GEORGE MCGOVERN AND CIA ON RADIO SANDINO'S HIT PARADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 21, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11
CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190017-7
ARTICLE APPEARED
0K PAGE 3
WALL STREET JOURNAL
21 September 1984
George McGovern and CIA on Rai
Hit Parade
Throughout the rainy summer, Nicara-
uans and other Central Americans within
reach of Radio Sandino were treated to the
grotesque spectacle of prominent U.S.
American politicians testifying in praise
and support of Managua's Marxist-Leninist
comandantes.
Leading the usual flock of "progres-
sive" Democrats from Jesse Jackson to
Rep. James Shannon (D., Mass.) is the
former senator from South Dakota, George
McGovern. Reminiscing on the Sandin-
istas' airwaves that "our own country was
born in revolution," Mr. McGovern
The Americas
by H. Joachim Maitre
stressed that Nicaragua's ruling Ortega
brothers-Daniel and Humberto-had won
power after a popular revolution. Mr. Mc-
Govern concluded: "I am for them. I
would be dealing with them on a daily
basis if I were president."
Few Nicaraguans have grown accus-
tomed to the cacophony of dissent rushing
down from the U.S. and eagerly ampli-
fied by the Sandinista propaganda groups.
Fewer North Americans realize that parti-
san speeches, so blatantly rooted in igno-
rance of conditions in post-revolutionary
Nicaragua, deeply affect the morale of
those democrats within Nicaragua strug-
gling to survive. True, pro-Sandinista rhet-
oric is often judged and discounted as a by-
product of ruthless party politics up north.
But the lack of a clear-cut anti-Sandinista
policy in official Washington is seen and
feared as more damaging, because with
every passing day, U.S. irresolution con-
tributes to the weakening of opposition
forces and threatens to result in stabilizing
Nicaragua's dictatorship.
What' is Washington's strategy? Is it
aimed at coexistence with yet another to-
talitarian regime in the immediate neigh-
borhood? Or are the Sandinistas targeted
for abolition? What role is Nicaragua's
armed opposition to fill in Washington's
strategy?
Washington maintains that the Nicara-
guan rebels' efforts remain limited to the
objective of forcing Managua to stop its
arms shipments to the insurgents in El Sal-
vador. But are 15,000 armed men needed to
force Managua to stop its support of the
insurgency in El Salvador? And why
should thousands of Nicaraguan freedom
fighters, mislabeled "cortras," risk their
lives for the survival of freedom and de-
mocracy in neighboring El Salvador?
Among the rebels there is agreement
that the arms shipments to El Salvador
must stop, but that such shipments will
stop automatically once the Sandinistas
have been toppled. Said a rebel com-
mander fighting in northern Nicaragua:
"We are not fighting to stop the weapons.
We are fighting to liberate Nicaragua."
Washington has never openly advocated
that goal. In fact, one Washingtonian's
blunt assessment of the Nicaraguan rebels'
chances was broadcast over and over by
Radio Sandino:
there's no chance that they will be
able to overthrow the government. In the
resistance you have perhaps 15,000 men
with rifles scattered around the open, un-
populated parts of the country. They can't
go into the cities, which the government is
protecting with tanks, 75,000 men in the
army, the militia and the security forces.
This dilettantish assessment. which be-
trays a near-total innocence toward all tjg-
ores and method overning insurgencies,
_di rJox1n a_disg~uratle~IaJ~ t2
partment holdover from the Carter admin-
istration. It originated in the Central Intel-
director, Willtam CEisev, throuL),h an inter-
view with U.S. News and World Report
.JA r e b e l w
pI' 3).Dne r2g
STA
heard the CIA director's words over Radio
Sandino commented: "Do you know u?.)a
at
~t does to hear the head of the CIA deni-
grate our chances of success?' Bevond u~
setting the morale of rebel forces, Mr.
Casevs remarks com are in an e
rassing fashion with similar assessmnus
made in Washington of a group of insur-
gents operating in the Cuban cot~t tryside_
in the late 1950s.
Then, Fidel Castro's chances of over-
throwing the Batista dictatorship were also
judged slim or nonexistent-at first. But
eventually the tanks and artillery pieces at
Batista's disposal proved to be no match
for Castro's lightly armed men.
Early last winter and spring, the three
major Nicaraguan rebel forces had scored
an impressive string of military victories.
From the north, roughly 10,000 guerrillas
under the banner of the FDN (Democratic
Forces) were operating in a north-south
line through the center of the country, in
Jinotega, Matagalpa, Boaco and Chontales
provinces. They had effectively cut off the
country's strategic road to the Atlantic
Coast.
From the south, ARDE (Revolutionary
Democratic Alliance) had made inroads
and briefly occupied the garrison town of
San Juan del Norte. In the northeast, In-
dian warriors of the Miskito, Sumo and
Rama nations roamed at random. But the
CIA's bungling of the mining operations,
resulting in Conc-ress turning its back on
t 7reg. o~n iy tern )'x souihy stal1ecJ
the advance and bought tim_Q_foL,tlle dap.:
dinistas.
The setback forced the squabbling rebel
factions into political action aimed at
unity. On July 24, in Panama, ARDE and
FDN pledged, in part, the following:
? "To struggle united until our country,
oppressed by a Marxist-Leninist totalitar-
ian regime and occupied by foreign troops,
is freed... .
? "To install in Nicaragua a transition
government of national conciliation
Continued
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190017-7