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Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 SECRET CIA DOCUMENTS ON MOSSAD COUNTER l3y The Magazine For People Who Need To Know Volume 6 Number 3 $2 Fueling Counterrevolution in Nicaragua Resuming the Vietnam War U.S. Green Berets Torture in El Salvador May - June 1982 secret noforn-nocontract-orcon Israel Foreign Intelligence and Security Services secret Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE The United States emerged from World War II as the world's dominant political and economic power. To conserve and enhance this power, the U.S. government created a variety of institutions to secure dominance over "free world" nations which supply U.S. corporations with cheap labor, raw materials, and markets. A number of these institutions, some initiated jointly with allied Western European governments, have systematically violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of people in this coun- try and the world over. Prominent among these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947. Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its facets: covert CIA operations, U.S. interference in foreign labor movements, U.S. aid in creating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporation-intel- ligence agency link-ups, and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view has been that while CIA operations have been one of the most in- famous forms of intervention, the CIA is but one strand in a complex web of inter- ference and control. Our motivation for publishing Counterspy is two-fold: ? People in the U.S. have the right and need to know the scope and nature of their government's abrogation of U.S. and other citizens' rights and liberties in order to defend themselves and most effectively change the institutions. ? People in other nations, often denied access to information, can better protect their own rights and bring about necessary change when equipped with such information. BOARD OF ADVISORS (in formation): Walden Bello (associate of Southeast Asia Re- source Center; director of the Congress Taskforce of the Philippine Solidarity Net- work and the Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship; co-author, McNamara's Sec- ond Vietnam: The World Bank in the Philippines.) Robin Broad (doctoral candidate at Princeton University; co-author, McNamara's Second Vietnam.) John Cavanagh (economist at the United Nations; author of numerous articles and a book on multi- national corporations.) Noam Chomsky (professor at MIT, activist in the peace movement, has written extensively on foreign policy and ideology.) Joshua Cohen (assistant professor of philosophy and political science at MIT.) Ruth Fitzpatrick (member of the Steering Committee of the Religious Task Force on El Salvador.) Dr. Arjun Makhijani (consultant on energy and economic development, author of Ener- g~L Agriculture in the Third World.) Martha Wenger (office worker, volunteer at WPFW Radio, Washington D.C.; CounterSpy's copy editor.) Organizations for identifi- cation only. FROM THE EDITORS This is the first issue of CounterSpy will continue to publish, and we wilL ac- that was prepared under the so-caZZed In- tiveZy fight the "InteZZigence identities teZZigence identities Protection Act - Protection Act." the first issue under U.S. government Beginning with this issue, CounterSpy censorship. As we go to press, the Senate will appear five times a year, instead of is about to vote on the bill, which was four. (This does not affect your sub- approved by the House several months ago. scription which covers five issues or one TY,erefore, there is a good chance that year already.) We believe that it is more the "InteZZigence Identities Protection important than ever to publish CounterSpy, Act" will be Zaw as you receive this'is- and growing sales and subscriptions seem sue. Needless to say, Counterspy magazine to confirm that. Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Contents BOSS Gets Caught ....................... 4 Public Relations ....................... 6 Sinister Disinformation ................. 7 U.S. Green Berets Torture in El Salvador ....................... 8 Counterrevolution in Nicaragua: The U.S. Connection ................. 11 Resuming the Vietnam War .............. 24 Noam Chomsky Interview: The Intelligence Identities Protection Act ...................... 27 British Intelligence and Iran ......... 31 Secret CIA Documents on Mossad........ 34 AID in El Salvador .................... 58 ATTENTION SUBSCRIBERS News NOT in the News Classify Acid Rain The Reagan administration's efforts to in- crease secrecy ("when in doubt, classify") have an obvious goal: restrict public ac- cess to embarrassing or indicting informa- tion. President Reagan is now considering a new and far-reaching Executive Order on the classification of so-called national security information. The order would even allow "reclassification" of already de- classified documents. In addition, the ad- ministration wants to give the Environ- mental Protection Agency new "classifica- tion authority" so that, as Steven Gorfinkel of the Information Security Oversight Office said, it can classify in- formation on issues such as "acid rain in Canada." Gorfinkel did not explain the connection between acid rain in Canada and U.S. national security. IF YOUR LABEL READS "R63" OR "L63", THIS IS YOUR LAST ISSUE OF COUNTERSPY Chemical Warfare in Laos - SO PLEASE RENEW RIGHT AWAY AND DON'T MISS A SINGLE ISSUE. Just who has been using chemical weapons in Laos? An unpublished U.S. Air Force history obtained by the National Veterans CounterSpy is available in microfilm Task Force on Agent Orange under the Free- from: University Microfilms Interna- dom of Information Act reports that-the 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR, tional "United States secretly sprayed herbicides , MI 48106, and 30-32 Morti- Ann Arbor on Laos during the Vietnam war." The State , London W1N 7RA PR t De mer St Department opposed the release of this re- , , . p ., England. port because it "would cause identifiable damage to the national security." Accord- ing to the Air Force history, spraying in Laos began in December 1965 "at the urging d er Of ben. William l WCSl.morelGULL, comman Counterspy encourages the use of its arti- " Over cles in not-for-profit publications. Other of U.S. military forces in Vietnam. t t d re rinti the next seven months, 200,000 gallons of 71 -7 t, 2n pu 2ea eons n eres p ng " (Inter- herbicides were dumped over Laos. CounterSpy materials must request permis- national Herald Tribune, 1/26/82) sion in writing. All reprints of Counter- fpL must be credited and include Meanwhile, the Reagan administration Counterspy's address. continues to accuse the Soviet Union of using outlawed biological and chemical Counterspy -- May-June 1982 -- 3 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 weapons against the Hmong people in Laos. (Some of the Hmong tribespeople worked for the CIA in the 1960s and early 1970s.) The State Department comes up with "the final proof" of these charges about once a month. (See also "General Haig's Yellow Rain," CounterSpy, vol.6 no.2.) However, wrote journalist Gene Lyons in "What Rain?," it is "hard to fathom what the administration is up to with its repeated charges of Soviet chemical and biological atrocities in Asia - other than justifica- tion for its program to spend $4 billion to $7 billion on... nerve gas-weapons." He concluded that "for all its shrillness, the Government's case would not suffice to convict a purse snatcher." (New York Times Times, 3/3/82) Lyons quotes two biochemists, Chester Mirocha of the University of Minnesota and James Bamburg of Colorado State University, who investigated government claims of "yel- low rain" in Laos. They say that the amounts of "yellow rain" the State Depart- ment claims kills people would need to be multiplied more than ten-fold to be lethal. Fred Swartzendruber, a Mennonite Central Committee worker in Laos from 1979 to 1981 travelled freely in Laos during that time. And he says that he couldn't find a single person in all the Hmong villages he visit- ed who knew anything about "yellow rain." Redirecting *the RDF U.S. officials now admit that the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is not primarily directed against a "Soviet invasion" of a Middle Eastern or African country. The ad- ministration is "redirecting its military efforts in the Middle East in the belief that internal subversion is more of a threat to friendly countries, and their oil, than Soviet attack" (emphasis added). The RDF is to police and prop up shaky pro -U.S. regimes in the region. U.S. off i= cials point out-that the "near toppling of the pro-Western government in Bahrain in gimes. Bahrain, a small island nation in the Persian-Arabian Gulf has been ruled by a one-family dictatorship since the Brit- ish withdrew in 1971. It harbors a U.S. naval base, and has been periodically shaken by demonstrations in support of democratic rights for decades. The ruling Sultan is using his Western-trained police and intelligence services to counter such democratic movements. With the RDF, he has gained a powerful backup force. BOSS Gets Caught It would be a "pushover," Michael Hoare told his fifty or so mercenaries before they went to the Seychelles on November 25, 1981 to overthrow the government of Albert Rene. Hoare was dead wrong. When his party landed in Victoria Airport, where they were expected by an advance party of several..mercenaries, troops of the Seychelles quickly surrounded them. At least one mercenary was killed in the bat- tle, but most of them managed to escape by hijacking an Air India plane to South Af- rica. Six others were subsequently arrest- ed on the island. Back in South Africa, most of the merce- naries were quickly released in spite of the tough anti-hijacking laws of the coun- try's government. Five, including Hoare, were charged with kidnapping (which, un- like hijacking, does not carry a mandatory sentence) and were released on bail. South African police minister Louis Le Grange justified this unusually lenient treatment of the mercenaries and hijackers by saying that they "only shot out some windows and ran around in the bush. You tell me what laws they broke in South Africa." ,Some of the mercenaries have now reportedly been rearrested.) Interrogation of the captured merce- naries in the Seychelles soon established South African involvement in the attempted December [1981]" was the latest example coup. Not only were the mercenaries re- that convinced the Pentagon that "the big- cruited in South Africa, one of them even gest threats to western oil supplies in confessed to being a South African intel- the Persian Gulf [are] internal." ligence officer: "I am Martin Dolinchek The example of Bahrain indicates that from the South African National Intelli- the Reagan administration will use the RDF gence Service and I am a senior officer." in support of blatantly repressive re- Former BOSS (Bureau of State Security, 4 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 previous name of South Africa's intelli- gence agency) agent Gordon Winter con- firmed Dolinchek's statement. He said that he had worked with Dolinchek - alias Martin Donaldson, alias Anton Lubic - when Dolinchek was the head of BOSS' Yugoslav Section at BOSS Headquarters in Pretoria. According to Winter, Hoare, the leader of the expedition, is also a "South African military intelligence man," and several other members of the mercenary group are members of the Reconnaissance Squad, a "crack unit of... specially trained com- mandos." The Reconnaissance Squad is also the sector of the Army from which BOSS used to recruit members for the "Z" or as- sassination squad. Hoare's Seychelles enterprise was in- tended to replace Albert Rene with former Prime Minister James Mancham. Mancham, as Gordon Winter told a press conference be- fore the attempted coup, is a BOSS agent who "spied for BOSS at the OAU [Organiza- tion of African Unity] and the United Na- tions." Hoare had a tape recording with him by Mancham which was to be played in the radio if the coup was successful. Winter's claim that Mancham was paid by BOSS was confirmed by Eschel Rhoodie of Information Scandal fame. Rhoodie admitted handing government money to Mancham, and told the South African paper Argus this was "old news." Mancham, one-time head of the "Sey- chelles Democratic Party," is a close friend of the U.S. and Britain, the former colonial power. In the early 1970s, Mancham campaigned against a movement for an independent Seychelles arguing that the country still needed "British protec- tion." Western powers have "good reason" to op- pose Albert Rene's government even though he has allowed a U.S. satellite tracking station to remain on the island. The U.S. government obviously wants more - espe- cially landing rights in Seychelles ports. These rights do not exist because the U.S. Navy refuses to declare whether its ships are carrying nuclear weapons. Rene is a vocal advocate of making the In- dian Ocean a nuclear free zone. The November 1981 mercenary attack on the Seychelles was not the first such at- tempt. In April 1979, Rene ordered the de- portation of a Belgian mercenary,. Alfred Lefevre. Lefevre was accused of being an associate of mercenary Bob Denard, who staged a successful coup in another Indian Ocean Island nation, the Comoros, in 1978. More attempts may be in the offing for the Seychelles; but the defeat of Hoare and his South African backers this time shows the strength of a people willing to fight against terrorist aggression. Civilian Internment Camps The Canadian government gave itself some far reaching powers last year in a May 21, 1981 "Emergency Planning Order." These in- clude the authority to "establish, admin- ister, operate civilian internment camps" and "facilitate the selective reduction of prison populations to provide for the es- tablishment of civilian internment camps." This order, some parliamentarians charge, "was drawn up in secrecy" and suddenly ap- peared in Canada's official Gazette. Fed= eral officials are trying to play down its significance, saying it is not a law, just a planning order. Celine Hervieux-Payette, Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General, de- fended the order in parliament. She said that it was intended for situations such as "war,... a breakdown in public order preceding the outbreak of war or in case of terrorist acts." This definition is un- doubtedly fairly wide since the federal government defines "a breakdown in public order;" but Hervieux-Payette said it was all in the public good. "The purpose of this order," she said, "... will, in fact, be to prevent occurrences such as those that took place during the last World War, which were mainly due to a lack of staff and regulations...." In other words, the internment of thousands of Japanese-Cana- dians as such was not the problem, the in- ternment became problematic because of the lack of regulations on how to proceed with it in an orderly fashion. CORRECTIONS: In our last issue, three mistakes were made: The nation of Cyprus became independent in 1953 and not in 1960; and Greece did not join the common market in 1980 but in 1981. Finally, the South African town of Brandfort is not a five mile but a five hour drive from Jo- hannesburg. Our apologies. CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 5 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 organization.... Then they prepared me for Public Relations the famous press conference of October 22 .... A prefabricated conference with some In its efforts to win the hearts and minds pseudo-journalists who beforehand had been of the U.S. Congress and the Guatemalan delivered the questions, as with me, as I people, that country's military regime is was given the questions and the text of my making use of Luis Pellecer, a Jesuit declaration." Toj was also forced to ap- priest who was captured by the government pear on TV and radio, and the military last year. Pellecer is compelled to appear took him around in helicopters to speak to on national television and in internation- some villages from the air. al press conferences to denounce the Guer- After he was freed, the EGP took over rilla Army of the Poor (EGP, a principal three radio stations in Guatemala City and guerrilla organization in Guatemala). aired statements by Toj informing the?peo-~ Moreover, Pellecer is "renouncing" his ple about the real reason for his "denun- membership in the Jesuit order, saying ciations" of the revolutionary organiza- that it is engaged in "subversive" activi- tions. In his statement, Toj also reported ties in Guatemala. Friends of Pellecer military actions he had witnessed as a claim that they are sure Pellecer has been prisoner. Toj learned that high-ranking brainwashed to make these statements, and government officials, including General there is concern that the government will Benedicto Lucas Garcia (the president's kill him when he is no longer useful. brother), Army Chief of Staff, participat- According to a statement by Emeterio Toj ed in massacres of civilians. He also Medrano, the Guatemalan military is indeed learned that government soldiers often using brutal torture, drugs, and threats participate in military operations while that it will wipe out whole villages to dressed in civilian clothes. compel individuals to perform such "public The liberation of Toj and his statements relations" speeches. Toj is one of the about how he was forced to "testify" founders of the Committee for Peasant Uni- against the EGP were virtually ignored in ty (CUC), the largest union for farmwork- the U.S. media. Luis Pellecer's "denuncia- ers in Guatemala. CUC is part of the Gua- tions" were given much more room. EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS "This book fills a vital need in bring- ing to bear a wealth of relevant factu- al material on the El Salvadorean situ- ation. Its account of the nature of the social and political order and U.S. policy provides essential documentation for the burgeoning opposition to the Reagan Administration. " James F. Petras "This book... provides accurate and relevant information, hitherto not readily accessible, and should be wide- ly distributed and read." Noam Chomsky Order from: Central America Information Office, 1151 Massachusetts Ave., Cam- bridge, MA 02138. 148pp., $5. Write to CAMINO for discount schedule. showed me off to a group of senators from I the United States as a deserter from my 6 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 temalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), a formal alliance of all revolu- tionary groups in Guatemala. Like Pellecer, Toj was captured and then forced to denounce Guatemala's revolution- ary groups over TV and radio. Unlike Pellecer, however, he was eventually lib- erated from prison by the EGP on November 26, 1981. Toj was kidnapped in Quetzaltenango on July 4, 1981 and taken to various po- lice, army and air force detention cen- ters. Toj was brutally tortured and con- stantly given drugs to make him talk. Mil- itary interrogators threatened to kill his family and assassinate the inhabitants of whole villages. On August 6, government soldiers, some of them dressed in civilian clothes, indeed massacred the people of the village Estancia de El Quiche. They told Toj that they were prepared to drop napalm on other villages in western Guatemala if he did not collaborate. States Toj: "In this manner they obliged me to publicly accept my recalcitration from my revolutionary militancy.... They Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Sinister Disinformation On February 18, 1982, a group of rightists in the U.S. announced the formation of the Coalition for Free Elections in El Salva- dor. The Coalition's members are corporate officials with financial interests in Cen- tral America, retired U.S. diplomats and leaders of rightwing organizations such as Young Americans for Freedom and the Coun- cil for Inter-American Security. "Besides working for a consensus in this counrty (sic) backing the Salvadoran elections," the Coalition's first press release states, it also aims to counter a "disin- formation campaign being waged by the Sal- vadoran Marxist guerrillas... and their supporters." Behind this campaign, the Coalition argues, are "the sisnister (sic) forces which keep Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet peoples under the totali- tarian iron heel." However, as it turns out, the Coalition for Free Elections in El Salvador itself may be part of a "sin- ister" disinformation campaign. A look at the histories of some of the Coalition's members will explain why. The afrique-asie press release lifts Daniel James as the h der- i Napoldon Duarte vu per Ramily Coalition s secretary. James as cons ac- with Major Guevara's group, miss Bunke was able experience with disinformation, ' attached cording to the New York Times (12/25/77). to the Soviet KGB.' He said in an interview that that had been his own "One of the most intriguing CIA disinfor- conclusion." mation campaigns of recent years was its Still, James acknowledged that he "did attempt to discredit the Cuban revolution get information" from the CIA for his in the eyes of other Latin American na- book. James said that he had been ac- tions by planting the suggestion that it quainted with the CIA's Mexico City sta- was controlled to some extent from Moscow. tion chief, and that he had asked him for ... Asked how the agency had disseminated "anything that they [CIA] could get for me its fabrication [that Tamara Bunke, an as- or help me with." However, James refused sociate of Che Guevara, was a high offi- to say whether "the agency had supplied cial of both the KGB and East German in- him with any of the material concerning telligence] the [CIA] official recalled Miss Bunke." that it [CIA] had provided 'material and Another member of the Coalition for Free background' to Daniel James, an American Elections in El Salvador, Dr. Evron author and former managing editor of [the Kirkpatrick (husband of U.S. Ambassador to CIA-funded] The New Leader, living in Me- the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick) brings a xico, who published a translation of Major background in "Latin American elections" Guevara's Bolivian diaries in 1968. to the group. Evron Kirkpatrick was the "In his introduction, Mr. James noted founder and president of Operations and that Miss Bunke, who had taken the nom de Policy Research, Inc. (OPR) of which Jeane guerre of Tania and who is scarcely men- was a member. According to Evron tinned in the diaries had nonetheless been Kirkpatrick himself, "in 1963, 1964 and identified a few months earlier by a low- 1965 OPR, Inc. received CIA money." This level East German defector as an agent of the East German security agency. Mr. James money, says Kirkpatrick, was "'principal- did for studies of Latin American elec- tions." (The Nation, 2/27/67) CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 7 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 U. S. Green Berets Torture in El Salvador by Ruth Fitzpatrick On a sunny day in October 1981, nineteen religious leaders from Canada and the U.S. sat around a large table in Cuernavaca, Mexico taping and photographing a slight young man from EZ Salvador. He was de- scribing how Green Berets from the United States taught him torture tactics when he was a military draftee in EZ Salvador. "Aren't you afraid for your life to tell us this?", one of us asked. "I am wanted dead or alive in EZ Salvador as it is now. ", was his quiet reply. The young man's name is Antonio. The place was the Cuernavaca Center for Inter- national Dialogue for Development (CCIDD). We were a group of religious leaders on the first leg of a study tour of Mexico, Nicaragua, and Cuba. What we heard con- firmed our worst fears of direct U.S. in- volvement in torture in EZ Salvador. Antonio's eyewitness report was that. American advisors were not only advising, they were teaching and participating in torture. Even before meeting Antonio I had sus- pected that U.S. advisors were more in- volved than the government was admitting. Only a months before I had visited La Lateinamerika Nachrichten CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 Virtud refugee camp on the Honduran-Salva- doran border. I brought back with me sev- eral photographs of U.S. Green Berets wearing camouflage fatigues and with M-16 rifles slung over their shoulders. Then in February 1982, Cable News Network TV filmed U.S. advisors also carrying M-16s, this time in El Salvador. A Lieutenant Colonel was ordered to leave the country for that violation, and now the Pentagon reportedly wants to change the rules for- bidding the advisors to carry M-16s. When our study group returned to the U.S., a number of us quietly circulated our tapes of the interview with Antonio - a simple young man who wanted no part in the fighting but was caught in circum- stances beyond his control. We cautioned that we were not able to prove any of his allegations and hesitated to focus inter- national publicity on this man who already had gone through so much. Then on January 11, 1982 the New York Times published Raymond Bonner's four column story about Carlos Antonio Gomez Montano, a "21-year old who asserts that he is a former Salvadoran soldier. [He] says that United States military advisors were present at two 'training sessions' early last year when two suspected guer- rillas were tortured by Salvadoran Army instructors." Bonner wrote that although Gomez's story cannot be independently cor- roborated, and Salvadoran military offi- cers claim he was never in the army, un- identified "military sources" confirmed Gomez's recruitment and desertion. In ad- dition, Bonner states, Gomez "revealed knowledge of military life in El Salvador that lent credibility to his story." The story on our tape and that in the New York Times are almost identical. We are sure it is the same person. However, (Ruth Fitzpatrick is a free lance writer working on a book about her life as the wife of an army colonel and her develop- ment into activism for justice. She is now a member of the Steering Committee of the Religious Taskforce on EZ Salvador.) Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 there is a key difference. Antonio told us that one United States advisor himself tortured and taught how to torture while the New York Times said the advisors were merely present. I have no reason to be- lieve that Antonio fabricated the story he told us. The following is a slightly edited transcript of Antonio's story which was simultaneously translated into English. My profession is repairing watches. In El Sal- vador I was summoned to report to the barracks. At the same time, my brother was involved with the guerrilla struggle. Before I entered the military, my brother was a guerrilla fighter. He asked me many times, why did I not incorpo- rate into the guerrilla struggle, for the peo- ple? I said, "No, I didn't like those sorts of things." A few months later I got a summons from the army that I had to report in February to the barracks. I did not answer the summons in February, was summoned again, and finally had to go in December of 1980. So I went and presented myself. After we were there, they taught us how to handle rifles, different types of formations, and working the streets. They brought us out to the different towns to carry out searches. Af- ter a month, they taught us a course in anti- guerrilla warfare. Many of my friends went on a course in Panama, but I didn't go. After they returned, there was another course that I took which was for paratroopers. After that course, they taught us a lot of tactics - advancing, retreating, military tactics. After that they gave us camouflage uniforms and boots that came from the U.S. Then they gave us classes about the war in Vietnam - how we should act on the battlefield. What they told us was that we shouldn't have mercy on anyone. Whether it be children or women or men, you have to kill them all. Many times we would go to the mountains. I saw many things regarding officials, and the officers. They took the young men and women from the houses and brought them to the bar- racks where they tortured and killed them. Later we had a welcome for the Green Berets. That day was the day of the soldier. They lined us up in columns.WW had an homage for those who had fallen and for those still alive. They got us up for this to greet the Green Berets who came from the U.S. The officers said they would be able to teach us a new tactic. We didn't have any idea what this new tactic was. The first time they brought us to the slopes of a volcano where we went into combat with the guerrilla fighters. The Green Berets didn't go into combat; they were just behind teaching us how to do these things. They would criticize us as to what was good and what was bad. We passed five days on this volcano. There were many who did not return. There were lots of soldiers who were killed. Six days later we returned to the barracks, and then they began to teach us how to torture. One evening they went and got nine young people that were accused of being guerrillas and brought them to where we were. This was more or less the last time that I had to see the type of torture they carried out against the guer- rillas. The first one they brought was a young fellow around 15 or 16 years old.... This young fellow said all sorts of things that they might let him go. The officers said, "We are going to teach you how to mutilate and how to teach a lesson to these guerrillas." The officers who were teaching us this were the American Green Berets. They didn't speak Spanish, so they spoke English and then another officer - Salva- doran - translated it into Spanish for us. They began to torture this young fellow. They took out their knives and stuck them under his fingernails. After they took his fingernails off, then they broke his elbow. Afterwards they gouged out his eyes. Then they took their bayonets and made all sorts of slices in his skin all around his chest, arms and legs. Then they took the hair and skin off his scalp. When they saw there was nothing left to do with him, they threw gasoline on him and burned him. The next day his dead body was found by people in the streets. The next day they started the same thing with a 13-year old girl. They more or less did the same, but they did other things to her, too. First, she was used, raped by all offi- cers. They stripped her and threw her into a small room, they went in one by one. Afterwards they took her out tied and blindfolded. Then they began the same mutilating - pulling her fingernails out and cutting off her fingers, breaking her arms, gouging out her eyes and all that they did to the other fellow. They cut her legs and stuck an iron rod into her womb. The last one they killed that day suffered more, because they stripped him naked at mid-day. Then they put him on this hot tin and made him lie there - he was like cooking. After about a half an hour, when they finally took him off, he was all covered with blisters - like wounds. They did different types of torture to him. Then they threw him out alive at 14,000 feet from a helicopter. He was alive and tied. They go and they throw them out over the sea.* This was the last that I saw of the partic- ipation of the Green Berets. Twenty-five days after they arrived, they put me into the brig. I was put into jail in the barracks because while I was on guard duty thousands of rounds of munitions disappeared. That was when I began to suffer - from that day on. They tor- tured me in a somewhat similar manner as the guerrillas. They didn't cut me, but struck lots of blows. They broke my hand, my wrist with kicks - my left leg. They blindfolded me and This "interrogation procedure" was practiced by the CIA and Green Berets in Vietnam during the war according to sworn Congressional testi- mony. CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 they threw me into a cell with others who were accused guerrillas. Four days later other guer- rillas arrived and were thrown into the cell. (Afterwards I realized that one of the officers was working in coordination with the guerril- las.).I suffered a lot in the barracks and the jail. I never wanted to be a soldier. I never liked fighting, period. After being there for a while and talking with the young people that were there, they convinced me that I should try to escape and try to help them. I asked "How?". Because I was unarmed and I was in prison just like they were.... Some days later, I don't know how many, I received bad news. I didn't believe it at first. This news that they brought - it was around six o'clock in the afternoon - the news was that they had killed my mother and my fa- ther and my brother. A lady told me who was a good friend of my mother. I didn't believe it. I knew she had a son who was a guerrilla fighter; I thought it was a ploy to get me to leave the jail. Afterwards an official came and said, "I am an official, you are just a private." He said, "Have confidence in me and in yourself, that you-are going to be able to leave here." I told him, "What is this all about?" He said, "You're the brother of one of the guerrilla fighters." He gave me the name of my brother and I said, "Yes, that was true." He said, "You are going to escape. If they kill you, you'll die fighting, but against the impe- rialists, not against the people." He told me, "They have killed your mother.,. your father and two of your brothers." It was a big surprise for me and I felt very angry. That's when I said, "What do I have to do to escape?" He said, "Well, you'll see this evening. We'll let you know. You are not the only one; there will be eight others who will go with you." How was I going to know who the others are who are go- ing with me? He said, "One will bring you a ri- fle, and if you have to - the sentinel who's guarding you - you will have to take away his rifle and kill him." Since they didn't bring me the rifle, I had to take the rifle away from this other soldier whom I had known - a soldier like me. I didn't kill him as such, but we tied him and put a grenade in his mouth so that if he shouted, he would kill himself. We didn't kill him but one of the other soldiers did. We left the barracks and it was 7:30 P.M. in the evening.... While we were leaving, we met the guard and he shot at us. He gave the alarm and all the others came after us. Very quickly there were all sorts of soldiers. We began shooting at them, too. We all had hundreds of rounds of ammunition with us, German sub-ma- chine guns, M-16s. Before we got out of the barracks, one of the nine of us was killed. An- other one, a corporal, died soon after and an- other corporal was badly wounded and I also was wounded. They had us pinned down. About 2:00 in the morning we still hadn't been able to escape the barracks. They were shooting at us from land and air. But we finally managed to break through and made our way toward the Department 10 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 of Chalatenango. The guerrilla army was await- ing us. They knew that we were deserters. The officer already had communicated, so we weren't in danger really that they were going to kill us. We arrived there on a hill, a mountain; they cured my wounds, bound them and also the corporal. After that we slept there that eve- ning. The following day was the day that I told them that I couldn't continue staying in the [guerrilla] army. They told me if I wanted I could stay but I didn't have to. I told them no, I didn't want to stay. The others stayed. They brought me to a city, then I went to my home town. I wanted to say goodbye to my sis' ter. I didn't tell her that I had deserted be- cause I didn't want her to be more worried. I told her I had a three-day pass. In those three days I made believe, so she wouldn't be worried but after seeing her, I left the country. One night at the border of Salvador-Guatema- la (the repression was very bad that day), so I went across the border over the mountains. I wasn't able to go through the streets. They would have captured me because all of the bar- racks had been notified that I had deserted. The people in general didn't know it; it is not convenient for them to say that people have de- serted. The following day after we left they said the barracks had been attacked by the guerrillas, but it wasn't the guerrillas; it was us who had the power struggle with the oth- er soldiers. I arrived in Guatemala, but there I was very much afraid. The Guatemalan army is practically the same thing as the Salvadoran. I was also wounded, and the wound in my leg was bleeding a lot; so I went through Guatemala and finally got to Mexican soil. I was around 15 days in Tapachula. From there I arrived in Mexico City. From Mexico City I ended up in Cuernavaca. Can you give a better description of the Green Berets? I don't know their names, but there were eight. The officers knew. There was only one of the eight that could speak Spanish. They were all white.... The eight U.S. Green Berets... dressed themselves the same as any soldier. One of them sort of gave orders, but they did not have any indication of their rank.... Did they do the fingernail pulling? It was one of the Green Berets doing the teaching. The Green Beret did the torture on the first one and then the others did the tor- ture on the others. Were drugs given to the Salvadoran army? What they gave us was marijuana and most of them went into battle drugged with marijuana. The officers said that those who don't want to smoke don't have to. The officers said instead of bringing food, "you can bring this because it gives you the courage to kill," but they on- ly said this for the soldiers. They didn't smoke, they brought food. The helicopters ar- Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 rived to drop food for the officers, but not for the rank and file..... Are you aware of U.S. helicopters machine- gunning the campesinoa? Before I deserted, 14 American helicopters arrived, armored helicopters with 50 and 30 caliber machine guns. I went five times out in the battle, they were bombing the houses. Did they strafe the ccnrrpesinoa in the fields? They strafed the fields. First, they dropped the bombs and afterwards, since those planes are very fast, they immediately leave. The ma- chine guns fire 1,600 rounds a minute. First they bombed and then they strafed - both the helicopters and the planes strafed. Counterrevolution in Nicaragua: The U.S. Connection by Jeff McConnell In spite of official claims to the con- ralism," codewords for bolstering two mi- trary, the United States has never had a nor sectors of Nicaraguan society: the non-interventionist position toward the business sector and the National Guard. Nicaraguan revolution. Since the assassi- Ronald Reagan has continued this policy. nation of newspaper publisher Pedro He has also expanded it - by renewing U.S. Chamorro in January 1978, when the revolu- reliance on former National Guard members tion became a large-scale insurrection, and increasing U.S. aid to the business the U.S. government has viewed develop- sector - into a policy intended to roll- ments in Nicaragua as a difficult dilemma back the revolution. The revelations about that required some kind of U.S. manipula- CIA involvement reflect the Reagan admin- tion. Both the Carter and Reagan adminis- istration's latest refinements of this trations have tried to influence events in rollback policy. Nicaragua by building up two social groups there: the so-called "private sector" (the I. CARTER'S POLICY TOWARD THE NICARAGUAN bourgeoisie) and the military (that is, INSURRECTION the National Guard while it existed, and later, its remnants). What is surprising Carter's approach to the Sandinista insur- about these American efforts is not that rection went through four phases.- Ini- they have been occurring, but the openness tially, in response to growing unrest in with which they are occurring, compared Nicaragua in 1977, the U.S. pressured Nic- with the true covertness of similar ef- aragua's dictator Anastasio Somoza to lift forts in the Philippines, in Greece, in the state of martial law under which he Brazil, and in Chile in the years from had governed the country for three years. Truman through Nixon. In Nicaragua, Ameri- It also encouraged Somoza to negotiate cans have kept a high profile while trying with the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), a to manipulate events to suit U.S. govern- centrist coalition of opposition groups. ment ends. This is a new trend in the his- The administration's strategy was to cut tory of U.S. intervention. losses - by channeling the new political The Carter-Vance-Brzezinski policy, both currents in Nicaragua in ways the U.S. before the Sandinista victory and after, was to contain the revolution: to maintain (An extended version of this article is a favorable climate for U.S. business and available after April 10, 1982. Send $5 to keep "radicals" out of power - in to Jeff McConnell, Department of Linguis- short, to block the creation of "another tics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA Cuba." The objective was to "foster plu- 02139.) CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 11 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 could accept. But President Carter was not a very positive effect, by helping to ready to abandon Somoza, since there were "strengthen contacts among important mod- no guarantees that Somoza's successor erate sectors of the Nicaraguan polity. It would adequately support U.S. aims in the is true that some of the member groups of region. U.S. ties were closest to the most the FA0 quit the organization during the pro-American sectors of the FAO: business negotiation process, but the fact is that groups, American Institute for Free Labor most of them stayed the course. Indeed, Development (AIFLD)-established labor the FAO picked up additional support from unions, and conservative political par- a broad cross section of the private sec- ties. When even these groups had abandoned -tor (COSEP) [Superior Council of Private Somoza, however) (largely because of his Enterprise, the congress of leading Nica- stranglehold on the economy through cor raguan business organizations; today at ruption and his vast wealth) it signalled the forefront of opposition in Nicaragua to Carter that a government centered and heavily funded through AID] which, around Somoza was no longer in America's while not formally joining the FAO, did "national interest." provide broad support to their negotiating In January 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, effort and endorsed the mediators' final editor of Nicaragua's leading daily La proposal with the FAO." Elsewhere Vaky Prensa and an important opposition figure, wrote: "Thus the effort in effect cata=- was assassinated. There were demonstra-' lyzed the moderate opposition elements in- tions and a general strike. The Sandinista to a relatively cohesive group capable of guerrillas made their broadest attacks functioning."2 yet against National Guard garrisons. The In early 1979 the several Sandinista National Guard responded with savagery, factions united and joined a wide spectrum The insurrection had begun. of Nicaraguan groups to form a very broad As the year progressed, all the opposi- political front which approved a political tion forces, including some sectors of the program for a pluralist post-Somoza Nica- Sandinistas, came increasingly to hope ragua, and carried out more crippling that Carter, the "human rights" president, strikes. The Sandinistas achieved signifi- would abandon Somoza. But although he cut cant military victories in late spring of back most military aid, Carter released 1979 as the entire country rose against economic aid to Somoza in May 1978. When Somoza. In an OAS meeting in Washington, Carter sent a letter to Somoza in August Cyrus Vance initiated the Carter adminis- 1978 praising Somoza's efforts to improve tration's third strategem for Nicaragua: the human rights situation in Nicaragua, he proposed that the OAS call for an in- the opposition's hope vanished. The guer- terim government drawn from all segments rillas launched their largest offensive, of Nicaragua (including the supporters of and the National Guard responded by bomb- Somoza) and consider deploying a "peace- ing several Nicaraguan cities into rubble. -k?eping" force that would in effect block Thousands of civilians died. By 1979 it was no longer politically possible for Carter to openly support Somoza. In conjuntion with the Organiza- tion of. American States (OAS), the U.S. put together so-called "mediation" talks between Somoza and the FAO, excluding the a Sandinista victory. The OAS rejected Vance's proposal and called for Somoza's ouster and an interim government drawn from the opposition. By now, the opposition front had formed a provisional government. The Carter ad- ministration, in its final gambit, tried Sandinistas and their broad-based politi- to arrange a ceasefire. It proposed that cal fronts. The eventual outcome of these Somoza resign and that a successor picked negotiations was envisioned by the U.S. to by the Somoza-dominated National Assembly be a plebiscite, and the replacement of appoint a group of prominent Nicaraguans Somoza by a government of private-sector to mediate among Somoza's Liberal Party, moderates. Somoza rejected the plebiscite Somoza's National Guard, and the opposi- in January 1979. When the U.S. responded tion forces to form an interim government. by proposing a compromise.acceptable to The opposition rejected this. Then Wash- Somoza, the FAO walked out. ington attempted to force the opposition Still, the Assistant Secretary of State to add more conservatives to the provi- for Inter-American Affairs, Viron Vaky, sional government and to guarantee the later wrote that the mediation effort had survival of the National Guard. In ex- 12 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 change, Carter offered Somoza's resigna- tion and threatened to hold back postwar reconstruction assistance. Again, the op- position refused. Finally on July 17, Somoza saw that defeat was inevitable. He resigned and fled to Miami. II. CARTER'S POLICY DIRECTLY AFTER THE WAR The high command of the National Guard fled to Miami with Somoza. The National Guard itself disintegrated and its members fled to foreign embassies in Managua, Red Cross centers, Honduras and Costa Rica. Many who did not succeed in finding refuge were arrested. The U.S. government offered political asylum to National Guard offi- cers,3 although Somoza was encouraged to leave the U.S. and did. These officers were not subjected to criminal proceedings for the hundreds of My Lais in which they had been involved. These same people later set up training camps for counterrevolu- tionary exiles in Florida in the last months of the Carter administration. In late 1979 and early 1980, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on Carter's plan to give Nicaragua $75 million in postwar aid. Several witnesses argued against the plan. One witness was Dr. Cleto DiGiovanni, introduced respect- fully as a "special consultant on foreign affairs to the private sector in Central America."4 Three months later when his testimony was published, DiGiovanni's bio- graphical sketch indicated that after leaving college, he "served three years with the U.S. Navy in the Special Opera- tions Group in Viet Nam, then entered the Central Intelligence Agency. With CIA, he served in the Far East, in Europe, and in South America in a variety of operational and managerial assignments, including sta- tion chief abroad and clandestine opera- tions chief of one of the geographical di- visions at the headquarters level. He left CIA at the end of 1978, and since early 1979 he has spent considerable time in Central America" as consultant. DiGiovanni testified that he did not think it "realistic to believe that uncon- ditional aid given Nicaragua, even if it should reach... moderate elements, would be used by them in any way not consistent with the goals and traditional orientation of the frente [Nicaragua's ruling body] and its members," which DiGiovanni viewed as Marxist. "Under these circumstances..., why not withdraw aid... rather than pro- vide money to [the government] which would help it solidify its power within the country.... The credibility of anti- Somoza, anti-Communist Nicaraguan exile forces seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government has yet to be established. What could happen in the foreseeable future is that the population within the country, without outside intervention, becomes dis- enchanted with its government's policies, and we should be prepared to take advan- tage of that situation should it occur." But DiGiovanni's recommendations were not immediately followed by the U.S. After intense White House lobbying, Congress eventually followed the line advocated by Viron Vaky.5 Vaky argued that aid was the best leverage available to the U.S. for keeping Nicaragua nonaligned, "pluralis- tic" and "moderate." He testified that the assistance "will go a long way toward strengthening the survival, and the capac- ity to operate, of elements which can con- tribute to pluralism. That is, the private sector.... If we do not participate and assist those elements, such as the private sector, such as many of the moderate demo- cratic elements in the government itself ..., we will abandon the field to other nations, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union...." The administration was not yet proposing direct subsidies of those private sector organizations, such as COSEP, with direct political objectives, but instead was al- locating 60 percent of its loan money for use by the Nicaraguan government through CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 13 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 private companies rather than public agen- cies. Moreover, at this point private sec- tor organizations still exercised re- straint in criticizing the government and were still part of the government. To as- sure the committee, the administration stated it had privileged information of exchanges between COSEP and the Nicaraguan government, probably obtained from COSEP contacts, in which COSEP voiced concerns and which were said to have been "frank and [have] covered a wide variety of sub- jects, both of a political and economic nature."6 Agency for International Development (AID) documents repeat Vaky's themes. The "U.S. interests" in offering the $75 mil- lion reconstruction package to Nicaragua were put this way: "Nicaragua's Government of National Reconstruction faces enormous problems as it attempts to rebuild and re- structure its shattered economy. U.S. as- sistance can accelerate reconstruction, bolster moderate economic policies, and help to create a positive relationship with the new Government."7 The package consisted of $70 million in long-term, low -interest loans, and a $5 million grant. The AID director for Nicaragua testified that over 60 percent, or about $45 mil- lion, would be "made available to private sector enterprises for the purposes of im- porting equipment, raw materials, farm ma- chinery, and so forth from the United States" - that is, as export subsidies to U.S. companies. The remaining loan money would be channeled by the Central Bank in- to various construction and agricultural projects throughout the country."8 Even more interesting, though, is the $5 million grant, about which little has been said publicly. The allocations from this $5 million grant appear in Table I. The scholarships under category 6 were admin- istered under the LASPAU program. Prior to this, LASPAU funding had come entirely out of regional funds. AID used an ongoing program in this case to create a special program for Nicaragua. Notice also the "operational program grants" under catego- ry 2. The money for "agricultural coopera- tives" was intended to offer "technical and financial assistance... [to] benefit 96,000 small farmer cooperative members." Of particular importance is the $300,000 grant to the Social Action Committee of the Moravian Church (headquartered in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania) which would 14 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 "reach some 40,000 low-income people in the Atlantic zone" - that is, Miskito In- dians. These points will gain importance when compared with later AID grants. The final part of the AID package was a "publicity campaign." "Extensive publici- ty will be given to the program loan and the activities it will finance. In addi- tion to television, radio, and press cov- erage of the basic loan agreement, there will be similar coverage of sub-agreement signing's. Forms and contracts used in the various programs will identify the U.S. Government as the source of the funds. THE $5 Matroip (hurt The $5 million grant will finance: 1. Agricultural technical assistance (title XII)__________________ $ 1,500,000 2. Operational program grants for private and voluntary agencies-- 1,400,000 a. Rivas Agricultural School (CARE)-------------------- (440,000) b. Agricultural cooperatives: (Moravian Church) ------------------------------- (800,000) (CARE) ----------------------------------------- (235,000) (Technoserve) ----------------------------------- (210,000) e. Preschool education: (CEPAD-Church World Services). (180,000) d. Salvation Army activities___________ (85, 000) 3. Technical assistance in municipal development----------------- 1,000, 000 4. Technical assistance fund to finance U.S. experts-------------- 500,000 5. Assistance to the Central American Institute of Business Ad- ministration (INOAE)_____________________________________ 300,000 0. Scholarships for poor students at the American School ---------- 300,000 Signs will be placed at all construction activities identifying the project as U.S. -financed. And plaques will be affixed to public buildings (e.g., the agricultural school.)"9 III. NICARAGUA RECOVERY PROGRAM II: A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY By November 1980, when AID's Congressional presentation for fiscal year 1982 was written, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua had undergone a marked shift. Aid to the pri- vate sector was now to become more fo- cused. And its aim was no longer simply companies but also business organizations. The "U.S. strategy and interests" for Nic- aragua was now put this way: The principal U.S. interest "is the evolution of a plu- ralistic society with a mixed economy, not hostile to the United States.... The AID strategy is to assist in establishing the economic framework within which Nicara-= gua's forces of moderation can operate and prosper.... The program also supports the private sector, which is the strongest force of democratic pluralism in Nicara- gua, activities of other private and vol- untary organizations (PVOs) and people-to- Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 people projects which strengthen contacts called for a cutoff of aid to Nicaragua between the United States and Nicara- during his campaign, when the new adminis- gua.1010 tration did suspend assistance several According to the document, the FY1980 days after assuming office, it spared the AID program, detailed in Section II and at $7.5 million grant program. No better tes- the time just being completed, "concen- timony.of its importance could have been trated on the recovery of the economy made than that of Alfonso Robelo, a busi- through support of both private and public ness executive and leader of the Nicara-, sector organizations (including PVOs) guan opposition party, MDN, in a Caracas which encouraged political and economic speech on January 25, 1981. "The U.S. gov- moderation.... The $5 million grant for ernment," he said, "should continue trying the Nicaraguan Recovery Program I... pro- to aid the Nicaraguan people, and should vides support to private sector organiza- be creative in looking for channels paral- tions for cooperative development, agri- lel to the Sandinista government, such as cultural institutional development, cooperatives and other private sector scholarships for low-income students, and groups."11 technical assistance and training." AID Reagan's position paper during the Pres- was "continuing its strategy initiated by idential campaign called the Nicaraguan FY1980" for the next fiscal year, but government a "totalitarian Marxist re- placing "a greater emphasis on support to gime." Clearly, Reagan and his advisors key private sector organizations." did not see themselves as "containing" the The new $7.5 million Nicaragua Recovery revolution by continuing the grant money Program II grant planned for FY1981 was but rather by rolling it back. In fact, designed to strengthen private sector or- officials of several of the organizations ganizations by funding technical assis- that have received U.S. money were taken tance to the confederation of business into custody by Nicaraguan security forces associations [COSEP] and its member orga- in late 1980 and charged with plotting to nizations, lending capital to the indepen- overthrow the government. dent cooperative association (FUNDE), as- Reagan's program quickly came to have sisting Red Cross and church'community de- three facets. Underlying the economic fac- velopment projects, supporting independent et of cutting off loans to the government labor unions through the American Insti- and blocking loans from international tute for Free Labor Development, reinforc- lending institutions of which the U.S. was ing the Central American Business School a part,was the rationale that Nicaragua (INCAE), and funding U.S. professional ex- supported "terrorism" in El Salvador and change activities [LASPAU]...." It is im- was thus not eligible for U.S. economic portant to note that AIFLD, like LASPAU, aid under the law. The military facet of was an ongoing program under the Latin the program consisted in ignoring the America and Caribbean Regional Program. camps in Florida and, later, California in These new funds under Nicaragua Recovery which Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries Program II were funds targeted toward Nic- were being trained. There were also re- aragua over and above the traditional ports that administration officials made share of AIFLD money going to Nicaragua. contact with counterrevolutionaries based in Honduras. The political facet was to IV. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY bring new faces and much money to the U.S. embassy in Managua to bolster America's Carter administration planners were cer- friends in Nicaragua. tainly aware that many organizations they were targeting for assistance were now Po- V. OUR MEN IN NICARAGUA litical organizations - not simply organi- zations with business interests. After Much as the U.S. embassy in Tehran became all, U.S. officials had been in contact an important hub for espionage against the with OOSEP for well over a year, and the new government after the Iranian revolu- Managua embassy had been substantially up- tion, so the Managua embassy took on a new graded. Ambassador Pezullo's testimony in importance after the Nicaraguan revolu- Congress revealed detailed knowledge of tion. In the rating of embassy assignments Nicaraguan organizations and trends. by the State Department, the Managua em- The Reagan administration quickly became bassy went from lowest to highest. The CIA aware of this fact. Although Reagan had moved a large number of officers into the CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 15 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 embassy, and the fact that the Subcommit- tee on Evaluation of the House Intelli- gence Committee has had an ongoing study of intelligence on Nicaragua since late 1978 reveals a high level of U.S. con- cern.12 The AID grant money is distributed out of the Managua embassy. It is useful to look at five recipients. ? FUNDE, the independent association of cooperatives in Nicaragua, receives "oper- ational support." U.S. officials hope the money to FUNDE will offset the power of the Sandinista organization of coopera- tives. ? COSEP also receives "operational sup- port." It is unknown how these funds are used. In November 1980, the Vice President of COSEP, George Salazar, was killed by security officials when he resisted arrest for involvement in a conspiracy to over- throw the government. In late 1981, four top officials of COSEP were arrested for agitating and violating civil emergency laws when they accused the government of adhering to "a plan to transform this rev- olution into a Marxist-Leninist adventure" and of "preparing a new genocide," even though 60 percent of the economy remains private and 80 percent of foreign credit and exchange goes into private hands.13 They were released in early February 1982. Nicaraguan government officials regard COSEP as counterrevolutionary. Yet as it represents Nicaragua's business community, they need its cooperation in rebuilding Nicaragua. An official at the U.S. embassy in Managua says that "COSEP is the inter- nal bellwether for our policy. Its surviv- al is key to our role here." ? The Chamber of Industry is another business organization which receives AID "operational support." Then-vice president Leonardo Somarriba was implicated in the plot broken up in November 1980. ? AIFLD has represented the AFL-CIO in Nicaragua since 1965. Most of its funds have come from AID, about $1.6 million be- tween 1965 and 1979; $824,000 of that be- tween 1973 and 1979.14 AIFLD was involved in setting up both the Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS) and the National Confederation of Labor (CTN), both of which received AIFLD money before and af- ter the war. Both have taken public posi- tions against government policy. More im- portantly, they are alternatives to the unions organized by the Sandinistas among 16 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 urban and rural workers, which are by far the strongest in the country. U.S.-spon- sored unions clashed head-to-head with Sandinista unions in many council elec-. tions and thus represent a source of non- government power. In late 1981, Richard Martinez, who once organized Brazilian workers in preparation for the 1964 CIA coup there, identified an AIFLD represen- tative in Nicaragua as a "conscious CIA agent."15 He also found the activities of AIFLD and the unions it sponsors to be similar to activities he had organized in Brazil 16 Thereafter the Nicaraguans re- fused to renew the visa of the AIFLD re- presentative, and now AIFLD and the AFL- CIO are gradually pulling out of Nicara- gua. ? The Wisconsin Partners is described as a health and educational program of the Social Action Committee of the Moravian Church with the Miskito Indians in eastern Nicaragua. The Social Action Committee has received AID money for this program since 1980. A clergyman arrested for aiding some Miskitos and Somocistas in insurgent ac- tivities testified that he had obtained money for arms and supplies from the So- cial Action Committee. The U.S. embassy maintains close contacts with these Ameri- cans in the isolated Atlantic coastal re- gion. VI. MILITARY PRESSURES IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1981 In addition to the ongoing political oper- ations, the military pressures continued, now disguised as diplomatic negotiations. In mid-August 1981, the State Department's chief of Latin American affairs, Thomas Enders, proposed in Managua that the U.S. and Nicaragua hold discussions to overcome differences. According to the Washington Post, the Reagan administration asked that the Sandinistas stop funneling arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador; that the size of the Nicaraguan army be expanded no further than the 15,000 to 17,000 troops that the Sandinistas officially acknowl- edged to be in uniform, and that Nicaragua stop importing heavy weapons from Cuba and the Soviet Union and permit some interna- tional body to verify this. In return the U.S. made two offers. First, the administration would enter into a non-aggression pact with Nicaragua. Sec- ond, it would close down the camps in Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Florida where Nicaraguan exiles were training to overthrow the Sandinistas. Not surprisingly, the U.S. offers were not well-received. The Sandinistas re- sponded that the U.S. was merely offering to do what it ought already to be doing: to refrain from attacking Nicaragua and to close down the training camps. The San- dinistas themselves unilaterally pledged not to attack the U.S., independently of any pact. They pointed out the administra- tion's past public statements that it did not have jurisdiction over the training camps under U.S. laws. Either it did or it did not, and if it did, it should en- force the laws. The Nicaraguan government further stated that what equipment Nicaragua was receiv- ing and what efforts were being undertaken to expand its army and militia were neces- sary to protect the revolution from the United States, from Nicaragua's Central American neighbors, and from the former National Guard members in Honduras. More- over, the.U.S. was told that Nicaragua was not helping the guerrillas in El Salvador militarily, although it was Nicaragua's duty to aid the revolution in ways short of military aid. Finally, in responding to the U.S., the Sandinistas listed several complaints: that the U.S. was joining Honduras in na- val maneuvers to practice intercepting arms coming into Central America for Nica- ragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas; that the columnists Evans and Novak had been fed the lie that 600 Cuban soldiers had arrived in Nicaragua; that the State De- partment had not repudiated the lie; and that the Reagan administration opposed the Nicaraguan proposal for a negotiated set- tlement of the Salvadoran conflict. VII. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS Secretary of State Alexander Haig took these Sandinista responses of late October 1981 to be a rejection of the U.S. propos- als and revived public attacks by accusing Nicaragua of renewing its support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. The Nicaraguan government responded that the U.S. admin- istration was inventing the evidence and doing so to justify American military in- tervention in El Salvador. About a week later, Haig spoke publicly for the first time about mounting evidence of the "to- talitarian character of the Sandinista re- gime." Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in late November, Haig refused to rule out a military blockade of Nicaragua or assistance to Nicaraguan ex- iles trying to overthrow the Sandinistas. Haig's remarks were carefully orches- trated and immediately followed the first decision by the National Security Council (NSC) in mid-November to implement a large -scale program to deal with opposition to U.S. policies in the "Caribbean Basin." The program included increased subversive operations inside Nicaragua, support for paramilitary operations against the San- dinistas from the outside, economic pres- sures, military threats, contingency plan- ning for military intervention, increased intelligence activity, propaganda efforts, more military aid to El Salvador and more pressures on Cuba, and joint planning with America's friends in Latin America. The Reagan administration had already canceled direct loans to Nicaragua, but even greater economic pressures were pos- sible. The U.S. could oppose loans and debt renegotiations for Nicaragua by in- ternational lending bodies. Nicaragua re- portedly received several hundred million dollars in such loans during Carter's last year and renegotiated a debt of about $490 million. The Reagan administration has al- ready attempted to block several multilat- eral loans to Nicaragua. It is also known to have considered certain trade sanctions against Nicaragua. A number of direct U.S. military mea- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 17 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 sures have been approved. The Pentagon re- portedly began contingency planning against Nicaragua in August and has been ordered to continue.18 These plans are said to involve naval blockades to stop arms shipments to Nicaragua or to strangle its economy. In addition to the maneuvers with Honduras, in November the U.S. and other NATO countries held large Caribbean maneuvers codenamed READEX-1 as a warning to Nicaragua and Cuba.19 Haig continues to refuse to rule out direct military actions against Nicaragua, although it is general- ly acknowledged that actions like block- ades would be ineffective. More maneuvers like READEX-1 are planned. To make more intelligence activity pos- sible, it was reported in mid-February that CIA stations in the region have been increased in strength "in recent weeks."20 Aerial reconnaissance was increased. The destroyer Deyo carrying surveillance equipment was deployed off the western coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador in No- vember and has since been replaced by an- other such ship.21 The Pentagon is plan- ning to reopen the Naval Air Station in Key West, Florida, as a command center for intelligence gathering in the Caribbean Basin ,22 and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has been secretly negotiating with the governments of Honduras and Co- lombia to establish U.S. bases there for use in "regional emergencies."23 Propaganda efforts were approved to cre- ate a perception in the U.S. of a threat from Nicaragua to the rest of Central America. To this end, the State Department has released "facts and figures," said to have been classified to bolster Haig's ac- cusations about growing "militarization" in Nicaragua.24 A campaign of "disinfor- mation" was also reportedly approved by the NSC.25 Accusations that the Sandin - istas are aiding the rebels in El Salva- dor.. may be part of this campaign. The Nicaragua decisions are thought, apart from their long-term aims of making Nicaragua more amenable to U.S. policies, to have the important short-term aim of assisting the increasingly unsuccessful U.S. policy in El Salvador. American plan- ners probably hope that intimidating Nica- ragua, and perhaps gaining some conces- sions, will demoralize the guerrillas in El Salvador. The elections there, not sur- prisingly, are said to be jeopardized by the on-going war, and the CIA has info;-med 18 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 Reagan that the Salvadoran government can- not win without outside troops. Argentina and the U.S. are reportedly training Salvadoran soldiers in "infiltra- tion" techniques that sound a bit like Op- eration Phoenix techniques of the Vietnam war.26 And although Leopoldo Galtieri, Ar- gentina's new president, has denied that he made any offers, El Salvador's Defense Minister Garcia has stated that he would accept Argentine troops in El Salvador.27 It has been reliably reported that Galtieri made the offer to traveling am- bassador Gen. Vernon Walters, former depu- ty director of the CIA in September.28 Another joint effort being pushed by the U.S. is the creation of the "Central Amer- ican Democratic Community," consisting now of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvadof, which Nicaraguans and many other observers believe will take on a military character. Venezuela, Colombia and the U.S. have be- come observer members..It is reported that Guatemala will be asked to join soon.29 Already there have been joint meetings of military representatives from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador that indicate co- ordinated military planning. The U.S. is reportedly backing these meetings. VIII. CONSTANTINE MENGES AND COVERT POLITICAL OPERATIONS According to the Washington Post, the CIA has proposed "a secret $19 million plan to build a broad political opposition to the Sandinista rule in Managua, and to create 'action teams' for paramilitary and polit- ical operations and intelligence gathering in Nicaragua and elsewhere."31 Just sever- al weeks after the first NSC decisions, the Boston Globe reported that the NSC had decided to "press covert action in Nicara- gua and El Salvador to infiltrate hostile elements both to gain intelligence and try to destabilize" the Sandinista government and Salvadoran insurgent forces. The Wash- ington Post did not know if the CIA pro- posal had been implemented but noted that U.S.-backed paramilitary operations along the Honduran border had reportedly begun. Outside the evidence of the AID grant program discussed above, very little is known about what specifically this $19 million would be used for. Neither is it clear where AID would stop and the CIA would step in. The CIA figure, however, is nearly three times the size of the Nicara- Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 gua Recovery Program II and nearly twice the $10 million Nicaragua Recovery Program III. This $10 million program appears to have been partially implemented. Sources at AID report that $2.4 million of the FY1982 budget has been spent as of Febru- ary 1982. They say that no public docu- ments exist on these latest AID efforts as the program is "in constant flux." The Globe reported that while "no one will talk about the details of the covert activities, it was pointed out that one of the lessons of Vietnam was that the Viet Cong thoroughly infiltrated the South Vietnamese government and armed forces and were able to exploit their inside knowl- edge and positions to considerable advan- tage." The Post stated: "As reportedly contemplated by the CIA,_ non-Americans would be used for the most part in imple- mentation of its plan, but the possible use of American personnel to undertake unilateral paramilitary actions against some unspecified 'special Cuban targets' also was envisaged."32 Baltadano, in his public confession of anti-government plot- ting (see box), claimed to have met with Reagan advisors while preparing the plot. Perhaps playing a key role in the CIA plan is Constantine Menges who, according to a public relations officer at CIA head- quarters, is the National Intelligence Of- ficer for Latin America at the CIA and formerly of the Hudson Institute.33 In 1981 he wrote, citing the "lessons of Por- tugal," that there is "an urgent need for a program of increased support for the genuine democratic groups in Nicaragua,"34 and that throughout Central America there is "a need to work with transnational groups such as parties, trade unions, civ- ic, business, and religious organizations to strengthen those genuinely democratic and moderate forces which exist within each country."35 Menges claimed that although "the Commu- nist and radical left groups have made a hidden but nevertheless intense. effort" to consolidate power in the Sandinista ruling council, "the much more loosely organized democratic groups represented by various independent political parties, non-Commu- nist business and labor associations, most of the Catholic Church, and most of the population have been steadily weakened by a strategy of ambiguous but unremitting harassment and persecution. As a result, Nicaragua today is nearly under the con- trol of the Communist groups." "After the revolutionary victory in July 1979," Menges wrote, the "obvious next question was whether the Cuban-supported Marxist-Leninist groups or the genuinely democratic forces would prevail in Nicara- gua." Menges derides Mexico and social democrats for ignoring their "revolutionary experiences." "Many Latin American social democrats also shared in the 'Cuban mis- take:' endorsing Castro without establish- ing a separate power base... and many Eu- ropean social democrats... would have cause to remember... the Portuguese expe- rience. There, following the 1974 revolu- tion which ended the five-decades long Salazar/Caetano regime, the Communist Par- ty with strong covert Soviet support moved quickly to dominate most government orga- nizations, trade unions, and communica- tions, and seemed to be heading inexorably toward dictatorial power. Only the failure of a Communist coup attempt in 1975 and a concerted effort by democratic parties and governments in Europe to help both the Christian Democrats and the social demo- crats and oppose the Communists resulted in the free elections of 1976 and the functioning democracy that Portugal has today." Paying heed to their "revolution- ary experiences" would have meant, "in Nicaragua, an effort on the part of Mexico and the social-democratic parties to strengthen the genuinely democratic groups and to prevent the covert Cuban strength- ening of the Marxist-Leninist groups." "This did not happen," Menges concluded. But the U.S. appears willing to put its hand in the pie if Mexico and the social democrats do not. Importantly, Menges ne- glects to mention the rightwing political domination in present-day Portugal. Nor does he mention the crucial role that Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, played in rolling back the Por- tuguese revolution. IX. U.S. BACKING FOR PARAMILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST NICARAGUA In mid-December, the Reagan administration reportedly informed Congress that the CIA was involved in paramilitary covert action aimed at Nicaragua. The U.S. was also pro- viding assistance to Argentine advisors, perhaps fifty of them, working with the Somocista counterrevolutionaries in Hondu- ras.36 About this time attacks on Sandin- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 19 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 ista positions escalated dramatically. Ex- dicted this would be possible within sev- ile leaders in Honduras told reporters eral months. "Senior intelligence sources" that "the war against Nicaragua has be- were said to expect support from Chile, gun."37 A number of sources indicate that Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. One of- the Somocistas are being aided by the Hon- fical reported that "Venezuela would like duran military, which has essentially re- to see the government of Nicaragua re- gained power in Honduras despite the re- moved. Venezuela already is supporting a cent cosmetic election there in which ci- [rebel] group in Costa Rica."39 vilians were elected to government of- fices.38 Nicaraguan Foreign Minister X. STEADMAN FAGOTH AND THE MISKITO INDIANS Miguel D'Escoto alleged that the U.S. was arming 6,000 Somocistas in twenty camps in The Indians of eastern Nicaragua have tra- collusion with Honduras, Guatemala and Ar- ditionally been isolated from the rest of' gentina. the society. The Sandinistas tried to im- About this same time, a possible scenar- pose central authority on the east, up- io for a naval blockade was reported. Con- graded their military presence, and tingency plans were said to have been brought Cuban doctors, teachers and sol- drawn up to support Somocista attackers in diers into the area. These measures creat- Honduras and Costa Rica. If they succeeded ed much hostility. Relations with the cen- in controlling a small piece of territory, tral government plunged when it was dis- the U.S. could set up a blockade around closed that the Indians' representative on Nicaragua in conjunction with other Latin the national governing council, Steadman American nations to "prevent foreign in- Fagoth, had been an informer for Somoza terference." White House officials pre- and he was arrested. He was released after Terrorist Attacks Counterrevolutionary groups failed in an sabotage of a Cuban plane in 1976 costing attempt to blow up a Nicaraguan jetliner, 73 lives. and a sabotage plot directed against key In a live TV presentation on January 12, industrial plants was exposed by State Se- Cerna and Interior Minister Tomas Borge curity during December and January. Mean- showed the local and foreign press the ev- while, attacks by armed bands in remote idence of a plot to blow up Nicaragua's regions along the Honduran border cost the only oil refinery and cement works. The lives of more than 20 Nicaraguans and leader of the team aimed at the cement nearly 30 soldiers are missing in action. works, William BaZtodano, a Nicaraguan A timebomb exploded under a seat in an civil engineering student, told how he had AeroNica 727 jet blowing a two foot hole crisscrossed the Americas seeking support in the fuselage while the plane was sit- for his organization, the Nicaraguan Demo- ting on the ground in Mexico City on De- cratic Union - Revolutionary Armed Forces cember 12, 1981. The captain and two of Nicaragua (UDN-FARN). In one trip to flight attendants were injured. The plane the U.S., he and his brothers, Fernando had been delayed and had the bomb exploded and Edmundo Chamorro RappachoZZi, held in flight a crash with more than 100 per- press conferences in Miami announcing sons aboard would have been a near cer- their intent to fight against the Nicara- tainty. [A second bombing at Managua air- guan government. In Washington, they had port in late February 1982 killed three meetings with unnamed government officials people and injured four others.] to explain their intentions. In another After investigations by Nicaraguan and trip to Argentina he claimed that after Mexican authorities, Nicaragua's security three meetings with high military officers chief, Lenin Cerna, declared that the they were given $50,000. This money and bombers were connected with the Cuban ex- more raised among wealthy exiles in Miami ile group CORU, also responsible for the was used to finance the plot and to supply 20 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 demonstrations by Indian supporters. The belief that Fagoth thereafter began to plot with Somocista counterrevolutonaries was confirmed when Fagoth was discovered to be among the survivors of the crash last year of a Honduran military plane transporting top Honduran military lead- ers. The Sandinistas have since charged that Indian groups were joining Somocistas in raids from Hondoras. After 26 people were said by the government to have been killed in these raids around the first of the year, Sandinista soldiers began evacu- ating Indians from the border area, some- times forcibly.40 As has been shown, the Moravian Church project with the Miskitos has been funded through AID. The latest disaster relief plan put out by AID indicates that there are fifty "locals" of the Moravian Church on the Atlantic Coast. Not surprisingly, former U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezullo stated: "We have very close communication with our people over there. "41 Nicaraguan officials have charged that Moravian Church leaders were working with Fagoth, Somocistas, Honduran officer Major Leonel Luque Jimenez and unnamed Argentine officers, to foment an uprising and de- clare independence for the eastern part of Nicaragua.42 Ten clergymen had been ar- rested or were being sought in mid-Febru- ary 1982. Vice Interior Minister Rene Rivas stated: "The Moravian Church, as a church, was involved in counterrevolution- ary action. The pastors persuaded the young people to go over into the [train- ing] camps, preaching a primitive brand of anticommunism."43 As stated above, the So- cial Action Committee, funded by AID, was used by these clergymen as a source of money for the insurgency. Fagoth reportedly sought contact with U.S. officials in Miami and Washington immediately upon being released from jail in early 1981. It is not known what con- tacts took place. However, in "recent military training camps for UDN-FARN in President Herrera Campins. Relations with Honduras. Venezuela are very important to Nicaragua Upon entering Nicaragua in early January both for inexpensive oil and for political with a Honduran passport supplied by a support against U.S. intervention. Venezu- Honduran military officer, Baltodano was eZa supports the Salvadoran junta and op- spotted by Nicaraguan security who follow- position parties in Nicaragua but has op- ed him for several days before arresting posed U.S. attempts to isolate Nicaragua. him and other members of the plot. Timing incidents like this could be used to di- devices, arms and 312 sticks of dynamite vide the two nations. were captured and in following days 14 A rising number of attacks by counter- were arrested. revolutionary groups along the Honduran The most alarming aspect of the plot was border has resulted in many deaths and the cooperation of four diplomats - three growing tensions in border areas. The Venezuelans and one Salvadoran - in the worst hit area was the remote northeastern conspiracy. According to Baltodano, the region inhabited by indigenous Miskitos. A plot was planned in the Salvadoran consul- military post was overrun before Christmas ate in Costa Rica. In Nicaragua, it was leaving seven soldiers dead and 27 mis- coordinated with the Venezuelan military sing. Health workers, teachers, and grain attache and two other diplomats. Further buying agents have been targeted too, in testimony about this was given by Julio an apparent effort to terrorize anyone Gonzalles Ferron, a Spaniard with Venezue- cooperating with the government. Zan citizenship who owns a Managua pickle The Sandinista response is to increase factory. A videotaped confession of his the number of troops in border areas and participation was shown and a search of encourage factory workers to watch over his house turned up fake rubber stamps their plants. Borge warned Nicaragua's en- for altering passports and an ID card nam- emies, "we are sleeping with one eye ing him as a member of Venezuelan military open." A Christmas amnesty for 540 of the intelligence. 4,000 ex-National Guardsmen serving jail Borge said he was sure that the govern- terms was cancelled after others that had ment of Venezuela had nothing to do with been previously pardoned were implicated the plot and felt that the CIA had to be in the increasingly frequent counter-rev- behind something Like this. The foreign olutionary moves. minister flew to Venezuela to confer with - by Larry Boyd, via APIA - CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 21 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100140003-9 weeks several United States military offi- cers stationed [in Honduras] have visited the Honduran Army command post in Puerto Lempira [where exile groups provided para- military training for Miskitos], while the local United States mission [in Hondu- ras] appears to have established direct contact with Mr. Fagoth and other anti- Sandinista leaders."44 Fagoth came to Washington on February 22, 1982 to speak with the press and the government. His trip was sponsored by the American Security Council, but his sched- ule was handled by the State Department. He was introduced at an American Security Council briefing by an aide to U.S. Ambas- sador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick. In his appearances Fagoth falsely charged that the Sandinistas are guilty of geno- cide, had set up concentration camps, and had carried out massacres and other atroc- ities against the Miskitos. In response to questions about his spying for Somoza and being on the Honduran military aircraft, he demanded proof that he had done these things. He claimed to be involved in a po- litical and not a military struggle. When asked why then he had in a January 1, 1982 radio address over Radio 15 September (a clandestine radio station operated for Miskitos from Honduras) praised those who had in 1981 died "fulfilling a noble mis- sion for the liberation of our fatherland" and had vowed that 1982 would be the year of liberation, he denied having made the address. However, the speech was translat- ed and printed in the U.S. Foreign Broad- cast Information Service.45 Fagoth later repeated his charges to a U.S. Congres- sional committee. "Sandinista repression of the Miskitos" is now a recurring theme in U.S. govern- ment statements about Nicaragua. President Reagan used it in his February 1982 speech to the OAS; Jeane Kirkpatrick told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March that the Sandinista "assault" on the Miskitos is "more massive than any other human rights violation that I'm aware of in Central-America today," and assured the Senators that Somoza, even though a "per- fectly clear cut dictator" was less re- pressive than the Sandinistas. Secretary of State Haig cited a photograph of burn- ing bodies published in the rightwing French Le Figaro as evidence of "atrocious genocidal actions" against the Miskitos. The photo was captioned "The massacre of 22 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 fiercely anti-Castro Miskito Indians... last December." Steadman Fagoth had used the same photograph in his Washington press conferences. However, as it turns out, in reality the photo was taken in 1978, when Somoza was still in power, and depicts Red Cross workers burning bodies of war dead as.a hygienic measure. Figaro editor Henri-Christian Giraud later ac- knowleged.that the caption under the pho- tograph had been a "deplorable mistake." An American Indian Movement (AIM) dele- gation which visited the Miskito region in late 1981 publicly supports the relocation of the Miskitos away from the border area, for their own safety. This is the first time that AIM has endorsed the relocation of an indigenous people. AIM charges that the real danger to the Miskitos comes from the U.S. government which wants to use the Miskitos in its war against Nicaragua, as the CIA used the Hmong tribe to fight the U.S. war in Laos.46 XI. THE WAR WILL GO ON Nicaragua should be prepared for a long fight. For the stakes are quite high for the Reagan administration, should it give in. As a "senior State Department policy maker" explained: "We're on a collision course.... If we do nothing there will be another communist regime in this hemi- sphere and they [the Republicans] won't be reelected. If we do something it undoubt- edly will cause a negative public reac- tion, particularly among liberals in this country who are still suffering from the post-Vietnam syndrome." "The administration is going to have to face up to a fundamental decision in the next six months: whether to allow Nicara- gua to consolidate its Marxist-Leninist regime, which already has become a base for subverting the whole hemisphere, or act to stop it." 1) See Richard Fagan, "bateline Nicaragua: The End of the Affair," Foreign Policy, Fall 79, pp.178-191; Noam Chcrosky and Edward Herman, The Washington Con- nection and Third World Fascism,- South End Press, Boston, 1979, pp.283-296. William LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?," Foreign Af- fairs, Fall 79, pp.28-50. 2) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States Foreign Policy. Toward-Nicaragua, June 79, pp. 59, 73. Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100140003-9 3) New York Times (NYT), 7/1/80. 4) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assessment of Conditions in Central America, 5/20/80, pp.77-89; see CounterSpy, vol.5 no.2, pp.54-55. 5) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Cen- tral American Economic Assistance, 11/27/79, pp.43- 44, 50. 6) Ibid., p.62. 7) AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1981, p.260. 8) cf supra, #5, p.30. 9) Ibid., pp.32-33. 10) AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1982, pp.208-210, 218. 11) NYT, 1/26/81. 12) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of the Presidential Certification of Nicaragua's Con- nection to Terrorism, 9/30/80, p.16. 13) NYT, 11/17/81; 11/30/81. 14) cf supra, #5, p.26. 15) The Guardian (New York), 12/2/81, p.13. 16) "La CIA es Como un Cancer," Sobriania (Managua), Oct. 1981, pp.43-46. 17) Washington Post (WP), 12/10/81. 18) Miami Herald, 11/26/81. 19) Ibid. 20) WP, 2/14/82. 21) NYT, 2/25/82. 22) WP, 2/13/82. 23) WP, 3/2/82. 24) Boston Globe (BG), 12/4/81. 25) New York Post, 2/15/82, 26) NYT, 12/2/81. 27) NYT, 2/23/82. Los Angeles Times (LAT), 2/18/82. 28) The Nation, 1/30/82. 29) Latin America Weekly Review (LAWR), 2/5/82, 30) WP, 10/27/81. 31) WP, 2/14/82. 32) Ibid. 33) In a phone interview with the author on 3/1/82; Menges was also identified as a CIA officer in SAIS Review, winter 1981-82, p.229. 34) SAIS Review, summer 1981, p.31. 35) Commentary, August 1981. 36) LAT, 2/5/82. 37) The Nation, 1/23/82, p.70. 38) LAWR, 2/5/82, p.7. 39) San Francisco Examiner, 12/20/81. 40) WP, 2/5/82. 41) Saul Landau memo on Nicaragua, Institute for Policy Studies, 1/25/82. 42) LAWR, 2/12/82, p.12; FBIS, 2/8/82, pp.P8-Pll. 43) WP, 2/5/82. 44) NYT, 2/21/82. 45) FBIS, 1/4/82, p.P7. 46) "All Things Considered," National Public Radio, 3/4/82. Resuming the Vietnam War by John Kelly El Salvador won't be America's next Viet- nam. Vietnam will, if the Vietnam National Salvation Committee (VNSC) has its way. In recent testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, the VNSC laid out its conspiracy to resume the Vietnam war, which it claims is in accord with the Reagan administra- tion's worldwide "offensive," "roll-back" strategy. Quite simply, the Committee ad- mits that it is aimed at "overthrowing" the Vietnamese government through "psywar [psychological warfare] and armed opera- tions, combined with diplomatic and polic- ital (sic) actions abroad." Taking it upon itself to speak for the U.S. government, the VNSC told the Subcom- mittee that "it is obvious that the United States can no longer stick to the tradi- tional policy of containment, whereas the front line now passes in Latin America, in El Salvador i.e. at the doorsteps of the United States. Washington has chosen a resolutely offensive strategy in order to solve the dilemmas of the policy of con- tainment. The roll-back strategy applies above all to the areas which are not cov- ered by the Yalta [Agreement]." While it is not known whether the U.S. government supports the VNSC, the Commit- tee says that it "looks forward naturally to moral support and material assistance from the great powers of the Asia Pacific area namely China, the U.S., Japan and ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations]...." rt is significant that the U.S. Justice Department has not prosecuted the VNSC despite its apparent violation of (John Kelly is co-editor of CounterSpy and author of the forthcoming book, The CIA in America.) CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 23 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 the U.S. Neutrality Act. At a minimum, the Reagan administration's inaction allows the VNSC to use the U.S. as a base of op- erations. The Chinese government, according to the VNSC, fully supports resumption of the Vietnam war, and VNSC spokesperson Truong Nhu Tang says he was recently invited to the People's Republic of China (PRC) where he met with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang and Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk. After- wards, the VNSC claimed that "China now has chosen to destabilize pro-Soviet Indo- china by arming all anti-Hanoi resistance movements, communist and anti-communist alike, and also separate ethnic minority groups." Troung Nhu Tang, once a Comptroller Gen- eral of the Vietnam Industrial and Commer- cial Bank and former Director General of the National Sugar Factory, testified be- fore the House Subcommittee on October 15, 1981. His submitted written statement was a potpourri of buzz words sure to warm the cockles of the heart of an:V Reaganite. Re- ferring to Vietnam alternatively as a "new East Germany" and a "new Cuba," Tang as- serted baldly that Vietnam "had become an integral and organic part of the Soviet Union" with the will and the means for "exporting the revolution beyond the bor- ders of Indochina." Laos and Cambodia, said Tang, "are thus destined to be ab- sorbed by Vietnam in a kind of Indochina pact, a miniature model and tropical ver- sion of the Warsaw pact." A la General Haig, Tang claimed that "Hanoi used toxic gas and chemical weapons to exterminate the Hmuong in Laos." For good measure, Tang threw in a Libya connection and the charge that the Vietnamese-Soviet friend- ship "directly endangers the commercial and military fleets of the West, chiefly Japan and China (sic)." enemies." More specifically, "the U.S. this time should support the opposition and peoples' movements" in Vietnam immedi- ately. For "now is the best time with the greater chance of success for the West." In the same breath, Tang urged and de- nied that he was urging the U.S. to become involved in a second Vietnam war. "I am not coming here to urge you to be in- volved in the new war, but it is a unique way to stop Soviet hegemonists less expen- sively and most effectively." A serious contradiction running through Tang's presentation was his contention that Vietnam was no longer a sovereign country because of its alliance with a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and yet, the way to restore Vietnam's sovereignty, he proposed, was through identification with the United States. Ironically, Tang himself observed that "during the war years in Viet Nam, many of us had admired Hanoi's role, independent from the China- Soviet conflict." Now he proffers U.S. assistance to the VNSC's war as a means to keep China allied with the U.S. and away from the Soviet Union which, said Tang, "must be more important than keeping Hanoi from Moscow. The U.S.-China relationship is therefore the decisive factor...." It would thus appear that by its own admis- sion the VNSC's war of independence is di- rected towards making Vietnam dependent on the United States, and not a war for inde- pendence at all. If the U.S. helps the resistance move- ment in Vietnam, the Vietnamese will stay in the country to fight for their own independence and liberty; they will not risk their lives to leave the country any more. It is the best and most effective way [to stop the refu- gee flow]." A second VNSC witness at the Subcommittee hearing was Doan Van Toai, author of the book, The Vietnamese Gulag. Toai is pres- ently doing research at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Uni- versity in Medford, Massachusetts. Like Tang, Toai went to great lengths to pre- With this philosophy as a preface, Tang sent himself and the VNSC as former sup- .told the Subcommittee that the U.S. should porters of the National Liberation Front "view the supporting of resistance move- (NLF) who subsequently "saw the light." ments in Afghanistan, in Vietnam, in Cam- Toai wrote about Truong Nhu Tang that bodia and in Laos as the global strategy "there is no one whose revolutionary cre- of the allies fighting against the common dentials are more secure...." About him- 24 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 The fighting for independence of a country first belongs to the determi- nation and decision of that people, and second depends on foreign assis- tance. Truong Nhu Tang Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 self, Toai wrote: "During the war years, as a Saigon student leader I supported the National Liberation Front (NLF - Viet Cong) and opposed the American interven- tion in Vietnam.... I was arrested many times by the Thieu regime." Toai asserted further that the "list of former prominent Communist and Viet Cong leaders who have fled [Vietnam] is extensive." He also dismissed descriptions of Vietnamese "_dis- sidents" as "CIA lackeys," adding that they "are beyond the charge of CIA com- plicity." Toai, who even insinuated that he was a leftist, failed to mention that he was a U.S. agent during the Vietnam war, and that his arrests were staged to establish his leftist credentials - a standard CIA ploy. In a secret file kept by the Thieu re- gime - obtained by Counterspy magazine - Toai's occupation is denoted simply as U.S. agent. Toai first worked in 1966 as a translator for one Terry Rambo of the Social Science Research Project which was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense. On December 25, 1969 he was arrested for participating in a cultural performance entitled "Sing for my People" - which Thieu's police considered anti-war. Within a few days, Toai was released. In a 1979 interview in the Vietnamese newspaper Doan Ket, Huynh Tan Mam claimed that the arrest had been staged. Throughout this period (1969-70), the secret file reports that Toai was meeting with U.S. political officers (Moore and Collins) in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and it repeats that "the party in ques-e tion" (Toai) was an agent working for the U.S. government. The file also reveals that Toai met with Nguyen Thien Nhon, spe- cial advisor to Thieu's vice president, who extended his "spiritual support" to Toai. In sum, Toai was an agent for a foreign invader and in that capacity was surrep- titiously working against his fellow com- patriots and students. Undoubtedly, Toai, as was once recommended by former CIA of- ficial, Richard M. Bissell through "indoc- trination," "money," and "training" de- veloped "a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the American staff." In this regard, it is of interest to note Toai's summary of the damage of the Viet- nam war. In his submitted written state- ment, he said it was "a tormenting war which cost the U.S. 350 thousand casual- ties, 300 billion dollars and an untold amount in lost pride; a war which marked America's first military defeat, a war whose heroes [emphaeis added] have been disdained rather [than] honored by their people, a war that is only now being re- assessed." He said not a single word about the damage done to the Vietnamese people and land by the American invaders whom Toai called "heroes." It is this Doan Van Toai who presents, indeed flaunts, himself as the new champi- on of Vietnamese independence and who as- serts that "both left and right-wing must respect the principle of independence and liberty... [and] must oppose any kind of invasion." At the same time, VNSC's offi- cial Position Paper, which reads like it was written at CIA headquarters, dismissed China's invasion of Vietnam as "the armed lesson of february (sic) 1979." It is this Doan Van Toai who asked the House Subcommittee: "Why today does the United States not want to spend a very little money in supporting the anti-Commu- nist people? Why today does the U.S. not want to help the Vietnamese who are fight- ing against the Communists, while in the past many Vietnamese were forced to fight against the Communists by the Americans?" While it is not known whether or not the Reagan administration is militarily sup- porting VNSC actions, U.S.-supported mer- cenary forays have occurred recently in Laos which the VNSC says is "occupied" by Vietnam. One such raid, reportedly orga- nized by the CIA, was carried out by Lao- tian mercenaries who became involved in a firefight. In November 1981, the newly- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 -- 25 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140003-9 formed Counterterrorist Task Force of the Pentagon, with the apparent knowledge of U.S. Representative Robert K. Dornan (R.- Ca.) provided former Green Beret (U.S. Special Forces) Lieutenant Colonel, James G. Gritz, with $40,000 and special equip- ment for two teams of Laotian mercenaries of former CIA agent and Lao Major General, Vang Pao. This operation also involved five other Americans including ex-Green Beret, Vincent W. Arnone, a security con- sultant from Malden, Massachusetts. The two teams invaded Laos from Thailand on November 15, 1981. It is not. known whether or not they are still in Laos. The sup- posed mission of the raid was to gather intelligence on American prisoners of war allegedly still alive in camps in Laos. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has accused the U.S. of using the POW issue as a "political weapon" against Vietnam. It should also be recalled that CIA-directed paramilitary intelligence forays - as the CIA likes to call them - into North Vietnam in the 1950s helped provoke the first Vietnam war. Ex-Green Beret Gritz told the Boston Globe that the Counterterrorist Task Force had also planned two more incursions into Laos and into Vietnam on"December 10, 1981. As part of the operation, Gritz was to return to active duty "as the Washing- ton, D.C., project officer and front man for the (intelligence group) working Oper- ation Eagle (sic)." If Gritz is correct, this means there was U.S. government sup- port of the raids. On December 9, 1981, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman was briefed about the pending raids by Gritz whom Inman described as "a colorful guy with a lot of good stories." According to the Globe, the December 10th raid was cancelled because of appar- ent bureaucratic infighting between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Counterterrorist Task Force. However, Gritz continues to organize the private efforts he began in 1979 to invade Indo- china to supposedly rescue American POWs. In this endeavor, he had been provided with full access to DIA-generated intelli- gence from U.S. agents, satellites and re- connaissance planes. As we saw, he also has the ear of the CIA. Representative Dornan's comment to the Boston Globe about Gritz' efforts was that: "I think the government should leave no stone unturned in finding out if we still have prisoners 26 -- CounterSpy -- May-June 1982 alive over there, and that includes use of the private sector if appropriate." The Counterterrorist Task Force, for its part, generates its own intelligence and apparently has a virtually free hand to undertake paramilitary actions in conjunc- tion with mercenaries and the so-called private sector. Its ability to engage in provocative, war-like actions was demon- strated by its predecessor group which un- dertook the military incursion into Iran to "rescue" the American hostages. More recently, Business Week reported that the "Front Unifie Pour la Lutte des Races Opprimees" (FULRO, Unified Front for the Struggle for Oppressed Races) had ini- tiated military actions in the southern highlands of Vietnam with U.S. arms and weapons from the Khmer Rouge and the Chi- nese. Reportedly consisting of Jarai, Rhade and Bahnar tribespeople, the FULRO claims to have a clandestine government with Y Chok Nie Krieng as president and Y Drun Nie as foreign minister. These mili- tary actions conform to the stated tactics of the Vietnam National Salvation Commit- tee and are the war-like actions the Com- mittee is urging the U.S. government to support. Provides current Information on Christian I fIVOIVlRIMC In struggles for justice and liberation in Latin America and the Third World. In addition to coverage of national and International Issues, the journal offers biblical and theological reflections relating to these concerns. This publication grows out of the specialized ministry of The New met CO M. etc., an ecumenical center focusing on social justice and International awareness. stl~ease T00AY1 S10.00 Per year foindividuals X~V A PUBLICATION SY I a l TO subscribe to this bimonthly publication of TM New York OC1