THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100620001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

The Other Side of
the Coin
By The Honorable William J. Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence, United States
Assessing Soviet science and technology and the
potential therein for military and strategic surprise
is perhaps the most critical and difficult challenge
we in the U.S. Intelligence Community face. As
of now the U.S. still appears ahead in most of the
critical technologies we survey but the Soviets
have pulled even in some areas and are out in front
in others and our margins of advantage and the
lead times we possess, have shrunk. Even more
troubling, however, is that recent assessments
show that the ability of the Soviet military-indus-
trial complex to acquire and assimilate Western
technology far exceeds previous estimates.
Just how do the Soviets get so much of our
technology? First of all this is not a haphazard
program but one endorsed at the highest levels in
the Kremlin. Significantly, a single organization-
the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) - is
responsible both for supervising the collection of
\Vestern technology and for coordinating all
Soviet military research and production. The
VPK, therefore, is well positioned to know what
the military needs are in the way of Western tech-
nology and to ensure that this technology is used
effectively.
Defectors have told us that the search for
Western technology commands the highest prior-
ity in the KGB and the GRU. As a result, there are
several thousand Soviet-bloc collection officers at
work primarily in the U.S., Western Europe and
Japan. In addition to engaging in the more classic
forms of espionage, these Soviet agents comb
through our open literature, buy sensitive technol-
ogies through legal channels and religiously
attend our scientific and technological confer-
ences. Students sent by the Soviets afid their allies
to study in the West also serve as transmission
belts for technological data that is easily obtained.
The Soviets also use dummy firms in sophis-
ticated international operations to divert and steal
Western technology. We have identified some 300
firms engaged in diversion schemes operating
from more than 30 countries - and there are prob-
ably many more. Most diversions occur via
Western Europe, which is why we have sought the
help of our European allies in combating illegal
trade activities.
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ARTICLE APPEARED LEADERS
ON PAGE
~~)
July, Auigust, September 1984
The Soviets pinpoint and target small, highly
innovative companies in the computer and micro-
electronics field not only because they are at the
leading edge of the technologies that Moscow
most needs but also because the security proce-
dures at such firms are usually inadequate to the
threat of penetration posed by a determined, hos-
tile intelligence service.
U.S. micro-electronics production
technology is the single most'significant industrial
technology acquired by the USSR since World
War II. In the late 1970s alone, Moscow acquired
thousands of pieces of Western micro-electrons,
equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars
in all of the major processing and production
areas. On this basis, the Soviets have systemati-
cally built a modern micro-electronics industry.
The Soviet equivalent of Silicon Valley, the Zele-
nograd Science Center was equipped, literally
from scratch, with Western technology.
Two Objectives
What can we do to stem this tide? We already have
had a fair number of successes in frustrating the
Soviet technology search. The West still needs to
organize more effectively to protect its military,
industrial, commercial and scientific communi-
ties. In so doing, we ought to keep two objectives
clearly in view. First, the West must seek to main-
tain its technological lead over the Soviets in vital
design and manufacturing know-how. Second,
manufacturing, inspection and most importantly,
automatic test equipment - which can alleviate
acute Soviet deficiencies in military-related manu-
facturing areas - must be strictly controlled.
Western governments not only have powerful
incentives to stop the hemorrhage of their technol-
ogy, they also have substantial potential for
controlling and restricting its flow. The laws
necessary to accomplish this are largely in
place - stricter enforcement of the existing laws,
however, is needed. To this end greater coopera-
tion among states will lead to greater effective-
ness. A cooperative intrastate approach - if it is to
be successful - must also serve to alert the private
businessman to the nature and extent of the prob-
lem. Similarly, if the West is to be successful, our
intelligence services will also have to increase their
joint efforts to meet this challenge.
In the final analysis the threat posed by grow-
ing Soviet technological absorption will not soon
disappear and-certainly not because of any self-
induced change of heart by Kremlin leaders. The
Continued
STAT
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stakes are sufficiently
high to ensure that the
Soviets will devote
whatever resources are
required to fulfill criti-
cal military-related
collection require-
ments. The West can
do no less if we are to
succeed in frustrating
Soviet efforts. ?
William J. Casey
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