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Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ~1 y COUNIrE Volume 7 Number 2 $2 Dec. 1982-Feb. 1983 HAITI: CHOICE BETWEEN TWO EVILS- DUVALIER OR IMF Also in this issue: Nicaragua: A Bay of Pigs in the Making U.S. Representatives Say CIA Lies About Central America AirLand Battle: The Army's New Aggressive Doctrine Secret U.S. Embassy Report Affirms Marcos Corrupt and on Shaky Ground CIA and West Germany's Christian Democrats Pentagon Proposes: "Peace Through Protracted Nuclear War" U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs to Morocco CIA Documents on East Timor U.S. War Plans Against the Soviet Union CIA and the Courts CIA in Australia Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Counterspy Statement of Purpose: The United States emerged from World War II as the world's dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. govern- ment created a variety of institutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these in- stitutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systemat- ically violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947. Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in cre- ating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporations-intelligence agency link-ups, and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view is that while CIA operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand in a complex web of interference and control. Our motivation for publishing Counterspy has been two-fold: ? People in the U.S. have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their gov- ernment's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend them- selves and most effectively change the institutions. ? People in other countries, often denied access to information, can better protect their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information. Instead of an Editorial Third Breast Bites Back, 1982 FBlntegrates to ClAssassins poison your mirror the British glass, i.e. to sour your dreams or which I had two, started out drinking beer us seeking jobs not knowing why I was here unsuccessfully dreams don't pay the rent william colby's cold dream spy eyes forwarding us into the fifties see out only Bush wacked by reaganazism on the way democracy not possible in U.S. of CIA and millionaires unless all are millionaires democracy don't pay the rent anyways reverse reverie lemmings to the sea nuclear energy bringing out the rats in me and you inactive in the face CIA aid of radioactive rain on your parade tea for two to four billion thoughts dominant till thoughts of you Salvadoran peasant coming of the pile of corpses defying the finite for the infinite levitate me making me wish these words could rise off the page to kiss your eyes light at the end and beginning of the tunnel to undermine to creation John Kelly Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Editors: Konrad Ege John Kelly Board of Advisors: Dr. Walden Bello Director, Congress Task Force of the Philippine Solidarity Network Robin Broad PhD Candidate Princeton University John Cavanagh Economist, United Nations Dr. Noam Chomsky Professor at MIT, peace activist Dr. Joshua Cohen Assistant Professor, MIT Ruth Fitzpatrick Member, Steering Committee of the Religious Task Force on El Salvador Laurie Kirby Professor, City University of New York Tamar Kohns Political activist Annie Makhijani Baker, nursing student Dr. Arjun Makhijani Consultant on energy and economic development Martha Wenger Office worker, CounterSpy's copy editor [Organizations for identification only] Cover design: Johanna Vogelsang COUNTERSpy 4 13 37 News NOT in the News Disarmament Disinformation South Africa's Nuclear "Super Gun" CIA Documents on East Timor CIA in Australia APSA and the CIA CIA and West Germany's Christian Democrats CIA Successfully Courts the Courts Haiti: IMF or Duvalier - Choice Between Two Evils by Walden Bello Nicaragua: A Bay of Pigs in the Making by Jeff McConnell U.S. Representatives Say: CIA Lies About Central America by John Kelly Afghanistan Update Secret U.S. Embassy Report Affirms: Marcos Corrupt and on Shaky Ground Military Issues U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs to Morocco by Martha Wenger AirLand Battle: The Army's New Aggressive Strategy Pentagon Proposes: "Peace Through Protracted Nuclear War" by Konrad Ege and Ariun Makhljanl Reagan's First Strike Arsenal Documents: U.S. Nuclear War Plans Against the Soviet Union +LL61W~?? X-523 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 News NOT in the News Disarmament Disinformation According to Reader's Digest, "the KGB has induced millions upon millions of honor- able,' patriotic and sensible people who detest communist tyranny to make common. cause with the Soviet Union." What do these people do? They are part of the disarmament movement and advocate a mutual freeze . in the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Reader's Digest Senior Editor John Barron "examines" the international peace movement in the October 1982 issue and comes to the conclusion that the peace movement has been "penetrated, manipulated and distorted to an amazing degree" by people intent to* "promote communist tyran- ny." The "proof," for this KGB manipula- tion is nonexistent. Barron limits himself to drawing obscure connections between persons he calls KGB agents and all major U.S. and some international peace organi- zations. The Digest bills " Barron as an expert on the KGB as the author of the "bestsel- ler" KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. What Reader's Digest doesn't men- tion, though, 9 -that Barron, according to the New York Times (12/25/77) consciously wrote the book for a covert CIA "operation- al purpose." Barron indeed admitted to the Times that he received "quite a bit of help" from the CIA for the book - but only after he had been exposed by an uniden- tified CIA official. Given Barron's history of writing for undercover pur- poses, one has to take the Reader's Digest article with a grain of salt, to say the least. (An earlier example of the question- able intimacy between the CIA and the 4 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Reader's Digest involved then-CIA Director Allen Dulles and senior Digest writer Charles J. V. Murphy. They were so close that Dulles asked Murphy to write his memoirs and gave Murphy free office space at CIA headquarters at taxpayers' expense.) South Africa "s Nuclear "Super Gun" There can no longer be serious doubt that South Africa is a nuclear power. Since early September 1982, that nation has also possessed one. of the most advanced mobile artillery units, the G6, which, according to South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, is capable of firing "North American nuclear warheads." The Johannesburg Sunday Times, rather excitedly, calls the G6 a "super gun" and a "wonder weapon" which can "shoot further and faster than any other artillery piece in the world." The G6 has "excellent" accuracy over a range of more than 30 If your label reads "R72" or "L72," this is your last issue of CounterSpy - so please renew right away and don't miss a single issue. Attention prisoner subscribers: Subscriptions to prisoners will remain free of charge. However, we are asking prisoners now to renew their subscriptions. Therefore, if your label reads "PP 72 , " please renew to let us know that you have been getting Coun nter- and wish to receive it in the future. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 kilometers, and according to South African officials, is capable of travelling about 100 km/h on the open road, and some 35 km/h on virtually every territory in Southern Africa. Its operational range is more than 400 kilometers. These characteristics make the G6 a highly dangerous conventional weapon, but even more important, an effective nuclear weapons delivery system. A less advanced G5 artillery unit may have been used to fire the nuclear weapon detected by U.S. satellites over the South Atlantic in September 1979. In addition, the U.S.- Canadian Space Research Corporation sup- plied South Africa with 300, 000 shell casings usable in both the G5 and G6 units in 1977. A House Foreign Relations Committee report, released in March 1982, blames the CIA and the State Department for "negligence" in allowing that ship- ment. Numerous press reports charge that it was considerably more than negligence. A British Independent Television program, for example, stated that the arms deal was, set up by the CIA itself. South Africa's nuclear weapons capabil- ity - or most likely actual possession of nuclear weapons - presents a grave threat to its neighbors and the liberation move- ments in Southern Africa. South Africa at this time is illegally occupying Namibia, has launched numerous invasions into Angola, built up terrorist groups in Mozambique, and launched subversive opera- tions against Zimbabwe. Still, on balance, the rule of white minority regimes has collapsed in most of Southern Africa and is under strong pressure in Namibia and South Africa itself. With nuclear weapons, the South African government apparently hopes it will be able to hold on to power in the face of massive opposition for many years to come. CounterSpy encourages the use of its articles in not-for-profit publications. Other publications interested in re- printing CounterSpy materials must request permission in writing. All reprints of CounterSpy must be credited and include CounterSp_ y's address. Sim- ilarly, researchers and journalists using documents originally obtained by CounterSpy must credit CounterSpy magazine. CIA Documents on East Timor Months before the Indonesian military laun- ched a full-scale invasion of East Timor in December 1975, the Ford administration, with intelligence supplied by the CIA and the National Security Agency, knew about Indonesia's determination to annex East Timor. The U.S. government fully condoned the invasion, even though Indonesia used U.S. weapons illegally in its aggression. The CIA's own National Intelligence Daily, a secret news sheet for high government officials, revealed these facts. Copies of the Daily, obtained and reprinted by the Australian National Times, show that the U.S. government knew Indo- nesia was waging "clandestine" warfare against East Timor, then a Portuguese island colony on its way to independence, as early as 1974. The Indonesian govern- ment was apparently aware that the leftist and nationalist Fretilin liberation move- ment in East Timor had strong popular backing. To counter these "communist elements," wrote the National Intelligence Daily on August 15, 1975, Indonesian "special forces located in Indonesian Timor are preparing teams of Timorese refugees to cross the border and establish guerrilla bases .... The teams have been given military training and may be used to stimulate a popular uprising." Indonesia's operations, commented the Daily three days later, "may lead to a more serious break- down in law and order. " The National Intelligence Daily further reported that Fretilin was well on its way CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 to victory in August, despite Indonesian subversion. Most of the East Timorese army had joined Fretilin, and Indonesian-spon- sored "public demonstrations" favoring "integration" with Indonesia never materia- lized. Indonesia was following a "two track approach toward the Timor problem:" publicly, it claimed to adhere to a hands- off policy and called on Portugal, the colonial power, to assist in getting talks underway between the different Timorese political groups. But privately, Indonesia "stepped up covert military operations inside Timor, including use of Indonesian special forces units to support pro-Indonesian Publicly, it claimed to adhere to a hands-off policy .... but privately, Indonesia "stepped up covert military operations inside Timor, including use of Indonesian special forces units to support pro- Indonesian Timorese." Timorese." On September 3, for example, some 100 Indonesian special forces entered East Timor; on September 18, 200 more were added. The Indonesian government had decided on a strategy of creating chaos and unrest in East Timor to be able to launch a full-scale intervention later with the claim that it was needed to restore peace and order. The Indonesian government, which needed US. arms badly, was extremely con- cerned about the use of U.S. weapons in the operations - going so far as to purchase other weapons from Malaysia. The government knew that using U.S. weapons 6 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 for an offensive purpose violated U.S. arms export laws. The National Intelli- gence Daily referred to this concern numerous times, but the Ford administra- tion was not interested in blocking the invasion. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger laid down the line: U.S. inter- ests in East Timor, he wrote, "relate solely to our broader interests" in the region. "U . S. interests at this time would appear to be best served by following Indonesia's lead on the issue." Indonesia launched the invasion in early December 1975 - carefully coor- dinated to begin after President Ford ended his state visit to Indonesia - when Indonesian "marine and airborne troops equipped with U.S. weapons mounted a full- scale attack" against East Timor's capi- tal, Dili. As a direct consequence of the invasion, in the following four years some 100,000 out of the 700,000 East Timorese people died - killed in a vicious coun- terinsurgency compaign and starved in the famine induced by Indonesian crop destruc- tion. The Indonesian government continued to be concerned about foreign reaction to the invasion. It managed to prevent a United Nations delegation from visiting areas still ' controlled by Fretilin and staged a carefully prepared show for the delegation in areas controlled by Indones- ian troops. Planning to keep the delegation out of Fretilin territory included serious Indonesian consideration of a plan to "sink the.frigate with the [ U. N. ] envoy on board." On February 13, 1976, the CIA attested to the fact that the Indonesian army suf- fered "severe casualties" in the invasion but also claimed that Fretilin was "disin- tegrating." Today, after seven years of Indonesian occupation of East Timor, Fretilin has yet to disintegrate. CORRECTIONS: We apologize for two mis- takes in our last issue. Due to a lay- out mistake, a paragraph in "U.S. Army Manuals Say: We Can Win a Nuclear War" was printed twice (p. 8). In addition, we omitted the credit for the layout of our cover page. It was done by Johanna Vogelsang. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Better Intelligence The Reagan administration is not the only one that is "unleashing" intelligence agencies and emphasizing their importance. The Japanese government reportedly is not satisfied with the quality of its intelli- gence either. The Foreign Ministry announced in August 1982 that it will establish "two new divisions under the Research and Planning Department to... strengthen the information gathering and analysis network to cope with the fast changing world situation." The intelli- gence division will be responsible for setting up a central computerized data bank "with the ability to store and pro- vide information 24 hours a day." CIA in Australia When Vice President George Bush met with Australian Labor Party Leader Bill Hayden earlier this year, Hayden spent most of the 30-minute meeting asking Bush about the Nugan Hand Bank. While the Nugan Hand issue has been all but ignored in the U.S. media (except for a three-part series in the Wall Street Journal in August 1982), in Australia it is an almost daily story. In fact, the scandal could well bring down the government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. Nugan Hand was not an ordinary bank. In January 1980, its director Frank Nugan was found shot dead in his car. Shortly after, it was revealed that the Bank was millions of dollars in debt and had de- frauded hundreds of investors. Moreover, enough "U.S. military and intelligence officers worked for Nugan Hand to run a small-sized war ." These included former CIA Director William Colby, former CIA Deputy Director Walter McDonald, former CIA Chief of Station in Thailand, Robert Jansen, Admiral Earl Yates and former Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, General Leroy Manor. Tom Clines, until 1978 director of training in the CIA's Clandestine Services ("dirty tricks") department, went to Australia shortly after Frank Nugan's death and the subsequent collapse of the bank. He met with Bernard Houghton, a former U.S. intelligence officer and bank manager. Many Australians are convinced that the Bank collaborated with U.S. intelli- gence agencies in international arms deals and drug running, and funneled CIA money to various political parties. The Bank's involvement in heroin trade from Southeast Asia to Australia, Europe and the United States was made public in an Australian government investigation. The CIA denies any involvement with the Nugan Hand Bank, but U.S. authorities - CIA, FBI, and Customs Service - stead- fastly refuse to release documents on the bank. Yet records found in Frank Nugan's office include documents which are unre- lated to banking, such as. "long, periodi- cally filed reports about military and political activities" in Indochina. Nugan Hand people have also been in contact with former CIA officer Edwin Wilson (now being tried in the U.S. for allegedly violating arms export laws) and several -Congressper- sons. The Nugan Hand Bank has been involved in arms sales to South Africa and to the White Rhodesian minority government before its defeat. (Australia has reportedly become a center for arms deals for the CIA and other agencies, because Australian law forbids international arms dealing only if the arms actually pass through Australia.) According to the Australian National Times (9/12-18/82), the Nugan Hand Bank was also used to funnel money to CIA contract opera- tive Mitchell WerBell. WerBell reportedly "conducted operations for U.S. intelli- gence on a regular basis" and was some- times paid through Nugan Hand. (WerBell originally became useful for the CIA when Many Australians are convinced that the Bank collaborated with U.S. intelligence agencies in international arms deals and, drug running, and funneled CIA money to various political parties. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 7 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 he designed silencers for machineguns to be used in the Phoenix assassination pro- gram in Vietnam, then headed by William Colby . ) The Australian government investiga- tion of the Nugan Hand affair, some jour- nalists and parliamentarians charge, amounts to a cover-up. One key question it ignores is why Australia's intelligence agency, ASIO, aided Bernard Houghton, a prominent bank officer (and a former U.S. intelligence officer) in obtaining a security clearance. And why did high government officials stop a probe into Nugan Hand's drug trade links in the mid-, 1970s? Prime Minister Fraser says he accepts CIA assurances that the CIA was never involved in the Nugan Hand Bank. Parlia- mentarians, however, have refused to let the matter die. As more and more facts about the Bank and its international links reach the public, Fraser is having an increasingly hard time convincing Austra- lians that his government has done every- thing in its power to investigate Nugan Hand. APSA and the CIA Guess who's been studying how to govern the world? The CIA. According to PS magazine, the journal of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Mark Lichbach of the University of Illinois (Chicago) recently won a CIA contract "to develop statistical models of govern- ability on a global basis . " PS reported in the same issue (Summer 1982) that a second political scientist - although not on CIA contract - will be exa- mining another topic of intense interest to the CIA: Mexico's food system. (See "CIA: Plowshares into Swords,", CounterSpy, vol. 4, no. 1.) Steven E. Sanderson, an assistant professor from the University of Florida, will research "U.S. agricultural food policy and the future of the Mexican food crisis in the 1980s (May 1983-August 1983)" at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, headed by former CIA officer and consultant James Billington. The CIA is making inroads in yet another "scholarly" field. PS announced the names of 26 federal executives chosen 8 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 to participate in the 1982-83 "Congres- sional Fellowship Program." Congressional Fellows, explains PS, "serve as profes- sional staff assistants for members of Congress and congressional committees." "Agencies engaged in substantial activity with foreign governments," it goes on, "were invited to nominate candidates for the Foreign Affairs Program section." Robin Schreiber, of the CIA, "assisted" the selection committee, and two CIA employees, John P. Maher and Steven E. Meyer, were selected as Foreign Affairs Fellows. (Someone should remind the APSA? that the CIA is prohibited by its own charter from such governmental activity, foreign or domestic.) Other fellows selected included: John P. Harrod (United States Information Agen- cy); Carl L. Leininger (Army); William J. Wight (Army); Timothy K. Sanders (Army); Gilbert R. Reed (Navy); Donald E. Gillis (Navy) ; Renee L. Anderson (Defense) ; Michael A. Hardin (Defense Intelligence Agency); and Cynthia J. Taylor (National Security Agency). Finally, PS revealed the attitude of the APSA toward "scholarly pursuits" on behalf of the CIA when it described the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CST)' as "an institutional focus for the growing need to articulate a balanced, coherent understanding of the role of intelligence in a free society." CSI was created in 1979 by CIA Director William Casey and others as a project of the Na- tional Strategy Information Center. CSI appeared shortly after a secret CIA plan was formulated to create just such "academic" institutions. It is run by former CIA officials and ultra-rightists such as Ray Cline and Roy Goodson of Georgetown University. Perhaps the PS's only honest admission is that the CSI strives "to promote professional contacts among scholars in the field," or, in CIA jargon, to cultivate academic assets. CounterSpy is available in microfilm from University Microfilms Interna- tional, 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR, Ann Arbor, MI 48106; and 30-32 Mortimer St., Dept. PR, London W19 7RA, England. CounterSpy is indexed in Alternative Press Index, P. O. Box 7229, Baltimore, MD 21218. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 VICTORY FOR STRAUSS To the delight of the Reagan administra- tion, West Germany has a new conservative government. The Christian Democrats, led by Helmut Kohl (now Chancellor) and Franz Josef Strauss, came to power not by elec- tion but through a parliamentary maneuver that ousted the Social Democratic govern- ment. It is expected that the new govern- ment - with the exception of the Soviet natural gas pipeline issue - will follow the U.S. line closely. Indeed, in one of his first TV interviews after becoming Chancellor, Kohl denounced his predecessor Helmut Schmidt as having created frictions with the U.S. and moved too close to the Soviet Union. As the head of the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democratic Party, Franz Josef Strauss is undoubtedly a key figure in the new government, although he holds no Cabinet post. He ran for Chancellor in the 1980 elections but was defeated. According to a recent article in Der Spiegel, operatives of the CIA, British intelligence and French intelligence (SDECE) actively assisted the Strauss cam- paign in 1980. Der Spiegel bases its charges on secret West German intelligence documents made public by former BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst, West Germany's CIA) officer Hans Langemann. (See "CIA, BND and the Nazis," CounterSpy, vol. 7, no. 1.) Langemann wrote a secret memo to Bavaria's Interior Minister and Strauss- confidant, Gerold Tandler, in November 1979: 1. The militant-conservative London- based writer Brian Crozier ... and his wideranging, international-political circle of friends are at this point, in the process of building an anony- mous action group ("a transnational security organization") .... Crozier is a long time CIA operative. We have to assume as certain that the CIA is fully aware of his activities. According to the Langemann memo, former SDECE Director Meronges, M16 (British intelligence) Director , "Dickie" Franks, and Nicholas Elliott, another former high- ranking M16 official, were involved in the group. Crozier, Elliott and Franks recently met with Mrs. Thatcher for a working meeting. We have to assume that M16 is fully ,aware of the project, and we might want to assume that it is one of the most important sponsors of this anonymous security organization. The excellent journalist Robert Moss has very close ties to Mrs.. Thatcher and Mr. Franks, together with Fred Luchsinger [ editor in chief of the Swiss Neue Zuericher Zeitung ] ... and others is being used by the group in the promotion of news items and articles. Langemann explained that the secret organization had two primary goals: to bring conservative governments to power in Britain and West Germany. The Crozier group planned to solicit "certain well- known journalists in Britain, the USA and other countries" to write articles and to use the resources of the various intelli- gence organizations to promote its goals. In addition, the Crozier group hoped to use "covert financial transactions for political purposes." This money was to be used "for the execution of international campaigns aiming to discredit hostile persons." The Langemann memo continues: According to a recent article in Der Spiegel, operatives of the CIA, British. intelligence and French intelligence (SDECE) actively assisted the Strauss [electoral] campaign in 1980. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 9 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 2. Crozier, together with his group, as it appears to the non-insider, did initiate the project VICTORY FOR STRAUSS with a journalistic or covert strategy similar to the one used in Great Britain (main topics: communist- extremist subversion of the governing party and unions, KGB-masterminding of terrorism, ... etc.). Langemann identified a second group of former and present intelligence offi- cials who were working to assist Strauss in coming to power: the so-called Pinay- Cercie, so named after the former French President Antoine Pinay. Langemann described this group as a "loosely tied organization... of conservative-anti-communist politicians, writers, bankers and VIPs from other professions." Members included former CIA Director William Colby, Chair- person of the Federal Reserve Bank Paul Volker, Heritage Foundation president Ed Feulner, South African General Frazer and persons with close ties to West European intelligence agencies. In a January 1980 meeting in Switzerland, the Pinay Cercle (with Crozier, former Defense Intelligence Agency Director Stilwell, Elliott and others attending) decided to work towards improving " Strauss' inter- national image. The Crozier-Pinay Cercle strategy was not immediately successful. For most West QliELLE'~'_c:JL1TZ sETrRAGS Serrn Staatsaini.ter - our ver,Snlich - ZWn STAATSSCHUTZ 'j tom/ 6!t?.~- /.., t Brian C r o s i e r . lenam - The Hulitnationals gad International Security - lr.J.kt 'Victory for STRAUSS' 2 Aalapn so der beisafisten Notiz Utardurtb erlauba icb air. sins bier erst.llte Behr vertrsulich. ltotis sun betreffatbe.s =it der Ditto us Janutis.&hms "r, lsse.. NUnch.a. des S. November. 1979 Abteiluas I F Germans, the prospect of having the ultra- conservative Strauss as chancellor was far more threatening than whatever, they might have believed about the KGB subversion of West Germany Crozier and his cohorts had warned about. Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume, that the VICTORY FOR STRAUSS campaign has not ended with its first defeat. The Christian Democrats are in power now, and elections are coming up in March 1983. Chemical Warfare Preparations The Pentagon is not only getting ready for nuclear war in Europe, but chemical and biological war as well. The U.S. Army is building a $1.65 million nuclear, biologi- cal and chemical warfare training facility at Grafenwoehr Army base in southern Ger- many. Unlike other facilities at Grafen-' woehr , this site is to be "utilized by U.S..forces only." Preparations for the construction of the facility are underway at a time when many Europeans have sharply criticized U.S. chemical war plans. Several German publications and TV programs recently revealed that U.S. forces maintain a large secret chemical weapons storage site near Fischbach, West Germany. Numerous citi- zens and organizations in the Fischbach area are pressuring the West German govern- ment to provide information about the nature of the facility, and to remove it from West Germany. The government has been forced to acknowledge that large quantities - estimated at thousands of tons - of highly lethal materials are being stored in Fischbach. Previously, most U.S. chemical weapons in Europe were stored in France, but President Charles de Gaulle, in the 1960s, forced the U.S. to remove their chemical weapons. The West German govern- ment, however, claims it is powerless to move the site from Fischbach since, under the NATO Treaty, West German sovereignty does not extend to U.S. military faeilties on its soil. Langemann memo to Tandler 10 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Prejudices Some U.S. State Attorneys are making re- markably frank statements these days. Peter K. Nunez, the prosecuting attorney in the case of Benjamin Sasway, the Cali- fornian who refused to register for the draft, stated in court that "Mr. Sasway's actions have not been based on any moral or religious conviction, but on his poli- tical beliefs." The judge in the case, Federal Magistrate Gordon Thompson, Jr., apparently had no qualms about convicting Sasway for his political beliefs. He handed down a two-and-a-half year sentence - two years more than the prosecutor had demanded. Meanwhile, in a different vein, a Federal prosecutor in Richmond, Virginia, David P. Baugh, confronted Federal District Judge D. Dortch Warriner in the following courtroom exchange on September 23, 1982: Baugh: "Very often, people, including me, have gotten upset with the coddling of 'white-collar crimes,' but from reviewing the records, it appears the color of the collar is not the key." Warriner : "Are you the court sentences people their race?" suggesting that on the basis of Baugh: "Yes, Your Honor." Warriner: "You are wrong." Prior to this exchange, Baugh had com- pared the judge's sentences for two White men with those of two Black men. One White man got a 6+-month sentence for con- spiring to obstruct justice, threatening a witness, and income tax evasion. Another White man got a 10-month sentence and a $25,000 fine for income tax evasion, making false statements, and attempting to in- fluence a grand jury witness in a million- dollar gambling case. In sharp contrast to these rulings, the judge gave a 14- month sentence and $5,000 fine to a Black man for stealing $3, 000 worth of military jackets, and 21 years to another Black man for stealing twelve rifles. Baugh is scheduled to become chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attor- ney's Office in Tyler, Texas. The New York Times reported that Judge Warriner called Baugh's assertion "despicable." A Richmond civil rights lawyer, Oliver Hill, countered that Baugh's statement was "not despicable or irresponsible but has a whole lot of basis behind it in the black community." The Old Dominion Bar Associa- tion has called for an investigation. CIA Successfully Courts the Courts "Whatever the truth may be, it remains either unrevealed or unconfirmed. We can- not assume, as the appelants would have us, that the CIA has nothing left to hide. To the contrary, the record before us sug- gests either that the CIA has something to hide or that it wishes to hide from our adversaries the fact that it has nothing to hide." (D. C. Court of Appeals, 1981 in Military Audit Project v. Casey.) So-called "national security" concerns are becoming an increasingly decisive factor in court decisions regarding intelligence agencies and constitutional rights. In one recent decision (Gardels v. CIA), the U.S. Court of Appeals (Washington, D.C. Circuit) affirmed a lower court ruling that the CIA could refuse to confirm or deny past or present contacts at the University of Cali- fornia, Los Angeles. It based its decision on section 403(d)(3)' of the National Security Act of 1947 "that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" - CaunterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 11 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 even though the CIA could not "prove conclusively that, if it responded, some intelligence source or method would in fact be compromised." This decision, of course, confirms, that ? there are covert CIA operatives on U.S. campuses, espe- cially since the CIA itself furnished affidavits and depositions asserting that it "Uses as intelligence sources, covert contacts with American academics and stu- dents at American schools, and in general has continued to maintain such contacts." The court admittedly made its decision on? the basis of the "good faith" of the CIA - an agency which has a documented history of duplicity. (The Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's predecessor, used to give a course entitled, "Lying.") The court strongly supported the CIA's need to hide its academic agents from foreign intelligence services because "the CIA has the, right to assume that foreign intelligence agencies are zealous ferrets." The court, however, ignored (and the CIA didn't mention) the fact that some of these covert operatives spy on, sabotage, assess and recruit U.S. students and academicians. One such operative, for example, was in the habit of sending the confidential files of some Princeton University students to the CIA without their knowledge. This practice is nothing short of a police state operation. It so undermines the functioning of academic life that even the upper echelons of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology - who have worked closely with the CIA - have rejected it. The CIA has refused to end this practice and the court's decision contributes to this continuation. In a second case, Navasky v. CIA, the Supreme Court let stand a ruling by the Court of- Appeals (New York) that the CIA is not, obliged to reveal the names of authors, titles and publishers of some 1,000 books it published in the 1960s. While deciding for the CIA in both cases on the basis of the National Security Act' of 1947, the courts conveniently ignored equally important components of that Act violated by the CIA. The CIA is bound by law only "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" and is prohibited from "internal security functions." For the courts to piously invoke the National Security Act to cover CIA actions prohibited by the same act goes beyond duplicity to complic- ity with the CIA. 12 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 The D.C. Court of Appeals also sided with the CIA in the case Halkin v. Richard Helms, et al., which concerned Operation CHAOS, the CIA's largest known illegal, domestic operation. If one were to substitute "DINA" (Chilean Intelligence) for "CIA," the decision would read like one by General Pinochet's rubberstamping courts in Chile. Typical of the police state reasoning involved was the court's refusal to issue an injunction forbidding the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) from future interceptions of private communications" by U.S. citizens. The court conceded that such interception, If proven, would constitute "an injury in fact." But the plaintiffs, said the court, could not prove that the NSA had intercepted their private , communication even though it was demonstrated that the CIA had submitted "watchlists" of their names to the NSA. The court did not con- sider this proof adequate, particularly since the NSA, under state secrets privi- lege, did not have to say whether it had intercepted conversations of persons on these watchlists. Summarizing its deci- sion, the court said, "As in the 'other cases in which the need to protect sen- sitive information affecting the national security clashes with fundamental consti- tutional rights of individuals, we believe that 'The responsibility must be where the power is.'" There was no denial of the charge of this case that the CIA surveilled,, moni- tored, compiled files, and intervened in the legal political activities of the plaintiffs. Depite this fact, the court refused to declare that Operations CHAOS and related operations had been illegal; denied any relief or damage to the plain- tiffs and refused an injunction against future CHAOS-type operations even though the plaintiffs pointed out that President Reagan's Executive Order 12333 allows such operations. As in the NSA component of the deci- sion, the court allowed the CIA to with- hold information - supposedly essential for the plaintiffs to prove their case. The extent of the court's complicity was demon- strated by the shallow defense it gave for allowing the CIA to withhold information. It argued that the naming of covert sour ces and agents (who were violating the law) would undermine national security. More- over, it said, since this was a question of national security, the court was not CONTINUED ON PAGE 36 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Features Haiti: IMF or Duvalier - Choice Between Two Evils by Walden Bello Events in Haiti are building toward a dra- matic climax. Over the last year and a half, the superficial stability of the reign of Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier, son and successor of the late Papa Doc, has been shattered by the country's most severe economic crisis and worst political infighting in over a decade. The crisis has triggered a struggle between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and dominant factions of the Duvalier ruling coalition over Haiti's economic policy. In February 1982, the Fund was able to impose, Marc Bazin, a World Bank technocrat, as Finance Minister. Bazin's Fund-orchestrated drive against corruption and mismanagement, however, only succeeded in alienating the opposing factions of the Duvalier elite. In a rare display of unity, these cliques managed to oust the Fund's man in July, after only five months in office. Roots of the Crisis The context in which the Bazin affair un- folded was a seemingly irreversible un- raveling of the "export-oriented model" of development imposed on Haiti in the early seventies by a fragile alliance of "enlight- ened" elements of the Duvalier elite in control of the state machine; the mulatto business class; and foreign capital. The strategy, which was copied from Puerto Rico, consisted of expanding primary pro- duct exports, like coffee, to the U.S. and other markets; attracting foreign investors to set up reexport, "assembly-plant" indus- tries by offering dirt-cheap labor and numerous tax exemptions; developing tour ism; and drawing large quantities of aid from the U.S., World Bank, and other multi- lateral lending institutions. The Haitian economic configuration which emerged by the late seventies mani- fested all the contradictions of this pat- tern of development. More than 250 foreign companies--most of them U.S. firms with political risk insurance from the U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)--had set up shop, taking advantage of the $2.60 minimum daily wage.. Being mere assembly plants, importing most of their raw materials and producing mainly for export, these enterprises did not trig- ger the "forward" and "backward" linkages necessary for an integrated and viable industrial sector. And since their markets were abroad, both foreign capital and the new Haitian entrepreneurs could afford to turn a blind eye to the grinding poverty of most Haitians. According to a secret World Bank memorandum obtained by Counter- (Walden Bello is the director of the Congress _Taskforce of the Philippine Solidarity Network and the Coalition against the Marcos Dictator- ship. His book, Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines (coauthored with David Kinley and Elaine Elinson) has just been re- leased by the Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.) CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 13 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 , Haiti's economic growth did not even touch the vast majority of the country's four million people. As of 1976, the top 0.4 percent of the population absorbed 43.7 percent of the national income, while more than 80 percent of the people had an average income of less than $100 a year.2 Directed by the IMF and the World Bank, Bazin initiated a number of dramatic "reformist" efforts which pushed him into direct confrontation with the ruling coalition. Agriculture was largely sacrificed to the demands of the export-oriented industry. Between 1970 arkd 1979, agricul- tural growth was negative. 3 Perhaps most symbolic of this subjugation of agricul- ture, on which 70 percent of the popula- tion depends for its livelihood, is the Canadian-proposed project to flood the Artibonite Valley, which contains some of the most fertile land in Haiti, to supply electricity to the foreign-owned export industries in the capital city, Port-Au- Prince. Together with the destruction of agriculture, the other significant nega- tive impact of export-oriented industriali- zation has been the rapid denationalization of the country's land and other resources. Ninety-nine-year leases for choice tracts of land have been awarded to many U.S. and other foreign investors. At one point, the government even considered leasing the whole island of Tortuga to a huge textile subsidiary, Dupont Caribbean. "Pirate Capitalism" Side by side with the activities of foreign capitalists, a freewheeling "pirate" capi- talism practiced by Haitian businessper- sons with strong ties to Duvalier and con- 14 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 nections with the underground in the U.S. emerged. Some gathered blood plasma from islanders and shipped it to the United States. Others took advantage of the rural crisis which is driving out Haitian peasants by smuggling them at exorbitant prices to Florida. Still others, many of them in the military and bureaucracy, made huge profits selling thousands of Haitians to virtual slavery in the sugar-cane fields of the Dominican Republic. According to the Anti-Slavery Society of London, many Haitian cane-cutters have been sold for as little as $3.30 per head.5 The Model Comes Apart This dream of making Haiti the "Taiwan of the Caribbean"--to use the words of the U.S. Agency for International Development administrator Peter McPherson -came crash- ing down in 1980. Coffee exports, which normally account for over 50 percent of foreign exchange earnings, were savaged by Hurricane Allen in the summer of 1980 and by falling prices. From $89 million in fiscal year 1980, export , earnings from coffee plummeted to $35 million in fiscal year 1981. The decline in coffee earnings was paralleled by a decline of earnings from Haiti's other primary product exports, bauxite and essential oils. With exports taking a nose-dive while imports kept rising--the classic dilemma' of the neocolonial economy--Haiti experi- enced a severe balance-of-payments crisis. The deficit reached a record $55 million in 1981. Foreign exchange reserves were quickly exhausted. Haiti's currency, the gourde, became virtually inconvertible, and payments arrears to external creditors and suppliers hit $20 million by March 1982. The inability to get hard cash to fin- ance necessary imports, Haitian finan- cial authorities informed the IMF, "has further eroded private sector confidence and has led to a massive outflow of Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 . Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 capital."7 Prominent U.S. firms led the pack of deserters: The American-owned Campagnie des Tabacs Comme 11 Faut, Haiti's only manufacturer of cigarettes; Reynolds Metals, the only producer of bauxite; and First National Bank of Chicago. Debts and Payoffs The balance of payments deficit could only be bridged by external loans. Haiti had negotiated a three-year Extended Fund Facility Agreement with the IMF in 1978, but drawings from this source were sus- pended in 1981, when public expenditures escalated and the budget deficit reached an all-time high. What particularly incensed the Fund was that Haiti's system of institutionalized corruption was seri- ously aggravating the crisis. Reliable re- ports confirm that Baby Doc and his people in the bureaucracy skimmed off as much as 38 percent of tax revenues. This left central authorities no other option than to finance necessary expenditures by going into deficit--i.e., creating money. This corruption and its impact on the economy intensified even further in 1981, when Duvalierists began to pocket significant amounts of the loans from multilateral banks which were supposed to bridge the balance-of-payments deficit .... An IMF cred- it of $20 million, for instance, vanished without a trace ! Donors Put on the Squeeze It was at this juncture that the Interna- tional Committee of foreign aid donors to Haiti--composed of governments of countries with major investments in the island-- pulled together behind the IMF to demand stringent conditions on the use of aid' funds . Canada suspended its biggest aid projects on the ground that funds were being misused by Haitian project staffers, and this provided a precedent that other donors found tempting to follow. Threatened with economic collapse, Duvalier agreed to the appointment of technocrat Bazin in February 1982. An important factor which secured Duvalier's compliance with the IMF- directed move was pressure from a signifi- cant sector of the mulatto bourgeoisie whose operations were being swallowed up in the absence of foreign exchange. Directed by the IMF and the World Bank, Bazin initiated a number of dramatic "reformist" efforts which pushed him into direct confrontation with the ruling coali- tion. He tried to ram through an institu- tional separation between the Central Bank and the National Bank of Credit--the key institutional link in the siphoning off of millions of dollars of aid money to Duva- lier and his cronies. Bazin also organ- ized an "anti-corruption drive" directed at smugglers and important personalities illegally exempted from paying import duties and other taxes. This brought him directly up against Ernest Bennett, Duva- lier 's father-in-law, who controls key sectors of the export-import trade, includ- ing coffee, cars stolen from the U.S., Eastern European vehicles, and large segments of the country's drug traffic. In return for Bazin's appointment, the Fund ? prepared a $40 million standby program for Haiti, But the conditions were stringent. Just a few weeks before Bazin was fired, the. Haitian authorities agreed with the IMF to make drastic cuts in government spending, limit central Bank lending to the private sector, and "defi- nitely" separate the Central Bank from the National Credit Bank. Perhaps the most important index of the loss of control represented by the agreement was the Haitian government's agreement to get the assent of the Managing Director of the Fund before approving any economic project requiring priva8te financing from inter- national banks. In other words, with the excuse of putting the house in order, the IMF was demanding the same broad powers which have led to its virtual control of official economic decision-making in many other Third World countries (e.g., the Philippines). CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 15 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Duvalierists Stymie the Fund Bazin and the Fund posed a threat to all sectors of the ruling coalition and forced them into a rare show of unity. They decided to sack Bazin in July. In this instance, Bennett, through his daughter Michelle (Baby Doe's wife) managed to form a momentary alliance with his archrival, Jean-Claude's mother, Simone, who is re- garded as the "guardian of the revolution" and the bulwark of Papa Doe's "Old Guard" Duvalierists. While expelling Bazin, Duva- lier nonetheless promised to follow the .Fund agreement to the letter--a promise no one believed. The key actor is the U.S. government, which still has to decide whether Baby Doc's staunch anti- Communism outweighs the costs of his repressive rule and economic mismanagement. In the wake of Bazin's departure, how- ever, events in Haiti have become even more volatile. With their common enemy gone, Ernest and Michelle Bennett successfully exiled Simone Duvalier to Paris. They have thus gained the edge in determining the succession to Baby Doc, said to be seriously ill with lupus. But they have also won the undying enmity of Papa Doe's still wide following, the Tonton Macoutes (an ,organized gang of thugs acting as NNYARN M. af~ue we -rance 1 Benin Chad C anne loo 11 Congo DI I bou 11 Ivory Coast Gabor Niger Senegal Togo, U p per Volta French Guiana. Guadeloupe. Martinique. Fleun,o Europe 250 F F Others 300 F F security force" loyal to Duvalier). " Significant sections of the mulatto busi- ness class, foreign investors, and the IMF now seriously distrust Baby Doc, and the potential for a powerful coalition against him exists in Haiti. The key actor is the U.S. government, which still has to decide whether Baby Doe's staunch anti-Communism outweighs the costs of his repressive rule and economic mismanagement. For the vast majority of the Haitian people, however, such a regime change would mean nothing positive whatsoever. Nevertheless, the deep economic and poli- tical crisis and instability might provide an opportunity for the further emergence of a genuine democratic opposition in Haiti. 1) Business Week, May 3, 1982. 2) World Bank, Memorandum on the Haitian Economy (Washington, D.C., World Bank, May 13, 1981. 3) Ibid. 4) Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Third Quarter, 1982, p. 20. 5) New York Times, Aug. 30, 1982. 6) Statement Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, April 21, 1982. 7) International Monetary Fund, "Haiti-Standby Agree- ment," Aug. 11, 1982. 8) Ibid. Please fill end return to : AFRIGUE?AS1t,13, no d'Uzes, 75002 PARIS NAME: .......................................................................... Firstname :.................................................................... Address :....................................................................... 16 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Nicaragua: A Bay of Pigs in the Making by Jeff McConnell A new Bay of Pigs invasion appears to be in preparation. Evidence is mounting that the Reagan administration is planning a major military assault against Nicaragua, the nation from which the CIA's invasion of Cuba originated in 1961. Rumors of preparations by the Honduran armed forces, their anti-Sandinista allies, and their U.S. advisers have been accumulating since mid-summer 1982. A Wall Street Journal dispatch from Tegucigalpa, for instance, reported that prominent "Honduran and U.S. sources here keep whispering about a November or December 1982 invasion."1 Whether these whispers are intended to provoke or inform, they indicate a readi- ness or perhaps an eagerness for war. Yet, longstanding 'internal conflicts in the anti-Sandinista coalition working out of Honduras and Costa Rica, which have become severe since July, probably caused the Honduran armed forces to abort an invasion of Nicaragua planned for late July or early August. This information converges with two other recent suggestions of such war plans. The Washington Post reported that an unnamed "senior State Department official" (possibly Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders) has stated in a background briefing that "the level of opposition to Nicaragua's Sandinista government has become substantial and is continuing to grow." The official also said that "there is a belief among its neighbors that Nicaragua, as presently constituted, may be incompatible with the rest of Central America. This basic question will have to be faced in the future. "2 A week later, on August 31,, Colonel Leonidas Torres Arias, head of Honduran military intelligence from 1976 to January 1982, held a press conference in Mexico City to raise "a voice of alarm." (The government had sent him into "diplomatic exile" in April.) He claimed that Honduras' military chief, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez and his "cronies" were planning an "adventure of madness" against Nicaragua. The Honduran high com- mand subsequently discharged Colonel Torres Arias and accused him of treason. Subversion, Phase I Reports of this kind have circulated twice before. Each time, they have appeared in the wake of National Security Council meetings (in November 1981 and in late March 1982) during which U.S. covert poli- cies against Nicaragua were finalized. In these meetings, the NSC reportedly approv- ed a large covert aid program for groups and individuals throughout Central America in order to "achieve long-term stability in Central America by creating, nurturing and supporting new political coalitions of centrist forces in Nicaragua and other key countries ."4 The overt counterparts of this program are the Caribbean Basin plan of trade and investment incentives for U.S. business and the enlarged program of military aid to the region. The covert (Jeff McConnell is a political activist living in Cambridge, Massachusetts.) CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 17 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 program consists - of CIA-directed intelli- gence, political and paramilitary opera- tions. Twenty million dollars was allocated for covert paramilitary opera- tions against the Sandinistas , and "significantly" more for an aid program for "moderate economic and political forces" in . Nicaragua. 5 The NSC also man- dated dramatic increases in the embassy staff in neighboring Honduras, largely in the CIA and Department of Defense person- nel. According to numerous reports, the CIA has been providing training, money and arms to former Nicaraguan National Guard members for paramilitary operations, using representatives from Honduras, Chile, Colombia, Ve iezuela and Argentina as intermediaries. Ronald Reagan approved the first phase of the paramilitary plan in November 1981. Almost immediately the State Department orchestrated a propaganda cam- paign against Nicaragua (portraying its government' as totalitarian, bent on domi- nating Central America, and sold out to Moscow), and other signs indicating that an offensive was upcoming appeared. Indeed, soon after, former Nicaraguan National Guard members based in Honduras and their Honduran military allies launched A new Bay of Pigs invasion appears to be in preparation. Evidence is mounting that the Reagan administration is planning a major military assault against Nicaragua, the nation from which the CIA's ' invasion of Cuba originated in 1961. "Operation Red Christmas." They attacked isolated Nicaraguan border settlements in the Atlantic Coast region and killed at least sixty Nicaraguans. 18 -- Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 At the same time, fabricated atrocity stories provoked many Miskito Indians in the area to flee to Honduras and join the ex-Guard members, while the Sandinista army moved other Miskitos away from the border and farther to the south. Newsweek reported that the Honduran army "snapped to 'Orange Alert' status and was prepared to invade Nicaragua until officials discov- ered that the report triggering the. alert - a rumor that Sandinista troops had crossed into Honduras and massacred 200 Miskito Indians - was false." Significant- ly, "Operation Red Christmas" coincided with a background briefing by a "senior State Department policymaker" who stated that the Nicaraguan counterrevolution was growing and worthy of U. S. support. The choice before the Reagan administration, which it would have to "face up to ... in the next six months," the official said, was "whether to allow Nicaragua to consolidate its Marfist-Leninist regime...or -act to stop it." Fighting deescalated, but soon after the March 1982 meetings of the NSC, there were fresh rumors in the Honduran armed forces that some kind . of military showdown between Honduras and Nicaragua would occur by July.8 The Reagan administration had apparently faced the third week versary of the fighting broke up to its choice. During of July, on the third anni- ouster of Somoza, heavy out in the remote border areas when Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries and their Honduran military allies staged terrorist raids into Nicaraguan territory. Forty Sandinistas and at least that many invaders were killed. At the same time, two air strikes against key Nicaraguan oil installations near Managua and on the Pacific Coast were carried out from inside Honduras, 9 and Honduras mobilized its reservists for the first time since its 1969 war with El Salvador. Joint "Exercise" A week later, U.S. and Honduran troops began what was called a "joint military exercise" in Durzuna, 35 miles north of the border with Nicaragua and 45 miles inland from Puerto Lempira, where numerous ships have been delivering heavy arms throughout 1982.10 Durzuna is also within fifteen miles of three armed camps (Morccon, Auca and Twbila) directed by Steadman Fagoth, the anti-Sandinista leader of a faction of Miskito Indians who left Nicaragua in December 1981. U.S. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 television networks filmed camouflaged American C-130 transports that flew 1,000 troops of Honduras' Fifth Infantry Battalion into Durzuna. The planes also reportedly delivered crates of automatic rifle cartridges, machine gun shells and mortars, and boxes of long-range patrol rations. The transports had originally come from the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, as did at least four helicopters used. The involvement of U.S. troops based in Panama in this operation prompted the Panamanian government to protest to the U.S. against the use of its territory for hostile acts against Nicaragua. The objective of the "joint exercise" was reportedly "the establishment of a permanent Honduran base at Durzuna, home for "an infantry battalion, supported by an artillery battery and an engineering unit" and site of an airstrip "capable of handling large transport planes and jet fighters." A Honduran Army major stressed the proximity of Durzuna to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, an important Sandinista base in, the isolated Atlantic region. While these events were unfolding in Durzuna, a U.S. landing ship, the Portland, docked at Tela on the north coast of Honduras on August 1, 1982. U.S. embassy personnel referred to it as a "routine port call," but senior Honduran Army 'offi- cers said that "the marines who came ashore were an advance party for a major exercise scheduled for November." An uni- dentified Honduran business leader told the New York Times, "There's no doubt that there is a warlike mentality," and omi- nously spoke of "soldiers who said that the peace would not last until November."11 On August 14, at the completion of the two-week maneuvers at Durzuna, Honduran officials stated they would be repeated in December. Nicaraguan sources, however, maintain that the same high level of acti- vity continued in this area throughout the summer' and into the fall. An official Honduran army announcement confirmed that 700 Honduran soldiers remained at Durzuna after the formal completion of the "exer- cise," presumably with a number of U.S. advisers. The announcement stated that they were working with Miskito refugees at nearby Morocon. It is unclear from these statements whether Nicaragua should brace itself for a major invasion or should expect a more limited border incursion. The likelihood of a more limited operation is supported by the lessons of past attacks, which appeared to be designed to provoke raids into Honduran territory in order to jus- tify retaliatory air strikes or "punishment raids."12 Even the rumors that attacks from Honduras are imminent could serve this purpose. A former Honduran army officer told the Wall Street Journal that high-ranking Honduran -army o ficers informed him that the "plan is to keep Nicaragua feeling so threatened that it comes down even harder on the growing internal opposition.... The more repressive the Sandinistas become, the greater the opposition," he said. "First you destabi- lize the Nicaraguans, then you get them to come charging over the border to divert- attention from internal problems, and then you ask for U.S. troops to help." This expectation of a "slow-moving Bay of Pigs" appears to be shared by the Sandinista leadership.13 There is also evidence that the Hon- duran military might mount a larger and more direct invasion. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Honduran mili- tary thinks "a war is necessary because.... Honduras and the rest of Central America will never have peace with the Sandinistas' Marxist government in nearby Nicaragua." Some ranking officers also appear to be "eager for battle because it would greatly strengthen the army's hand" in internal Honduran politics. Even this officer told the Journal: "The guys at the top want a war with U.S. help, because they aren't ready to go back to the barracks yet."14 CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 19 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Back1i the Slow Motion Plan The Reagan administration apparently backs the "slow motion" plan, but it appears to be concerned that it may be unable to keep General Alvarez in line. The Honduran military has become more openly supportive of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, and hostile toward the Sandinista government, since the transition to civilian rule under President Roberto Suazo Cordova who was inaugurated on January 26, 1982. General Policarpo Paz Garcia, head of the military junta until this time, stepped down, and Colonel Alvarez, soon promoted to general, took over the leadership of the Superior Council of the Armed Forces. Alvarez had headed FUSEP, the Honduran internal security force, and was thus already a very powerful man. He is also ambitious (Torres Arias called him "a man blinded by personal ambitions" who "lusts for power"), and he and his supporters in the military, along with their Reagan administration patrons, have made the transition to civilian rule merely cosmetic. There are indications, however, that Alvarez and his supporters are more interested in achieving specific military objectives whose success can immediately be gauged and in manipulating tensions in order to consolidate their own power than in becoming subservient to the United States, by playing parts in a longer-term plan, which they do not control and whose outcome is less certain. In such an effort, Alvarez could depend on the fervor created by the somewhat successful govern- ment propaganda campaign about the increas- ing threat to Honduras from terrorism and outside aggression. He has also been able to count on unity among leading Honduran officials since an August shakeup. At the same time, while Honduras and Nicaragua (not counting militias and reserves) would have roughly equivalent troop strengths in the event of a major war, Honduras would have , superior air power, which could, contrary to State Department statements, give it a decisive advantage.15 The Sand- inistas might also be forced to fight on a number of fronts, at once, given the border encampments of anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans in both Honduras and Costa Rica. And because of its political isolation, Nica- ragua would have only Cuba (and perhaps Mexico) to rely on, while Alvarez, probably correctly, believes that Honduras could depend for logistical aid on the United States, Argentina, Chile, and its other 20 -- Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 current patrons, as well as a number of Rio Treaty signatories. The tactic of provoking retaliation could also be used to start a full-scale war. Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega has claimed to have "intelligence information" about a plan to start a war "by having anti- Sandinist guerrillas dress in uniforms of the Nicaraguan Army an attack the guerrilla bases inside Honduras."1$ Not Another Fiasco U.S. concern with Alvarez appears not to be over the creation of tensions with Nicaragua or the possibility of a war, but over its timing. With the Bay of Pigs fiasco presumably on their minds, adminis- tration officials surely do not want to start a war before it is in their interest to do so or before their forces are pre- pared to fight one. More importantly, they certainly do not want to fight one this time in a context in which they would be on the wrong side of public opinion. According to a State Department source, the Honduran government discovered soon after anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans began their mid-July series of border attacks that the Sandinista Army might be preparing The choice before the Reagan administration, which it would have to "face up to ...," the official said, was "whether to allow Nicaragua to consolidate . its Marxist-Leninist regime ... or act to stop it." to launch counterattacks into Honduras. Alvarez, according to this source, was about to launch a pre-emptive attack on Nicaragua when he was blocked by the State Department. The U.S. was reportedly con- cerned that Honduras should not be viewed as the aggressor.17 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Some observers believe that Torres Arias' public revelation of Alvarez's planned "adventure of madness" was a warning to Alvarez from the United States. One well-informed source speculated that the CIA may have played a role. Torres Arias, after all, had close ties to the CIA while head of military intelligence. Arias' statement has reportedly led to new divisions inside the Honduran leadership. There were signs after his press con- ference of a slowdown in war preparations, but at the same time, Alvarez' opponents continued to disappear and the government and its allies were exploiting the take- over of the San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce in mid-September to promote domestic hysteria over external threats to Honduran security. U.S. officials are presumably unified in seeking to keep Alvarez in line, but there are said to be divisions within the CIA itself over just how the Honduran armed forces should be used. And, there continue to be conflicts between the U.S. Embassy and the contingent of Argentine advisors in Honduras. Earlier differences over support for former Nicaraguan National Guard members appear to have been resolved. The Argentines had backed these former Somoza supporters, but the CIA opposed that, maintaining that to do so would dis- credit the anti-Sandinista efforts. Now,' the Honduran armed forces are playing a larger role in the military effort against Nicaragua. The Somoza supporters are allied with former Somoza opponents (led by Jose Cardenal) and the faction of Miskito opponents of ' the Sandinistas led by Steadman Fagoth to form the FDN (Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses). The U.S. appears to be supgying and training the several FDN factions . Thus the U.S. appears to have shifted away from backing realistic alternatives to the present Sandinista leadership toward simply seeking to destabilize the junta to a point where the U.S. believes it can exact concessions. Still, Alvarez' Argentine advisers, pushing for a more aggressive Honduran posture are reported to be very influ- ential. >'9 Argentine money cemented the FDN iance.20 A number of press reports concluded that Argentina had removed its advisers during the Malvinas /Falklands war, but this conclusion was based on the false belief that Argentine forces were merely surrogates for the U.S. In fact, Argentina has been involved with former Somoza supporters in Honduras since May 1981, and probably before, and had ini- tiated talks over cooperation with the U.S. only much later. Z' The reasons for the early Argentine involvement are simple: beyond the thrill of foreign in- volvement and the connections created by the Argentine counterinsurgency training school, the Argentine officers involved were motivated by a desire to draw Honduras and the Somocistas into a new Condor-like operation against their own leftist opponents, the Montoneros, some of whom now live in Nicaragua. With the Reagan administration reapprising its policies once again in light of these variables, there may be room to act to stop what Torres Arias called the "bloody and criminal campaign" against Nicaragua. If political forces in- side the United States do not make clear to the Reagan administration that its war pol-' icy is unacceptable, however, the opportun- ity to make a difference may disappear. 1) Wall Street Journal, 9/28/82; see Latin America Week1 Re ort LAWR , 9/17/82. 2) Washington Post WP), 8/27/82. 3) New York Times ZNYT), 9/1/82. 4) WP, 3/10/82. 5) WYT, 3/11/82; 3/17/82. 6) In These Times (ITT), 3/26/82; The Nation, 3/6/82; Miami Herald (MH) 3/22/82. 7) San Francisco Exa im ner 12/30/81, Newsweek, 3/1/82, p. 20. 8) LAWR, 3/12/82. 9) LAWR, 7/30/82; 8/6/82. 10) ounterSpy, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 4; Latin America R ional Reports (LARR), 8/13/82. 11 NYT, 8/3/82. 12) 7Y-supra, #9. 13) NYT, 8/29/82. 14) 15-f supra, #1. 15) NYT, 9/11/82. 16) Cf supra, #13. 17) LARR, 9/24/82. 18) Excelsior (Mexico City), 8/10/82. 19) LAWR, 9/24/82. 20) NYT, 3/14/82; MH, 3/25/82. 21) WP7 5/31/82. Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 21 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 U.S. REPRESENTATIVES SAY: CIA Lies About Central America by John Kelly "Successful collection, rigorous analysis and able presentation do characterize most of U.S. intelligence performance world- wide," and there is "much fine performance by the intelligence community" with regard to Central America. This is according to. a September 22, 1982 staff report of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. An example of perhaps the "greatest" intelligence achievement was the El Salvador White Paper, continues the report - even though this "White Paper" on alleged Soviet-Cuban subversion in Central America has been debunked by critics ranging from the Wall Street Journal to former CIA officer Ralph McGehee. (See also: "El Salvador White Paper?," Counter- , vol. 5, no. 3; and "El Salvador White Paper- (-Cont.)," CounterSpy,vol. 5, no. 4.) Because of-this generally pro-CIA attitude of the report, its criticisms of the CIA are even more devastating, par- ticularly since they seriously challenge every major assertion by the intelligence agencies about El Salvador and Nicaragua. Addressing the March 4, 1982 briefing by CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman (which received national front-page coverage as well as TV coverage on all three networks), the Congressional report says that "the presentation was flawed by several instan- ces of overstatement and overinterpreta- tion" which "detracted somewhat from the creditibility of the presentation." For example, says the report, the briefing stated that "lots of ships have been traced" from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. Upon closer questioning, intelligence ana- lysts produced "only a very few examples." Another statement the CIA made at the briefing was that "you don't plan an operation like what is being run in El Salvador if you haven't gone to somebody's. command and general staff college." The Intelligence Committee took this statement to mean that the revolution in El Salvador was being directed by graduates of military schools in the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries. Upon questioning, though, the committee was told that this statement was a "figure of speech...." A briefing slide, captioned "Guer- rilla Financing (non-Arms)" indicated that outside sources were providing the Salva- doran guerrillas with $17 million annually. Described as "slightly inaccurate or mis- leading" by the staff report, this state- ment turned out to be simply untrue. The briefing also presented slide illustrations on so-called guerrilla pro- paganda. A prime example of guerrilla propaganda that reached the U.S. public, according to the briefers, was a Febru- ary 14, 1982, Washington Post article by Philippe Bourgois which reported an indis- criminate attack by the Salvadoran mili- tary against some 1,000 women and children, and guerrillas who had separated them- selves from the non-combatants. The slide- listed five charges made by Bourgols. Next to this list were intelligence asser-_ tions which were supposed to belie Bour Bois' report. After' Intelligence Committee members questioned them, the officials were forced to admit that Bourgois "proba- (John Kelly is co-editor of Counterspy.) 22 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Inman Complains If its true, it's a first: Democrats in the House Commit- tee on Intelligence are pro- testing certain aspects of the CIA's covert operations abroad, according to recently-resigned committee consultant, and for- mer CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman. In an Associated Press interview published in the Boston Globe (10/15/82), Inman claimed that the Demo- crats had written letters to President Reagan "critical of CIA covert actions" possibly including those in Central America. This disagreement, Inman argued, led the Democrats to vote for the public release of the committee's report, U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America. The charge was denied by committee officials. Inman resigned because of the report and complained that it "reflected a bias against U.S. policy in Central Amer- ica.'o In fact, the report fully endorses U.S. policy there. It was even cited by State Department Public Affairs Advisor Jeffrey R. Biggs in a letter to the New York Times (10/14/82) as abso- lute proof backing up the Reagan Administration's propa- ganda campaign which accuses Nicaragua of directing and arming revolutionary forces in El Salvador. In the process of com- plaining, Inman leaked an important fact: the committee's report, he stated "failed to say [thatla key'House briefing on alleged outside control of the Salvadoran insurgency was given by operational officials 'deeply enmeshed' in covert actions, not by intelligence analysts." It is not apparent what Inman is arguing here. But his assertion does do two things. It ironically con- firms charges that the CIA's "dirty tricksters" are indeed active in Central America. And it demonstrates that Con- gressional briefings, which the CIA promotes as unbiased, factual reports, are in fact sometimes given by covert agents, who can hardly be detached observers. bly was truthful in describing what he saw." The report concluded that "it was misleading to present the article as an example of guerrilla 'propaganda;' no frau- dulent media manipulation has been shown." Yet after making these criticisms, the staff report stated that the intelli- gence briefing was "based on a skillful and professional examination of data obtained from various sources. The analy- sis was impressive and of definite value to policy makers." The subcommittee also, felt that the briefing provided "convinc- ing intelligence that the Salvadoran insur- gents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for certain headquarters and logistical operations," and that there is "persuasive evidence" of Cuban and Nicaraguan support for the insurgents. The second major CIA achievement cited by the committee report was the Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence." Suffice it to say that CIA Director William Casey sent back two drafts of this study because it did not conform to his preconceptions of worldwide terrorism directed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. (In spite of these overall findings supportive of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, House Intel- ligence Committee consultant Bobby Inman resigned his post when the report was published. He described it as "seriously flawed" and complained that he had not been consulted before the report came out. Apparently, Inman wanted to influence this Congressional report investigating CIA performance during the time that he him- self was deputy director--in fact eva- luating some of the very briefings Inman had given.) Perhaps the most damning finding of the report is that "intelligence has pro- vided little firm information about the subject of violence by the [Salvadoran ] right and security forces... [and ] Infor- mation about political killings that might permit such attribution is not systemati- cally collected or analyzed." Granting the many difficulties in this area, "the staff has found that they L intelligence analysts] have simply not considered the subject of Salvadoran rightist violence as CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 23 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 a target for collection." Though the report refuses to draw this conclusion, the lack of reporting on rightist terrorism is a clear-cut case of intelligence agencies reinforcing and act- ing in complicity with U.S. government policies in El Salvador. This complicity is . exemplified by the case of the ultra- rightist Roberto d' Abuisson, president of the Salvadoran Constitutent Assembly, death squad organizer and reported graduate of the CIA's International Police Academy. After the Christian Democratic government in El Salvador arrested d'Abuisson, the U.S. in May or early June 1980, obtained documents captured in connection with the arrest. They detailed meetings, names, addresses, phone numbers, and equipment of Salvadoran rightists, and their connec- 97th Congress } Sd gsssion U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA : ACHIEVEMENTS AND SELECTED INSTANCES OF CONCERN STAFF REPORT SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND EVALUATION PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE tions to assassinations. D' Abuisson was directly linked through the documents to a coup attempt and various assassinations, including the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero. The subcommittee report traced the ,treatment of these documents as follows. [Then U.S. Ambassador Robert] White reports giving the documents to the Chief of Station, and requesting that CIA examine them closely. After this their whereabouts is unknown. The CIA analyst who covered El Salvador... did not examine them closely.... CIA's DDO [Directorate for Operations] could find no record of the documents or of any analysis. DIA [Defense Intelli- gence Agency] analysts in Washington never received or analyzed the docu- ments. Washington Post article The 4 March 1982 intelligence community briefing on external support to the Salvadoran insurgents included a section on guerrilla pro- paganda. The presentation focused on a slide, paraphrased below, which contrasted the way a Salvadoran military sweepl peration was report- ed in the Washington Post with what was known from available intelligence: Salvadoran Government Operation Cabanas Department November 1981 As reported in Washington Post article of Feb. 14 * Peasant Farmers * 1,000 women, children attacked - * Guerrillas keep away from peasants to draw. fire away. * No sophisticated weapons WW-II vintage rifles. * Little ammunition. As reported by Intelligence * Guerrillas forced by Government to flee * Guerrilla force totaled less than 1,000 people military and civilian. * Element needs help from other units in meeting Government forces. * This unit, like others, equipped with automatic rifles, machine guns,' mortars. The Bourgois article reported that the Sal- vadoran military attacked guerrillas and non- combatants indiscriminately, and described the latter as separate and distinguishable from the fighters. The briefer presented the slide as an illustration of the problem'of guerrilla U.B. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OPTIC' al-Sm 0 WASHINGTON: 1982 24 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 11) The author, Philippe Bourgois, an American anthropology student, had entered El Salvador's Cabanas Province to ex- plore the feasibility of a research project, and had found himself caught in an Army sweep and unable to leave for 14 days. The Post article detailed his experience as he and other noncombatants sought to escape the fighting that en- circled them. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Policymakers at the State Department learned of the documents through Ambassador White's June 1980 cable, but chose not to make any immediate use of the documents... .During the two years since their capture, these documents had been virtually ignored not only by policymakers, who felt they had no immediate use for them, but more importantly by the intelli- gence community. They did not re- ceive the kind of routine intelligence evaluation given to a large number of the Salvadoran guerrilla documents, captured later that year." The subcommittee report ends by detailing intelligence lies regarding President, Reagan's certification that the Salvadoran government is gaining control over its armed forces; the Salvadoran military's massacre in El Mozote; the Miskito Indian situation in Nicaragua; and the alleged military build-up in Nicaragua. Regarding the latter, government claims made publicly about a burgeoning Nicaraguan military preparing to invade other countries were "quite distinct" from facts presented in closed hearings, according to the subcom- mittee report. (Copies of the report, "U.S. Intel- ligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern" may be obtained by calling (202) 225-4121. The documents on d'Abuisson are discussed in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "The Situation in El Salvador" of March 18 and April 9, 1981. Call (202) 224-4651.) "propaganda" reaching the U.S. public. Following the briefing, the Committee asked whether there was evidence that Bourgois mis- represented himself or that the article was fabricated by others. In a written response, the intelligence community claimed to have in- formation that "Bourgois was with an FMLN (guerrilla) fighting unit." This undermined Bourgois' claim that he was with noncombatants. When the staff asked to review the relevant intelligence report, intelligence officials re- sponded that there was no single item that dealt specifically with Bourgois, but that their statement that he was with an FMLN fight- ing unit represented an "analytic judgment;' based on much information which reflected the type of fighting going on in the area. The staff then reviewed this information. A careful review of these items and subse- quent conversations with intelligence personnel revealed that, although the intelligence was valid, the presentation was misleading: -- Available intelligence on deployment of guerrillas in the area, which encompass full- time organized units, part-time militias, and noncombatants, had enabled intelligence ana- lysts to identify with certainty the guerrilla unit which resisted the Army's sweep operation on the dates when Bourgois was present. How- ever, no intelligence existed to contradict Bourgois' claim that he was with noncombatants. Concerning Bourgois' claim that the guerrilla fighters kept their distance from the noncom- batants, an intelligence official explained, "I collectively call the guerrillas and their fol- lowers a 'group."'... He added that Bourgois probably was truthful in describing what he saw. -- The presentation appeared to imply that each of the four statements on the slide drawn from the Bourgois article was contradicted by the intelligence extract opposite it - a mis- leading implication, since the extracts were not parallel. In interviews, the responsible intelligence personnel insisted that the slide was not intended to imply a contradiction, al- though they recognized that the presentation could have had that effect. Another intelli- gence official recalled that the extracts were selected to "shoot down" Bourgois' claims. Ad- ditionally, the slide suggested that the total number of military and civilians comprising the "guerrilla force" represented assets to the guerrillas, when the evidence from which this figure was taken indicated that they consti- tuted a burden as well.... It was misleading to present the article as an example of guerrilla "propaganda"; no fraud- ulent media manipulation has been shown. Intel- ligence officials explained that the intention, instead, was to overcome what they viewed as excessively negative coverage of the Salvadoran military in the U.S. press. The written intel- ligence community response stated: "(Bourgois) did not talk with the government forces in- volved in the campaign.... Instead his report represents an image of poor peasants, women and children being bombed and killed by an unfeel- ing Salvadoran military. This is exactly the image the guerrillas want to have presented to the outside world." An intelligence official emphasized in an interview, "There are two sides of every story," and up until February 1982 the U.S. press was reporting "mostly from the guerrilla viewpoint." This approach is questionable as an inter- pretation of the mission of the intelligence community. Clearly, U.S. policymakers must not be limited to information "from the guerrilla viewpoint," and it is important for intelli- gence producers to be aware of media coverage The remedy is to provide policymakers with first class, dependable intelligence products - not to present as "propaganda" a newspaper ar- ticle which is simply one-sided in its perspec- tive. (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE) CowzterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 25 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Disciplining of Salvadoran military personnel In January 1982, the President certified that El Salvador "is achieving substantial con- trol over its armed forces," and Assistant Sec- retary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders then testified that "substantial progress" has been made toward the goals of controlling vio- lence and bringing murderers to justice. He noted specifically that the Salvadoran authori- ties had "transferred, retired, cashiered or punished over a thousand soldiers for various abuses of authority or for their cooperation with the violent right." Again, this report is not intended to judge the appropriateness of either the presidential certification or Mr. Enders' testimony. In- stead, the report examines the intelligence relative to such policy decisions and state- ments. This examination reveals that the intel- ligence community supported policy claims with assertions based on little more than official statements of the Salvadoran military. ' Asked by a member of the Committee whether the government of El Salvador has control of the military, a CIA official in early February 1982 replied that much progress has been made, as evidenced partly by the fact that "hundreds and hundreds of military personnel" had been transferred, retired or disciplined. Asked to provide details on the latter point, the CIA official doubted whether any reporting could be found, citing disruption caused by a recent move of his analytic offices within the head- quarters building. Responding to a further que- ry from the Committee staff, CIA provided a memo that acknowledged that "we have only frag- mentary information on disciplinary actions taken by the Salvadoran armed forces against members of the military in 1981." The memo showed that essentially the only source for the assurances consisted of state- ments by the Salvadoran Ministry of Defense that armed forces personnel had been demoted, dismissed, or transferred. The offenses ranged from such infractions as drunkenness, coward- ice, AWOL, and disobedience, to deserting, thievery or murder; only a fraction of these were the types of brutality considered politi- cally motivated. In one statement, the Salva- doran Ministry of Defense in March 1981 replied to an inquiry from the U.S. Congress by stating' that 28 members of the Army and security forces had been sent to trial for homicide since Janu- ary 1980. However, in reporting this reply, the Embassy cautioned that it did not know whether any of these crimes were committed for politi- cal reasons rather than as common crimes; it did not know whether the crimes occurred prior to January 1980; and it did not know how many of the trials ended with verdicts of innocence. Virtually the only information to corrobo- rate these official Salvadoran statements came in a closing paragraph of an Embassy cable, which reported: ... (S)ome individuals believed to be involved in repressive activities have been transferred in an effort to remove them from troop commands or to break the local level alliance with land owners that has existed here for decades. We do not know how many transfers would have been made for these reasons rather than as a result of normal rotation.... (T)ransfer in- stead of discipline has been used to curb repression because military lead- ers feel that the latter would drive some individuals into open opposition to the government. Since so little intelligence basis could be found for CIA's assurances about the disciplin- ing of military personnel, the Committee staff asked the State Department for the basis for the Assistant Secretary's February 1982 state- ment. The Department responded that the basis for the statement was the Department's own 1980 Country Report on Hwnan. Rights Practices. That report said that "about 1400 enlisted men reportedly have been cashiered... for various abuses" during that first year following the October 1979 military coup. It qualified this by continuing, "There are indications that some of these men have been recruited subsequently into rightist terrorist squads. Government for- ces have broken up few right-wing groups, most- ly because the right does not attack the secu- rity forces." Thus, the February 1982 statement was based on a 1980 figure, the exact significance of which was uncertain even when it first ap- peared. However, it is the intelligence commu- nity's participation in these assurances that concerns this report. Intelligence displayed a willingness to claim greater certainty than warranted by the evidence, and a complacent ac- ceptance of official Salvadoran claims whose limitations had already been acknowledged. El Mozote investigation Also in his February 1982 testimony, Mr. Enders challenged news reports of a massacre in the Morazan Province village of El Mozote. Ac- cording to the testimony given to Congress, two Embassy officers had been sent to investigate these reports, and "no evidence could be found to confirm that government forces systematical- ly massacred civilians, nor that the number of civilians killed even remotely approached the 733 or 926 victims variously cited in press reports." Recognizing the difficulties inherent in investigating such cases, the Committee staff examined closely the intelligence pro- cess underlying the Assistant Secretary's statement and found the following: Only the last paragraph of the long (nearly 2000 words) Embassy report on the field investigation explained that the investigators never reached the towns where the alleged events occurred. Because the area was consid- 'ered to be guerrilla controlled, the two inves- 28 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 tigators could not reach El Mozote nor, appar- ently, any of the other nearby towns in which the military had allegedly slaughtered civil- ians. The investigation, which occurred a month after the event, was conducted by interviewing individuals who had been in the area and by overflying El Mozote in a helicopter. --- The cable appears to assume that there was a fight, rather than a massacre of noncom- batants. Yet a close reading of the cable shows that the only confirmation of this from any of the refugees the investigators spoke with was that a man from a town several miles away from El Mozote "intimated that he knew of violent fighting in El Mozote and other nearby canto- ns." The cable reported that he was unwilling to discuss the comportment of government for- ces. -- The lead sentence of the Embassy report, which appeared in both the summary and the con- clusion, stated: "Although it is not possible to prove or disprove excesses of violence against the civilian population of El Mozote by government troops, it is certain that the guer- rilla forces who established defensive posi- tions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle which they were aware was coming and had prepared for, nor was there any evidence that those who remained attempted to leave." This seemingly spurious point was made less certain by the body of the cable, which reported that an aged couple from El Mo- zote (apparently the only refugees from El Mo- zote interviewed) as well as refugees from other cantons near El Mozote, said that the guerrillas warned them of the impending Salva- doran military operation and urged them to leave because they were old. -- Another report at the time contained some reservations and qualifications bearing on whether there had been a fierce firefight in El Mozote, yet the subleties and uncertainties which had been carefully conveyed in this re- port were disregarded by a State Department in- telligence analyst in explaining what had hap- pened. Similarly, a later message issued by the State Department in response to an inquiry abroad cited the account with fewer indications of uncertainty than in the original field re- ports, even though no additional intelligence on the matter had been received in the interim. Familiar weaknesses in the intelligence pro- cess are evident in this case. The Embassy field report suggested greater certainty about whether a firefight occurred, and about the ac- tions of the guerrillas, than was warranted by its own information. Uncertainties which did appear in field reporting were lost in subse- quent presentations. The Embassy field report's lead sentence (not fully consistent with the body of the cable) implying callousness by guerrillas and/or civilian support for the guerrillas, suggests a desire to "balance" pub- lic reports of massacres. ... Briefing on Nicaraguan Military Build-up A briefing on Nicaragua's military build-up, which was given to the Committee by DIA on March 24, 1982, and was aired publicly earlier that month, presented a different problem. The briefing was structured around a presentation of the evidence concerning each of the elements of the military build-up, including the growth of Nicaragua's army and militia, construction of new military bases, expansion of airfields, and acquisition of new equipment. Throughout, the emphasis was on how each element increased the army's capability to launch offensive oper- ations outside of Nicaragua. This format obscured DIA's analytical judg- ment on the difficult, but essential, question about the significance of the build-up: what do Nicaragua's leaders intend to do with it, and what is the likelihood of Nicaragua's initiat- ing various sorts of offensive operations against its neighbors? These issues were ad- dressed directly in a separate classified briefing, whose analytic judgments about Nica- ragua's intentions were quite distinct from those that appeared implicit in the briefing on the build-up. Therefore, the concern in this case is not that important analytic questions were neglected, but that the format of this particular presentation did not permit them to be addressed in a deliberate way. The result, that the briefing conveyed an implicit judgment about Nicaragua's objectives not entirely con- sistent with DIA's reasoned judgment, detracted from its informative value. NOW AVAILABLE: Reprint from Counterspy U.S. NUCLEAR THREATS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 50C each for 1-4 copies; 40C each for 5-25 copies; 30C each for 26-99 copies; 20C each for 100 or more copies. Add $1.00 postage for first 20 copies, and 50C for each additional 50 copies. For sample, send SASE (37C postage) to CounterSpy. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 27 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Afghanistan Update Negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakis- tan under United Nations auspices, appear to be moving the "Afghan conflict" closer to a political solution. At the same time, outside support by both private organizations and governments for the so- called rebels in Pakistan continues to hinder such a political solution. With U.N. Intermediary Diego Cordovez, Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohamed Dost and his Pakistani counter- part, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan met in Geneva for several days in June 1982. Cordovez has since kept in close touch with the two governments. He does not believe he will achieve a quick solution, but he says some progress has been made, and a basic "package of understanding" has been reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan government has announced that it is willing to hold talks with all opposition groups fighting the government, with the exception of the groups based in Pakistan. It is these Pakistan-based groups who have been able to attract con- siderable foreign support. Pakistan pro- vides facilities and allows shipments of arms to the rebels; while the U.S., Egyptian, and Chinese governments have been aiding the rebels with a covert multi-million dollar support program. In addition, the U.S. has provided more than $200- million for the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, which are tightly controlled by the various rebel factions. Western European governments and the Reagan administration are also engaging in propaganda campaigns for the rebels by organizing events such as an "Afghanistan Solidarity Day" on March 21, 1982. U. S. celebrations of this day were coordinated by Richard Nixon's Secretary of State, William Rogers, who wrote In his proclama- tion that the "courageous struggle by the Afghan freedom fighters serves as a deterrent to Soviet invasion of Poland." Private organizations and individuals actively aiding the rebels attest to a strange mixture of politics, ranging from the extremely rightwing Soldier of Fortune magazine to evangelist Pat Robertson o the Christian Broadcasting Network and repre- sentatives of the French and Italian 28 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Socialist Parties. The activities of the European groups are coordinated by the Bureau International Afghanistan (BIA) in Paris. The Bureau, which is working to collect money for the rebels, , sees itself as a public relations agency to "educate" people in Europe about the necessity to "support the resistance of the people of Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation." The BIA has organized trips for several rebel leaders, including Sayed Gailani (formerly a wealthy landowner and car dealer), to meet with government officials and parliamentarians in Europe. The Bureau was set up during a meeting of the International Committee in Solidarity. with the Afghan resistance in Rome in 1980. In March 1982, European Afghanistan committees, again with Gailani and also Sibghatullah Mujadidi (another former landlord with ties to the ultra-rightist Muslim Brotherhood) met to strategize about gaining diplomatic recognition for the rebels by European governments. The conference also aimed to "help to gain acceptance for the Afghan resistance in Private organizations and individuals actively aiding the rebels attest to a strange mixture of politics, ranging from the extremely rightwing Soldier of Fortune magazine to evangelist Pat Robertson of the Christian Broadcasting Network and representatives of the French and Italian Socialist Parties. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 left-wing circles;" its vice president was Carlo Ripa di Meana, an Italian Socialist member of the European parliament. Afghanistan committees in London and Paris have raised money for seven radio transmitters for the rebels. Some of the Russian language programs for the trans- mitters are prepared by Soviet "dissidents" in England, including Vladimir Bukowsky. In the United States, most of the "Afghanistan solidarity work" is done by organizations on the far right, such as Freedom House, which has an Afghanistan Information Center and publishes occa- sional "News Leads" and other materials on Afghanistan. Similarly active is the Committee for a Free Afghanistan. (Its executive director Karen McKay claims the Soviet move into Afghanistan is a step toward the "Soviet encirclement of the Persian Gulf.") A scholars' committee on Afghanistan is run out of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska in Omaha. (The Center was founded in the early seventies as the first and only Afghanistan Studies Center in the U.S.). In addition, the openly racist Soldier of Fortune magazine has set up a special fund for the "freedom fighters." In short, the Italian and French Socialists and other "left circles" find themselves in questionable company when it comes to "Afghanistan solidarity work." But more than that, it is striking, to say the least, that they would work "in solidarity" with organizations that advo- cate antisocialist policies. Many of the "rebel leaders" they sup- port are the feudal landlords who left Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 shortly after a progressive government that advocated land reform came to power in Kabul. According to the conservative Swiss Neue Zuericher Zeitung, "the social conditions of the Afghan tribal areas continue to exist in the refugee camps. That is espe- cially true for the domination of men over women - which is parallel to the domina- tion of the landowners over the peasants." Neue Zuericher Zeitung writes that aid from the United Nations, governments and private organizations helps perpetuate these relationships. In many cases, the Afghan refugees get more money from the U. N. than local Pakistanis can earn : "Financial help to the refugees in Baluchistan," for instance, "is larger than the amount of money budgeted by the Pakistani government for the whole province." The Christian Democratic daily Welt (West Germany) reports large-scale misuse of U.N. and Western donations to the refu- gees. ' A significant part of the goods sent to the camps are sold on the open market for the profit of the rebel leaders and other dealers. The rebel leaders have even built up their fiefdoms in Pakistan. One of them, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, controls the public transportation system in Peshawar, where the rebel headquarters are located. These rebel leaders' interests are certainly better served by the present situation than by a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Yet it appears very unlikely that they will achieve mili- tary victory, especially given the intense infighting between the various groups. At the same time, the Afghan government is demonstrating in its negotiations with Pakistan and by other internal policies that it is striving for a political solu- tion. The Afghan government also appears to have been able to broaden its base. Journalists for the Swedish Svenska Dagbladet who visited Afghanistan in September 1982 wrote that "although there were explosions, shots and artillery fire during the night and occasionally during the day," the central sector of the country "made a relatively calm impression." High ranking government officials now tra- vel to villages around the country. Dagbladet also reported that the govern- ment provides weapons and ammunition to "civilian self-defense groups" which have been set up "among the civilian population against the rebels' often ruthless demands for money, shelter and food... A general view - also among Westerners in Kabul - is that criminal behavior by guerrilla groups has increased considerably in recent months." All in all, according to Dagbladet,? "there is nothing to indicate that the Barbrak Karmal regime is not firmly in the saddle." (For background articles, see: "CIA Intervention in Afghanistan," CounterSpy, vol. 4, no. 2; "CIA Rebels Supply U.S. Heroin," "Chemical Warfare in Afghanistan," CounterSpy, vol. 5, no. 1; "Who Wants Peace in Afghanistan?," CounterSpy, vol. 5, no. 3.) CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 29 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Secret U.S. Embassy Report Affirms: Marcos Corrupt and on Shaky Ground The following confidential report by the U.S. Consulate in Cebu, Philippines was leaked by State Department sources to CounterSpy and the Congress Task Force of the Philippine Solidarity Network in August 1982. Written by Consul G. S. Sheinbaum, the document focuses on a poli- tical and economic assessment of Mindanao, the second largest Philippine island. The document's significance lies in the frank- ness with which it acknowledges the in- creasing brutality and corruption of the Philippine government and the rising strength of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party in the Philippines. This is the kind of candid analysis which never makes it into the official reports of the State Department. The Sheinbaum report was penned in the context of escalating support for Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos from the Reagan administration, which welcomed him warmly during his state visit in mid- September 1982. According to the State Department source who leaked the report, "I think he [Sheinbaum ] is trying to signal us that a policy of supporting Marcos will mean more than just supplying military aid pretty soon." (CounterSpy is reprinting only the political section of the document. The complete report is available for $3.00 from CounterSpy. ) TO : SECSTATE WASHDC AMEMBAS' Y MANILA INFO :CINCPAC HONOLULU HI DEPT PASS: CINCPAC ALSO FOR POL'AD I0ya2_z' CUFIP!?I F.OM : AMCONSUL CEBU DATE: APRIL 13, 1982 SUBJECT : EASTERN MINDANAO AND AN OMINOUS FUTURE REF TAGS: PINT, ECON, MILL, SHUM, RP 30 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 1. C - Entire Text. 2. Summary and Introduction. Visits over the past three months to all but two of the provinces of Eastern and Northern Mindanao, Re- gions X and XI, lead to the conclusion that whatever is good there may only be-temporary and whatever is bad may only get worse. This may sound like a worst-case scenario, but pres- ent circumstances are not encouraging and the future is ominous. A change could come about with a stunning recovery in the economy (espe- cially coconut oil prices), continued quietude in the GOP's relations-with the Muslim popula- tion, and more effective local government, but Mindanao residents are not optimistic for ei- ther'the short or the long term. Even the ap- parent truce that exists with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), while encouraging of itself, is not expected to last for long; some believe that when the GOP [Government of the Philippines], because of budgetary constraints, begins to reduce sharply its aid to Muslim reb- els and ex-rebels, the MNLF may take up arms again. 3. The year 1980 brought with it the appar- ent truce with the MNLF and a terrible slump in the domestic copra market. In 1981, the \xili- tary shifted forces from Western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago to Eastern Mindanao to offset the increased activity of the New Peo- ple's Army (NPA) which had begun in early 1981. Copra prices continued to be low, bringing down other aspects of the economy and leading to a resurgence of malnutrition in many areas. Gov- ernment programs are unevenly distributed, of- ten poorly planned and poorly managed, and - except for some superficial attention to the Muslim segment of the population - it is gener- ally agreed that the greater the distance from Manila, the less the GOP interest in the re- gion, Ilocos excepted. Prime Minister Cesar Virata has made a determined attempt to become acquainted with the southern Philippines by visits to all regions, relying on Regional De- velopment Councils to provide a profile on their areas. However, senior government offi- cials, including members of the cabinet, seem to travel to Mindanao only when there is a cri- sis, such as after floods and typhoons, or for some political event. President Marcos has not been to Mindanao in three years. 4. The United States role in Mindanao af- fairs is perceived to be mostly limited to US companies which have substantial enterprises in the area; US aid programs there are overshad- owed by efforts of the World Bank, Asian Devel- opment Bank and the Japanese. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, attitudes toward the US - includ- ing in the Muslim areas - appear to be margin- ally more positive than in Visayas, e.g., peo- ple in Mindanao are generally less inclined to blame the country's ills on US support for President Marcos. 5. The military has saturated NPA areas, bringing with it reports of some increased abuses and the heavily criticized "hamletting" in Davao del Norte. (Military behavior in less- contested areas seems to be better.) The NPA in those saturated areas have lowered their pro- file and are reportedly laying plans in areas where neither they nor the military have been active before. We are not convinced that, should the military reduce its forces in those areas, the people and their local leaders are now so committed to the government's cause that they will be able to resist a return of NPA in- fluence. The GOP's involvement, measured in terms of financial resources, is not good. And the poor economy will not help. End Summary and Introduction. 6. Consul Cebu visited ten northern and eastern Mindanao provinces in past three months. On the surface it appears that peace and order in that area is more prevalent than at any time in the past several years. First, the Muslim conflict has abated over the past year. Second, the NPA, seemingly on the rampage in early 1981, has taken a wait-and-see atti- tude because several Army and Constabulary (PC) units were moved from the now-quieter Muslim areas to those areas being harrassed by the NPA. However, this does not necessarily mean that the future is brighter, and various local observers, civilian and military, suggest that this might only be the lull before the storm(s). 7. MNLF Conflict. The two Lanao provinces were suspiciously quiet, and the last ambush (as of the time of our visit in December) along the Marawi-Iligan road took place in August, a relatively long period without such incidents there. (However, another ambush occurred in March.) Military checkpoints along the road were still numerous, but soldiers on duty were noticeably casual in behavior, even upon the arrival of an Army officer at their location. Because of seemingly improved security, some units have been moved from Lanao elsewhere and there is decidedly less of a military presence in Marawi City itself as compared with our last visit in March 1981. Nonetheless, local resi- dents are still tense and cautious in their be- havior and movements around the area, and the city is virtually dead at night. The MNLF con- flict, we were told, only heightened existing animosities and acts of revenge still occur regularly, although less often than during the height of MNLF activity. 8. Muslims and Christians alike in the two CONFIDENTIAL CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 31 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Lanao ish d provinces agree that the MNLF has lost some of its glamor as well as most of its ex- havi ternal support. Internecine conflicts among alth various MNLF factions, including acts of re- fice e the relative cohesion that perviously ex- isted. Several apparently neutral observers ad- mitted that the GOP's program of "attraction" has been.perhaps more effective than they orig- inally gave it credit. Distribution of the gov-and ernment's largesse to surrenderees, however, has been erratic, and some jealousy has emerged west because more recent surrenderees receive less than earlier ones. A more imposing problem is that many surrenderees had expected government- al support to be for an indefinite future and would be accompanied by land allocations, jobs, and even cash. Overzealous GOP agents may have oversold the program but, so far at least, no to the hills to fight. (There are substantial reports of softcore MNLF who have "surrendered over large number of MNLF surrenderees have returned Norte in p more than once, but we believe this practice has been contained because the military will not accept as a surrenderee anyone who does not bring in a weapon.) There is also a widespread f 1 feeling that a more liberal GOP attitude toward more the Muslims has enticed many less-committed MNLF members down from the hills outside the surrenderee program. Such reports are sketchy but may indeed be among various valid reasons for the quieter situation. 9. Brigade commanders in both Iligan and Marawi told us that, despite a decrease in their own strength because units have been di- verted elsewhere, their military position is stronger than even a year ago. They attribute this to the surrenderee program, a better work- ing relationship between the military and Mus- lim awareness that the military are no longer' seeking to locate and destroy MNLF elements. Both officers separately expressed some concern that they might be enjoying a false sense of security, but they are sure that their intelli-less, gence is accurate and that, especially without help from abroad, the MNLF conflict in the La- nao and Cotabato areas will continue to abate until it becomes non-existent. Muslim leaders has i in Lanao not associated with the government be- lieve such a forecast pay be accurate, but be-betw, 10. Banditry and the Military. Army`and~'PC commands in both Lanao o provinces said they are has' now more concerned with NPA activity and the' banditry problem which is historically endemic throughout Mindanao. Regarding banditry, they acknowledge that individual servicemen, and whic perhaps even some small units, are involved since the types of weapons and clothing dis- CONFIDENTIAL 32 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: venge for a wide variety of causes, have dimin- lieve that the tenser situation in Sulu and Ba- silan is likely to endure much longer fortes"oa- riety of other factors. played, the manner of the bandits and their be- or all suggest that military are involved, 11. Upsurge of NPA Activities. NPA activity in Lanao del Norte is a recent development and is said to be emanating from Misamis Occidental (to the West). There have been recent teach-ins tion in November of a woman barangay captain in bers and threats to other local officials. NPA activity in Lanao Norte has over the past year grown slowly but steadly. 12. NPA propaganda and recruitment through- out northern and eastern Mindanao seems to be following the same pattern as that in Lanao : slow but steady. The rash of incidents y in the year in the Agusan provinces, Sur- Sur and Bukidnon were attributed to spill- roaming the Davao and Cotabato provinces. When peace and order improved in the latter areas, the rate of NPA incidents in the more northern provinces increased markedly. Yet, now that northern provinces and the situation is quiet- er, there are still continuing reports of in- creased NPA propaganda and recruiting nonwith- standing the military presence. Few officials or military with whom we spoke could identify local NPA commanders, apparently because NPA presence is new. It was thus not possible to verify if NPA commanders were natives of the provinces in which they were operating. It was clear, however, that the present period may be peaceful but the future is ominous. Most blamed the poor economy: low copra prices, loss of land, poorly-planned relocations to make way for large agro-business, little government at- tention to the rural areas except where planta- tions or large projects are located, and (to a 13. In Bukidnon, Task Force Diamond was created in October and based atMaramag, 50kms. south of Malaybalay. One of its two battalions leaving only the 29th (HQs in Valencia, halfway Task Force's pressure, traffic on the roads from Bukidnon to both Davao and Cotabato cities or condition owing to the fact that there Mindanao conflict began in 1972. ... 16. NPA forces in southern Agusan del Sur are now the target of three army battalions Davao) based at Trento, Agusan Del Sur, near the Davao del Norte border. TF Aguda has been CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 actively pursuing several small NPA units roam- ing the hilly and mountainous border areas, and then last August-September extended its operat- ing zone into the newly-created municipality of San Vicente, Davao del Norte, an area previous- ly known as La-ac. TF Aguda was assigned there by the Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM) under B.Gen. Jose Magno, headquartered in Cotabato reported officially and therefore the authori- ties have no way of verifying information or can even be directed to conduct an investiga- tion. He commented, nonetheless, that he sus- pects military or ex-military to be responsible for at least some of the kidnappings, based on the sparse information he received. He acknowl- edged to us, that military commanders in the city have never been able to reduce this prob- lem, and he said that several wealthy families had already begun to move temporarily out of 17. NPA 7 of Davao del vorbeeas appear to be the Davao lyorte well brewin o other sinc f Davao Orie capit um' The area rea alog in ntal al, Tag g the roadpar from e travel eon th1981 and Sine Feb escene the of cOastal provinfro small, a at road Davao we were advinumero ce Pparent avao Ori advised incidents ins and recruitiY Isolated NPAIncental has a also ed to e in orther g durjng the idents as reported pavoeopidla` 1jYnin J n auarvao Oriental ev c Six months elandS11, 000 have crossfire Y, movie a since between militarY and Carry d their homes because of returned Additional uathe te .000 in Order to areas of the ea to ing concessioproblems are eThey by Priests who `rn Part of n' I;Z tradit expected serve that Davao e1 Nortzonal tribal area. `~ .. .] reported City. According to Magno and others, the NPA in San Vicente began to organize there five years or so ago and, because of the terrain, low ag- ricultural productivity and little government attention, had quietly grown in strength and became more important than the local government structure. NPA from San Vicente were used in the 1981 battles in the Arakan Valley of North Cotabato, were probably involved in various in- cidents in Davao City, and finally attacked the municipal halls of Maco, Montevista and a few other places in Davao del Norte. The latter in- cidents led to the formation of TF Aguda, which after some weeks discovered the NPA stronghold in San Vicente and led directly to the "hamlet" scheme decreed by the TF Aguda commander. 19. Davao City remains potentially turbu- lent because of street crime and general law- lessness, much (if not most) attributed to the military and ex-military. In the period Decem- ber 1981-February 1982, there were several kid- nappings of wealthy people. One 24-year-old son of a wealthy Chinese was kidnapped and appar- ently murdered before the ransom was paid, but the others we believe have all been released. Brig.Gen. Alfredo Olano, PC Commander of Region XI, stated that none of the kidnappings were Davao to the Visayas or Manila. Ex-Mayor Luis Santos, a former police chief who had been may- or for ten years, said that while he was still mayor he had proposed that the PC be removed from the city because his own police force could handle it. Santos is well known for using extreme methods, no matter how effective. He noted that before he left office in April 1981 he was able to keep large-scale gambling out of the city but, under the new administration of Mayor Elias Lopez, gambling has been allowed to flourish openly and the PC are benefitting fi- nancially. Another source estimated that Olano himself has a weekly income of P5,000 from the syndicates that have resurfaced. 20. Various sources in Davao City, not in- cluding Mayor Lopez who played it down, report- ed that the NPA has become more active in pro-, paganda and recruiting in the city, although no incidents have lately been attributed to the (word missing). 21. Overall NPA strength. The regional chief of the National Intelligence Security CONFIDENTIAL CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 33 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ~ Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Agency (NISA), Commander Adolf Borje, the larg- accompanied by propaganda explaining why the est of the combined military intelligence ser- NPA took those actions. This leaves some doubt vices, informed us in February that the two NPA in our minds that they were in fact committed commands in Eastern Mindanao now number 950 by the NPA. Nonetheless, these new reports per with a total of 288 weapons. He said that this haps presage a more advanced stage of NPA de- is a 30-50% increase over the past two years. velopment, the liquidation of known bad ele- The NPA are almost equally divided into the ments. We are told that during the Hukbalahop Southern Command, based in Davao City, and the movement of the 1940s and 1950s, the terrorism Eastern Command based in Tagum, Davao Del Nor- stage immediately preceded the more widespread, te. He said that the Eastern Command is also organized and well-coordinated attacks of in- responsible for NPA activity in the Agusan and surgents on small military units and municipal Surigao provinces as well as Davao del Norte centers. It should be recalled that the NPA at- and Davao Oriental. (It should be noted that Manila's Bulletin Today reported on February 10, 1982, that there are 1,300 "regular" NPA in Region XI with 1,800 active support elements and 18,400 mass base sympathizers. The newspa- eases lr. per cited military sources.) t itlcr whale 3. In some areas visited on this trip it 2 ors that the NPA has instituted a low level appe deliberate terrorism, particularly execu- of d of erring officials or civilians. In Agu- san kidnapped father that his behavior toward other ba- her rang a barangay captain was assassinated for Norte tions informing. In Davao Oriental, the husband of a info thy physician was assassinated after having weal been ties and other abuses of poor residents tivi cease. However, it appears that most of should e alleged NPA terrorist incidents were not th es CONFIDENTIAL other provinces may not yet be at the same u and well?e the a1Ieo obserV S of the P art of rLeot1 c? d ~, 11 S he rnmert corditi? the wOr St dePet'de action an lists ' t he p??` e;,d opus af tune of 1 for pro Padar Eastern regard b are : Ot 1 arg Ze1% in thahave beerost helP;u they ?r e the m tacked several municipal centers in early 1981, "N F th to Sr w rove t red recruit fag s , Pries neaber s X sn? Zr- uoht Mae ;iay:~sSts ca to lewo, e t ?ffic m?St 1;? P, on r?da ,-zmer that ? t t a Qa- to or ro. agn-ee ale r. sa~-d of opP e of c ivlllar aPP2a t ecause t~ey who area Policy i id: ff e ayd that peo? ar`{ jzt b _k lehave Pract f?rma;lce at we sP?~e ca ated A pool p2s with who t two yeZeountry Ile ad, Sen agreed teaeMote a does erteed ever ally the n?t ao cite has` tot 22 ' Z aVe C~urr SaS t on, ly hat.reparip g ice se and ty Strerti? t h, activit y stzetigt~'stages ?M P itary Of uriv oesbe stage of development but in Davao del Norte NPA terrorism and the attacks on municipal centers appear to be the underlying rationale for TF Aguda to "hamletize " San Vicente. 24. Military Behavior. Abuses have been at- tributed to be among the reasons for NPA re- cruiting success. Although - except for Davao City - abuses by the military occur most fre- quently where military units are actively con- fronting insurgents. PC units are consistently cited as being the most abusive (although not all PC units are included in this generaliza- tion) while the Army and the Marines enjoy bet- ter reputations. Generally speaking, PC units are responsible for peace and order in built-up areas, hence they have more contact with the 34 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 local populace and likely to have more confron- tations with the latter. Army and Marine units, on the other hand, normally operate in less- populated areas and are not responsible for en- forcing peace and order in population centers as are the PC and the Integrated police. Throughout Eastern Mindanao, as elsewhere, the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) gets mixed re- views. Some local officials and military offi- cers say they are very reliable and responsible since they, more than other military branches, operate in their home base areas, are known to the residents and therefore their families can be made to suffer for any abuses. In other places, the CHDF enjoy bad reputations because they are poorly trained, lack discipline toward civilians, are often consuming alcoholic bever- ages, and are too reluctant to pursue NPA who may be members of families known to them and who may in turn retaliate against the CHDF mem- bers' families. 25. Governor Carlos Fortich's major com- plaint in Bukidnon was the crime and corruption conducted by his provincial PC command. Aside from running a few businesses of their own and harrassing people, the then provincial command- er (now transferred to Misamis Oriental), brother of Assemblyman Navarro of Surigao Nor- te, was said to be rarely in the province. His most senior officers take as little action as possible, Fortich added, leaving everything involving the NPA to the Army task force.... 27. The recent departure of Col. Teofilo Bulosan as Provincial PC Commander of Davao del Norte may have brought a new day to the prov- ince; Bulosan's successor, Col. Milton Tiburcio is reported to be taking a much stricter view toward abuses in his command. (General Olano told us that he gave Tiburcio clear orders to reduce abuses by military and civilian offi- cials.) It will be recalled that Maryknoll Fr. Ralph Kroes, the church representative of the province's Church-Military Liaison Committee, was expelled from the country because of a con- frontation he had had with Bulosan. 28. At a committee meeting which had been discussing the then rampant abuses by the mili- tary, Kroes reportedly pointed at Bulosan'and accused him of deliberately allowing the abuses to continue. Bulosan then apparently enlisted the aid of his mentor, Antonio Floirendo, ba- nana plantation owner and friend of the First Lady, who arranged for Kroes' expulsion. The previous Region XI PC Commander, BGen. Buena- ventura Casenas, told us early last year that he had left the region because Bulosan ignored his orders, particularly with regard to his command's poor discipline. It is widely be- lieved that Bulosan is financially supported by Floirendo, in whose company he was seen more often than some observers thought was warrant- ed.... 41. Development. Development planning in Eastern and Northern Mindanao is spotty. At a meeting of town mayors in Agusan del Norte, the mayors, when asked, replied that their priori- ties were (a) improved agricultural production, (b) better health care, and (c) farm-to-market or barangay roads. In other provinces, there was more stress on roads, and the only real de- velopmental impact of any sort is being made by donors such as the World Bank and the Asian De- velopment Bank for road programs, including a few major highways. Agriculture needs an up- lift, but the GOP appears to use most of its funds in agriculture for supporting large com- mercially attractive projects such as oil palm, ypil-ypil, and mining, not that they are ill- advised, only that little comparatively is spent on simple needs for the small farmers. There is also the problem of convincing gov- ernment workers to visit areas where they are most needed, but this is impeded by poor roads and, in many places, the NPA. 42. In Muslim areas, development is linked with the surrenderee program. For example, the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) is beginning to pump substantial funds into Lanao del Sur, heart of the Maranao coun- try. A fish cage project around Lake Lanao, to assist 1,500 surrenderee families, will cost P13 million and is already taking shape.... 44. Health programs in the area are sorely neglected. The floods of early 1981 and early 1982 in Northeastern Mindanao resulted in nu- merous deaths from illnesses contracted by peo- ple who did not have access to even a modest form of health care. Not many community water projects were visible during these trips; water is plentiful but also quite polluted in the many areas where there are agro-industrial projects operating or getting under way. 45. A basic problem is that of leadership. For national officials visit these provinces, except the larger cities of Davao and Cagayan de Oro. Even regional officials, with some no- table exceptions, do not venture far from their offices. Without proper and constant observa- tion,,there is weak knowledge of what is needed in the remote areas - or even the urban slums, for that matter, no matter how close to the center of town. The little provided for devel- opment funding is skimmed rather heavily, we were told in all areas, and GOP programs where loans are involved have not been effective in maintaining the revolving-fund concept for the capital allocated to each program. 46. This problem has bred discontent, CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 35 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ~ Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ng av the ADB and the Japanese, the latter heightened by the declining economy. It is built the Maharlika highway throughout the probably the single most important factor in country, part of which links Surigao City w the expansion of the NPA during the past year Davao City. US presence is marked mainly by or two. Unfortunately, even were GOP officials operations of Del Monte and Dole, both of w to begin taking a more active interest, NPA to have good reputations in their re presence in many areas adds to the risks faced appear spective areas; nonetheless, they are often by each official seeking to visit areas of dis- linked in a very general sense to other pla content. Moreover, a military escort for civil- tions whose reputations for dealing with lo ian officials could well be disadvantageous as residents is clearly not good.... it would link those officials with the mili- tary. 47. US aid programs are far less visible to local residents than those of the World Bank, on the s hr ive . to the lgN t~entlon a esse- notea, nnent aria (t? that tunes ' ~ot~y gov 11) area , the V a lg0 S ari till t_ r eC?. not fille o- the i. ri to 49 one t?? any (buy-, the hPA e,y?a ; e oa;'Pa gas well bas needs in ? eeukbalt ok QaSna ar efA.eotb a eXte;, ab ~;~: tent urid e7;isted Sri far ~? eCeive s gal erv exited- Cover Zori that eratlon then as a rlw'he=e 195ps , min Luilitar i ?p din ?orily n? a take v attentlbe- the vaCuke it the coon ion , and scene an Hers Fads us to st 0 OJ~ as er par ~s on of att eriu4?n the S , tion le not 1A e~ t? to- e eitY'er inst=uot an of r, 0~h ;rifusi n. co gew r it% 'rL to ty tlhas left i gs , ana a 01 - assts 'ha ave be Alt Ylouoh In the Ma Xist - t 1.2 p n I4arx st rhetoric t? eve that 1 tr nines Of MarXi or rid wheav~ dose a earlier generation rural people would have aV?Z wanted to be left alone, critical needs an pirations (aided by the media, mainly radio) appear to have made them more involved. They know that assistance is available somewhere and they are, generally speaking, not getting their fair share... CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12 required to evaluate this against the titutional rights of the victims. C ons Thus, even though it is sworn to i hold the Constitution, the court claimed,, that national security interests predominate. The court also allowed the CIA to, with- hold the names of foreign intelligence agents and agencies which had worked for Operation CHAOS. Release of this infor- mation, the court said, would endanger national security because it would be "embarrassing" to foreign governments, and these foreign agents might refuse to spy on U.S. citizens abroad. (Copies of these decisions may be 36 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 i h ith the hom nta- cal obtained from Counters mailing costs are 25.00. Copying and . Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Military Issues U.S. Sells Cluster Bombs to Morocco by Martha Wenger While the issue of Israel's use of cluster bombs in its Lebanon invasion occupied U.S. headlines for weeks, the U.S. Department of Defense's admission that it had sold the deadly weapons not only to Israel, but to 17 other nations as well, has provoked little comment. The Pentagon said cluster bombs (often referred to as CBUs, Cluster Bomb Units) and cluster shells (fired from a 155mm artillery gun) had been sold to some Arab countries, and to the Shah's Iran, but claimed that the list of purchas- ers was classified.' CounterSpy has now learned that one of these countries is Morocco. When confronted with specific data about U.S. sales agreements with Morocco, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed in September 1982 that the U.S. delivered 100 CBU-58s and fuzes (each costing about $2,000) to Morocco in November-December 1981. And Morocco has more on order. ? Defense Security Assistance Agency data2 reveals that the U.S. agreed on January 19, 1982, to sell Morocco 252 additional CBU-58s and fuzes for $561,773; and again on April 22, 1982, to sell $1,909,623 worth of CBU-71 bombs, fuzes and related materials. The U.S. apparently has not yet delivered the latter two purchases. The sale to Morocco--a close U.S. ally under the Reagan administration--is of particular concern because Morocco, like Israel, is engaged in a war. For seven years, Morocco's King Hassan has poured $1 million a day into a no-win con- fict with the Polisario Liberation Front of Western Sahara over his attempt to annex that former Spanish colony. The native Saharawi people are demanding self- determination, and in 1976 declared the independence of the Saharawi Arab Democra- tic Republic (SADR). Twenty-seven African nations have officially recognized the SADR, and the Organization of African Unity admitted the nation as its 51st member state in February 1982 in a hotly contested move which threatens to split the organization. King Hassan, intensely interested in the phosphate wealth3 of this Martha Wenger is a member of CounterSpy's advisory board. She is co-author with Joe Stork of Military and Political Aspects of U.S.-Israeli Relations: The Case of Cluster Bombs, prepared by the Middle East Research and Information Project for the American Middle East Peace Research Institute, September 1982. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 37 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 otherwise barren region--which together with Morocco's own deposits would make it a world leader in phosphate reserves-- continues to fight. It is in this war that Morocco is most likely to put the cluster bombs to use. Cluster bombs are fragmentation weapons : they kill by inundating a large area with deadly shrapnel fragments, expel- led outward at extremely high velocities. The bombs, used extensively by the U.S. in the Indochina war, were specifically de- signed as antipersonnel weapons. Arms developers have increased the velocity of the fragments to such an extent that some varieties can penetrate tanks and armoured vehicles, but antipersonnel applications obviously have not been lost. Each Cluster Bomb Unit is made up of hundreds of one to two pound "bomblets" packed into a bomb- shaped dispenser, or "mother" bomb. The bomb is air-dropped, the dispenser opens in flight and disperses the bomblets--each of which explodes separately--over a wide The 100 U.S.-made cluster bombs Morocco already has, and the hundreds more on order, strengthen King Hassan's refusal to negotiate with the SADR and provide him with a particularly abhorrent weapon with which to pursue this losing battle. area. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) describes the CBU-58 supplied to Morocco as an antiper- sonnel/antimateriel bomb with 650-670 golf ball-sized steel bomblets packed inside a seven foot metal cannister. The CBU-71 on order, a more recent variety, contains" 650 fragmentation bomblets, each equipped with a random delay fuze. (Many of the CBU casualties in Lebanon were caused by indi- vidual cluster bomblets that had been re- 38 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 leased from the dispenser, but had not ex- ploded on impact. They went off only later when accidentally moved or picked up by curious people.) These bombs are effec- tive killers: a single, modern CBU muni- tion "has the equivalent effect of a well- aimed barrage of 600 simultaneous rounds of 81mm mortar fire."4 Lebanese and Palestinian doctors, and the Vietnamese before them, found cluster bomb injuries uniquely damaging and hard to treat. Dr. Ammal Shamma, head of the emergency room of a Beirut hospital for seven years, told the Philadelphia Inquirer she had never seen anything like it: "The number of people who lose limbs....We've had children literally brought in in pieces. It's the most hideous group of injuries' I've ever seen in my career." A Norwegian , doctor working in Beirut said that a cluster bomb fragment in the heel could be so devastating that doctors are forced to amputate above the knee; "Begin amputations," he called them.5 The gruesome capabilities of cluster bombs to maim and kill, massively demon- strated in the U.S. bombing of Indochina, spurred efforts to outlaw the weapon, similar to those made to ban napalm. The U.N. General Assembly in 1975 adopted by consensus a resolution prohibiting or restricting the use of indiscriminate or excessively injurious conventional weapons. The Swedish government has officially re- commended to a Diplomatic Conference charged with developing international lave[ that "cluster warheads" be banned entirely." But no specific ban has been adopted to date and the U.S. and five other nations continue to produce and export the bombs. Cluster bombs will be a particularly useful weapon for Hassan's 40,000 troops. In spite of their tremendous numerical and arms superiority, the Moroccans have been unable to defeat the Polisario fighters, who know the desert terrain intimately and have used it to their advantage. In fact, the Polisario Front now controls 90 percent of th7 Western Sahara's 127,000 square miles, having steadily forced the Moroc- cans to retreat into an enclave around the (now abandoned) phosphate mines. There, Hassan's troops are dug in behind a defense line of sandbanks, mines, barbed wire, and an electronic detection system supplied by Westinghouse Corporation. . They seldom range into Polisario-controlled territory. Polisario keeps up frequent harrassing raids on Moroccan bases, and even into Morocco proper. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 The sole remaining strength of the Moroccan military is its monopoly in air power. (The U.S. has sold Morocco 20 F5-E jet fighters and six OV-10 "Bronco" coun- terinsurgency aircraft since 1976.8) While the Polisario forces provide few of the typical targets of air strikes--mili- tary installations, tank formations, radar command centers--the cluster bomb is de- signed precisely for use in such wide open spaces, and in situations in which the tar- get is an entire area (and all the people in it), rather than a specific point (such as a tank). The CBU-24 used in Vietnam, for example, covers an area approximately 300 meters wide by 1 kilometer long, 9 and "it is a virtual certainty that any person located within the pattern area will be killed or wounded.1110 Thus the 100 U.S.- made cluster bombs Morocco already has, and the hundreds more on order, strengthen King Hassan's refusal to negotiate with the SADR and provide him with a particular- ly abhorrent weapon with which to pursue this losing battle. 1) Associated Press story in Chicago Tribune, 6/22/82. 2) Obtained by the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., in a Freedom of Information Act request. 3) Phosphates are used primarily to produce fer- tilizer, but in recent years chemical corporations, among them Westinghouse, have developed technology for extracting uranium from phosphates. Multina- tional Monitor (November 1980, pp. 5-6) reported that Westinghouse would like to sell its technology to Morocco. The corporation already has cordial relations with King Hassan who bought the $200 million electronic detection system from Westing- house that now protects the Moroccan-held area of Western Sahara. 4) Tom Gervasi, Arsenal of Democracy II (NY: Grove Press, 1981), p. 2 . 5) Philadelphia Inquirer, 6/20/82. 6) The full name of the body is the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. Eric Prokosch, "Technology and its control: Anti- personnel Weapons," International Social Science Journal 28, 2 (1976), pp. 343, 353. 7 A rica News 2/15/82. 8) a ""Arms Sales in North Africa and the Conflict in the Western Sahara: An Assessment of U.S. Pol- icy." Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 25, 1981, p. 6. 9) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Uncontrolled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 71. 10) Michael Krepon, "Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster Bombs," Foreign Affairs 52, 3 (April 1974), pp. 596-7. KNOW THE ENEMY and know yourself; in 100 battles you will never be imperiled. sun tzu Quarterly newsletter on anti-military affairs: draft counseling, U.S. troops abroad, chemical warfare, military- industrial complex, direct action against the Pentagon, and books for organizers. Subscribe for $10 to RECON, P.O. Box 14602, Phila., PA 19134. SUBSCRIBE TO COUNTERSPY Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 39 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 AirLand Battle: The Army's New Aggressive Strategy The U.S. Army has a new doctrine called AirLand Battle. It is designed to deal with "worldwide challenges." The Army maintains that the purpose of AirLand Battle is to deter war, but even the con- servative U. S. News and World Report states that AirLand Battle is "highly sensitive politically, because it seems so aggressive as to hold out the possibility of a U.S. attack." One military analyst, John Mearsheimer of Harvard University, comments that the AirLand concept "comes very close to calling for pre-emptive strikes." As have past Army doctrines, AirLand Battle ultimately relies on first use of nuclear weapons. The key dif- ference, however, is that nuclear - and chemical - weapons are to be used very early in the conflict. From the start, these weapons are to be employed not on the front line of battle, but deep in enemy territory. A recent article in the Army's Military Review charges that the old Army doctrine .. codified in Field Manual 100-5 TRADOC Brigadier General Donald Morelli ... declares that "AirLand Battle is the attempt to bring the lead the Army has in the laboratory to the battlefield." (published in July 1976; see CounterSpy, vol. 7, no. 1) was inadequate because it viewed "nuclear and conventional wars as separate entities requiring wholly dif- ferent approaches." "If we are going to be responsible professionals" in the 40 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 "business of war-fighting," says Col. Gary Werner of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in Fort Monroe, Va., nuclear and conventional weapons have to be integrated, and the Army has to be pre- pared to use conventional, nuclear and chemical weapons. Two elements are key in AirLand- Battle, according to the new Field Manual 100-5 (published in August 1982) : "Early initiation of offensive action" and "attacking the full depth of the enemy." Says FM 100-5, "any U.S. force operating anywhere in the world must secure the ini- tiative as early as possible and exercise it aggressively. It will use every weapon, asset and combat multiplier and throw the enemy off balance with a power- ful blow from an unexpected direction. It will follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery." FM 100-5 emphasizes further that surprise, concentration, and violence can give the attacker his only significant advantage - the initiative." After gaining the initiative, U.S. troops are urged to maintain it through "relentless exploitation" until the enemy is "destroyed." Nuclear and chemical weapons are, recommended for use 'against enemy troops before they engage in battle. "Supported with nuclear or chemical weapons, small forces attacking at high speed may achieve the same success as larger forces sup- ported with conventional fires. Nuclear or chemical preparatory fires may so reduce the enemy's strength that deep, multiple ... attacks are possible." In depth attack, the second key con- cept in AirLand, means that U.S. forces should immediately expand the battlefield into the enemy territory and not limit themselves to fighting enemy troops in the actual battle zone. By attacking enemy formations and facilities far to the rear of the battlefield, AirLand wants to pre- vent enemy troops there from ever reaching the battlefield. To this end, according to FM 100-5, "nuclear weapons are par- ticularly effective in engaging follow-on Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 formations or forces in depth because of their inherent power and because of reduced concerns about [ friendly ] troop safety and collateral damage." The Army also has plans far beyond AirLand Battle. AirLand 2000, a further development of the aggressive AirLand con- cept, is being drawn up to guide the Army into the next century, when the battle- field will have changed substantially., Its characteristics in the future, according to TRADOC, are "large quantities of sophisticated combat systems... battle expanded into the airspace and depth of enemy formations (300+ km) ; intensive battle at the decisive points" instead of a slow-moving battle of attrition and "le- thality." There will be "more casualties and more varied types of wounds ." In order to win on such a battle- field, says the Army, "we must achieve combat advantage through the quality, not the quantity of our weapons systems. This means more accurate weapons, better sur- veillance and reconnaissance equipment, and more effective command and control systems." On this battlefield of the future, according to TRADOC, it is even more important to gain the initiative from the very beginning. Unlike the prolonged wars of the past, future wars are likely to be decided in the first battle. . Col. Werner is optimistic about U.S. capabilities twenty years from now. He believes that the U. S. has a lead over the Soviet Union (the assumed enemy) in high technology and communication and recon- naissance systems. U.S. superiority also reaches into the area of electronic war- fare which, according to TRADOC, "will be a major component of combat power" and will "include offensive weapons of destruction." TRADOC Brigadier General Donald Morelli agrees that there is a U.S. technical advantage and declares that "AirLand Battle is the attempt to bring the lead the Army has in the laboratory to the battlefield."* Most of the scenarios played through by the Army in preparation for the AirLand *Increased reliance on electronic warfare has of course stirred quite some excitement in the elec- tronics industry. A recent editorial in Defense Electronics lauded the development of the AirLand Battle 2000 concept as "virtually unparalleled in U.S. military history" which, "simply translated means more lucrative opportunities for the electro- nics industry." A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities CSWS (Corps Support Weapon System) GLCM (Ground-Launched Cruise Missile) MLRS (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) Pershing II Copperhead FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines) ASAS (All-Source Analysis System (Corps/Division)) RPV (Remotely Piloted Vehicle) TACSAT (Tactical Satellite Communications Subsystem) SOTAS (Standoff Target Acquisition System) TACFIRE (Tactical Fire Direction System) * C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) MILITARY REVIEW Counterspy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Nuclear and chemical weapons are recommended for use against enemy troops before they engage in battles doctrine take place in Germany. In case of war in Central Europe, says TRADOC, the Army, in its effort to gain the initiative early on, would have to carry out "cross border operations" especially along the "inter-German border." More simply put, U.S. or NATO troops will have to invade the German Democratic Republic. According to General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, the NATO allies have accepted the AirLand concept and agreed on a new Allied Command Europe doctrine based on it. The other NATO countries agreed to AirLand even though they had not been consulted in the pre- parations for the AirLand doctrine. The Reforger Maneuvers in Europe in early fall 1982 explored AirLand doctrine in practice for the first time in concert with European forces. AirLand and AirLand 2000, together with the procurement of highly sophisti- cated weapons systems and more and more nuclear weapons, push the U.S. and Europe closer to war. Army public relations efforts emphasize that AirLand is a doctrine 'designed to counter Soviet or Soviet-inspired invasions. Nonetheless, even if one were to ignore the aggressive role of the U.S. Army in the past, an exam- ination of AirLand Battle itself uncovers the overwhelmingly offensive aspects of the doctrine. - Konrad Ege - FM 100-5, August 1982 (Excerpts) OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS The object of all operations is to destroy the opposing force. At the foundation of the US Army's operations are the principles of war and their application to classical and modern theories. The Army's basic operational concept is called AirLand Battle doctrine. This doc- trine is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy.... AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area, stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. It distinguishes the operational level of war - the conduct of-cam- paigns and large-unit actions - from the tacti- cal level. It recognizes the nonquantifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver which is as important as firepower. It acknowl- edges the importance of nuclear and chemical weapons and of electronic warfare, and it de- tails their effects on operations. Most impor- tant, it emphasizes the human element, coWaa- geous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, ef- fective Leaders. In execution, AirLand Battle may mean us- ing every element of combat power from psycho- logical operations to nuclear weapons. The bat- tlefield includes every area and enemy unit that can affect the outcome of the immediate fight, and it extends into the area of interest where future operations will take place. An in- novative approach to fighting at botl} the tac- tical and operational levels, all arms, all services, and all means of support. To insure success, AirLand Battle doctrine concentrates on - ?Indirect approaches. .Speed and violence. ?Flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior leaders. .Rapid decision-making. .Clearly defined objectives and operational concepts. ?A clearly designed main effort. .Deep attack. AirLand Battle offensives are rapid, vio- lent operations that seek enemy soft spots, re- main flexible, and exploit successes promptly. The attacker creates a fluid situation, main- tains the initiative, and destroys the coher- ence of the enemy defense. Using supporting and reserve units flexibly, the attack must contin- ue as long as it takes to assure victory.... Whether attacking or defending, any US force operating anywhere in the world must se- cure the initiative as early as possible and exercise it aggressively. It will use every weapon, asset and combat multiplier to gain the initiative and throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction. It will follow up rapidly to prevent his recov- ery.... At both the tactical and operational levels and for all levels of command, initia- tive, depth, agility, and synchronization are the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine.... Surprise, concentration and violence can give the attacker his only significant advantage - the initiative. If the attacker loses the ini- tiative, even temporarily or locally, he will 42 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 jeopardize the success of the entire operation. To maintain the initiative, the attacker must see opportunities, analyze courses of action, decide what to do, and act faster than the ene- my - repeatedly. Aggressive maneuver, respon- sive firepower, and effective deep attack are essential to maintaining the initiative. On today's battlefield the attacker must maneuver rapidly, penetrate deeply, survive powerful counterfires and countermeasures, and above all, maintain momentum by maintaining the initiative. If the attacker does not pre- serve the momentum, the enemy will recover from the shock of the first assault. He will identi- fy the attacker's main effort and mass forces and fires against it. METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available), weapons, and the higher commander's concept of operations determine the conduct of an offensive operation. Whatever the plan may be, CONCENTRATION, SURPRISE, SPEED, FLEXIBILITY, AND AUDACITY are fundamental.... The battlefield is lethal, and the attack- er must succeed early and maintain a rapid pace. Thus, division and corps commanders should concentrate for the attack and employ every combat capability available to them. They should allocate enough combat, combat support, and combat service support units to permit them to adjust missions and task organizations. Such support and flexibility will allow the attacker to exploit opportunities as they arise. Every level of command practices concen- tration of effort. However, it is most effec- tive at division level and higher, where all combat power, logistic resources, can be coor- dinated in support of the plan. When concen- trating forces for the attack, commander must avoid patterns or obvious movements which indi- cate the attack's timing or direction. Mobili- ty, speed, security, and deception are essen- tial to concentrate forces successfully. Offensive operations, especially those in- volving air-land operations, require arms and services to cooperate closely to achieve con- Mid-term objectives: The DoD will acquire a more robust, reli- able and survivable military space capability through such techniques as survivability en- hancement, proliferation, mobili- ty, reconstitution and the main- tenance of adequate numbers and types of space and launch vehi- cle assets to provide for peace- time failures and wartime attri- tion. The DoD will deploy and op- erate satellite and launch con- trol facilities using organic DoD resources to the maximum extent practical and remove vulnerable critical nodes from our space system. centration of effort. Air-ground operations are complementary. Ground maneuver forces will be the critical elements in an attack, but their progress will depend on Army and Air Force re- connaissance, close air support, and tactical interdiction. The attacker's advance causes the defender to concentrate and to move forces. This, in turn, can create lucrative targets for air attack. Air attack on enemy reserves and defenses in depth promotes ground maneuver. Concentration of combat and logistic sup- port is also essential to maintaining offen- sive momentum. Historically, disrupted engineer assistance, air defense coverage, field artil- lery support, communications, and logistic sup- port have limited, the success of large offen- sives. These functions require integrated staff planning. Nuclear and chemical weapons dramatically increase the possibilities for sudden altera- tions on the battlefield, which attacks can ex- ploit. Troop concentrations should be brief, deception should be of highest quality, and plans should be flexible enough to accommodate sudden changes. These imperatives, however, represent only an extension of the characteris- tics of a sound attack. Although risks will be greater, the attacker will gain considerable protection from nuclear fires by disrupting the defender's fire support system and by confusing him with speed. Under nonnuclear conditions, developing schemes of maneuver and then planning fire sup- port to achieve their objectives are normal. When nuclear weapons are available, planning such fires and then basing schemes of maneuver on their effects may be preferable.... Tactical schemes for the nuclear or the chemical environment must stress rapid move- ment, minimum massing, alternative routes, and violent execution of simple plans even when communications are lost. Nuclear or chemical fire support may allow smaller units to accom- plish missions that would require the massed forces in a conventional battle. The DoD will establish a pro- gram for identifying, modifying and integrating national intelli- gence and civil space resources into military operations for cri- sis and wartime support or for denying their use to an adver- sary. In capabilities and opera- tions planning, the military de- partments and unified and speci- fied commands should consider these capabilities as supplemen- tary except where system require- ments such as tasking responsive- ness and wartime endurance are ducted in such a manner as to di- minish the enemy's knowledge and capability to discern specific missions among the population of national security satellites. As a matter of policy, the DoD will: ? Improve the survivability, per- formance, and coverage of space systems used to warn us of a So- viet ballistic missile attack and to assess its size and scope. ? Pursue an operational antisat- ellite system. ?Accelerate those areas of tech- assured. nology offering the potential for The DoD will plan, control, and significant military advantage operate national security shuttle and develop those space systems missions. To maintain secure mil- that have been shown to enhance i ary space operations, the mili- the U.S. military balance of pow- tary space program will be con- er. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 43 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Pentagon Proposes: "Peace Through Protracted top Nuclear War by Konrad Ege and Arjun Makhijani The Reagan administration is preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. President Reagan has sent a strategic master plan to the National Security Council to "give the United States the capability, of winning a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union. 111 This plan is designed to put into operational effect Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's Defense Guidance for Fiscal Years 1984 to 1988. The Guidance calls for building up U.S. forces so as to be able to "render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet ? allied) military and political power structure." It states that in a "strategic nuclear war with the USSR... the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States."'2 According to Webster's Dictionary, "pre- vail" means to "gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority; win mastery; triumph." These plans to wage and win a nuclear war are the ultimate step in a general strategy of aggression against the Soviet Union. But they also target countries striving to be independent from U.S. domi- nation and liberation movements, which, the administration believes are essen- tially conspiracies hatched in Moscow. The U.S. nuclear buildup has an economic aspect as well. The administration is intent on forcing the diversion of Soviet resources from the civilian to the mili- tary sector in the hope of provoking re- volt or economic collapse or both. Failing that, the administration plans to use the nuclear superiority it hopes to achieve to, "change Soviet behavior." Nuclear weapons are seen as "the ultimate military guaran- tor of American security," and the 1980 Republican National Platform proclaims, that "we will build toward a sustained defense expenditure sufficient to...reach the position of military superiority.... "3 Richard Pipes, the National Security 44 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Council's senior adviser on Eastern Europe, believes that the Soviet Union must choose between its socialist system and war. Colin Gray, a presidentially- appointed advisor on arms control, wrote in a 1980 article in Foreign Affairs that "the United States should plan to defeat the Soviet Union and to do so at a cost that would not prohibit U.S. recovery. Washington should identify war aims that in the last resort would contemplate the destruction of Soviet political authority and the emergence of a postwar world order compatible with Western values." Gray's statement is echoed by James Wade, Princi- pal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, who told a Congressional panel in secret testimony that the Reagan nuclear program will guarantee that "U.S. postwar posture and international influence" are maintained after a nuclear war. 4 Navy Secretary John Lehman is even more blunt : "You have to have a war-winning capability if you are to succeed;" and a war-winning capability depends in part on "clear maritime superiority. "5 The Reagan administration's concerns about nuclear war fighting are directed towards deploying first strike weapons and expanding the nuclear arsenal so as to have a large number of weapons left after both the Soviet Union and the United States have been hit in a* strategic "nuclear ex- change." This second aspect of the Reagan strategy was confirmed by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Thomas K. Jones. He was pressed in a Congressional hearing about the exact number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear warheads, and then criticized for, giving a figure for U.S. warheads lower than official Pentagon numbers. Commented Jones: "I may have been in error and con- (Konrad Ege is co-editor of Counterspy magazine and a freelance journalist. Arjun Makhijani is a consultant on energy and economic matters.) Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 fused -[the present number of warheads] tive measures of military power. But with the balance at the end of the Soviet there are also qualitative dimensions strike or the... exchange, because we no where we have countervailing strengths and longer, in the Department [of Defense] advantages" over Soviet forces. Weinberger compare the static indices of what each says that the final years of this decade side has in its inventory." Instead, might be crucial for U.S.-Soviet confron- Jones said, "we are more concerned with tations: "By the end of the 1980s, the the balance that would follow a Soviet Soviets may encounter major economic dif- attack on our strategic forces and the ficulties, just when the U.S. military and balance after the U.S. responded in allied programs are beginning to show kind."6 fully the effects of major improvement According to Weinberger's Guidance, efforts." The U.S. government "should use it might not be possible to build up U.S. this opportunity to help shape the future forces sufficiently to win a protracted competition in ways which are advantageous nuclear war within the next five years, to the United States." and in any case, "our allies and we cannot In order to reach the point where the expect to match the Soviets in quantita- U.S. will be in a position to "win" an Who's Ahead ? President Reagan's contention strike weapons is not designed include constant improvement that U.S. nuclear forces must to achieve parity. It is an of the B-52 bomber, force; be built up rapidly is based offensive program. introducing multiple indepen- on charges that the Soviet The administration propa- dently targetable reentry Union has a "definite margin gates another myth: that the vehicles (MIRVs) on Poseidon of superiority." Nevertheless, large nuclear weapons buildup submarines (some 5,000 war- Reagan does not believe the. is necessary because of the heads); adding 76 FB-111 bomb- Soviet Union could win a nuc- previous "decade of neglect." ers to the Strategic Air Com- lear war, and U.S. commanders Reagan goes so far as to say mand; taking into commission have said repeatedly that, that the U.S. has been "uni- 356 F-111 nuclear capable given the choice, they wouldn't laterally disarming." This is bombers; and retrofitting 900 switch forces with the Soviet simply not true. For most of MK12A weapons on 300 Minuteman Union. It is obvious that this "decade of neglect," the III missiles. In addition, Reagan's statements about a U.S. has been deploying new the U.S. developed a new Soviet lead are either deliber- nuclear warheads at a rate of "family" of nuclear weapons - ately misleading or based on three per day. Modernization the neutron bomb. erroneous assumptions. Accord- programs in the last ten years ing to figures based on Defense Department, CIA, and Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies (London) statistics, II, the Washington-based Center for Defense Information states that NATO has some 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons; the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), 7,800. Half of the U.S. strategic forces are on sub- marines, which are virtually y invulnerable. Each Trident submarine alone can carry enough nuclear weapons to destroy 250 Soviet cities - every city of over 100,000 people. Clearly deterrence is as- sured. While the Soviet Union has an advantage in some weap- ons systems, the U.S. is ahead J in others. Overall, parity exists. Therefore, Reagan's "modernization program," intro- ~A1W NOyrouph! ducing hundreds of new first CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 45 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 extended nuclear war against the Soviet Union, the administration has budgeted $222 billion for its strategic program. Two hundred twenty-two billion dollars is the official figure only, though, and, rather deceptively, does not include the cost for the actual nuclear warheads of the weapons systems to be built. The Con- gressional Budget Office further estimates that the Pentagon might be underreporting the cost of the strategic program by some 25 percent. Therefore, the real cost of ,.-preparing to "win" an all-out nuclear war. with the Soviet Union is at least $300 billion for the next five years. Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, who retired two years ago as a high-ranking Pentagon planner for conventional and nuclear war, comments: "I think that that [ expenditure ] is clear evidence of the implementation ~of a new strategy shifting the United- States from the idea that we are going to deter nuclear war to a position designed to fight, survive and win a nuclear war."7 nuclear bombs exploded over the United States might be sufficient to render use- less the entire C3 system. Pentagon offi- cials admit, that even the improvements- financed by the Reagan administration will not be able to establish a fully "surviv- able" C3 system. Therefore, any C3 up- grading has to be seen primarily as an offensive program. When the C3 network was established in the 1960s, its main functions were "to detect and confirm an attack and to relay the President's retaliation directives to the nuclear forces;' Because of the Ore- For Reagan, the era of detente, of coexistence and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union is over. The era of relentless confrontation has begun. Reagan is preparing for war against the Soviet Union if other measures to "change Soviet behavior" fail, and he believes the United States can prevail in such a war. .II. Decapitation and Counterforce The Defense Guidance indicates three prin- cipal aims of U.S. nuclear war strategy against the Soviet Union: ? Elimination of the leadership and political structure in the Soviet Union (decapitation) ; ? Destruction of the Soviet mili- tary, particularly its nuclear weapons and its industrial capacity to produce more weapons (counterforce); and ? Preservation of the U.S. leader- ship with large numbers of nuclear weapons "sufficient for trans- and post-attack protection and coercion." The Pentagon is at present developing and deploying weapons systems to fit the requirements of the Defense Guidance - primarily so-called counterforce weapons; that is, extremely accurate missiles with a capability to destroy hard targets such as missile silos and command centers. The key requirement for a nuclear war fighting strategy is an integrated command, control and communications (C3, pronounced C-cubed system to coordinate U.S. forces. C systems, which consist of ground-based. radar installations, early warning sat- ellites, military command centers and communications networks, are inherently vulnerable to nuclear weapons. (Nuclear explosions give off a powerful electro- magnetic pulse which destroys communica- tions systems.) It is estimated that 50 dR __ ('rnrnt~+~c+^+ -- r1a^ 10R2 _ Fch_ 19R3 cently redefined U.S. strategic doctrine," says a Congressional Budget Office report, the C3 system will have to be "dramatic- ally" improved to be able to function "in both the trans-attack [during a nuclear attack on the U.S.] and post-attack periods. 118 Air Force officials describe C3 improvements as "top priority." In Weinberger's words, "I can't think of any higher priority than improving the C3 aspects" of , the strategic program.9 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Donald Latham, the man in charge of the C3 program, stated in a secret Senate hearing that a C3 system with "balanced capabili-. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ties" would best be able to achieve "peace through protracted nuclear war.1110 The administration has budgeted a total of $18 billion (in 1982 dollars) for strategic C3 system improvementll with $3.8 billion to be spent in Fiscal Year 1983.12 In addition to upgrading the North American air defense network, the C3 improvement program is to enhance the "survivability and capability of command centers that would direct U.S. strategic forces during a nuclear war," and to deploy "survivable" communications links between the co mand centers and U.S nuclear forces. l" Upgrading of the C system will include the completion of the Extreme Low Frequency (ELF) system in Michigan and Wisconsin, 14 designed to give orders to deeply submerged submarines; the "hardening" of communications links to "protect" them against the electromagnetic pulse created by nuclear explosions; the deployment of additional airborne command posts; and the development of a new, extreme high frequency and purportedly jam-resistant satellite communications system, MILSTAR. The weapons and delivery systems to be connected by the improved C3 system are designed to fit into the strategy of decap- itation and counterforce: the Pershing II ballistic missiles, the MX intercontinen- tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the B-lB bombers, the Trident submarines with their D-4 or advanced D-5 missiles, anti-satel- lite weapons, and the thousands of ground-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles. Each system has its place in the "win- nable" nuclear war strategy. The Pershing IIs to be installed in West Germany in late 198315 are probably the most impor- tant and dangerous element of the U.S. buildup for a first strike capability. Their flight time to the Soviet Union is only six to eight minutes. John Steinbruner, Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution noted that the Pershing Its "could attack much of the central command system of the Soviet Union.. . it looks that it might be used, or intended to be used as the spearhead of a preemptive attack and is therefore a particularly threat- ening v~-eapon from the Soviet point of view.n16 Pershing Us , with special "earth penetrator" warheads are ideal weapons to use to destroy hardened under- ground Soviet command centers - to "decapitate" the Soviet military. The MX missile is 'another first strike weapon. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lewis Allen conceded in Congressional testimony that these extremely accurate counterforce weapons "have some first strike capability," although he hastened to add that a first strike capability is "not our goal."17 MX missiles would most likely be used very early in a conflict since they are virtually unprotected against enemy missiles. Cruise missiles - the Pentagon plans to buy about 8, 000 - are very flexible and accurate weapons, ideal for "nuclear war fighting" because they can be launched, from virtually any land-, sea- and air- based platform. They are to be used against Soviet nuclear forces and radar installations, for war fighting on the battlefield, and against what the Pentagon calls the "industrial/economic base of the Soviet Union." Many air-launched cruise missiles will be carried on B-52G and B-52H bombers and the newly develped B-1B. (Reagan plans to buy 100 B-lBs.) With 22 cruise missiles each, every B-lB bomber will be a "superfortress," able to wipe out a dozen CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 47 ~ve~~pcK Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ~ Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 or more Soviet cities and military facili- ties in one launch. Bombers are, of course,, the most flexible and the most important reusable nuclear delivery system. Ballistic missiles on Trident II sub- marines, most notably the D-5 missiles which will be operational in 1989, are highly accurate and can therefore be used as counterforce or first strike weapons. The Reagan administration is planning to build twelve Trident U submarines with 24 missiles; each missile has eight indepen- dently targetable 100 kiloton warheads. The D-5 missile will be able to carry up to 1% warheads and has a range of 11,000 km.1 Space warfare will play an increas- ingly important role in nuclear lgnd con- ventional war in years to come. Anti satellite weapons, capable of destroying enemy early warning and communications satellites, are crucial for a first strike strategy. Two hundred eighteen million dollars are budgeted for the anti-satellite weapons program in Fiscal Year 1983;20 the Air Force will have its first anti- satellite weapons program operational in the mid- or late 1980sZ1 To give its commanding officers a chance to practice the use of these weapons systems, the U.S. government has greatly stepped up "realistic" exercises for nuclear war. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) has "made sweeping changes in its training philosophy " to exercise "the way it would fight."2Z From March 1? to 5, 1982, the administration conducted "Exercise Ivy League 82," which was "the first complete exercise of the military and 'civilian command structures and com- munication . systems to be used in all-out nuclear war since 1956.n23 The Pentagon announced Ivy League 82 simply as "a Reagan's First Strike Arsenal Pershing II Hundreds of thousands of West Germans have demonstrated against the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany, and some three million have signed an appeal against the missiles. The reason for this wave of protest is obvious: The deployment of the Pershing II is not just a "modernization" of nuclear forces in Europe, and it is not a defensive program to counter Soviet missiles; Pershing Us are first strike weapons. According to secret NATO documents, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group decided in 1977 to deploy the missiles. The Pershing . Us are the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Their flight time to the Soviet Union is less than ten minutes- their margin of error is 25 meters. i Former Army Secretary Clifford Alexander explained that the Pershing Us are espe- cially "credible" weapons because of this accuracy and their "warhead option:" either air burst/surface burst or "earth penetrator.n2 These characteristics - extremely short flight time and hard target capabil- ity - make the Pershing Us a weapon system uniquely suited to hit Soviet com- mand and control centers early in a war. The Pershing IIs' purpose is to "decapitate" the Soviet government: "The basing of the Pershing II on West German soil," writes Blaetter fuer deutsche and internationale Politik, a respected West German monthly, "gives the American president... the unprecedented option of being able to threaten to decapitate another world power permanently and out of the blue. And all that from West Germany,, far away from the Pentagon and the White House." This is a "permanent and deadly threat," and the Soviet Union has no defense against it whatsoever." The official number of Pershing Us to be deployed in West Germany is 108. The actual number is considerably higher. The Department of Defense, without any 48 -- CounterSpy.-- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 routine [ ! ] worldwide command post ex- ercise." The "scenario" for Ivy League, stated a Pentagon Press release, was "a fictitious series of worldwide events leading to increased tension and conflict among nations, thus providing headquarters staffs, and the unified and special com- mands with the opportunity to test plan- ning and communication procedures in that fictitious environment. "2'i During the exercise, the United States was hit by a massive - 5,000 megaton - nuclear attack (the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima had the strength of one-fiftieth of a megaton). Still, the Wall Street Journal wrote that the exercise reportedly convinced Presi- dent Reagan that "the nation has the plans and the capability to maintain continuity of government during a nuclear strike." Beginning in 1983, the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, -Pennsylvania, will be equipped with a new computerized war game called Janus. Janus, with input from the Defense Mapping Agency, can display any part of the earth on its screens and si- mulate a battle in progress. The Janus project is designed to help officers learn when and how to use nuclear weapons. Most of the scenarios played take place in West Germany. Janus Director Donald Blumenthal of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory com- mented that the officers using the com- puter game tended to employ nuclear weapons rather indiscriminately. "If they were caught out of position, they would try to retrieve the battle with nuclear weapons."25 The Army argues that such training will help officers to make intel- ligent decisions in a real battle. But it could have the opposite effect, too, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology sociology professor Sherry Turkle, by "numbing" the officers and making nuclear war more thinkable. public discussion, has found a fascinating way to increase the number of Pershing Us from the 108 approved by NATO to nearly four hundred. The Army has ordered no less than 385 Pershing II missiles. This ingenious Pentagon mathematics counts not the actual missiles but the launchers to be deployed in separate units. Each unit contains nine launchers and thirteen Pershing II missiles. In addition, each unit will have, according to an analysis in the West German weekly Stern, ten spare missiles. Moreover, Pershing II launchers are easily reloadable, and the U.S. Army The official number of Pershings lls to be deployed in West Germany is 108. The actual number is considerably higher. The Department of Defense, without any public discussion.... has ordered no less than 385 Pershing 11 missiles. plans to fire at least two missiles from each launcher. All this adds up to the almost 400 Pershing II missiles that the Pentagon has on order. (The Army has even taken into consideration that a mass move- ment opposed to the Pershing Us might prevent the Army from deploying them. In that eventuality, the Army would substi- tute short-range Pershing II missiles capable of hitting targets within a 750 km range. These short-range missiles could be transformed into full Pershing Us without major technical problems.) The deployment of the Pershing Us in West Germany scheduled for the end of 1983, will immediately increase the danger of war. The Soviet government has warned that the deployment may lead to a new "launch on warning" posture. Under this policy, Soviet nuclear missiles targeted against the United States and Western Europe "would be programmed for almost instant action if computerized Soviet intelligence monitoring facilities report an imminent American threat to the Soviet Union.114 There would be no time for diplomacy, even of the "hot line" variety. Cruise Missiles In addition to Pershing 11, NATO has de- cided to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe by the end of 1983. These missiles are extremely accurate, and, with a 2,500 kilometer CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 49 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 M. "We Must Not Fear War. "26 In an attempt to make nuclear war "more thinkable" for the population as a whole, the Reagan administration has insti- tuted a civil defense program, with de- tailed plans to solve the numerous pro- blems that would arise from a "nuclear exchange." At the same time, this program is part of an effort to gain military superiority. Ronald Reagan pointed out in his budget message that "civil defense, as an element of the strategic balance, should assist in maintaining perceptions" that the U.S.-Soviet balance of nuclear weapons "is favorable to the U.S." (Emphasis added. Reagan believes that his civil defense program will "provide for survival of a substantial portion of the U.S. popu- lation in the event of nuclear attack pre- ceded by strategic warning, and for contin- uity of government, should deterrence and range, can strike deep into the, Soviet Union.6 (See Figure 1.) GLCMs are very small weapons - only 219 inches long - and. THEATER NUCLEAR TARGET COVERAGE T .~ . \ 111.11M \ ~.OI~IM I Ai are hard for radar installations to detect. Although they have a flight time considerably longer than the Pershing II, with their hard target capability they are first strike weapons. Major General Niles Fulwyler, head of the Army's Nuclear and Chemical Directorate, confirmed in secret testimony to Congress that a typical GLCM target "would be a command center, a nuclear delivery unit," or, added General Robert Russ of the Air Force, "air defense master centers. Thosc would be a high priority sort of target." Cruise missiles, based on land, sea and air, are ideal "nuclear war fighting" weapons. They are easy to retarget and easy to transport. The Air Force has escalation control fail. "27 The director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Louis Giuffrida, claimed that Reagan's civil defense pro- gram is a "moderate, orderly, responsible and inexpensive [ $4.1 billion ] way to implement a complete population protection program by the end of FY 189.11 Civil defense programs are intimately tied to overall planning for strategic war. Under Reagan, the Pentagon has set up a Direc- torate for Emergency Planning which is responsible for coordinating "all Defense Department emergency planning efforts... and for ensuring that FEMA's planning for nuclear attack preparedness is appropria- tely integrated with other strategic nuclear attack planning in the Department of Defense."28 Obviously, the Reagan civil defense program to provide "complete population protection" can only lower the threshold, already begun to deploy air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on B-52G bombers; the B-113s scheduled to be built will be equipped with cruise missiles as well. ALCMs have pinpoint accuracy. In a war, they are likely to be launched - first from bombers flying outside Warsaw Pact terri- tory to attack air defense systems. The way would then be clear for B-52s and B-1Bs to penetrate deeper into Soviet territory to destroy other targets. The Air Force is expected to purchase some 3,800 ALCMs while the Navy is buying some 4,000 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Secretary of the Navy- John Lehman sees the deployment of the SLCMs on surface ships and submarines as "by far the most rapid and cost-effective way to distribute strike capability throughout our naval forces." More than 100 U.S. ships are to be fitted with Tomahawk cruise missiles over the next five years, beginning in early 1983. The Navy is equipping four submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles already this year.9 The SLCM's are a key part of the administration's desire to achieve a nuclear war fighting capability, according to Rear Admiral Frank Kelso, the Director of the Navy's Strategic Submarine Division. Kelso stated in a secret 1981 Senate hearing that the deployment of the cruise missiles on ships and submarines (most can be targeted against both ships and land targets) "will result in a distri- bution of significant firepower from a wide variety of platforms.... The net 50 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 of nuclear war. Some administration offi- cials indeed seem to believe that a large part of the population will survive a nuclear war. Said Thomas Jones : "Every- body's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around....Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it."29 In reality, it is questionable whether humanity would survive an all-out nuclear war. Some of the long-term results from the explosion of thousands of nuclear weapons all over the world (military bases and other facilities used by U.S. and Soviet forces in third countries would certainly be targeted) are unpredictable. The destruction of the ozone layer, for instance, would allow high doses of ultra- violet rays from the sun onto the earth which would cause skin burns in humans and animals and could destroy a large part of the earth's vegetation; the resultant cli- mate changes could lead to worldwide star- vation. As far as immediate protection for the people in the U.S. against nuclear explosions is concerned, the Reagan civil defense program is unrealistic. It is based on questionable assumptions such as that cities will be evacuated in an orderly way and people will leave their guns behind; that the rural communities where people are to be relocated will welcome them; and that the Soviet Union will wait until everybody is moved out of the cities before it fires its missiles and will not retarget them.30 Government planning also fails to deal with - indeed, cannot deal with - other dramatic con- sequences of nuclear explosions. These include widespread fires with few people left fit to fight them; large amounts of radiation emitted from destroyed nuclear result is a survivable force of signifi- cant capability.... In addition, the United States would, in any post-nuclear exchange environm nt, retain a measure of coercive power."10 MX Missiles The administration plans to build 100 MX Intercontinental ' Ballistic Missiles, each containing ten multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Former CIA Deputy Director Herbert Scoville calls the MX a first strike weapon which "will be ineffective if n9t used to start a strategic nuclear war." 1 This is the case because the MX, although extremely accurate and powerful enough to destroy , hardened targets such as missile silos, is itself unprotected against a missile attack. (The "dense pack" deployment strategy, or basing of the MX in existing silos will not decrease this vulnerability.) The MX is a classical example of a "use them or lose them" weapon. A joint statement by Air Force Secretary Verne Orr and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Lewis Allen illustrates this point: "With greater accuracy and more than three times as many warheads as our newest Minuteman missiles, the MX will be able to hold at risk high value Soviet targets such as hardened command posts, nuclear storage sites, and missile silos ."12 Yet Allen and Orr conceded that the MX is vulnerable to a Soviet attack. For public consumption, the MX is billed as a "defensive" weapon. The rationale put forward by the Pentagon is that the U.S. needs to upgrade its land- based ballistic missiles because a Soviet attack would wipe out most of the current force. This is a specious argument: if the Soviets can wipe out the current force, they can certainly target some of their missiles at the new land-based MX which will remain virtually unprotected irrespective of the deployment mode. The MX would have then proved useless except if used in a first strike. Indeed, Paul Nitze, Reagan's chief arms control nego- tiator warned three years ago that to deploy the MX in a vulnerable basing mode "would increase crisis instability" because it has "the negative feature of a threatening but vulnerable U.S. first strike counterforce capability."13 The Carter administration originally proposed deploying the MX in the "race track" system designed to hide it and pro- tect it from a Soviet attack. The fact that the Reagan administration is going ahead with the MX deployment without any real effort to protect it underscores the first strike character of the MX. President Reagan is supposed to announce an interim MX basing decision by the end of 1982, and, if the MX is to be deployed on schedule, a permanent deploy- ment mode will have to be determined in time for the Fiscal Year 1984 budget. The administration is considering a variety of counterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 51 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 power plants; "tens of millions, ' 31 of human and animal cadavers; flooding from broken dams; exploding fuel storage sites and gasoline tanks in cars; and widespread, outbreaks of disease due to unsanitary water. Above all, the civil defense plan- ners assume that people will obey orders from the government - if there is a govern- ment left capable of communicating with the country. A number of administration officials fail to grasp these horrible realities. ,Vice President George Bush, for example, was asked in a 1980 interview to comment on the statement that any quantitative advantages in nuclear weapons make no dif- ference in light of the fact that the United States is certain to be devastated in a nuclear war. Bush replied that the statement "makes a little sense.. .if you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange... .1 don't believe that." When pressed for a definition of "winning," Bush mentioned "survivability of command and control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a per- centage of your citizens, and...a capabi- lity that inflicts more damage on the opposition that it can inflict on you," and stated that for him, winning would also mean that more than 5 percent of the people in the U.S. would survive. 32 IV. Making Sure the Bombs Survive Reagan administration officials who believe that a civil defense program can "save a substantial portion" of the people in the U.S. obviously are not reconciled to the idea that the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear weapons parity, and that therefore, strategic nuclear war will in- evitably end in global destruction. These officials - and they , hold key posts in the White House and the Pentagon - talk about a "post nuclear exchange environment" in which the U.S. would once again have un- questioned nuclear superiority based on its larger and more advanced nuclear weapons stockpile. Indeed, having nuclear weapons left after a prolonged war- while the enemy has none appears to be the defi- nition of "prevailing" and the basis for shaping the world according to "Western, values," as Colin Gray put it. The emphasis on the "survival" of options for both the interim and permanent basing. Several of the options under con- sideration would violate existing arms control agreements. However, Defense Secretary Weinberger seems little con- cerned about violating or "revising" such agreements. Overall, "in more than one respect, the present U.S. Administration is envisaging a future in which the deployment of strategic nuclear weaponry is not constrained by treaty."14 Footnotes 1) See F. Clifton Berry, "Pershing II: First Step in NATO Theatre Force Modernization," International Defense Re- view, August 1979, p. 1303. 2 Ibid., p. 1304. 3) Karl Bredthauer, "Von der Anti-Hitler Koalition zur Anti-Reagan Koalition? Wiederholt sich die Geschichte?," Blaetter fuer deutsche and internationale Polt k No. 8, 1982. 4) Washington Post (WP), 4/11/82. 5) The Pentagon might have plans beyond the deployment of the 464 GLCMs. It is buying a total of 560 Tomahawk GLCMs. 6) Sverre Lodgaard, "Long range theatre, nuclear forces in Europe," in The Arms 52 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Race and Arms Control, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982, p. 144. 7) Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second Session, Part 4, p. 429. 8) Ibid., Part 2, p. 290. 9) Ibid., Part 2, p. 13. 10) Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, First Session, October 26-30; November 3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 1981, p. 203. 11) See Jack Coihoun, "White House Fumbles and Bumbles on MX," The Guardian (New York), 5/12/82, p. 7. 12) Cf supra, #7, Part 2, p. 302. 13) R. Jeffrey Smithf "Reagan's Plan for MX Attracts Fire," Science, 4/9/82, p. 150. 14) Frank Barnaby and Randall Forsberg, "Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in The Arms Race and Arms Control, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982, p. 88. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 nuclear weapons and the command, control and communications facilities essential to use them is further underscored by the Reagan administration's plans to build a "surge capacity" for plutonium production - a capacity far beyond the needs of even the expanded nuclear weapons program now underway. (Today, the U.S. has some 28,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. President Reagan has called for a "drama- tic increase in warhead production," and over the next ten years, the Pentagon wants to produce 23,000 nuclear warheads (about 6 per day), some of which are to replace out-of-date systems, others are entirely new types of weapons.33) The strategy of the Reagan admini- stration to "prevail" in a nuclear war is based on the reactionary desire to go back to the good old days of nuclear mono- poly or clear superiority when the U.S. could freely use nuclear threats against the Third World and make plans to turn the Soviet Union into a "smoking, radiating ruin" with impunity. Since it has been in possession of nuclear weapons, the United States government has worked out numerous plans for atomic destruction of the Soviet Union. (Some of the plans are excerpted in the annex to this article.) Many of these strategies, though essentially aggressive in nature, were wrapped in the cloak of defensive operations to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Others openly contemplate a first strike against Eastern Europe. OPLAN 100-6, a nuclear war plan for Europe in the 1960s, for instance, pro- vided for such a first strike. According to OPLAN 100-6's "Attack Option I," the objective of a preemptive strike "is the destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear deli- very forces posing a threat to the U.S. and its allies and allied forces over- seas." "Attack Option II" in OPLAN 100-6 included "Option I plus the destruction or neutralization of other elements of Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and mili- tary resources in being."34 Under this option, the U.S. planned to wipe out thir- teen (out of twenty) Soviet divisions and ten (out of twenty) allied divisions sta- tioned in other Warsaw Pact countries. OPLAN 100-6 was also designed to sow dissention and conflict among Socialist countries. It was to "exploit military and political opportunities ... generated to penetrate into certain European satellite areas in order to create situations fav- ourable to successful satellite rebellion against Soviet domination." (OPLAN's stra- tegy that a selective use of nuclear weapons against "centers of Soviet power" would lead to uprisings by the "captive nations" of Eastern Europe is still pre- sent in some strategic thinking today.35) A secret Air Force Nuclear Yield Requirements manual of the early 1960s prescribes that in the event of a nuclear war, U.S. forces could drop 18-20,000 megatons of nuclear weapons on Europe within 24 hours. The yield requirements manual provides for atomic bombing of Eastern Europe and U.S. allied and A secret Air Force Nuclear Yield Requirements manual of the early 1960s prescribes that in the event of a nuclear war, U.S. forces could drop 18-20,000 megatons of nuclear weapons on Europe within 24 hours ... In addition, there were some fifty other targets in Iran, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. friendly countries, such as West Germany, Iran and Austria, as well as Finland and Yugoslavia. Other targets to be bombed with nuclear weapons - presumably to pre- vent the Soviet Air Force from using them as bases - were three airfields close to Cairo, three in Tehran (other Iranian targets were Abadan, Hamadan, Kermanshah and Tabriz), one airfield in Baghdad and a British air base in Habbinayah, Iraq. In addition, there were some fifty other targets in Iran, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. For West Germany, the Pentagon had a "radioactive earth" strategy, should it be taken over by Warsaw Pact forces. Under a "Barrier and Denial Plan," U.S. commanders were prepared to blow up dozens of atomic CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 53 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 ~~ Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 demolition mines on major West German roads (prepared chambers for these mines still exist) , and to destroy all major bridges. Worse yet, in order to "deny" them to a potentially advancing enemy, the- U.S. was prepared to drop nuclear bombs on a number of West German cities. U.S. plans also say that enemy troops are to be maneuvered into nuclear "killing grounds" - areas with large concentrations of atom- ic demolition mines, or areas certain to be bombed. (In addition to destroying and irradiating West Germany with nuclear weapons, a 1962 document signed by U.S. Lt. Gen. John Michaelis orders U.S. troops to empty their petroleum and other fuel storage sites into rivers and ignite them before retreating.,36 ) V. Reagan Takes It to The Brink Achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s did not deter Pentagon planners from forg- ing ahead with a counterforce strategy. "The only plausible reason" for developing such a counterforce capability, wrote nuclear weapons researcher Robert Aldridge, "is to acquire the capacity to launch an unanswerable first strike against the Soviet Union."37 A counterforce strike makes sense only if it is delivered before the enemy fires its missiles; otherwise it hits only empty missile silos. In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon approved the so-called Flexible Options Strategy (National Security Deci- sion Memorandum 242). NSDM 242 was a nuclear war fighting doctrine, discarding the idea of mutually assured destruction in the event of a global nuclear war. The Carter administration went even -further in its nuclear war fighting plans with the approval of Presidential Decision 59. According to secret Carter administration testimony, "PD 59 specifies the develop- ment of plans to attack a comprehensive Soviet/Warsaw Pact target system, with the flexibility to employ these plans, should deterrence fail, in a deliberate manner consistent with the needs of the situation and in a way which will deny an aggressor any gain." PD 59 acknowledged that the role of U.S. strategic forces goes much further than deterring a Soviet 'nuclear attack : "Our strategic forces also must deter... the nuclear coercion of, or attack, on, our friends and allies. Our strategic forces..-.must also contribute to deterrenc9 of conventional aggression as well. " 54 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 As with all other U.S. nuclear strategies and plans, PD 59 relies on first use of nuclear weapons. Ronald Reagan was not the first pre- sident after parity was attained to order a nuclear war fighting strategy. His strategy is a gradual development of those By further escalating the strategy contained in PD 59, Ronald Reagan has taken the people of the world to the end of the spiral of nuclear war plans. The next step is nuclear war itself. outlined in NSDM 242 and PD 59. But by further escalating the strategy contained, in PD 59, Ronald Reagan has taken the people of the world to the end of the spiral of nuclear war plans. The next step is nuclear war itself. More than the Carter administration, Ronald Reagan ? and his administration are engaged in an economic and ideological war against the Soviet Union. For Reagan, the -era of detente, of coexistence and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, is over. The era of relentless confron- tation has begun. Reagan is preparing for war against the Soviet Union if other measures to "change Soviet behavior" fail, and he believes the United States can pre- vail in such a war. Confrontation with the Soviet - Union is the driving force behind Reagan policies. The administration believes that destroying the Soviet political and economic system will solve most problems confronting the U.S. government and U.S. corporations today. For the sake of being able to spend an unprecedented amount of money on war preparations, this administration has been forced to do away with the "guns and butter policies" of the past which pre- vious administrations had used to promote and maintain anti-Sovietism in the United States. The Reagan administration is the first government to cut and eliminate social programs in order to pursue more Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 A Suicidal Illusion Contrary to what the adminis- sufficient to completely des- Who would a U.S. commander tration believes, it is impos- troy each country. Nuclear talk to in the Soviet Union sible to acquire military devastation of the United about "controlling the nuclear superiority over the Soviet States is assured in case of escalation" or stopping the Union. Assertions of an nuclear war, no matter how war once the Soviet leadership "American capacity to outbuild many additional nuclear weap- is wiped out - even if the U.S. the Soviet Union" (Eugene ons Reagan orders. All the communication system is still Rostow, Director, Arms Control administration can do - and is functional? and Disarmament Agency) are doing - is to build up huge Retired Air Force Lt. based on illusions. The arsenals . of first strike Gen. Brent Scowcroft recogni- Soviet government has stated weapons that might result in a zes this as "a real dilemma repeatedly that it will not U.S. government perception of that we haven't sorted out." allow the U.S. to achieve nuclear superiority, thereby He pointed out during a 1982 nuclear superiority, and if greatly increasing the danger meeting by the Air Force past Soviet successes in of war. Electronic Systems Division catching up with U.S. tech- The nuclear war will be that "the kinds of controlled nical advantages are any indi- unwinnable because, once be- nuclear options to which we cation, the Soviet Union will gun, it would be impossible to are moving presume communica- make good on that promise. end. This is particularly tions with the Soviet Union; In any case, quantitative true given the U.S. strategy, and yet, from a military point superiority based on having a as described by the National of view, one of the most effi- larger number of nuclear Security Council's Richard cient kinds of attack is weapons is meaningless in an Pipes, to attack first "mili- against leadership and command age in which a small fraction tary objectives, command and and control systems." (See of the nuclear forces of control, and the nerve system Washington Post, 7/22/82.) either the U.S. or the USSR is of the Soviet leadership." adamantly an anti-Soviet policy. Again for the sake of "confronting" the Soviet Union, Reagan is willing to create deep frictions within the NATO alliance. No one should be fooled. Government, documents such as Weinberger's Defense Guidance and Reagan's order for a master plan to win nuclear war have been made public. People in the United States and the world over do know about the adminis- tration's war winning plans. Some seem to have a hard time believing what the admin- istration is planning. But the administra- tion is not only planning, it is acting by deploying first strike nuclear weapons systems. As announced in the Defense Guidance, it is opening up "new areas of major military competition" by deploying the cruise and Pershing II missiles and developing weapons systems for space war. The administration is also engaged in a build-up of conventional forces which, according to the Guidance, "in conjunction with those of our allies, should be capable of putting at risk Soviet interests, in- cluding the Soviet homeland." To ensure that those allies are prepared to do their part, the Reagan administration is pressuring Western European countries and Japan to hike their defense budgets. The Guidance announces that the U.S. is pre- pared to "exploit political, economic and military weaknesses within the Warsaw Pact." The administration is trying to do just that with its natural gas pipeline embargo and attempts to force other NATO countries to go along. One could point to virtually every prescription in the Defense Guidance and then, by examining the Reagan military buildup and other policy measures, confirm that the administration is acting on it in detail. We are left with no choice but to accept the Guidance's key dictates as the literal parameters of the Reagan strategy: In a strategic nuclear war, "the United States must prevail." In the late 1980s, the U.S. will have, and should use, the "opportunity to help shape the future competition" with the Soviet Union "in ways which are advantageous to the United States." Footnotes: 1 Los Ang eles Times (LAT), 8/15/82. 2) All quotations from the Defense Guidance are cited in articles in the Washington Post (5/25/82, 5/27/82, 6/2/82, and 6/19/82; and the New York Times (5/29/82, 6/4/82, 6/5/82, 6/6/82_,_6/_7_F82_, 6/13/82, 6/19/82, 6/20/82, 6/21/82, and 6/22/82.) 3) 1980 Republican National Convention Platform, p. 31. - 4) Department of Defense Authorization for 1983, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 55 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, Second Session, part 4, p. 462. 5) See ibid., part 2, pp. 5-22. 6) Ibid., part 4, p. 403. 7) Interview with Pacifica Radio, Washington, D.C. 8) Strategic Command, Control and Comrpunications: Alternative Approaches to Modernization, Congres- sional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., October 1981, pp. IX, X, 19. 9) Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, First Session, 1981, p. 233. Most of these hearings were held in executive ses- sion and are now available in a heavily censored form. 10) Ibid. 11) Ibid., p. 256. 12) Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Hearings be- fore the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, Second Session on S.2248, 1982, part 2, p. 946. 13) Cf supra, #9, p. 212. 14) See Thomas Murphy, "ELF - Preparing for a First Strike," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1. The ELF system, as advocated by the Reagan administration, consists of an 84 mile grid of cables - down from the 6,000 miles originally planned. ELF is a prima facie first strike system. Vice Admiral Gordon Nagler, Director of Command and Control in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged under intense questioning by Michigan Senator Levin that ELF is not a survivable system in the event of a nuclear war. Therefore, its construction makes sense only with the intent to use it before nuclear weapons hit the United States. 15) Irrespective of the political opposition to the Pershing U deployment in West Germany, deployment might be delayed for technical reasons. As of October 1982, the Army has yet to successfully testfire a Pershing II. Thomas K. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, was asked in a Congressional hearing about the difficulties resulting from the deployment of a missile that has not been tested sufficiently. He said there would be no problem since the Soviets "will have little choice but to assume that our missiles will work." 16) Interview with Pacifica Radio, Washington, D.C. 17) As quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon Moves Toward First-Strike Capability," Science, 5/7/82, p. 596. 18)Frank Barnaby and Randall Forsberg, "Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in The Arms Race and Arms Con- trol, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1982, p. 90. 19) See John Pike, "Reagan Prepares for War in Outer Space," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1. 20) Cf supra, #4, part 2, p. 305. 21) Cf supra, #12, part 1, p. 702. 22) Major Bruce Eickhoff, USAF, "SAC Trains the Way it Would Fight," Air Force Magazine, February 1982, p. 62. 23) Wall Street Journal, 3/26/82, p. 1. 24) News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, No. 86-82, 2/26/82. 25) Time, 8/16/81, p. 59. 26) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense James Wade to the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, 9/15/81. 27) Air Force Magazine, June 1982, p. 73. 28) Ibid., pp. 72, 73. -- Counteru'r, -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 29) LAT, 1/15/82. 30) See Washington Post (WP), 4/24/82. 31) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Effects of Nuclear WE, April 1979, p. 25. 32) LAT, 1/23/80. 33) See William Arkin, Thomas Cochran and Milton Hoenig, "The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile," Arms Control Today, April 1982, p. 1. See also their Nuclear Weapons Data Book, prepared for the National fie- sources Defense Council. 34) All quotations are from The Statesman, 6/27/80, pp. 959-960. These nuclear war plans were sent ano- nymously to several British publications and poli- ticians. Similar documents were obtained by the West German magazine Stern ten years earlier. Military officials have coon imed that the docu- ments are authentic; they claim that they were obtained and then made public by Soviet intelli- gence. 35) See Gary L. Guentner, "Strategic Vulnerability of the Soviet Multinational State," Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1981. Guentner argues that the use of nuclear weapons against "central areas of the USSR" with a high concentration of ethnic Russian people would "significantly increase Soviet vulnerability." He states that if these Russian areas were attacked, other Soviet national- ities and Eastern European countries might rise up against the Russians. "Prevailing wind patterns throughout the year ensure that early fallout (the most lethal) would cover areas with the highest population density and with the highest concentra- tion of ethnic Russians. The implications are clear: in the event of a nuclear attack, Soviet minorities have a far better chance of survival than ethnic Russians." 36) Stern, Hamburg, No. 6, No. 7, 1970. 37) See Robert Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., 1981. 38) Nuclear War Strategy, Hearing before the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, Second Session, 9/16/80, p. 29. The hearing was "sanitized" and published on 2/18/81. Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 DOCUMENTS: U.S. Nuclear War Plans Against the Soviet Union 1948 Only seven weeks after the end of World War II, U.S. military offi- cials had drafted their first war plan against the Soviet Union. A Joint Intelligence Staff docu- ment, "Strategic Vulnerabilities of Russia to a Limited Air At- tack," called for dropping twenty atomic bombs on Soviet cities. In late 1945, General Dwight Eisen- hower, then Commander in Chief in Europe, produced another war plan against the Soviet Union, symbol- ically entitled "Totality." These two plants, while not immediately militarily feasible, laid the groundwork for a number of plans to destroy the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and to occupy it. Operation Dropshot - its full title was "Long Range Plans for War with the USSR - Development of a Joint Outline Plan for Use in the Event of a War in 1957" - was prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff with President Harry Truman's authority. It argues that "the ultimate objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world" and calls for U.S. forces to crake heavy atomic attacks on the Sovi-, et Union and eventually to occupy it. Operation Dropshot claimed that the U.S. would be waging a defensive war after a Soviet at- tack on Western Europe. Neverthe- less, it explicitZ.y contemplates a "preventative" nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. 1. Under the over-all strategic concept it is essential that (a) the air offense be initiated im- mediately, (b) it be initiated and sustained in sufficient force to be effective, (c) targets or target systems destroyed-be those which contribute most to the re- duction of war-making capacity, and (d) the results of the effort be reflected immediately in the reduction of the offensive capa- bilities of the Soviet military forces, particularly with respect to their capability to employ weapons of mass destruction. 2. The use of atomic weapons in a strategic air campaign against the U.S.S.R.... is considered es- sential to the provision of ade- quate initial destructive capa- bilities to that air effort.... For planning purposes herein it is assumed that the development of atomic munitions in the U.S.S.R. will give the U.S. a quantitative advantage, on D-Day, in the order of 10 to 1 and that the Soviets lag slightly behind the U.S. in technical development of both offensive and defensive weapons. 3. Target systems selected for atomic attack, and the timing and magnitude of the initial attack are based on the reggirement for early and effective preventative attack if such action becomes feasible and on the requirement for destruction of their off en- sive capabilities against our own war potential. They are extended to include the early destruction of selected elements of the Sovi- et war making capacity. The fol- lowing general considerations are deemed pertinent to atomic target selection at present and in 1955. a. Destruction of stockpiles of atomic bombs or other weapons of mass destruction, stocks and pro- cessing plants of fissionable ma- terials, and any known operation- al supplies of such weapons must be destroyed as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostili- ties. b. The initial atomic campaign must provide for its employment against the political, govern- mental, administrative, and tech- nical and scientific elements of the Soviet nation. They include urban areas as an essential ele- ment in basic industries. Insep- arable from the destruction of urban areas, major destruction would be accomplished on industry itself. No over-all change in the location of Soviet centers of in- dustry and population can be ex- pected to occur during the next 8 years, with the exception of ad- ditional development of limited extent, hence, weapon require- ments will be modified primarily by the effectiveness of available bombs, and means of delivery, rather than through revision of the over-all target complexes. c. The use of atomic weapons in reasonable quantity will permit the achievement of great physical destruction with relatively small CounterSpy effort within a-short time. In addition to this physical de- struction, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the use of the weapon would create a condition of chaos and extreme confusion. Operation Dropshot was a plan not only for full-scale war, but also for "cold war." In striking simi- larity to the Reagan administra- tion's current Defense Guidance dictates, the Dropshot planners emphasized the need for an anti- Soviet campaign in time of peace. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND AIMS VIS-A- VIS THE U.S.S.R. 19. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the U.S.S.R., our gener- al objectives with respect to Russia, in time of peace as well as in time of war, should be: a. To reduce the power and in- fluence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, tational in- dependence, and stability of the world family of nations. b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of interna- tional relations by the govern- ment in power in Russia, to con- form with the purposes and prin- ciples set forth in the U.N. charter. In pursuing these objectives due care must be taken to avoid per- manently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions in our way of life. 20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims: a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Rus- sian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satel- lite countries as entities inde- pendent of the U.S.S.R. b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of at- titudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and per- mit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national in- dependence. -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 57 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Mos- cow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world Commu- nist party and adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them. d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the practical unde- sirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accor- dance with precepts of interna- tional conduct, set forth in the purposes and principles of the U.N. charter. 1950 A 1950 plan, codenamed HARROW, directed the Air Force to uni- laterally initiate action in case of "sudden hostilities." In 1950, the Soviet Union had virtually no deliverable nuclear weapons. Department of the Air Force Memorandum for: CHIEF, WAR PLANS DIVISION bombs will be limited by produc- tion. The most rapid and reliable initial provision of the assem- bled bombs in the United Kingdom can be obtained by transporting bomb components, partially assem- bled, in modified aircraft to the forward assembly point. In this plan we use the 509th Bomb group for that purpose, and at present all modified aircraft would be scheduled individually from the Zone of Interior to the forward base areas and on to the target, and then returned to the United States to prepare for the next mission. ... the entire initial effort is devoted primarily to achieving success in the atomic offensive. However, concurrently with the atomic strike, deceptive missions must be flown by conventional bombers, and conventional bombers must accompany the atom carriers to cover their flights and pro- vide counter-electronic measures. In this plan, reconnaissance and divisionary missions, flown from every theater, will support the atomic offensive. Everything pos- sible must and will be done to make the enemy believe that every airplane over their territory is a potential atom carrier and they may not concentrate their defen- sive action on atom carriers alone. 'ATTACK ALONG THE ROUTES WE HAVE ESTABLISHED. THE CARRIER TASK FORCES, SUPPORTED BY THEIR UNDER- WAY REPLENISHMENT GROUPS, ALSO WILL ATTACK APPROPRIATE TARGETS. THIS CAREFULLY EVALUATED CONCEPT DOES NOT CALL FOR THE AIRLIFT OF HUGE LAND ARMIES TO THE BATTLE AREA DURING THE FIRST HOURS OF A GENERAL WAR. THE FULL CAPABILI- TIES OF AIR MOBILITY WOULD, ON THE OTHER HAND, BE UTILIZED TO APPLY THE MAXIMUM FORCE IN THE MOST TIMELY MANNER. OUR EVALUA- TION INDICATES THAT THE AVAIL- ABLE AIRLIFT, IN BEING, AND PRO- GRAMMED FOR THE FUTURE, WILL SUP- PORT THIS CONCEPT. FOLLOWING THE MASSIVE ATOMIC ATTACK, OUR MILITARY AIR TRANS- PORT FLEET, AUGMENTED BY A FULLY MOBILIZED CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET, CURRENTLY CONSISTING OF SOME 350 FOUR-ENGINE AIRCRAFT, AND FURTHER AUGMENTED BY THAT PORTION OF OUR HUGE TANKER FLEET WHICH COULD BE DIVERTED TO A TRANSPORT MISSION, WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT OUR SEA- LIFT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MORE PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND UNITS FOR THE FOLLOW-UP OFFENSIVE AC- TION. 1980 Subject: Commanders' Conference at Hq USAF - 17 and 18 April 1950 HARROW is a unilateral Air Force emergency plan. At the time it was put oil paper there was no jointly- approved concept of operations, and the Air Force was without a current plan of action to meet an emergency situation. HARROW pro- vided a basis for initiating ac- tion in the event of sudden hos- tilities, and it provided a yard- stick for measurement of Air Force capabilities and an indication of the action required to improve our current. position.... . The initial atomic and conven- tional air offensive against the Soviet Union will be conducted from the United Kingdom and Kara- chi, and, until they are neutral- ized, Triploi, Abu Sueir in the Cairo-Suez area and Dhahran. Practically all of the major ob- jectives can be reached from bases in the United Kingdom and Karachi without refueling. Until the initial stockpile of A-bombs is consumed, the rate at which atomic bombs can be delivered will be limited by the current availability of bomb assembly equipment and bomb assembly crews. Thereafter delivery of 1957 U.S. strategy in the late 1950a, a time of overwhelming U.S. nu- clear superiority, called for a massive strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union in case of war, according to a top secret White House briefing given to "Congres- sional leaders" on January 1, 1957. THE INDIGENOUS FORCES OF OUR ALLIES, AUGMENTED BY DEPLOYED U.S. GROUND AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES WITH ATOMIC CAPABILITIES, WILL HOLD ANY ATTACK LAUNCHED BY THE ENEMY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE SHALL LAUNCH OUR FULLY ALERT AND MOBILE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, AND FAST CARRIER TASK FORCES, IN A MASSIVE ATOMIC ATTACK AGAINST THE WARMAKING CAPABILITIES OF THE EN- EMY. THIS CONCEPT MAKES THE MAXI- MUM USE OF THE INHERENT MOBILITY CHARACTERISTICS WE HAVE BUILT IN- TO-THOSE FORCES. IN A MATTER OF HOURS, OUR READY STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, SUPPORTED BY ITS OWN IN- TEGRAL TRANSPORT AND AERIAL TANK- ERS, AND BY THE MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE, WILL LAUNCH AN ,'residential Decision 59 was pro- claimed by the Carter administra- tion in 1980. It is still a clas- sified document, but was ex=plained by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. in a top secret Sen- ate hearing on September 16, 1980. PD 59 is a war fighting doctrine. While it proclaims to have deterrence as its top prior- ity, it clearly emphasizes the "need" for the ability to fight a "flexible" nuclear war. Some of Brown's statements indicate that U.S. nuclear weapons use was not limited to countering a Soviet attack but would also be an op- tion if the Soviet Union tried to "coerce" a U.S. aZZy. Consistent with U.S. policy, PD 59 reserves the "right" to a first nuclear weapons use. PD-59 specifies the development of plans to attack a comprehen- sive Soviet/Warsaw Pact target system, with the flexibility to employ these plans, should deter- rence fail, in a deliberate man- ner consistent with the needs of the situation and in a way which will deny an aggressor any gain, or would impose costs which clearly exceed his expected gains. This could entail initial 58 -- CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 retaliation on military and con- trol targets while retaining the capability either to withhold for a relatively prolonged period, or to execute, broad retaliatory at- tacks on the political control system and on general industrial capacity. These individual target systems, which we feel the Soviet leaders value most, include lead- ership and control, military forces both nuclear and conven- tional and the industrial/econom- ic base. Highlights of targeting aspects include an increased num- ber of situation-oriented op- tions, and more flexibility for selectively attacking all catego- ries of targets. PD-59 requires the option to attack a full range of industri- al/economic targets be retained. PD-59 also places more emphasis on how to improve the effective- ness of targeting retaliation against Warsaw Pact leadership and control, nuclear forces, and conventional forces in a wartime situation. In contrast to some pronouncements by the press, the United States has never had a doctrine based simply and solely on reflexive, massive attacks on Soviet cities. Instead, we have always planned both more selec- tively (options limiting indus- trial/economic damage) and more comprehensively (a range of mili- tary targets in addition to the industrial/economic base). Previ- ous Administrations, going back well into the 1960s, recognized the inadequacy of a strategic doctrine that would give us too narrow a range of options. The fundamental premises of our coun- tervailing strategy are a natural evolution of the conceptual foun- dations built over the course of a generation. PD-59 is not a new strategic doctrine; it is not a radical departure from past U.S. strategic policy. Our counter- vailing strategy, as formally stated in PD-59, is in fact, a refinement, a codification of previous statements of our stra- tegic policy. PD-59 takes the same essential strategic doc- trine, and restates it more clearly, more cogently, in the light of current conditions and current capabilities.... Deterrence remains, as it has been historically, our fundamen- tal strategic objective. The overriding objective of our stra- tegic forces is to deter nuclear war. But deterrence must restrain an adversary from carrying out any of a far wider range of threats than just that of massive attacks of U.S. cities. We seek to deter any adversary from any course of action that could lead to general nuclear war. Our stra- tegic forces also must deter nu- clear attacks on smaller sets of targets in the United States or on U.S. military forces overseas, and deter the nuclear coercion of, or attack on, our friends and allies. Our strategic forces, in conjunction with theater conven- tional and nuclear forces, must also contribute to deterrence of conventional aggression as well. 1982 The following is a compilation of quotations from the 1984-88 De- fense Guidance which have ap- peared in the Washington Post New York Times and Defense Week. United States conventional forces in conjunction with those of our allies, should be capable of putting at risk Soviet interests, including the Soviet homeland. [In Western Europe,] first prior- ity will be to stop the initial Warsaw Pact thrust with minimal. loss of territory.... Emphasis will be given to offensive moves against Warsaw Pact flanks to force diversion of Pact resources from the central front.... To exploit political, economic and military weaknesses within the Warsaw Pact and to disrupt enemy rear operations, special opera- tions forces will conduct opera- tions in Eastern Europe and in the northern and southern NATO regions. ... Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the USSSR occur, the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earli- est termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States. This requires: ? Forces capable, under all con- ditions of war initiation, of at- tacking a wide range of targets, even when retaliating to a mas- sive strike received without strategic warning.... 'Employment plans that assure U.S. strategic nuclear forces can render ineffective the total So- viet, and Soviet allied, military and political power structure through attacks on political/mil- itary leadership and associated control facilities, nuclear and conventional forces and industry critical to military power.... 'Forces that will maintain, throughout a protracted conflict period and afterward, the capa- bility to inflict very high lev- els of damage against the indus- trial/economic base of the Soviet Union and her allies so that they have a strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets. ? U.S. strategic nuclear forces and supporting [control, command and communications systems] cap- able of supporting controlled nu- clear counterattacks over a pro- tracted period while maintaining a reserve of nuclear forces suf- ficient for trans- and post-at- tack protection and coercion.... Our allies and we cannot expect to match the Soviets in quantita- tive measures of military power. But there are also qualitative dimensions where we have counter- vailing strengths and advantages. ... By the end of the 1980s, the Soviets may encounter major eco- nomic difficulties, just when the U.S. military and allied programs are beginning to show fully the effects of major improvement ef- forts. We should use this oppor- tunity to help shape the future competition in ways which are ad- vantageous to the United States. It is essential that the Soviet Union be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict should it seek to reach oil re- sources of the Gulf. Because the Soviets might induce or exploit local political instabilities, their forces could be extended into the area by means other than outright invasion. Whatever the circumstances, we should be pre- pared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear that the securi- ty of access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened.... The United States space program will contribute to deterrence of an attack on the United States or, if deterrence fails, to the prosecution of war by developing, operating, and supporting space systems which: ? Ensure free access to and the use of space for us and our al- lies in support of U.S. national interests; ?Enhance the effectiveness of U.S. and our allies' military forces in preparing for and wag- ing war; ? Deny the use of space of op- posing forces in those instances where foreign space operations would be injurious to the effec- tiveness of U.S. and our allies in waging war; ? Support the defense of the ter- ritory and military forces of the U.S. and our allies from attack. CounterSpy -- Dec. 1982 - Feb. 1983 -- 59 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130008-5 Plea a enter subscription to CounterSpy for c~ne year (five issues). 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