COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN: SPECIAL: THE U.S. AND AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100180008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Number 13 ~ uiy-August ~ y~ t
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Special: The U.S. AND AFRICA
$2.50
INFORMATION BULI~TIN
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Edito~fal
The Reagan administration's decision to replace the
already bankrupt and hypocritical Carter human rights
policy with the emotionally charged and paranoid concept
of terrorism was long in the making. Even during the
Carter years, right-wing officials and para-governmental
organizations such as the American Security Council, the
Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the
Centet for Strategic and International Studies had
soundt:d the terrorist alarm, paving the way for the change.
So it was no coincidence that the mechanisms fell so
quickly into place. Secretary Haig bluntly set out the policy
in the early days of the administration, as the Republican-
controlled Senate created the Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism, chaired by Senator Denton.
The only snag so far has been the rejection of Ernest
Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights,
a defeat due more to his questionable ethics and finances
than his Neanderthal views on human rights. Indications
are that the administration will respond to this rebuff the
Tabl? of Contents
Editorial ................................. 2
The Namibia "Solution" ............ 4
Gun Running ........................ 15
The "Buffalo Battalion"........... 16
Globe Aero, Ltd ..................... 18
The Passport Racket ............... 20
Klarl Koup Attempt ................ 22
The Faces of Evil ................... 28
The Militarization of BOSS ..... 30
U. S. Africa Policy .................. 34
Secret State Dept. Documents .. 37
Central America Ignites ........... 42
Naming Names ...................... 47
Sources & Methods ................ 49
Publications of Interest ........... 50
News Notes ........................... 56
The Cover: SWAPO President Sam Nujoma holding a survivor of the Kassinga massacre.
Coi~ertArtion /nJormatron Bu//etin, Number 13, July-August 1981, published by Covert Action Publications, lnc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corporation, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone: [phone]. All rights reserved; copyright ?1981 by Covert Action Publications,
Inc. T'yp:~graphy by Art For People, Washington, DC; printing by Fucu/tr Press, Brooklyn, NY. Washington staff: Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Louis
Wolf, Str.w;~rt Klepper. Board of Advisors: Philip Agee, Ken Lawrence, Elsie Wilcott, Jim Wilcott. The CovertAction Information Bulletin is available at
many bookstores around the world. Inquiries from distributors and subscription services welcomed. Library subscriptions encouraged. Indexed in the
A/ternat~ ve Pre.rs Index. Original graphics in this issue copyright ?1981 by Steven Clark Hunziker.
2 CovertAction Number 13 (July-August 1981)
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first such Senate rejection in 22 years-by petulantly
abolishing the position.
As terrorism replaces human rights in policy as well as in
practice, dictators get off the hook, massive military aid is
justified, torture and disappearances are condoned, and
rightist and state terrorism is redefined and made
acceptable as a weapon. State terrorism becomes a holy
war against the vision of an international terrorist
conspiracy, led by the Soviet Union, along with Cuba and
Libya.
Domestic Repercussions
Domestically, the repercussions are predictable. The
U.S. Communist Party is no longer viable as the scapegoat
for domestic repression it was in the 1950s. The direction in
which the Denton Subcommittee is headed makes this
clear; instead, all international liberation movements have
been redefined as terrorist, and all U.S. solidarity for those
movements becomes domestic terrorism. Any such support
is seen as Soviet-backed and any such organizations as
Soviet-supported.
Budget cuts are gigantic; only defense spending is being
increased. Thus it is only measures to counter the alleged
threat of terrorism which shake dollars from the Reagan
budget. The effect on the lives of poor people in the U.S. is
shocking, and will inevitably lead to massive demon-
strations, which the administration will see as manifesta-
tions of that same terrorist threat. Reagan's views are so
simplistic that when he faced in Canada placards similar to
those he saw in Washington, most commonly saying "U.S.
Out of E1 Salvador," he viewed this as evidence of an
international conspiracy.
new heavyhanded approach. CIA analysts leaked a study
that contradicted Haig's wilder claims about the rise of
U.S. terrorism--but were quickly ordered to reexamine
their definitions, to increase the figures. The State
Department's embrace of South Africa was exposed in
documents leaked to the press [which we reprint this issue].
Although the new policies create the impression that
much dirty work previously covert is now quite overt, there
are other indications of more sinister maneuvers. The
statistical revisions noted above were preceded by a spate
of bombings attributed to groups supporting Puerto Rican
independence, although none of them has claimed credit.
Also analyzed in some detail in this issue is the open
support now being given to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA,
part and parcel of the administration's racist southern
Africa policy.
In part because of"unauthorized"leaks, aid because the
administration wants to control which aspects of its
machinations become public, there is amany-pronged
attack on open government. These include the Intelligence
Identities bill, the attempt to repeal or gut the Freedom of
Information Act, the move to repeal the Clark amendment,
and the proposed Executive Order to legitimize increased
covert operations in the U.S., in the style of COINTEL-
PRO, Operation CHAOS and MKULTRA.
The leaks are not the only problem the administration
faces with its new policies. For one thing, Western allies are
not going along with it all. They did not buy the "White
Paper" on El Salvador, and they do not buy the
communist] terrorist conspiracy line. The election in
France and the cabinet crisis in Italy give some indication
of this.
There are some clear contradictions in this policy; most
pointedly the rise of right-wing terrorism. The fact is that
the only terrorism of any significance in the U.S. is that
personified by the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazis, and Omega
Seven. (The attempts to assassinate President Reagan and
Pope John Paul II were both by right-wing extremists.)
There are no efforts to stop the spread of mercenary and
Klan training camps in the United States. Indeed there
appears a great degree of official collaboration with them.
Former CIA veteran David Atlee Phillips who wept
when the Bay of Pigs invasion failed-has joined the
editorial board of Eagle, a new mercenary magazine with
this editorial policy: "Life is conflict. Conflict can kill
you-it can also make you rich." In the latest editorial
signed "Spymaster Dave Phillips" he decries the influence
of CAIB and, calling for the passage of the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act, states, "C1A cannot, alone,
neutralize this kind of anti-American behavior .
Congress must do it, and should not delay." [Emphasis
added.]
There are more contradictions surfacing. Some seg-
ments of the establishment are not going along with the
But Reaganites do not give up easily, and there are
undoubtedly difficult times ahead.
In this issue we devote most of our space, for the first
time in two years, to the problems of southern Africa a
bellweather of administration policy. We hope our
summaries and analyses can be of some assistance in the
worldwide struggle against racism and its most ardent
practitioner, South Africa. We also continue our review of
events in Central America and our profiles of admin-
istration intelligence figures.
We apologize to our readers and subscribers (now in 46
states and 58 foreign countries) for our occasional delay in
publication. Nevertheless, we are entering our fourth year
of publication confident we shall continue, Congress and
the CIA notwithstanding, and hopeful that we contribute
to an understanding of the malevolent role American imperialism
plays in the world.
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Threat to the United Nations
1'he Namibia "Solufiion"
The Future of Southern Africa
By E11ea Ray aad B~11 Schaap
Underlying Western strategy for a solution to the
"Namibia problem" has not changed fundamentally with
the election of Ronald Reagan. The thrust of the strategy
has al~Nays been to press for what will be acceptable to
South Africa, not what will be in the interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Namibian people, led for the
past :!2 years by the South West Africa Peoples
Organization (SWAPO). But in the past this strategy was
well disguised; now the masks are coming off and the
Western plan is in the open.
'The fundamental contradiction remains the same: The
West and South Africa, for their own reasons, are
determined to maintain control of Namibia's vast mineral
wealth and of its strategic location. It is crucial both in
relation to the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean sea lanes and
as a buffer between the progressive states of black Africa
and the racist regime of Pretoria. Namibia, twice the size of
California but with a total population about that of San
Francisco the lowest population density in the world
separates Angola and Zambia to the north from Botswana
to the east and South Africa to the south, with 800 miles of
South Atlantic coastline. The people of Namibia, 90% of
whom are black, want self-determination and real control
of thei ~ nation, free from the influences of apartheid South
Africa Indeed the presence or absence of South African
influences in Namibia directly affects all of southern
Africa
In. tLe struggle to resolve this contradiction, global forces
are at work and profound issues are to be determined. Not
least o ~ these is the significance, if not the very existence, of
the United Nations as a viable factor in international
relations. For Namibia is the only International Territory
in the world. It is under the direct legal authority of the
U. N., recognized by the International Court of Justice and
until recently by every nation in the world but South
Africa Current developments indicate, however, that the
Unitec'. States and its Western allies, particularly the
NATC powers, are fast approaching the culmination of a
secret elan, over five years in the making, to sabotage the
authority of the U.N. while acting for the forces of racism
and fo r the multinational corporate giants.
Western arguments are blunt. A series of secret Reagan
administration State Department documents on Namibia
policy [reprinted in full in this issue] were recently leaked to
Randall Robinson of the Washington-based TransAfrica.
In one of them, quoted in the May 29, 1981 Washington
Post, the U.S. suggested "that if the South Africans
cooperate on an `internationally acceptable settlement' of
the problem of Namibian independence, the United States
can `work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world
and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important
regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatical-
ly,"'The document notes with cynicism that South Africa
"must make this approach credible."
Brian Crozier, who formerly headed the CIA-owned
London news service, Forum World Features, and is still
director of the intelligence-linked Institute for the Study of
Conflict there, is less hypocritical in his choice of words. I^
the April 17, 1981 National Reviek~ he presents this
analysis: "The real priority is to stop SWAPO coming to
power in Namibia; for if they do, South Africa will be
totally isolated, and the West cannot survive without
South Africa's minerals; moreover, if Namibia goes, the
South African hold on the strategic harbor of Walvis Bay
will become tenuous ...; moreover, with S WAPO in power
Savimbi will be outflanked and starved of supplies; so the
real priority is Angola: give Savimbi and the other Angolan
guerrillas operating in the north maximum aid and the
whole Cuban effort in Africa can be nullified, and possibly
SWAPO can be finished off into the bargain."
Converging Interests and Nuclear Policy
Many interests converge in Namibia, all to the detriment
of the Namibian people. The multinationals continue to
plunder Namibia's resources, especially uranium, and
welcome the tight control of South Africa, or, if world
public opinion demands, its puppet, the Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The Western nations approve
of that control not only for the economic health of their
multinationals but also for the geopolitical reasons laid out
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by Crozier. Under South African control Namibia has
been for some time the main staging area for military and
paramilitary operations, both overt and covert, against the
progressive black nations to the north and east, especially
Angola. But under SWAPO, a Namibia free of the
domination of a white minority would provide refuge and
support for the African National Congress (ANC) and
other revolutionary forces within South Africa who will
ultimately topple the racist minority in Pretoria.
Namibia is one of the world's major respositories of
uranium, diamonds, zinc, copper, and, it is believed, oil.
The economy of the country is overwhelmingly linked to
foreign-owned enterprises, mostly based in South Africa,
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, West
Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands. Not coincident-
ally, five of these nations comprise the Western Contact
Group, discussed below, which has been instrumental in
whittling away the U.N. role in Namibia, gaining time and
concessions for South Africa.
The dominant corporate interests in Namibia are the
U. K.'s Rio Tinto Zinc, its Canadian subsidiary Rio Algom,
and its French subsidiary, Total. They control the Rossing
mine which is responsible for the bulk of 5,000 odd tons of
uranium oxide that leave Namibia each year, mostly
destined for European nuclear plants. But the Western
links to the South African nuclear industry are also
illuminating. Tied to that industry are the U.S. multi-
nationals such as Union Carbide, Allis-Chalmers, U.S.
Steel, and Gulf Oil; along with European concerns like
Urangesellschaft, STEAG, and Siemens of West Germany;
and Frantome of France. [See A.W. Bingham, "The Illegal
Exploitation of Namibia," The Nation, October l8,
1980.]
Another of the secret State Department briefing papers
reveals that South Africa has asked the Reagan administra-
tion to review its policy prohibiting the export of enriched
uranium to South Africa. South Africa has access to all the
uranium ore it needs, but the enrichment of uranium,
necessary for both bombs and reactors, is a billion dollar
operation and there are few such plants in the world. Many
reports note that South Africa has a secret uranium
enrichment plant well under construction. It is alleged that
CIA attempts to photograph the facilities led to the
expulsion in April 1979 of several U.S. Embassy officials
caught using acamera-laden Beechcraft airplane. More-
over, the May 1981 Africa Now speculates that South
Africa is actively seeking U.S. acquiescence for further
South African nuclear testing in the South Atlantic.
Nuclear capability is a pathological concern of the Pretoria
regime.
The economic and political interests of the Western
powers are clear. Despite their public condemnation of
apartheid, it is evident they oppose it on purely pragmatic
grounds. As the United Nations developed a strong and
practical approach to the Namibian problem, the Western
nations developed acounter-strategy.
In 1966, with world support (only South Africa and
Portugal opposed), the U.N. terminated South Africa's
mandate over Namibia. In 1969 the Security Council
declared South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia
illegal; and in 1971 the World Court ruled that South
Africa's presence in Namibia violated international law.
South Africa ignored each pronouncement, and as a
practical matter nothing was done.
On January 30, 1976 the Security Council unanimously
passed Resolution 385, calling upon South Africa to take
steps to transfer power to the people of Namibia through
free elections under U.N. supervision. In the ten-year
period the situation had changed significantly. SWAPO
had grown in strength and international recognition.
Armed struggle had become aday-to-day reality. The U.N.
had recognized SWAPO as "the authentic representative
of the Namibian people." And the Portuguese colonial
regime had been overthrown; Angola, Mozambique, Cape
Verde, and Guinea-Bisseau were independent.
Young SWAPO Militants
"Coercive Diplomacy"
It was in this context that a new Western strategy
emerged, a strategy designed to deal with the reality that
there was a genuine danger to the status quo, that the South
African role in Namibia could not continue unmodified.
The goal was to shape a solution which would create the
appearance of Namibian sovereignty while maintaining
South African or Western neo-colonial military and
economic control. Compromises had to be forced upon the
liberation movement and the frontline states. The Western
powers would exert diplomatic pressure, and South
Africa-with covert cooperation from the West-would
exert military pressure.
This policy, "coercive diplomacy," has been well-
defined: "Coercive diplomacy...mixes diplomatic and
military action. It is a technique used by stronger powers
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against weaker ones, a technique more advantageous to the
strong than negotiation in a pure form and less dangerous
than a use of overwhelming force. Coercive diplomacy may
be defined as the use of diplomacy and limited force for the
achievement of specific goals. It always involves the threat
of a greater use of force. In its more sophisticated forms, it
also i~ivolves the offer of inducements to those against
whom it is aimed." [Sean Gervasi, "Namibia: The Failure
of Coercive Diplomacy," paper prepared for the SWAPO
Mission to the United Nations, New York: 1981.]
On the diplomatic level several developments were
prominent during the 1976 to 1978 period. Chief among
them was the formation by South Africa of what came to
be known as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). In
late 1975 a small group of white businessmen and farmers
and carefully-screened blacks-hand-picked by tribal
background to fit into the apartheid scheme-met under
South African tutelage, taking the name Turnhalle from
the bu .]ding in Namibia's capital where they held their first
conference. They discussed a constitutional conference
without U.N. participation and in opposition to SWAPO.
By mini-1976 they had a plan for an interim government
with independence scheduled for the end of 1978. The
propo~~ed government would have racial and ethnic quotas,
with disproportionate powers for the whites and the
compl~ae exclusion of revolutionary forces. In 1977 the
group, heavily financed by South Africa, became the DTA
in anticipation of the 1978 election campaign.
Clemens Kapuuo, a subservient Herero chief, and Dirk
Mudge, a wealthy white farmer, emerged as Pretoria's local
front :nen and considerable effort was made to project
Kapurio as the "leader" of Namibia. A confidential U.N.
memorandum of October 31, 1976 noted "indications that
BOSS, and possibly the C1A" were behind that campaign.
More 1 han a half million dollars was paid to Kapuuo's U. S.
legal advisors and public relations firms, one of the latter
run by a former Radio Free Europe officer. No one would
say wh o was paying them. [See "Confidential U.N. Memo
Unmasks the Covert Action Against Namibia," Counter-
Spv, X01.3, No.2, December 1976.]
Kapuuo was assassinated in 1977, and Mudge became,
and continues to be, the main spokesperson, although
Peter T. Kalangula, a black minister, is the token
President. A modified Turnhalle plan was unilaterally
instituted by South Africa with tightly controlled elections
in late 1978-boycotted by SWAPO. With no real
opposition allowed, DTA took 41 of the 50 seats, and has
the effrontery to refer to itself as "the only legitimate and
duly elected representatives of the people of the country."
The economic triangle which is presented by the
relations between South Africa, the West, and black Africa
is rife with contradictions. The most striking problem is the
almost complete economic dependence upon South Africa
of all the frontline states except Angola-a dependence
which is a direct result of past colonial relations. Zambia,
Mozambique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe rely heavily upon
South Africa for both food and foreign exchange. This is
not lost on the West; as Claudia Wright observed in the
Apri13, 1981 New Statesman: "The Reagan administration
is confident that the frontline states that support South
Africa's guerrilla movements will crumble under direct
South African attack and indirect American economic
pressure. The economic part of the strategy is intended to
demonstrate, in the words of Richard Burt, the State
Department's Director of Politico-Military Affairs, that
`it pays to be an American friend."'
While countries like Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozam-
bique would like to end economic ties with South Africa,
they will need considerable time to do so; South Africa, on
the other hand, is doing so selectively, most recently
announcing the termination of its l6-year-old preferential
trade agreements with Zimbabwe.
The United States is also heavily involved. It has vast
and increasing economic ties to South Africa. U.S. exports
to South Africa in 1980 were $2.5 billion, up 74% from
1979. Americans own half of all the Krugerrands sold by
South Africa.
There are contradictions which cut the other way,
however, most notably oil. Nigeria, the second largest
supplier of foreign oil to the United States, has reacted
vigorously to the U.S. overtures to South Africa, holding,
but not yet playing, the oil card. Joining Nigeria in its
criticisms, particularly of attempts to reauthorize massive
covert actions against the government of Angola, are
companies such as Gulf Oil, Cities Service, and Texaco.
They have extensive investments in Angola, where Gulf
facilities in the province of Cabinda have for years been
protected by Angolan and Cuban forces. Gulf has
repeatedly asked the administration and the Congress to
stay out of Angola. They dismiss the charges that the
Angolan government or the SWAPO leaders are Soviet
puppets. Angola, the oil company executives have pointed
out, is "development-oriented," and not "interested in
politicizing central Africa on behalf of Cuba or the Soviet
Union."
Sevf~ral other diplomatic offensives were mounted under
Western guidance. Sean MacBride, the highly-respected
Irish diplomat, was ousted as U.N. Commissioner for
Nannit~ia. His commitment to real independence did not
square with the new strategy, and a campaign of sly attacks
led by the U.S. made his continuation in the office
intolerable. Concomitantly, the Western powers exerted
massive diplomatic and economic pressures against the
African nations which supported SWAPO, especially the
frontline states.
The most significant diplomatic development in the late
1970s, and that which was most damaging to the role and
influence of the U.N., was the emergence of the self-
appointed Contact Group, or Group of Five, the five
Western powers which were members of the Security
Council in [977: France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, West Germany, and Canada. Throughout 1977 and
1978 the Contact Group had talks with the South African
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government, to ascertain South Africa's requirements for
an "acceptable" Namibian solution. South Africa wanted
above all to stall negotiations until it could secure military
Pretoria Gold
control and destroy SWAPO. The Contact Group met
intermittently with SWAPO, attempting to gain such
concessions as South Africa demanded. SWAPO agreed
1'he Namibia Loi~i~y
A great deal has been learned about the South Africa
lobby since the Muldergate scandal, when it was revealed
that South African Information Minister Connie Mulder,
and his subordinate Eschel Rhoodie, secretly funneled mil-
lions of dollars into organizations around the world in
return for favorable publicity for South Africa. Namibia
has its own lobby, but the funding is the same Pretoria
gold. Embarked on a "corporate image building" cam-
paignfor the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, South Africa
has begun, with some degree of success, to project the
South West Africa/Namibia Council as a legitimate and
independent governing body.
Proswa is the Namibian counterpart to the South Africa
Foundation allegedly independent of the government,
but in fact funded entirely and lavishly by Pretoria. Pros-
wa'sprimary activity is to host numerous junkets to Nami-
bia of visiting "dignitaries" about 400 a year all ex-
penses paid. Recent visitors have included former U.S.
Defense Department Counsellor Gustav M. Hauser;
members of the American Legion, including Robert J.
Billings, the Executive Director of the Moral Majority;
Mrs. Ian Smith; former Green Beret Robin Moore; and
many reactionary journalists, businessmen, and politi-
cians. Among the latter was Representative Larry Patton
McDonald (Dem.-Ga.), the ultra-rightwinger who visited
there in January 1981. McDonald, described in the Wind-
hoek Ach~ocale as "a recognized expert on internal securi-
ty,"told an adoring audience: "If S WAPO gets South West
Africa the Russians will take Africa."The visitors are often
taken to "operational areas" of the SADF near the
Angolan border, presumably to be shown the large mock-
UNITA camps created by the South Africans to convince
the outside world of legions of Sabimbi troops.
Proswa's Chairman Gunther Kaschik is rather pleased
with his Foundation's work: "In the hundreds of articles
that have reached us as feedback, not one of the guests
found it necessary to paint a negative picture.
Shipley Smoak &Akerman
The chief lobbyist in the United States for South Africa's
views on Namibia is the Washington law firm, Shipley
Smoak &Akerman. Senior partners Carl L. Shipley and
Marion ("Joe") H. Smoak tout for the DTA and for the
so-called government, the Council of Ministers. Their
primary vehicle is the U.S.-South West Africa/Namibia
Trade and Cultural Council, Inc., a corporation registered
as a foreign agent, ostensibly "organized for patriotic,
cultural, educational, research and trade association pur-
poses,which shall include but not be limited to strengthen-
ing U.S. national security, trade and cultural relation-
ships between the people of the United States and the
people of Namibia."
From the Shipley Smoak offices in the National Press
Building in Washington, the Council issues reams of press
releases on flashy, three-color paper. Some are vicious;
some are ludicrous [see insert]. Shipley, an advisor to
Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon and the host of one of
the Reagan inaugural balls, and Smoak, who served briefly
as Nixon's chief of protocol-and still signs his letters
"Ambassador of the U.S. (Ret.)" also spend a good deal
of their time churning out letters to big business, to
members of Congress, to newspaper editors, to U.N. mis-
sions, to Prime Ministers, and occasionally to "Mr. and
Mrs. Taxpayer." The latter are the targets of one of the
Council's many diatribes against the United Nations, criti-
cizing the U.S. contribution to the U.N. budget.
On the United Nations, Shipley Smoak has filed a
lawsuit in federal court in the name of the Council against
the State Department. The suit notes that U.S. funding of
the U.N. is made under a law authorizing "such sums as
may be necessary." It further states that the U.N. supports
SWAPO, and that since there already is a "legitimate and
duly elected"government of Namibia, the DTA, U.S. pay-
mentsare not "necessary." It asks the court to prohibit the
State Department from "disbursing funds to the United
Nations for the support of SWAPO." The suit, a publicity
gimmick, will undoubtedly be thrown out of court.
It is impossible as a practical matter to distinguish the
South Africa lobby from the Namibia lobby in terms of
their major efforts in the U.S. What is interesting is huw
many highranking right-wing Republicans, in and out of
office, have ties to South Africa. Most notable is John
Sears, who was Reagan's campaign manager until he was
ousted and replaced by William Casey, now CIA Director.
Sears has been hired to represent South Africa at an annual
retainer of $500,000. National Security chief Richard V.
Allen, who represented the Portuguese colonial regime in
the 1970s, has as his top aide, Frederick Wettering, who
spent 12 years in the CIA, most recently as Chief of Station
in Maputo, Mozambique from 1975 to 1977. Former
Texas Governor John Connally has major investments
in South African gold mining companies, as did
Chester Crocker, who says his holdings are now in his
family's name.
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on point after point, insisting, however, that independence
arrangements must take place under U. N. auspices and
that there must be free elections to a constitutional
asserr bly.
As what later became known as the "Western Plan" took
shape, there was a drastic escalation in South Africa's
military offensive.
Militsiry Developments
Ong, of the first moves by South Africa in the period
immediately following the January 1976 passage of R. 385
was the formation of the 32 ("Buffalo") Battalion and other
mercenary and paramilitary units wreaking terror and
destruction in Namibia, Angola, and Rhodesia. [See
sidebar.] In a short time South Africa had more than
50,001) regular troops and police in Namibia, more than
one soldier or policeman for every 20 citizens. The
campaign of "hot pursuit" into Angola was intensified-
although the notion that South Africa only attacked
SWAP() military targets inside Angola was a myth.
Punishing Angola for supporting SWAPO was as
important as battling SWAPO itself. SWAPO fighting
units spend most of their time within Namibia, and the
South African incursions into Angola are usually aimed at
Ango an forces (FAPLA) or at Namibian refugee camps.
There are over 50,000 Namibian refugees in Angola. In
1978 the South Africans attacked the refugee camp at
Kassiirga, more than 500 miles from the border, massa-
cring 6(10 refugees. The camps had to be moved even
further north, to Kwanza Sul. South Africa also continued
its support of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, keeping the
remnants of that organization alive, buying with its
support further harrassment of Angola and SWAPO.
Victims of Kassinga Massacre
The Western role in South African Namibia policy was
quite explicit. In a recent interview with CA/B, Sean
Macl3ride explained: "South Africa wants to divide and
conquer Namibia, and it wants to maintain control of
Nami ~ii..."
Considerable opposition to the election plan has
developed in El Salvador. The Federation of Lawyers of E1
Salvador refused to participate in drawing up the election
law. Acting Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas criticized
the plan, and in .a meeting with Col. Garcia on May 23
urged that the FDR be brought into negotiations about the
conduct of any el.?ctions. Garcia rejected this idea, stating
that, "power is never negotiated." Rivera y Damas
subsequently criticized the U.S., saying that, "as ruling
regional power, [the U.S.] is not willing to play the role that
Great Britain played in Africa" by recognizing leftists in
Zimbabwe. Considering that Rivera y Damas's predeces-
sor, Archbishop Oscar Romero, was assassinated after
criticizing U.S. military aid to EI Salvador, this was a
significant and courageous statement.
U.S. and International Aid: Promoting
the Generals' Welfare
While budget cuts have dominated the news in the U.S.,
vast increases in aid to the right-wing governments of
Central America have generally escaped notice. The Center
for International Policy in Washington has been following
these aid proposals, and CovertAction has done some
digging of its ow,n. The results show massive increases in
direct U.S. aid to certain countries in the region, and a
determined attempt to involve the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund in the Central American
civil wars. if the international lending agencies go along
with U.S. proposals for this fiscal year, the total amount of
aid to E1 Salvador will increase by almost 700% over
figures from 1979-from $79.3 million in 1979 to $523
million in 1981, or almost exactly $100 for every
Salvadoran. Since about $260 million of this sum depends
Number 13 (July-August 1981)
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upon 1~avorable action on U.S. proposals by the World
Bank