READERS ON SPIES: HANG'EM!

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100710001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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STAT
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MIAMI HERALD
15 December 1985
Readers on spies: Hang 'em!
LAST week in this space I advocated
the death penalty for spies who
furnish another country with "vi-
tal secrets that Imperil this nation's
security." Judging by response from
readers, the same thought must have
been on many of your minds too.
Only one letter writer disagreed with
me outright. Another - anonymous, of
course - called me a racist anti-Semite
for referring to the recently revealed
Israel espionage against the United
States but not to other spy scandals.
Other letters posed a range of thought-
ful questions. The rest said, in effect,
"You're right."
Here's a sampler of thoee_ responses.
"No doubt the vast majority of your
readers will agree with your conclusion
of what to do about traitors." wrote
Martin Ulan of Lauderdale Lakes. "But
Is your definition of treason correct?
"You wrote, 'Of all the forms of
betrayal, the deliberate betrayal of one's
country is the most reprehensible.' OK,
but what about the German army
officers who ttempted to assassinate
Hitler during [World War IIl? Would
you hang them -Or a Soviet soldier who
defects to the Afghan rebels, perhaps
bringing a plan o . battle? Would you
take his life? Or a Jane Fonda who goes
to Hanoi to show her opposition to her
country's war in Vietnam?
"Is It always 'my country right or
wrong'? Is one a terrorist - or a
freedom fighter?"
Bernard Adelman of Boca Raton
writes that his heart says yes to my
suggestion, but his head says no. "The
death penalty does not deter traitors,"
he reasons. "The electrocution of the
Rosenbergs 30-plus years ago had no
effect on, for example, the, Walkers.
"Suppose the Sovf. a . catch, try,
convict, and electrocute, a, Russian spy
In our service. Are we to be morally
Indifferent? Do we approve of their
killing because they have argued that
such treasonous behavior could be
responsible for untold deaths in the
future? Do we execute sentences based
on probable or possible harm?
"If we are to sentence to death spies
whose acts' results we can't know with
certainty," Mr. Adelman asks, "what do
we do with people like Philip Agee, the
ex-CIA agent whose disclosure of CIA
names resulted In the murder of some
agents? And do we try as accessories all
those In the book world who had read
the galleys and didn't delete the names
of CIA agents, even though the book-
men should have had the brains to
foresee the consequences of disclosure?"
For an opposing view of the deter-
rence question, I'll let W. Donald
Stewart of Miami Beach reply to Mr.
Adelman. Mr. Stewart says that he
spent 14 years chasing spies for the FBI,
followed by 10 years (ending in 1975) at
the Pentagon.
"The death penalty is a decided
threat which will lead to the coopera-
tion of a trapped spy," Mr. Stewart
opines. "Many years ago, shortly after
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were exe-
cuted - she first because the thought
was that he'd crack after she was gone
- when a U.S. spy was interviewed,
the opening line of the interviewers
might well be, 'Do you want to
cooperate or take the Rosenberg route?'
With that fresh potential, cooperation
was often forthcoming.... "
In his eight-page letter, Mr. Stewart
also worries about the vastly differing
qualifications required by the myriad
Government agencies that handle classi-
fied material. FBI agents are closely
trained and supervised, he notes, and all
must have at least a bachelor's degree.
In contrast, "three years prior to
leaving the Pentagon, I was the inspec-
tor general of the Defense Investigative
Service," which conducted background
checks required for Defense Depart-
ment top-secret clearances.
"Its investigators ranged from corpo-
ral to major, and, for the most part,
when the serviceman completed his
enlistment, he and what little experi-
ence he accrued left the military
service. Also. because of the large
volume of work, many of the less-edu-
cated military personnel 'ghost wrote'
part of their reports." Instead of
interviewin the clearance applicant's
neighbors, for example, Mr. Stewart
says that it wasn't uncommon for
Investigators to copy names from
mailboxes and fabricate interviews with
them. That can put a sizable hole in any
spy chaser's net.
From Ken Leasing of Opa-locka
comes this: "I have disagreed with you
frequently on a. number of other
matters. However, it is hard to see how
any right-thinking American could dis.
agree on this one. This country has
gotten far too soli."
Miami lawyer J.B. Spence echoes
that thought. "I served in the military
for six years, part-time on submarines
and four years overseas," he writes.
"Anyone who would spy on our
military should be shot In public at noon
several times."
Althou his terse letter doesn't my
Beller, tM.D., of gather
Sebastian doesn't agree.
He writes: "To the spy in the fold, now
out of the cold, a question to your
question: 'Like the Rosenbergs?"'
Dan Schmidt III of Jensen Beach
terms my proposal "right on - right on
the noses of those Idiot judges and
lawyers who deliver these stupid and
disgraceful sentences for those who sell
our country's secrets and technologies.
These individuals should be hanged or
shot - no prison, no plea bargains, no
smart-lawyer gobbledygook.,...
"Send copies [of the column] to your
congressmen," Mr. Schmidt concludes.
"Maybe they'll take time out from their
PACs to read it."
"Probably I would be considered
barbaric," muses William V. Sherman of
Miami, "since I feel that public hanging
would be suitable. As a GI during some
of the darkest days of World War Ii, I
appreciate this great land.
"Yes, Jim, hang them high."
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MIAMI HERALD
15 December 1985
Executive Imposition
THE QUESTION is not whether this
nation or any nation has the right Polygraph Testing
to protect its secrets from spies or
careless bureaucrats. That is a given. Of Federal Workers
The question, rather, Is whether the
Reagan Administration, in the pursuit of Finally, the biggest problem is one of
this goal, should Impose mandatory privacy and individual rights. All told;
polygraph tests on up to 10,000 Govern- some four million people, defense-indus-
ment employees who have access to try employees as well as Government
highly sensitive security material, workers, have some access to classified
This Is not-. the flitst time that the Information. Once the polygraphing
Administration has proposed enlarging starts on the scale that this order
the pool of Government officials re- mandates, where does it stop? And with
quired to take these tests. Already the whom?
Central Intelligence Agency, the Nation- The Administration backed off of its
al Security Agency, and the Pentagon last polygraph proposal because of
require some employees in certain areas opposition in Congress and Secretary of
to take polygraph-tests. State George P. Shultz's reported threat
One problem with the current propos- to resign if it were implemented. The
al is its origin. - The last time the polygraph is no less Invasive of individu-
Administration proposed forcing Gov- al privacy, and no more reliable in its
ernment officials to take polygraph tests results, now than it was then. The
was during the 1984 Presidential cam- President should recognize that and
paign. Its concern. then was news leaks rescind this onerous executive order
to the press. The. current concern is the before its injurious effects go any
rash of espionage incidents - about further.
three dozen - unearthed since Mr.
Reagan took office in 1981. The Presi-
dent signed the polygraph order secretly,
and the order itself remains secret.
White House spokesman Larry
Speakes says that the order is limited to
national-security matters. Yet what per-
sonal protection do Government offi-
cials, or the public, have that this new
directive will be used only to weed out
spies? What assurances are there that an
overzealous official will not use his new
powers to try to deter his subordinates
from talking to the press ?
Another serious problem is the unre-
liability of polygraph tests. Some experts
say that polygraph tests are more
effective at intimidation than at detect-
ing people who actually He. Under the
best of circumstances, a polygraph test is
only as good as the examiner who
administers it. And the number of
certifiably competent polygraph examin-
ers is limited.
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ul etAQ ? 4 December 1985
Stopping the Spies
A RASH of spy incidents stirs public
concern. and for good reason: If
even one well-placed spy can harm
the nation's interests, then the potential
for harm in a whole series of such cases
is truly disturbing.
The flurry of spying incidents has
rekindled interest in various proposed
remedies. Several are sure to spark
debate in a humane and open democracy.
Proposals have surfaced. for instance, to
impose prior restraints on certain publi-
cations, to widen polygraph testing of
Government employees, to increase sur-
veillance of American radicals, and to
restore the death penalty for espionage.
In this debate, the calm counsel of FBI
Director William Webster is especially
valuable. Speaking from experience in
the spy-vs.-spy game, he offers two
suggestions of particular merit.
First, as Mr. Webster told a Senate
committee, the United States ought to
tighten restrictions on the travel of
Soviet-bloc diplomats in this country.
Mr. Webster said that 1,000 or so of the
2,500 envoys from Communist countries
engage in espionage and that they're
showing "increased aggressiveness" of
late. There's no reason to let them roam
freely; their countries don't let Ameri-
cans travel freely there.
Second, in a recent interview Mr.
Webster said that far too many Govern.
ment documents are classified or over-
classified. Moreover, far too many
people have access to them. The result,
he said, is that persons who routinely
handle such documents become
"numbed" and grow careless.
This insight is not new. Congressional
coihmittees have plunged into the mo-
rass of Government secrecy and conclud-
ed the same thing. They reason that it
less material were classified, its custodi-
ans could protect it better.
Yet In seeking remedies for overclas-
sification, Congress has been frustrated
by the sheer size of the problem.
Restricting the movement of Soviet-bloc
diplomats is child's play in comparison
with battling the blizzard of Govern-
ment paperwork. Moreover, the "Top
Secret" stamps are classifying new
material faster than overseers possibly
can monitor.
If Congress is to heed Mr. Webster's
sensible suggestion, then, it must consid-
er bold systemic changes that'll greatly
reduce the amount of classified material.
It's a logical approach to theft preven-
tion - like keeping surplus cheese out
of the vaults at Fort Knox so that the
sentries are free to guard the gold.
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ARTICLE APPEA MIAMI HERALD
oNPAGE )JO 29 July 1985
A Bow to Reality
jT'S FUNNY, but you don't hear
j anyone talking about who "won"
when President Reagan and Chinese
China Summit
President Li Xiannian went mono a most totalitarian societies, and its contin.
mano in their half-hour White House ued designs on Taiwan and Southeast
parley. No one worried that Mr. Li might Asia are at odds with U.S. aspirations.
take advantage of the convalescing Mr. Top-level meetings between the two
Reagan's weakened condition. And governments are unlikely to hasten
though some
undits second-
uessed the
p
g
wisdom of Mr. Reagan's decision to
further Chinese purchases of U.S. nucle-
ar technology, their reservations didn't
approximate the shrieks sure to greet
any similar pact with the Soviet Union.
How times change. Just 12 years ago,
U.S. leaders were loath to acknowledge
the existence of the world's most
populous nation. In many Americans'
eyes, the Chinese were scarcely accredit-
ed members of the human race, and Mao
Tse-Tung's anti-West hostility seemed
far more implacable than that of Leonid
Brezhnev, his Soviet counterpart.
The sea change in U.S.-Chinese rela-
tions is neither miraculous nor mysteri.
ous. It marks the simple triumph of
understanding over ignorance. It's a
pragmatic recognition that even nations
separated by serious disagreements en-
joy some mutual interests.
In recent years, Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping has weaned his nation steadily
away from Marxist-Leninist dogma
while initiating a series of capitalist-
inspired economic moves. Yet Mr.
Deng's China remains among the world's
un amenta chaa es in Me nature =o
either. But regular parleys do rov e
opportunit es to promote mutually ne.
ficial efforts in trade. tec no o c
development, and nuclear non ro era- ;
tion. The also help avert t e misca cu
tions that may arise when lea ers
seeing to scern eac of er s ntentions
rely exclusively on terse iplomifi'c
notes and vague intelligence estimates. Sadly, neither the Administration nor
the public seem inclined to adopt such
common sense about the approaching
summit meeting between President
Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail
Gorbachev. Already fraught with unreal-
istic expectations, those talks seem
destined to be branded a failure if they
bequeath anything less dramatic than a
new nuclear-arms agreement.
It need not be thus. The low-profile
U.S.-Chinese meeting provides ample
evidence that ideological adversaries
have little to lose and much to gain by
talking regularly. With a little less
hoopla and a little more realism. U.S.-
Soviet relations also might escape their
zero-sum prison.
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ARTICLE ?IA^?I HERALD
SN PAG 28 June 1985
Heed Chamorro
A NY DISCUSSION of the legality -
or illegality - of American aid to
the Nicaraguan rebels is confusing
because what used to be legal has been
illegal for almost a year but is likely to
be legal again soon. Even in this context,
however, there is no excuse for the
Reagan Administration's helping to or-
ganize private American military and
humanitarian assistance to the rebels.
Congress made it plain in 1984 that it did
not want the United States providing
any type of assistance to the Nicaraguan
insurgents.
Both the House and the Senate have
enacted legislation permitting resump-
tion of humanitarian aid to the guerrillas
now. Even so. the 1984 prohibition is
still the law. That prohibition will
remain in effect until a congressional
conference committee irons out differ-
ences in the two bills and the President
signs the compromise measure.
The disclosure by former rebel leader
Edgar Chamorro that Administration
officials involved themselves directly in
coordinating and encouraging the pri-
vate aid is most disturbing. The pattern
is a recurring theme in the struggle
between the President and Congress on
who has the last word on what can, or
cannot, be done in Nicaragua.
Even in its early years, when the
On Nicaragua Aid
Administration legally could provide
~rec an m irec assistance e
insur ents, Administration officials
flouted the limits im ose on ress.
In fact, one of the reasons Con ress cut
off the aid was t o decision by the
entra Intelligence A enc to mine
Nicaraguan ports and to provide the
rebels manuals on how to "neutralize"
San inista o icia s.
The issue takes on new importance
now that both the houses of Congress
have approved nonmilitary aid to the
rebels. If Administration officials cir-
cumvented the will of Congress when all
assistance was prohibited, can anybody
trust them to maintain the distinction
between military and nonmilitary aid?
Congress should carefully review Mr.
Chamorro's allegations, detail the exact
nature of the Administration's violations,
and bring charges against any officials
implicated. The Administration must be
shown that it cannot violate Congress's
mandates with impunity. Otherwise, its
past transgressions suggest that those
violations will continue no matter what
the law says.
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MIAMI HERALD
2b March 1985
ARTICLE
ON PAGE
CIA as Benefactor
RARELY DO Americans get a favor-
able peek at the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA). When the
CIA does its job right, it is supposed to
go unnoticed. When things go wrong,
the resulting uproar eclipses public
appreciation for the agency's dual roles
of intelligence gathering and covert
activities.
As the veil lifted over drought-stricken
Africa this weekend, however, the CIA
emerged in the unaccustomed role of
humanitarian. About 800 Ethiopian
Jews, stranded in Sudanese refugee
camps and hostage to Arab-Israeli
enmity, were airlifted by U.S. planes to
Israel.
Secrecy was essential because Suda.
nese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry's na-
tion maintains an official state of war
with Israel. His government had stopped
an earlier Israeli rescue operation that
saved several thousands of Ethiopian
Jews. They had made their-way north
into the Sudan, fleeing starvation in their
parched homeland. The CIA had to fake
European destinations for the refugees in
order to achieve their departure.
This operation demonstrated American
principles at their best. Reportedly
negotiated directly by Vice President
George Bush, it applied the considerable
clout of U.S. economic aid to the Sudan
to press that government into accepting
the subterfuge. Then it used American
resources actually to fly the 800 Ethiopi-
an Jews to refuge in Israel, the only
nation in the region that welcomes them.
- Americans should make no secret of
their justifiable pride in this successful,
albeit surreptitious, humanitarian effort.
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: 2E
:11A.^:1 HERALD
30 December 1984
Get Smart, CIA
W ITH a sordid twist here and a
surreal turn there, the tale of the
CIA's primer on terrorism con-
tinues to unravel. CIA Director William
Casey and his subordinates have been at
pains to explain away the infamous
manual on guerilla warfare, prepared for
the edification of U.S.-backed rebels in
Nicaragua, ever since its existence
became public. Their performance so far
recalls the old Get Smart! routine in
which Agent 86, asked to account for his
latest miscue, tests a series of implausi-
ble excuses ("Would you believe. . ?")
before offering a credible explanation.
First came the denials, then the
protests that the manual's prescription
for "neutralizing" Nicaraguan officials
had been misinterpreted, then the disin-
genuous apologies for the excesses of
overzealous underlings. Would you be-
lieve Mr. Casey didn't ' know a thing
about it? The CIA's congressional over-
seers remained skeptical, as well they
should.
Now, in secret testimony before the
House Select Committee .on Intelligence,
CIA officials have offered yet another
version of the guerrilla-warfare manu-
al's origins. Acknowledging that the
contras have committed atrocities
against hundreds of Nicaraguan civil-
ians, the agency now insists that the
manual was intended to moderate the
rebels' behavior.
In recent weeks senior CIA officials,
rebel leaders, and private organizations
that monitor human-rights abuses in
Nicaragua have described rebel-instigat-
ed abuses as horrific as those committed
at My Lai. Their reports have included
accounts about groups of civilians,
including women and children, who
were raped, burned, dismembered, blind-
ed, or beheaded. One rebel official
testified that the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force, the largest rebel group, has,,
documented "several hundred cases" of
rebel atrocities against civilians.
Most observers perceive all this as
another CIA public-relations disaster and
a powerful argument against renewing,
American aid to the rebels. To the CIA's
twisted way of tt.inking, however, it's l
just another demo.zstration of the need
for continued U.S. support. Think the
guerrilla-warfare manual's prescription
for assassinating elected officials, black-
mailing ordinary citizens, and arranging
the "martyrdom" of fellow rebels is
rough stuff? the agency's argument runs.
Well, wait and see what the rebels do
when we're not there to moderate their
behavior!
What bilge! It may well be, 'as one
rebel leader candidly has acknowledged,
that "it is very difficult to control an
irregular army," and the Sandinistas
may well have committed acts equally as
heinous. But it's insane to imagine that
either side may hope to win the hearts
and minds of the Nicaraguan people
through a campaign of terror, however
well-disciplined.
The stabilization of Nicaragua can be
achieved only in negotiations. The
United States ought to expend more of
its energies on that front and less on
trying to refine murderous thugs into
disciplined terrorists.
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
Md,42'a .r._ ' D
10 December 1981.
Restrain Casey
O F COURSE the CIA's manual in-
structing guerrillas how to assassi-
nate Nicaraguan officials violated
Congress's ban against U.S. attempts to
overthrow the Sandinista regime. That
conclusion, now reached officially by the
House Intelligence Committee, is only
slightly gratifying, since it only' states
the obvious.
The committee concludes that the CIA
murder manual was the product of
"negligence" by senior CIA officials,
who should have prevented it but were
unaware of it. CIA Director William
Casey acknowledged as much. Having
concluded the obvious, the committee
now says that the matter is over.
It is not over, not by a long shot. As far
as this murder-manual imbroglio goes,
Mr. Casey should be held accountable; it
is yet another example of his negligence.
Last spring Mr. Casey neglected to
inform the Senate, as law requires, that
his agents were mining Nicaragua's
harbor. He got away with that too.
This murder-manual scandal is loathe-
some, but attention should not focus
excessively upon it. To focus on the
manual is to focus on the flea; attention
instead should dwell upon the dog - the
CIA's "covert" guerilla war against
Nicaragua.
On the same day that Congress
troubled itself with its dismissive report
about the murder manual, Mr. Casey's_
guerrillas ambushed a truck in, Nicara-
gua and killed 22 civilian coffee pickers.
This is now the favored tactic employed
by Mr. Casey's thousands of guerrillas in
their war against the Sandinistas. In an
effort to cripple Nicaragua's economy
further, they attack coffee farms and
trucks carrying humble coffee pickers.
They hope thereby to cause an uprising
that will topple the Sandinistas.
When leftist guerrillas employ such
economic warfare to try to topple El
Salvador's government, America con-
demns the immorality of the violence
and can't send enough millions to crush
the insurgents. Yet in Nicaragua the
CIA's rightist guerrillas do the same
thing. and Americans evidently are not
supposed to object.
Americans - particularly those in
Congress. = must object. The United
States is not at war with Nicaragua.
Congress ordered Mr. Casey not to try to
overthrow the Sandinista regime, yet his
contras clearly are trying. Nicaragua
alleges that 7,000 of its citizens have
been killed fighting the contras. If true,
that is a higher proportion of Nicara-
gua's population than America lost in
Vietnam.
If Nicaraguan exiles mount a war,
that's their business, but for America to
underwrite it and train their guerrillas is
immoral. Mr. Casey did that, a fact that
the manual merely underscores. He must
be restrained, and if he again breaks his
leash, Congress should do all in its
power to persuade the President to
remove him.
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