ahmad Gailani, a relative of the royal family through his wife, portrays himself as a religious figure. He had large land- holdings in Afghanistan and also amassed wealth from tribute paid to him by nomads and from the monopoly he held on marketing Peugeot cars in Afghanistan. Gailani's "National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan" has close ties to the Saudi royal family and advocates the return of the monarchy to Afghanistan. ? Sebgatullah Mujadidi went to Pakistan only weeks after the 1978 Afghan revolution, where he set up his "National Liberation Front of Afghanistan" with money from Saudi Arabia. He was a feudal landlord in Kabul province. Mujadidi now maintains a U.S. headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, which he visits frequently. These rebel leaders, along with about a dozen other counter- revolutionary chiefs, have set up fiefdoms in Peshawar, Pakistan, from which they launch incursions into Afghanistan. They also run "a highly efficient and well organized 'mafia' which dominates the export of hard drugs from Pakistan... to the West, and with the proceeds [they] are buying arms for the struggle and property inside Pakistan."4 The counter- revolutionary leaders have also bought- businesses in Pakistan. Hekmatyar, for instance, controls much of the public transportation in Peshawar and has been buying real estate in the area, "causing house prices in Peshawar and Islamabad to rise steeply in the past two years."5 For these leaders, the war is just another profit-making enterprise. Footnotes: 1) For details, see Mohammed Sarkash and Seamus O'Faolain, "Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Prospects for Peace," Counterspy, vol.5, no.3. 2 New Statesman, 12/26/80. 3) Washington Post, 9/2/79. 4) "Afghan Gun-running and Drug smuggling 'Mafia,!" The Middle East (London), May 1983. Also see Konrad Ege, "CIA Rebels Supply U.S. Heroin," Counterspy, vol.5, no.1. 5) The Middle East, May 1983. 54 -- Countehepy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 r---rrrrrrrrrr_rrrrrrrrrrrJ Eyewitness Afghanistan when the rebels cut the power lines from Jalalabad to the factory. The State Planning Committee's Economic Development Plan for 1982-83 gives ample evidence of the many failures to reach economic goals because of the "special conditions" in the country. Nonetheless, the government in Kabul is confident. Officials point to a "positive trend" over the last years. And in spite of all the internal problems and the subversion from abroad, the social, political and economic reforms of the last few years have brought more progress to Afghanistan than decades under the monarchy. (See "Reforms.") Bringing an end to the foreign intervention carried out by the United States, Pakistan, China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is key to peace and further progress in Afghanistan. These countries are standing in the way of a negotiated political settlement to the "Afghan conflict." The Reagan administration, by providing millions of dollars in aid to the counterrevolutionaries, is eager to tie down Soviet troops in Afghanistan and to score points in its anti-Soviet propaganda crusade. A political settlement is possible in Afghanistan - in fact, dramatic steps have been taken in that direction through the government's negotiations with rebel military commanders and with tribal leaders. An overall political -rrrrrrrrr-rrrrrrrrrrrr-r- The Reforms Literacy Campaign Of all the reforms promoted by the Afghan government, the literacy program might hold the key to the government's overall reform strategy. People are taught primarily practical things; e.g. women use books on health care, and peasants learn to read from books on new methods of farming. At the same time, the campaign is used to inform people about the government programs - for many people, this is probably the first time they hear in-depth and first-hand descriptions of what the government stands for. Before the revolution, Afghanistan had an illiteracy rate of some 95 percent. According to Zafar Zai, the president of the literacy campaign, illiteracy will be wiped out within ten years. One million people have graduated from the nine-month literacy course since 1980; some eight million books have been printed. But these achievements "have not come easy," says Zai, settlement which would facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is being held up by the intransigent posture of the Reagan administration. The U.S. government, through the CIA and allied regimes in the Middle East and Asia, is waging a "secret" war against Afghanistan, just as it is waging a "secret" war against Nicaragua. Millions of people oppose that CIA operation. The CIA's war against Afghanistan, however, has provoked little organized opposition in the United States. On the contrary, the names of the very Senators who have opposed covert operations against Nicaragua can be found signed onto a resolution calling for increased CIA aid to the Afghan rebels. The parallels between these two operations are striking, though the countries and their revolutions are very different. In both cases, the CIA is trying to overthrow a government which is committed to rebuilding a country after decades-long dictatorial rule and exploitation. In both cases, the CIA is financing military forces of the extreme right committed to reestablishing the previous system of government. Therefore, if one opposes the CIA's war against Nicaragua - as does the majority of the people in the United States - it is only consistent to oppose the CIA's war against Afghanistan. c? pointing to a poster in his office with photos of dozens of young literacy teachers who have been murdered by the counterrevolutionaries. "In addition, 60 percent of the premises used by the campaign have been destroyed; the counterrevo- lutionaries have killed people just for applying for literacy courses." The literacy workers have changed their approach to promoting the campaign. At the beginning, some teachers and party cadres seemed to believe that they could advance the campaign by forcing people to attend. In some instances women were forced to come - women who might have lived in situations where they couldn't even visit their parents without asking their husbands for permission. To compel these women to attend a literacy course outside the house, and perhaps to be taught by a man was considered an insult. There was also some resistance by rightwing clergy. Today, the government is taking a new tack: it asks the mullahs (religious leaders) themselves CowzteAspy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 55 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan rrrrrrr-rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr to teach courses. It is argued that people should take part in the campaign in order to be able to read the Koran. Some courses are now taught in mosques, and mullahs are given training so they can conduct the classes. Likewise, in areas where it is necessary, women are told they have to get permission from their husbands to attend, and the literacy teachers set up day care centers so the women can come to the courses. Women teachers now wear the same clothes as the local women. The literacy campaign also reaches out to Afghanistan's 2 to 3 million nomads. The teachers travel with the nomads for the duration of the courses. Land Reform and Agricultural Cooperatives Before the revolution, according to the U.S. government's Area Handbook on Afghanistan, two percent of Afghanistan's landowners held 40 percent of the land, while two out of five peasants owned no land or less than half a hectare. Afghan government statistics show that some 300,000 peasants so far have benefitted from the land reform program (which had ground to a virtual halt during Amin's rule). At present, the government is proceeding carefully and deliberately with the land reform - too many mistakes have been made, and too many people have been alienated. According to Deputy Minister of Tribal Affairs Shafi, -the government has sent investigative teams to a number of provinces to examine the progress and prospects for land reform in these areas. Of equal importance for the development of Afghanistan's agriculture, says Hassan Rashiq, the Deputy President of the Union of' Agricultural Cooperatives, is the establishment of coopera- tives. They also serve as "training schools" for future political leaders, he says. 1300 coops were created after the revolution. But "because of the deviations in the first phase, the cooperatives suffered." Today, explains Rashiq, only 236 coops are functioning. The others folded during the purges under Amin, because their leaders were assassinated by the counterrevolutionaries, or simply due to mismanagement. Revitalizing these coops is one of the government's highest priorities. In addition to these 236 producer cooperatives - i.e., peasants working together to grow crops - there are also consumer cooperatives. These 56 -- Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 are aided by the government in jointly buying consumer goods. The government also buys the cooperatives' harvests at a good price. Previously, the peasants were forced to sell their crops, often at low prices, to merchants immediately after harvest for lack of storage facilities. About 9000 coop members also belong to self- defense groups. Attacks by rebels have been a serious problem for the cooperatives. Says; Rashiq: "Because the counterrevolution has received military setbacks, they are resorting increasingly to economic destruction. No co- operative exists that has not suffered from the attacks of the counterrevolutionaries." Women's Rights Probably the biggest challenge the revolution has presented to the established power structure, says Jamita Nahid of the Democratic Women's Organization (DWO), is the law guaranteeing equal rights for men and women. Life for millions of Afghan women is harsh; before 1978 there were virtually no laws giving women legal protection. Women at times lived no better than slaves, and could be sold into marriage. Nahid tells of a friend of hers, a medical student,,who went to a village near Kabul to see a woman who had fallen sick. The student told the woman's husband, a poor peasant, that she needed a doctor. Said the husband, "my cow is sick, ..?-? - -- ----?-..--.._ Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan too. First I need a doctor for the cow, because if it dies, I cannot afford to buy a new one. I depend on it for my living. If my wife dies, I can get a new one." Women have been doubly oppressed in Afghanistan, says Nahid. First they suffered from Probably the biggest challenge the revolution has presented to the established power structure ... is the law guaranteeing equal rights for men and women. the literacy campaign. It has also established Women's Clubs where women meet to produce handicrafts and talk about their concerns. "As long as women do not participate fully in the social and political life of the country, the revolution will not advance very fast," says Nahid. The goal of the D W O is not only to help women liberate themselves, but also to help men see that without equal rights for women, "there will be no real progress." But that, Nahid concedes, "will take a while. The mentality that women are inferior is centuries old," and even "some of the more conscious men have problems putting the principle of women's equality into practice." Trade Unions The government of the People's Democratic Party is the first government in Afghanistan to allow workers to form unions and to draft an extensive labor code. Afghan trade unions, according to the President of the Central Satar Purdeli , the: poverty, the misery and the feudal rule as Council of the Trade Unions, have 163,000 did the rest of the Afghan population. But in members; 14,000 of them have joined the self- addition, women suffered, and still suffer, from defense groups which are responsible for the their special oppression as women: often they hysical security of the factories. work long hours in the fields and then return p About 40 percent of the unionists live in t home to do the housework; women were no allowed to participate in the political life; very few girls used to go to school; women bear eight, ten, twelve children; and they often suffer from a reactionary interpretation of Islam which relegates them to the status of second-class human beings. Under the previous regime, there was virtually no possibility for women to work outside the house or the fields, or to hold professional jobs. , , g workers, the DWO to organize women to push for the great contributions to the revolution, and "it is implementation of the laws guaranteeing equal always a great step forward in a country's history rights. Often the DWO attracts women through Cow1_teJu, p y -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 57 The government is now encouraging employers to hire women. In the Government Printing Office in Kabul, for instance, more than 200 out of the 700 workers are women. One 22-year-old woman worker in the bindery said: "Some men still complain that the women take the jobs from the men. But it's getting better." Like many of her unmarried co-workers, she had lived with her parents doing housework after she had finished school, and the bindery, she says, "is much more interesting." A day care center has been established at the factory, but many women are still unable to hold industrial jobs for lack of day care facilities. In some rural areas, it is very difficult for Kabul, but, says Purdeli, every province has its trade union council. Union strongholds are in Nangarhar, Balkh, Baglan, Kandahar and Herat. The trade unions participate in all major factory decisions. They have established health care centers in the factories as well as child care centers. The trade unions are also building recreational facilities for the workers and their families - often in former royal family palaces. The trade union headquarters itself used to belong to a member of the king's family. Workers also receive food coupons which allow them to buy essential items - rice, flour, oil, matches, etc. - at sharply reduced prices; the union also makes an effort to provide subsidized housing for its members. Likewise, the government has hiked the minimum wage to 1410 Afghanis (about $20) a month, and wages have been increased by 30 to 50 percent over the past three years. Purdeli concedes that "quantitatively, Afghan workers have not yet developed into a strong working class" since for decades, the monarchy did nothing to develop the country's industrial potential and had not allowed unions. The are making Purdeli goes on h thou Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Eyewitness Afghanistan when trade unions are established for the first time." Youth and Education One of the most crushing legacies left by decades of monarchical rule is the lack of educational facilities. Many children, especially girls, had no chance to attend school; only one out of 20 people could read. There was only one university in the country and it had no consistent curriculum, no program for doctoral degrees, and no textbooks for nine out of ten courses. A second university has now been opened in Nangarhar province, and even though "Kabul University is still in somewhat bad shape," says its director Asadullah Habib (one of Afghanistan's best known poets) things are improving. Several new faculties and departments have been opened. Others, such as the Polytechnical Institute and the Islamic law department, have been greatly expanded. There are 7000 students, 2400 of them are women; some 3000 come from distant provinces. The university has also opened facilities for people who could not finish their education for lack of money. Several hundred students are now studying in a "workers' and peasants' faculty" and in Kabul University's night school. Many children still do not attend school. The reasons are often money-related. Families need the added income their children can earn. In Kabul City, for instance, hundreds of boys sit at street corners selling cigarettes -- by the piece, not the pack - or walk around with buckets full of cold water which they sell in cups. The government's education campaign has also been hindered by the destruction of some 1300 school buildings by the rebels. Disruptions at Kabul University are a thing of the past, but during 1979, there was a political purge of teachers which prevented the university from 58 -- Counteipy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 functioning normally. Large-scale fighting in the country in 1979 and 1980 also created problems. Says Habib: "How can you expect a student to attend classes and to study when he hears about fighting in his province, and he has no opportunity of finding out what is actually happening there?" According to Habib, psychological warfare is being waged against the university. For example, he says, when Kabul University opened last year, BBC and Voice of America reports claimed that the university was shut down because of unrest. Everybody at the university could see that this was a lie; nonetheless, says Habib, such reports create a tense atmosphere. Many of the university students are members of the Democratic Youth Organization (DYO) which serves to draw young people into the revolution. According to Hanif, a DYO secretary, more than half of the people who joined the party last year (it has some 100,000 members) had been DYO activists. The DYO itself has 110,000 members, some of whom also serve in the "social order brigades," i.e. armed detachments which function primarily as guards against the rebels. Hanif says some of the members of the "social order brigades" are women; all in all, the DYO has 10,000 women members. In some areas of the country, Hanif says, DYO members are still forced to work underground; in these regions, anyone connected with a revolutionary organization is a likely rebel target. Many of the DYO members come from Kabul but, says Hanif, considerable progress is being made in the provinces. For instance, in Nangarhar province there are 5000 members, in Jowzjan 5000, in Badakshan 4000, and in Kandahar and Herat more than 3000 each. The DYO now concentrates on organizing in the countryside. Members go to the villages to help farmers and to do guard duty. In addition, the Youth Organization has artistic brigades which travel around the country to show films and talk to the young people. Since the Youth Organization was founded in 1980, its membership has doubled each year. @) NEWS, bnom page 32 17) "Victory for Strauss," Counterspy, Vol. 7, No. 2. 18) Cf. supra, #13. 19) Quoted from a confidential letter from Institute for the Stpdy of Conflict files. Time Out, 8/29-9/4/75, p. 6. 20) Ibid. 21) Cf. supra, #13. 22) Colin Legum, "Reporting on the 'Liquidation' of the Empire," The Observer, (London), 1/24/82. 23) Cf. supra, #13. 24) Robert Parker, Rough Justice, Fontana Paperbacks, London, 1981, p. 162. 25) See Washington Post, 12/22/75. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100130005-8 CIA Aid to the Rebels CIA support for the Afghan rebels is the largest known CIA paramilitary campaign since the mid-1970s when it aided UNITA forces in Angola in an attempt to stifle that country's revolution. The United States and its allies - China, Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia - have spent some $200 million to arm and train the Pakistan-based counterrevolutionaries.1 The CIA campaign began shortly after the People's Democratic Party took power in April 1978, and escalated after Babrak Karmal became president in December 1979 and Soviet troops entered the country. In early January 1980, the Carter cabinet decided that the CIA, in conjunction with China and Egypt, should make a major commitment to support the Afghan rebels in Pakistan. The operation was to be run by a special committee headed by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski coordinated the program with four nations: Egypt (which delivers Soviet-made weapons from its warehouses and supplies military trainers), Pakistan (which permits and protects the Afghan rebel military camps on its soil and allows arms shipments through), China (which ships arms and provides training) and Saudi Arabia (which finances some arms shipments and props up the Pakistani government with economic aid). President Carter wanted the operation to be deceptive: "The Afghan struggle was an 'Islamic struggle,' President Carter told his aides, and U.S. assistance should not disturb that impression.112 The Afghan rebel leaders in Pakistan still work hard to keep up this "indigenous Islamic struggle" facade. They claim all of their arms are either locally produced, were obtained from defecting Afghan soldiers, or were captured from Afghan or Soviet army posts. Ronald Reagan has taken a more overt approach to aiding the counterrevolutionaries. Already during his electoral campaign, he openly advocated U.S. arms shipments to the rebels ("freedom fighters," in his lexicon). Once president, he stepped up the CIA program which by now even CIA Director William Casey has admitted exists.3 The weapons supplied by the U.S. and its allies include rocket-propelled grenade launchers capable of piercing Soviet tank armor, plastic-covered land mines, mortars, recoilless rifles, bazookas, and shoulder-fired anti- aircraft guns. These weapons shipments are very likely to continue: On his visit to Pakistan in early July 1983 Secretary of State George Shultz addressed Afghan "refugee" leaders as "fellow fighters for freedom" and assured them that they "do not fight alone." "My message from the United States is simple," said the Secretary, "we are with you."4 The CIA's current strategy of stimulating and financing military operations by feudal, and some tribal, leaders against the Afghan government can make use of experience gained on two previous occasions when such a strategy was contemplated or actually carried out. According to Leon Poullada, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, U.S. embassy officials back in the early 1950s considered bringing about the overthrow of the King-appointed Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, using exactly the same tactics. At the time, many U.S. officials thought Daoud (a cousin of the king) was moving the country closer to the Soviet Union. Then-U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward, discussed his opposition to Daoud with Pakistani officials who, "alarmed by Daoud's policies, ...wanted to stir up tribal rebellions to overthrow Daoud." Poullada continues: "The CIA station chief in Kabul had a strong personal influence on [Ambassador] Ward.... With Pakistani colleagues and royal family dissenters he dreamed up plots to 'destabilize' the Daoud regime."5 Poullada claims that these plans did not have U.S. government backing, and, in any case, Daoud learned through his intelligence service of the CIA's deliberations. Ambassador Ward and the CIA chief were replaced soon thereafter. A much more serious attempt to Eyewitness Afghanistan destabilize Afghanistan was launched in 1973 after the same Daoud had overthrown King Zahir Shah. The Pakistani government was concerned that Daoud would reignite a long-standing border conflict, and in anticipation secretly trained some 5000 Afghan "rebels." The Nixon administration, thinking that Daoud might be a leftist, reportedly aided that project but then withdrew support when it turned out that Daoud and a U.S. ally, the Shah of Iran, were growing increasingly close. In July 1975, these 5000 "rebels" infiltrated into the Panjsher Valley, where they fought against the Afghan government forces. After planning to create "tribal rebellions" in the early 1950s and actually setting up the 5000- member force in the early 1970s, it was only a small step for the United States, Pakistan and their allies to support "Islamic rebellion" against the People's Democratic Party from 1978 to the present. C~) 1) Carl Bernstein ("Arms for Afghanistan," New Republic, 6/18/81) wrote that by mid-1981, more than $100 million had been spent to aid the rebels. A New York Times article (5/4/83) claimed that $100 to $150 million had been given to the rebels from 1980 to 1983; while Aernout van Lynden, a Dutch journalist who traveled with the rebels and is sympathetic to their cause, says that the U.S. is paying $20 to $30 million a year to Egypt alone to buy up that country's stockpile of Soviet-made weapons (Washington Post, 12/19/82). 2) ABC News, "20/20," 6/18/81. 3) See Lou Cannon, "Casey, Who Can't Remember, Berates Officials Who Can't Read," Washington Post, 6/27/83. 4) Washington Post, 7/4/83. 5) Leon Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years," Middle East Journal, Spring 1981. 6) Far Eastern Economic Review, 1/30/81. Couwte,t6py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 59 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100130005-8 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8 Pteab a enter. my a ubb c.iu.p ion to Coun te.i p son. one yeah ( .ia4ue6). 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