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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 STAT Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 C ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 4, Sec. II LOS ANGELES TII'S 19 June 1981+ The White -House staff is agonizing over this Ivanov 'Antonov, a Bulgarian* airline -executive ..question: What if Italian prosecutors prove Soviet ? whom Agca is said to have identified as.one of the complicity in the attempted assassination of Pope secret policemen directly involved in the assassina- `:John Paul II? How should President Reagan react? Lion plot, were to testify that the Bulgarians got Journalist Claire Sterling, who has -followed the their orders from Moscow? case closely, reported the _ other* day that State If persuasive evidence of this sort were offered, it Prosecutor Antonio' Albano has filed a still-secret is hard to see how Reagan could avoid "a harsh '. Mort charging that the'Bulgarian secret services denunciation of the Soviet Union. It is equally hard ,.recruited Mehmet Ali?Agca; the'would-be Turkish -to see how the President could then meet at the . assassin, to. kill the Pope and thereby weaken the summit with Soviet leader Konstantin U: -Chernen- Solidarity movement in Poland. ko in the near future. ,..: g. 'The prosecutor-` according'' t&:the *report,. has The White House hopes that the problem won't recommended the_ indictrrient and -trial of three arise. The Administration is trying to, get arms Bulgarians and six Turks, including Agca, for control talks going again, 'and is angling for an conspiracy: ?to 'kill . the Pope. Judge Ilario Martella, eventual summit. About the last thing that the" 'Whose investigation under Italian law has covered Reagan team needs is for-.the time bomb ticking the same ground, will rule next month on-whether a away in Rome to go off: trial should go forward.-_-But if it does, should.the President denounce the Government' officials' say that they have' no Russians in vintage Reagan rhetoric and accept the reason to.doubt the accuracy of Sterling's report.. , inevitable damage to U.S.-Soviet relations? Should Western experts-on Soviet' Bloc :- affairs . have -he blast the Bulgarians but try to let the Russians ,,AI,. ays assumed that the Bulgarian secret police are off the hook? Or should he dump the whole blame under the direct 'control of the Soviet KGB. The onto the late Yuri V. Andropov, who was boss of the -Italian prosecutor's report does not , mention the KGB when' the attempted assassination too1 place,- KGB, but It" implies prior Soviet knowledge and and ostentatiously pretend that the new' leadership approval of_the assassination attempt.* had nothing to do with it? :As long as Bulgarian involvement depends only If events in'an Italian courtroom pose'the question on the testimony of Agca, and Soviet complicity in stark and unavoidable terms, there is no easy remains. speculative,', the Reagan Administration answer to this excruciating' moral and political faces no particular problem. But what if Sergei dilemma. - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TINES ON PAGE 4, Sec. II 28 May 1984 :Overt Cutoff on Covert Aid ".Now that the House of Representatives has voted " to cut off funds for the Nicaraguan rebels being ,supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, the :.&ragan Administration should accept the decision and find more acceptable ways to bring about policy changes in the Sandinista government. The House voted 241 to 177 last week to deny a t21-million supplemental appropriation that the Administration had sought for the contras, as the anti-Sandinista rebels are known. Key Republican ..members, at the request of President Reagan, had - linked aid for the contras to a supplemental appropriation of $61 million in military aid for the .government of El Salvador. Administration officials `irlaim that progress in El Salvador's war is not possible unless the arms flow from Nicaragua to ..Salvadoran rebels is cut off by the contras. But the Administration's rationale does not fit the facts. While the Sandinistas clearly provide some '.aid and comfort to the guerrill as in El Salvador, the Salvadoran rebels have enough arms and popular '.'support inside their homeland to fight effectively, on their own. For better or for worse, El Salvador's -problems can be solved only in El Salvador, not by -pursuing illusory subversives in a neighboring .-country. - ` The Administration's rationale for helping the contras also does not jibe with what contra leaders ' say. They say flatly that they want to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Overthrowing gov- .,ernments is not the kind of activity in which the United States should be involved. --.-Finally, the Administration's rationale does not -jibe with what the Sandinistas think the United .S!stes is up to. The Sandinistas believe that the .r."oictras are merely the spearhead of yet another U.S.. military intervention in Nicaragua, and have used this paranoid fear to portray themselves as ~,`de?enders of their homeland against Yanqui aggres- sion. 2he .contra attacks also. give the Sandinistas an excuse to dismiss all dissent against the government as subversive and CIA-inspired, even when it comes from legitimate sources like the Roman Catholic Church and the independent newspaper La Prensa.. This is especially dangerous, because even ineffective contra attacks could give the San- dinistas an excuse to limit free debate and cam- paigning before Nicaragua's elections in November. Those elections will give Nicaraguans their first real opportunity to pass judgment on the results of the Nicaraguan revolution. The Somoza dictatorship that was overthrown in 1979 was widely detested, so few people in Nicaragua would vote for a return to the old days. But it is less clear that all Nicaraguans are happy with the Sandinistas and their Marxist experiment in governing. It is vitally important that the November elections be as open and as unfettered as possible. Reagan claims that this is what he wants, but those words would ooze cynicism- if U.S. funds allowed the-..contras to interfere with the campaign or voting. ' * Once the contra money runs out, the Administra- tion wilt have other, more potent, tools at its disposal to deal with the Sandinista government. The most-important is financial leverage-Even if, as statistics indicate, the Nicaraguan economy is perilously weak, that is no reason to presume that the Sandinistas are immune to economic pressure. If anything, they may be especially receptive to positive economic incentives from the Administra- tion, such as an offer to reopen U.S. markets to Nicaraguan sugar and other commodities. During floor debate on the Administration's Central American aid package, Rep. William S. Broomfield (R-Mich.), who ushered it through the House, accused Reagan's critics of pursuing a "hypocritical, contradictory and counter- productive" policy in Central America. Broomfield's strong words were aimed in the wrong direction. They describe exactly what is wrong with the Administration's policy toward Nicaragua. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED G:; ?AGE 7, Sec.- II LOS ANGEL 'S TD- ES 19 April 19B1 ~ng~?ess Roils, ForeigmPolicy Waters By P. H. TERZIAN Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.I'.), no stranger to melodrama, need not fear for is reputation. His abrupt resignation as rice camp man of the Senate intelligence Committee in protest over the CIA's failure to keep the comrrJttee "properly" informed snout its activities in Central America has made huh a congressional hero of sop s. Resignations on principle are as rare as dismissals for cause in Washington. Moyni- han r e.-rands us that in politics as in boxing it may be better to go down swinging than to hang on the ropes and be beaten silly. And yet, was it worth the trouble? Of all the foreign-policy issuer that could be -profitably debated on Capitol Hill, a breach of eticueue seems somehow inappropriate for a hold self-sacrifice. Even the breach is now disputed. Some senators contend that ..they were properly informed; others deny it The House claims to be satisfied , the Senate complains that it was not "fully" briefed by -the CLk. and Sen. Barry Goldwater (R- _A_:1:.), c a.rr an of the committee, is an- royed t:^a; :i is i.fo:mation was not "cur - fi Goldwater's language was suitably scue; the only .1,ing left is for the ..crats to demand a special prosecutor. Of course, cong-essional barons are con- geni _'ty cf,ended, and there is little that Ronald Reagan or any President can regu- larly do to mollify the egos or soothe the feelings of several dozen Claghorns and TThrottlebottoms. The legislative sense of self-ir portance is no idle mood. The Senate does not call itself the world's greatest and passed the odious McCairan Ac: ?to deliberative body for nothing. restrict unwelcome iz migration. The Sen- Nor does it cavil at translating its indig na- ate resoorse to 'Hitler was an af`-nation of tion. into action-and if there has ever been American neutrality and the Nye Commit- any routine danger to the foreign policy of tee's well - publicized incantations about the Republic, it is the prospect of congres- "mercl=nts of death." sional interference. Indeed, it it difficult to Even in the bipartisan high tide of the resist the conclusion that the congressional Cold War, Congress persisted in annual role in modern times has been almost scrutiny of the Bricker Amendm ent, which .;;consistently baleful. Certainly its current would have severely restricted the Presi- determination to bend Central American 'dent's treaty-making powers and enjoyed policy to its petulant will is in character. the warm support of the American Bar Assn.. The separation of powers is bound to And kicking itself in anger at the end of the generate conflict, and the smooth workings Vietnam War, the Senate punished the of government will always depend on the innocent with the War Powers Resolutio.l, skills and scat-sm nship of people in all thereby usurping the P-esident's constitu- branches. But does Congress have a creative tional powers of military action. role to play in foreign policy? Sometimes. Now, as the United States is challenged in Has it used .its powers and resources to its own hemisphere, it is consultatjor, (or the advance the national interest? Not really. It lack of it) that spurs Capitol Hill to action. It has habitually reduced foreign policy to the should not be any surprise that the exercise ingredients of partisan dispute or provincial of privilege awakens tong. essional interest: concern, and, while keeping its responsibili- The legislature canp3t conduct foreign ties ill-defined, has grown increasingly policy, nor does the Constitution suggest jealous of its prerogatives. that it should. What Congress is supposed to To be sure, the wisdom of presidential do it does in sufficient quantity. government has not always been self- Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1&S5 that evident Thirty years ago Dwight D. Eisen- : Congress "can violently disturb, but it bower was to be congratulated for-protect - cannot often fathom, tit ?aters of the sea in ing 'White House documents from the which the bigger fish of the civil service inquiring hands of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy. Ixn and feed. Its dragnet stirs without Today, as Sam Ervin used to say, "executive cleansing the bottom."- That was true privilege is executive poppycock." Who can when he wrote it, and it remains true a deny our luck that Franklin D. Roosevelt century later. defied an isolationist Congress to prepare for -tale Axisthreat-and supply Britain in its hour of need? Now, such shadowy substances as inter- national law and Third World approbation P. H. Ter tan is an page. - - are.invoked to protest Reagan's policies in Central America and the Caribbean. Part of this is politics-as-usual: One Presidents sober vision is another's military vainglory.. We now know that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 1930s was obtuse, and that Secretary of State Dean Acheson was entitled to complain some years later that "what the executive brings is initiative, proposals for action; what the legislature brings is criticism, limitation, modification or veto." Can we learn from hindsight? It seems reasonable to suppose .that the Senate persists in its obtuseness, and that the popularity of certain measures, or the apparent will of Congress, may not ulti- mately serve the needs of the nation. . It is useful to remember that it was the Senate, not the President, that kept the United States out of the League of Nations ass stani editor of this Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 A-RE CLE A.:I ~EARE? LOS ANGELES Tb,!ES O PAGE Li Sec II 18 April 198+ Taking Can Terrorists ;,'Sometime soon the Reagan Administration will send to Congress a package of anti-terrorism legislation that may dispel some of the mystery about how it plans to deal with this increasingly dangerous form of warfare. What little is known so Ier.about National Security Decision Directive 138 raises some disturbing questions. On April 3 President Reagan signed a secret directive calling for a get-tough policy on inter- national terrorism. According to Times staff writer Robert. Toth, the directive envisions intensified intelligence-gathering efforts, including higher pay for informers and improved communication with other governments on terrorist information. "I'he policy also calls for the training and employment of special paramilitary teams to com- bat terrorists under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These teams could be used not only t_o fight terrorist attacks as they occur-and, when appropriate, to carry out reprisals-but also to carry out "preemptive" operations. It's the preemptive aspect that is perpleain and of-conceln. .Let L'her e be no mist.ake: Terrorism is a dirty, ` appalling form warfare that grows more danger ous each year. Overall . terrorist activity.. has iii eased fourfold in a decade. jLa_st year alone well over 600 people died in attacks by international terrorists. Many victims were American. ranging from the 241 servicemen . kilted by a truck bomb in Beirut -to diplomats and servicemen gunned down in foreign capitals. Innocent bystanders are often part of the carnage. Terrorism is the largest single worry hanging.. over this summer's Olympics in Los Angeles. Today's most dangerous terrorists are not hot- eyed idealists gone "round the bend," but those trained and directed by governments-Libya and Iran being the major cases in point. Other countries serve as terrorist training bases. Civilized countries cannot let terrorists have their way. The countries must do what they can, separ- ately and in concert, to identify terrorists, control their movements across borders, punish those who maim and murder in the na_rne of higher politics, and lean hard on governments that help them. Common sense tell; you that if a government has solid evidence of a planned act of terrorism it must move to prevent it. But how far does the new presidential directive go in this direction? How tightly will the White House control its para thtary forces? What form of congressional oversight will be exercised? Will preemptive action be used only to head off a specific terrorist act, or also to destroy camps or_sa?e _ho s that are known (o:-mergly believed) to be used by terrorists? pert on terrorism -know that it is -almost impossible to get reliable information from inside a terrorist organization. Yet without such evidence .preemptive strikes could be made against theivrong people in the wrong places. One false move and the program could be dead, with terrorism home free Congress has an obligation to answer these and other questions before it agrees to start this new chapter in the battle against terrorism. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 t=_I/L:E APP EA-~c. Sec. II LOS A_.GELES TI?2 S 16 April 1;^ istressing Signals President Reagan and his policy -makers are ? giving private signals that they remain con~.mitted to the policies that they have been following in Central America and are confident that they will be able to continue along that course once Congress cools off and comes to its collective senses. That is a ;most disturbing attitude. The most disturbing element is the evidence that public support in official Washington for the peace initiative of the Contadora nations-Mexico, Vene- zuela, Panama and Colombia-is not matched in private. There appears to remain a paternalistic view that the Reagan Administration knows best. "We've been winning the war in Central America but losing all our battles in Washington," a State Department official told Times reporter Doyle 'McManus. But that State Department official was wrong, and so are the President and all around him who remain convinced that the United States, by sponsoring its own campaign of CIA terrorism against Nicaragua and: by pouring more military aid into El Salvador, can . resolve the terrible problems of Central . merica, let alone "win" something. ?- - The war being waged in Nicaragua by the CIA- sponsored contras has no more legitimacy than the g oerrilla ca-mpaign in El Salvador sponsored by the Sancinistas of Nicaragua- Both are destructive, ,giverting desperately needed resources from im- _poverished people. Both prolong violence and post- pone peaceful settlement, imperiling fledgling dem- ocratic procedures-including national elections in May-in El Salvador and in November in Nicaragua. The continued flow of arms from Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador is cause for concern. It cannot be ignored any more than the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua can be concealed. Both are contrary to accepted principles, for it is evident that imposition of a Marxist regime in El Salvador is the goal of the Sandinistas and overthrow of the Marxist regime in Managua is the objective of the CIA Despite the outcry raised in Congress last week over the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors, Administration officials say that they will stick to their "game plan" in Central America. The main reason for this single-minded determination, they insist, is that their many critics in Congress and elsewhere cannot offer a better policy, a viable alternative. But there is another course appropriate to the problem-a course respectful of the binding treaties that control relations in this hemisphere, a course supported by virtually every nation. That is the 21-point peace plan of the Contadora Group. It is a plan agreed to by the principals. Diplomats of those nations are al )York drafting implementing treaties. They hope to have them ready by the end of this month. This initiative by the nations themselves contrasts with-Washington's disinterest and:*hat appears to be rio more than cynical exploitation by Nicaragua itself. The Contadora process could be given immediate impetus by the U.S. government with a unilateral renunciation of armed intervention in the affairs of Central American states. That would respect a basic element of the Contadora plan. It would challenge Nicaragua to match its cornraitment to democracy at home and non-intervention abroad with deeds. It would provide a respite in the fighting as a step to a cease-fire,, essential to the Contadora process. And it would respect the mood evident in the votes in recent days of 281 House members and 84 senators. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 AP:ICLE ?APPEL_ED LOS A.iMELES TIl?S O;i PAGE 6, Sec.- V 10 April 193li Betrayal by America The single-minded determination of the Reagan Administration to impose its wishes in its own way on Nicaragua has left the United States isolated, an outlaw in the world community. The reputation of tSe, nation is at stake, and with it Washington's influence in the free world. Worse, the policy jeopardizes the fragile structure of international law and order that 'has painstakingly been constructed ii the 40 years since World War ii -At the heart of the controversy is President . Reagan's commitment to force against Nicaragua. He has sought to justify the terrorism that he finances as necessary to frustrate the terrorism of Moscow and Havana against neighboring states. But he'has failed to persuade others that there is virtue is what he has been doing. And he has allowed the terrorism to get out of control, damaging ships of several nations with no apparent forethought of the corseouences. So it was no surprise that he found himself alone in the U.N. Security Council last week when the council called for an end to the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Among those voting against the United States were China, France, Egypt, the Nreetherlands, Pakistan and Peru. One trusted friend and' ally, Great Britain, abstained on the vote, but made clear its opposition through private channels. ' Iy ow this arrogation of power by Reagan has been extended to the World Court, with the assertion that the United States will not accept the jurisdiction of the court on matters relating to Central America for two years, lest Nicaragua convert the court into a propaganda platform. That is a terrible lesson to teach the world about the legal process, about the respect within the United States for the law and for civilized procedures. This corruption. of principle is all the more appalling because it also stands condemned by the Contadora nations, the four peacemakers of the Americas that have again pleaded for an end to foreign intervention. There are questions that go beyond the law. The murderous campaign on land and the harbor- mining program sponsored by the U.S. government in Nicaragua are wanton disruptions of the economy of a desperately impoverished nation. The United States has the dollars, the firepower and the resources to maintain the disruption, to defy inter- national opprobrium, as long as it wants to, but the results need to be seen for what they are-over- whelmingly counterproductive. Fresh suffering is being imposed on a population too long brutalized. The democratic opposition finds itself under new repression-a repression justified by the Sandinista regime in the name of national security. Leeitimate onnosition now can be conveniently dismissed as another manifestation of the Central lntellhgence Agency's camnai?n of terror. Censorship orLa Prensa is once again heavy. The risks of rigging the November- election are enhanced, but also the probability that the Sandinistas will need no tricks to win. There is an alternative to the policy' being pursued by the White House. That alternative has been spelled. out by the Contadora nations and agreed to by all key states of the region. It is a plan of peace through negotiations. But the plan has received only lip service from Washington as the Administration pursues a policy clearly aimed not only at containing the Marxism of the Nicaraguan revolution but destroying it as well A campaign of terror is no way to persuade the Americas that there is an alternative to the blandishments of Havana's ideologues. The tyranny of Reagan's present policy and his flagrant neglect of the rule of law are a betrayal of what the United States can bring this hemisphere in leadership, in principles, in freedom. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGMES TINS ON PAGE 6, Se.c. II 2 April 1981+ Nicaragua Tightrope The latest escalation in the Central Intelligence Agency's covert war against Nicaragua-the min- ing of the country's major ports-is the riskiest tactic so far in a campaign that has always been a mistake and that now is downright dangerous. The Reagan Administration has allowed the CIA to provide financial and logistical support to anti-Sandinista guerrillas operating out of Hondu- ras and Costa Rica for almost three years, with no substantial results. The attacks carried out by the so-called contras have done little to weaken the Sandinistas. If anything, the MA's not-so-secret war has helped the most ardent revolutionaries strengthen their grip on Nicaragua. It has given the most extreme Sandinistas an excuse to crack down on internal dissent, and has increased their popular support by allowing them to pose as nationalists standing up to Yankee pressure. The contras have never been a serious military threat to the Sandinista government. The Sandinis- tas worry about them chiefly because they believe that, the guerrillas are the spearhead of a larger invasion force that will eventually try to overturn the Nicaraguan revolution-a force that they expect will include troops from the United States. The Administration denies that it is trying to overthrow the Sandinistas, and insists that it wants only to pressure them into modifying their rigid revolutionary stance-to cease their harassment of the Roman Catholic Church, the press and rival political parties, and to stop providing aid and comfort to rebel guerrillas in El Salvador. But mining harbors goes beyond putting pressure on a hostile government.: It is a direct attack on a nation's economic lifeline. In the case of Nicaragua it is an especially harmful tactic, because the nation's economy is particularly weak and heavily dependent on exports and 'imports. So far none of the ships damaged by the primitive but effective magnetic mines placed in Nicaragua's ports by the contras were on military missions. Four, including a Soviet ship, were trade tankers carrying commodi- ties like oil and molasses. Another was a Dutch vessel dredging a harbor. The most worrisome aspect of the mining tactic is the possibility that it will be construed by the Nicaraguans as an attempted blockade, which is an act of war under international law. -So far the Sandinistas have shown restraint in fighting back against the contras. But the serious economic problems that. will be caused by an effective blockade could provoke them to move against Honduras and other neighboring nations that have helped the United States support the contras. A Honduran-Nicaraguan war would further complicate the Central American crisis, adding to bloodshed and making it even harder for Latin American nations to settle Central America's wars and rebellions among themselves. The presence of U.S. military personnel in Honduras also raises the. specter . of the United States being dragged, wittingly-orunwittingly, into a regionwide-conflict Some officials in the Reagan Administration think that it would be easy for the United States and its allies in Central America to overthrow the Sandin- ista government by force. They are foolishly optimistic. ? .Certainly Nicaragua would--not be another Vietnam, but it would not be another Grenada, either. All available evidence indicates that a military campaign against the Sandinistas would be bloody and prolonged. It would alienate our important friends in Latin America and cause deep political divisions in this country. By escalating its pressure against the Sandinistas to the level of a blockade, the Reagan Administra- tion is being needlessly provocative and increasing the chance of direct U.S. involvement in a regional war in Central America. The Administration should call off the CIA and use more subtle and, in the long run, more effective means-creative diplomacy, economic leverage and moral suasion-to deal with the Sandinistas. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS AiiGELES TIl S ON _ AOr z v_4 11 March 1984 Mix-up of Strategies? The Senate Appropriations Committee was right country's March 25 presidential elections. U.S. to reject a hurried Reagan Administration request officials have promoted the elections as a key step for S21 million in covert aid for anti-Nicaraguan toward creating a stable democratic government in rebels in Central America. It should do the same . El Salvador, and they fear that the gueriil]as this week with another questionable request, this . fighting to overthrow the government will try to one for a substantial increase in .military aid for :I.,-. disrupt the vote by force. El Salvador. :-. _ - _: - . .... But correspondents in El Salvador, as well as :-Why the Nicaraguan guerrillas, who are fighting professional military observers, report that there is the Sandinista government from bases.inRonduras -no evidence that government forces face any kind with -assictance' from-- the:=:Centre "Intelligence "~'of -supply crisis. Salvadoran military units are Agency, suddenly.. need . more 'aid -was not fuily _' ; 'proceeding with.regular field operations,.and are explained. That,, along' with' the Administration's"'.~ making preparations to defend the elections in case demon to rush the request through Congress.by.. the guerrill as renege on their pledge not to disrupt amending a- totally "Unrelated appropriations .bill .the voting. If there are local shortages of ammuni- designed to help poor.,Americans - pay for home, tion, spare parts, field rations or other supplies, they heating, troubled Republicans as well as Democrats' may be contrived-reflecting the historical tenden- on the committee. That is why Republican Sens. cy of commanding officers in all armies to stockpile Mark 0. Hatfield of Oregon,'Lowell P. Weicker 3r. supplies and underreport what they have available of Connecticut -and Warren B. Rudman of New in hopes of getting even more. Hampshire helped vote the amendment down..- - -If -there were shortages, Secretary of State ::Those Republicans, and the other members of they George P, Shultz and other Reagan Administration committee, should be doubly skeptical next week if *.: officials should have started warning'' Congress the Administration follows through with 'its an='"about them weeks ago. There is no question that flounced intention to attach an amendment to" Congress will have to debate sending more-military provide more than $93 million in" military aid for' aid to El Salvador before the end of the summer. El Salvador to'another avpropriations'biIl designed ~1 But nobody : could blame" the 'Administration for to pay for emergency-food relief fat several African wanting to bave such controversial issues as aid for countries Some Administration -*-officials are even'El'.Salvador and the rebels in Nicaragua out of the' suggesting that they will tie.. covert. Nicaraguan _ way before the presidential "election- -campaign funds to that. bill,.too, in a second effort to ram the .. begins in earnest proposal through Congress. It is hard to shake the notion that the Administra- '?-Tne official explanation of the need for emergen- ? lion's emergency request for military supplies for cy aid for El Salvador's security forces is Reagan.!.: El Salvador and the Nicaraguan rebels has more to Administration concern that those forces might run' do with political strategy in the United States than low on amm~.uvtion and other supplies before that with military strategy in Central America. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE AP? :ARM OIN PAGE II-6 - LOS ANGELES TD'S 10 Februe-ry 1931+ T acaragna: Letthe People Judg'e The .Sandinistas have _.talked.- about holding--. society. They-cite the movement toward elections elect1ops in Nicaragua, ever since 1979, when they led the popular uprising ,'that overthrew :dictator na,laslo Somora Until this week there'.wastittle acton2d match the talk T'hai changed on Wednesday,: when3he-2tiicara- guan Council of State, which is controiledy the Sanstas,publishedthe details of a proposed law as one indication that U.S. pressure is working. But even if the strategy has been useful to some extent, if does more harm than good. Contra activity gives the most radical Sandinistas .an.excuse 1.0 push for repression against dissidents in the country: ? Rebel violence has *.been? used to discredit the. many sincere critics of the Sandinistas setting forth rules for elections to -take'place next ..-who remain in Nicaragua-and who look 3.o elections year. -Under the law. Nicaraguans would; vote'for a'- as .a .chance. to offer their people a constructive president, vice president and 90-member Constitu- alternative to the rigid revolutionary, fervor of the ent Assembly to rewritt the nation's constitution. - -Sandinistas. CIA involvement with the contras gives The proposed law is-due to be approv'ed..by. the . '-the Sandinistas a perfect opportunity to ~~ray Council -of State within- two weeks. ,But.,4oubts: , Lhermselves as nationalist heroes defending their persist. that an. election will be held, because some cn n riu;aain TIS. ng?gc~i n. And as long as the key Sa,dirusta leaders have warned that voting will . contra activity continues, the Sandinista leaders be delayed if there is any threat to Nicaragua's who do not want elections will have a strong stabii -either widespread terrorism by anti- argument for blocking them. govern +.ent? . rebels, the so-called contras; or pan,;...-'The Reagan Administration should give the inyasib6by a foreign power. That seems reasonab) e. Sandinistas breathing room. tighten the CIAs leash The last~-thing that a state under siege, orxine that on the contras; and watch for the next ste' s toward believes.that it is under siege, wantstodois:tinker .the long-promised Nicaraguan?-elections. Doing so with its fo: m of government =- ?'w- ;-` would involve .no -.; isk. The rebels . pose no real What worries the Sandinistas about the contras is.- threat to the: Sandinistas, and a new strategy would not the problems that they cause, but their ties to - deprive the Sandinistas of their only real extuse for the United States. The contras receive barely-secret : delaying elections. 'aid-from the Central Intelligence Agency, and the - It is important that free and open elections be held .Sandinistas fear that the CIA's covert war is a in' Nicaragua as soon as possible, for they would give -prelude to a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. .Given the-- - the people of that country a clear opportunity to ' sae_ .history of past U .S. interventions in that judge the Sandinistas and their revolution. Allowing country, the Sandinista fears are rational. the people of Nicaragua to freely .express their will Reagan Administration -officials insist that.they -.. should _be .-foremost in the minds of all those who ,'do not want to overthrow the Sandinistas,-only:to .:claim to care about Nicaragua's future-whether .rod. {hem .into loosen ng =their grip. on:Nicaraguan. theysitin Managua or in Washington. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TIMES ON PAGE,., 6 February 299L Horror S1Or7 In all decency, the U.S. government should move promptly to settle the-long-pending lawsuit brought against it by nine Canadian citizens who were the unknowing subjects Of medical experiments 27 years ago in a Montreal hospital. This is a horror story that came to tight seven years ago, and the horror has never ended for the victims. The Central Intelligence =Agency secretly funded a .25-year experiment in the controj_QUhe human mi . Involved were several medical re- search institutions alid government hospitals in the United States and Canada. . - Without their knowledge; selected patients in the' Montreal hospital were given heavy doses of LSD. A member of the Canadian Parliament, David Orli- kow, first learned of the experiments in newspaper accounts. His wife .had entered the Montreal hospital'for treatment of depression during the time of the experiments. She said that she had been given doses of hallucinogenic drugs, and,,in.the 27 years since, she said that she has been unable to concentrate and even now is unable .to read .an entire magazine article.. Another victim, according to a report in the New York Times,. said_that the' experiments left her with no memory oaf the births bf her four children. The 'Canadian government had not shown much interest in the suit until after the case was discussed recen0y : on a nationwide Canadian television 'program. The Canadian embassy in Washington 'then -sent a note to the U.S. State Department 'asking the United States to give relevant documents to the attorneys for the nine Canadians. Foreign Minister Allan J. MacEachen of Canada said that he was considering an appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in behalf of the t jects of the experiments. His statement was 'considered a move to persuade the United States to settle the suit, which was filed in federal court in Washington, seeking $1 million for each victim. The evidence is plain. There is no way to reconcile the CIA-sponsored medical exverimepls on.unknowing subjects.with conduct worthy oLthis nation. They never should have been permitted, and the U.S. government should meet its obligation to negotiate a settlement without dragging the victims 'through the ordeal of long and tortuous legal proceedings. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE APPEARED LOS ANGELES TIMES ON PAGE=-- 29 December 1983 Blunt Indictment The deep misgivings that the Pentagon has felt from the beginning about U.S. military involvement an Lebanon shine through unmistakably in its report on the October massacre of Marines at Beirut .airport. That report, prepared by a five-member commission -headed by retired Adm. Robert L. J. Long, stands as yet another blunt and. informed challenge to a Reagan Administration policy that, in the 15 months since its inception, has been so mercilessly hammered and confounded by events .that it can now be said to have lost all focus and `relevancy. The Long Commission is unsparing in its criti- cisms of local Marine commanders in Beirut and higher-ups in the chain of command for failing to take better protective measures "in the light of .,the deteriorating political-military situation iri Lebanon." But the commission also blames the Reagan Administration for its inability to respond to changing conditions in Lebanon that steadily placed the Marines in greater peril. Why there `was not more vigorous action taken to defend the Marines, what policy considerations may have .dictated a continuation of a low-profile stance in ,spite of manifestly increasing dangers-these remain among the most urgent of unanswered :questions. One of the more intriguing sections of the :commission's report cites "Policy decisions" for the failure to rovide effective "human intelligence" to the local Marine commander. It recommen that Defense Secretary Caspar W Weinberger establish "all-source intelligence support" for military com- manders in high-risk areas. The suspected and really ineavlicable absence of such intelligence in Lebanon is thus confirmed. What m= new ho eavlained, by Weinberger or the President is why there were pohcy-meaning~oli tical-decisions not to seek out and use all intelligence resources as were available. The Long Commission urges the Pentagon to draw up alternatives to the continued deployment of the Marines in Beirut. It implies, in other words, that the Marines should be pulled out, not least because even now it finds that security measures are inadequate "to prevent continuing significant attrition .. . The President this week accepted -the ultimate , responsibility for what befell U.S. forces in Beirut in October. The clear danger remains that, the United States, if it retains its forces in Lebanon, will continue to suffer casualties, for no good purpose, even -whim facing the risk of deepenini involve- ment in a country that is by no means one of its vital interests. The responsibility for that would also and inescapably be the President's. Surely the time has come for him to admit the failure of a policy, and to ' act to forestall further American loss. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ARTICLE AP?rhRED LOS ANGELES TD- MS ON PAGE 16 November 1983 Reassessing Policy on Gays The time has comeyfor'the federal government to the clearance after . 10 years when government reassess its out-of-date policy against granting investigators discovered his homosexuality during a security clearances to homosexuaLs. The case that background check on another TRW employee. could have been made in the past that homosexuals The federal government banned homosexuals might be more easily blackmailed into betraying from many jobs in the. early.1950s. Policies have government secrets-to avoid being.publicly identi- been changed-or tossed out by., courts-in most fled has been undermined by the openness of many areas except the military and' national security. homosexuals and the tolerance developing in the Green's case illustrates the problem with any society around them. assumptions about a person's vulnerability because The injustice in the government policy was never of. his or her sex life, no matter its orientation. It is more apparent than in the case of John W. Green, time for the government to drop a prohibition that is who says that he never hid his sexual preference no longer valid, and to evaluate potential security and yet held a special clearance while managing a risks on* an individual bass rather than on. a top-suet project at TRW Inc. until 1981. He lost stereotype that is now outdated. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 LOS ANGELES TIMES 1 November 1983 Intelligence Bumble -It is clear now that it was not only the American people, their representatives in Congress and the public's eyes and ears in the news media that were kept largely uninformed about what was going on in Grenada for most of last week. The military forces that were called on. to invade the tiny Caribbean island also had their share of ignorance and upcertainty to contend with. The problem was not that information was deliberately withheld from those required to do the fighting. The problem was that the information that they were given proved incomplete and inadequate. Reagan Administration officials heatedly deny that there was any intelligence failure in the planning or execution of the Grenada operation. But the facts as they have trickled out, now that the Administration has eased its arrogant effort to control the flow of news, make nonsense of that assertion. What the facts show is that there was a. shocking absence of both' basic information and timely tactical intelligence about Grenada. Given this dearth, it may have been only sheer luck that U.S. troops did not suffer significantly higher casualties than they did as they moved to secure the island. 'Item. Apparently the troops of the initial landing force were provided - with nothing better than photocopied tourist maps with which to orient themselves and locate' military objectives. More complete and up-to-date maps, an essential tool of warfare, became available only when a Cuban hoard of.them was captured. - . .?Jtem. It took * nearly a week for - the U.S. gdvernment to figure out how many Cubans really were on Grenada. The first estimate of around 600 was very nearly doubled after a few days, whether on the basis of the opposition that was encountered or on a misreading of captured documents isn't clear. The-result in any case was a quick summoning of substantial backup units to augment the U.S. forces that had already been landed. By the end of the week the Administration 'found itself in the embarrassing position of having. to tacitly accept Havana's own claims that there were fewer than 800 Cubans on Grenada.:. . ot knowing for sure how. many Cubans there were or how they were armed helped lead at first to air". underestimation of the 'degree of military opposition that was expected. In the end American casualties fortunately turned out to be relatively light, and credit must also be given the armed forces for the care that they. took to avoid inflicting casualties on Grenadian civilians. The one exception came with an attack on a mental hospital that was not marked and around which some Cuban troops were active. Proper preliminary. intelligence, though, would have identified the building for what it was and perhaps helped spare its inhabitants. The paucity of sound intelligence is especially inexplicable in the light of the anxious attention that the Reagan Administration has for so long been calling to Grenada. That concern predates by far the bloody coup that last month toppled the Maurice Bishop regime. And it predates the subsequent chaotic conditions that the Administration cited, in justification for the invasion, as imperiling Ameri- can lives and interests. Months ago President Reagan himself went on television to display aerial photos of the lengthy airfield that the Cubans were building on Grenada. He attributed a sinister military purpose to that construction, and maybe he was right. But if the Administration's suspicions were deeply aroused, if the alarm bells-were ringing in Washington, why weren't more intelligence resources devoted to, keeping current with what was going on in Grenada? Why-was there, after the invasion, such seeming confusion or surprise over the extent of Cuban involvement on the island and 'the military buildup that was discovered there? U.S. intelligence services can't be everywhere, and they can't know everything. But they can be expected and certainly should be required to make a considerable effort to gather fundamental informa- tion about a place that the President has told the American people caused him deep concern. It was clearly too late to start assembling that information once the American civilians on Grenada were presumedly placed in jeopardy and orders for the invasion were given. ' Still, the Administration claims that there was no intelligence failure. Perhaps in the narrow sense it is right. For if no major effort was made to gather intelligence about Grenada, then plainly no subse- quent failure need be acknowledged. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 r -I APPEARED LOS ANGELES TD 'S ?:,C~ .25 October 1983 ,_,ealing Up Government Congress will now have time to hold hearings on the broadest government attempt at censorship in oar history. That is the most significant aspect of the Senate vote last week to block for six months the.censorship directive that President Reagan put into effect last March without consulting Congress. The directive would impose lifetime censorship on more than 100,000 government officials who handle sensitive information. Under the-scheme, govern- ment employes with access to -classified information would . have to sign an agreement to, submit -to pre-publication review all -written material that t_`rey plan to make public whether or not it Contains classified material. During their government ca- reers.and for the rest of their lives they would be under the thumb of a government censor. Even :c:ion based on their experience in government vcu d have to be submitted to the-censor, whose criers could be enforced by court injunction. Nothing like this has ever been attempted.by a prior administration, and the censorship directive not only violates the First Amendment rights ofgovernment officials but, more ominously, also- undermines the public's right to be fully informed on matters of grave consequence to the nation. Would it make sense for officials of a prior Administration not to be able. to comment on the current situation in Lebanon without submitting their statements -for' approval to . the Reagan Administration?' Th e mere' thought is absurd. The Reagan order, intended to guard sensitive informa- tion, is so extreme that it itself is a threat to national security because it would deprive the public of access to a 'broad range of views necessary for informed public debate. . The action of the Republican-controlled Senate gives Congress two opportunities: first, to examine every aspect of the censorship directive, and, second, to write into law, if necessary, a carefully defined policy that protects secrets without under- mining the first Amendment. The present directive is simply unacceptable. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2 ANTI L_ A? " :E LOS A1GM,ES TDrMES ON _-?G- 24 October 1.983 War in the Shadows For the second time in three months the House of Representatives has voted to cut off covert U.S..aid tolne rebels fighting the Sandinista government of N ca agua This time the Reagan Administration should accept the rejection of its hostile policies toward Nicaragua, and try more constructive moves. toward the Sandinistas. The House first voted in July to stop the Central tntelhigence Agency from helping the contras Ohio want' to overthrow the Sandinista regime, but' the action was not followed up by the Senate, where -a Republican ;.majority is more sympathetic -to-'the Administration than is .the Democratic-controlled House.. Since then-theUTA's war. against 'Nicaragua has.;grown larger and more -ggressive. Recent reports indicate that the agency has even Whelped plan con1rn sea and air raids against Nicaraguan communications and oil-storage facilities. But the latest vote cannot be ignored. By a 227-194 margin the House voted to delete aid to the conirus from the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984. Even if the Senate does not include a similar provision in its funding bill, the issue will have to be resolved by a joint conference committee Thistime the Senate should go along with the House and stop the covert assistance, offering in its. place .open support to countries that feel imperiled by . the Sandnistas-CostaRica, El Salvador and Honduras. .Reagan Administration officials insist that the coritrc rids help cut-the flow of arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, but that arms flow has been negligible for some time. It.looks' more and more as though the Administration's, real goal in Nicaragua is to overthrow the Sandinistas, an aim distasteful to the American public. It remembers, better than the CIA's secret warriors apparently do, the long-term failures caused bypast U.S. covert actions in Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs and Chile.It also finds it morally reprehensible,.to_ overthrow another government, even one that the United States rightfully judges to be misguided. :Despite their many failings, the Sandinistas still command popular support in Nicaragua. They came to power on the crest of a popular uprising against a hated dictator, Anastasio Somoza, whose family was .propped up .by. the United States for two genera- tions. ,And, while- -the Sandinistas have alienated many of -their original supporters by .trying to -turn Nicaragua into a -rigid Marxist state-harassing the Roman Catholic--Church, limiting freedom of the 'Press, stifling. political opposition and militarizing .tbe..nation. far-beyond its legitimate needs-they have. not brutalized their people as Somoza did. So any -hostile. action that the United States takes against their government only generates more support for the.Sandinistas by making them appear to be anti-Yanoui nationalists. Whether the Reagan, Administration likes it or not,.the days when. the United States could have its way completely in Latin America-covertly or openly-are.past; this country is going 'to have to live with' he Sandinis-as. And whether the Sandin- ?istas like it or not, they are going to have to live with the United States as the dominant.power in the Western.:.hemisphere. That reality is -the best argument for both nations trying to reach an understanding based on mutual self-interest. ..But before any accommodation can be reached, the CIA's war 1ri the shadows must' end. All evidence indicates that it served its stated pur- pose-persuading the Sandinistas that the United States will prevent them from exporting revolution to ..neighboring countries. To push the ? covert campaign any further now-when both the Nicara- guans and this country's Latin American allies in the Contadora Group are working their R ay toward a diplomatic settlement to the fighting in Central America-would beg more trouble, not bring peace. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/09: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100660003-2