THE DIRECTOR: RUNNING THE C.I.A.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000200820001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP90-00845R000200820001-5
20 January 185
Director:*:'
Running
The.
The
- Ry Joseph Letyveld
OR THE CENTRAL
Intelligence Agency
and its frequently
embattled leader,
William J. Casey,_
the start of the sec-
ond Reagan Admin-
istration is more
than just the halfway mark in a mara-
thon. 'Ronald Reagan is the first
President in 12 years to take the oath
of office for a second time, but it has
been 16 years since a head of the
American intelligence community
last managed to continue in office
from one Presidential term to the
next. On the previous occasion, in
1963, Richard M. Nixon reluctantly
gave in to an argument that he should
retain Richard M. Helms as Director
of Central Intelligence in order to
saieguard the nonpartisan character
of the office. There have been five di-
rectors since, and Casey - whom no
one has ever called nonpartisan -
has now survived longest of them all.
This can be regarded as a footnote,
a fluke, or an indication that the
C.I.A. has essentially weathered the
investigations and strictures of the
1970's, that it has recovered much of
its old effectiveness and mystique.
The present director, who would natu-
Joseph Lelyveld is a staff writer for
this magazine.
rally favor the latter interpretation, I reliving his youth.
has tried to function as if it were so,
casting himself in the mold of Allen
W. Dulles and John A. McCune, who
flourished in the 1950's and early 60's,
before serious questions had been
raised, on either moral or pragmatic
grounds, about covert action. on a
global scale. Like them, rather than
like his immediate predecessors, he
has been recognized in Washington
and beyond for having ready access
to the President. Like them, he has
not hesitated to make his voice heard
at the White House on policy matters
as distinct from intelligence evalua-
tions. (Indeed, he might even be said
to have surpassed them in this re-
spect, for, serving a.President who
values the Cabinet as a forum, he has
managed to become the first Director
o~tral Intelligence ever .to sit at
the table as a participating Cabinet
member.) And like Dulles in particu-
lar - fondly, known to his subordi-
nates as "the great white case offi-
cer" because of his consuming pas-
sion for espionage and related games
- Mr. Casey is believed to have im-
mersed himself deeply in the day-to-
day management of clandestine
operations.
Yet for an assortment of reasons -.
some personal, others having to do
with changing times and changed ex-
pectations of a director - no one
would suggest that official Washing-
ton has learned to view William Casey
?Conservativemembers, who can be
nearly as harsh, tend to portray him
as the opposite of an activist director:
that is, as a captive of a Langley bu-
reaucracy whose major objective, it
is alleged, is to shield itself from con-
troversy. The two images overlap, in
that neither takes him very seriously
as an effective Director of Central In-
telligence or an influence an policy,
either broadly on matters of national
security or narrowly on matters spe-
cific to the intelligence community.
What is involved here is more than
a clash of perceptions about Casey. It
is also a clash of perceptions about
what a Director of Central Inter-
gence should be and, beyond that,
about how ready the United States
should be to intervene secretly -
politically and, especially, militarily
- in the affairs of other countries. On
both sides - those who think this di-
rector is too active and those who
think he is not nearly active enough -
there is a tendency to forget the fun-
damental insight that emerged from
the investigations of the 1970's: that
all directors, finally, are creatures of
the Presidents they serve. If Pre$i-
dents hear intelligence about the
world that conflicts with what they
would rather believe, they have the
option of setting it aside. But no direc-
tor can ignore the President's goals.
The different ways directors inter-
pret their jobs reflect differences
among the Presidents who picked
them.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP90-00845R000200820001-5