WHAT'S BEHIND REAGAN STRATEGY IN NICARAGUA

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190020-3
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RIPPUB
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K
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4
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December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 28, 2010
Sequence Number: 
20
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Publication Date: 
April 23, 1984
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OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28: CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. (703) 351-7676 George V. Lauder Director, Public Affairs FCxecutive Fiec~~stry 85- 1934 6 May 1985 -~ ~~., Joe Fromm of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT has asked if you might be interested in doing another interview with them, similar to the one you did last year (copy attached). Again they will give you final approval of the text. Fromm says the new regime there is interested in meeting with you and that the interview would be followed by an off the record luncheon with chairman and editor-in-chief Mort Zuckerman and editor Shelby Coffey. Their schedule is flexible, but they'd like to do it within the next month. Accept interview with U.S. NEWS Decline interview Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28: CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 -T- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 r~'.'' --- -- -- ---- l;;ten~iew t~~itn V/illia,;~ C2sey, Director, Cent,~al Ir,telligenc V~'ashington's ultimate goal, the CIA chief contends, is heading off a massive refugee crisis on America's southern border. Q Mr. Casey, with so much attention 1o- cured right now on Nicaragua and the con- tras, can you give us your assessment of the impact of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas? A T'nev're creating a great deal of cii- array and pressure on the regime. They've damaged the economy. Daniel Ortega Saavedra [leader of the Sandinis- ta junta) said a couple of weeks ago that the contras have cost them about one third of their exports. The main impact, however, is to di- vert Sandinista leaders from supporting the insurgency in El Salvador and bring pressure on them to negotiate sensibly to a more peaceful situation in that EFL ~?hole area i ne}? aze perceived to be the ttueat to the peace by ail the surrounding countries becau_ce Nicaragua is the bzse for supporting insurgencies not only in E) Salvador but in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras as well. Q Wnlle the United States may want to pressure the Sandi- nistas to end support for Marxist guerrillas elsewhere, is that really the goal of the contras in Nicaragua? Aren't they bent on overthrowing the regime? ' A Tnose t'~ings are always mixed. They would like to unseat the regime. Tne question is: What is th'e U.S. govern- ment's purpose? After ali, in World Waz II ~ were helping the Communists, the Royalists, the Gaullists and everybody. They were all trying to get power. VGe didn't care about that; we just wanted to get help against the Nazis. It's sn analogous situation we have here. Our own national inter- ests need not be strictly tied to any one group's goals. Q What chance do the contras have of overthrowing the Sandinista regime? A I thin]: there's no chance that they will be able to overthroK~ the government In the resistance, you have, it is said, perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered around the open, unpopulated parts of the country, which is where guerrillas caa hide. They can't go into the cities, which the government is protecting with tanks and 75,000 men in the Army, the militia and the securit}? forces. So they're not going to overthrow that government It could be-but it's a very long shot and unlikely-that the government would dissolve because the people would get fed up and fall away from the regime. But it's hard to change a government that operates a system of control where everybody in every block is counted a-,d say strang- ers ~?ho show have to explain themselves. Q Whaf Is your response to published reports that the CIA was involved in the mining o1 the Nicaraguan ports? A 1 can't comment on such allegations. Q What about reports that the CIA is actively running this A 1 never comment on such reports. Q Are the Cubans still heavily in- volved in Nicaragua or have they reduced their presence there as some recent re- ports suggest? A ~'~'hile the Cubans have been tal]dng about )owerin? their presence, they've actually been moping in more people. The Cubans run the security ser~~ces that manage the block-popu- lation-control system. There are about 7,000 to 9,000 Cu- bans in ?~icaragua including 3,000 to 3,500 military advisers interh~ined with the Nicaraguan military. They ako have 5,000 to 6.000 teachers, construction and health workers u?ho are regularly taken back to Cubs on rotation. The replacements nor be- ing sent have had military training and are under 40. As we saw in Grenada, Cuban con- struction workers carry rifles as well a< shovels. There have been occasions where these Cuban construction workers joined in the fighting in Nie? azagua when contras tangled with the Nicaraguan military. - t1 is there any evidence that Cuba or the Soviet Union is ~eonverting Nicaragua into a kind of strategic base along lines you've warned about in the pastT A We were concerned about that because they were lengthening aimelds in Nicaragua to make them long enough to handle supersonic planes. And we ?mow, Nicara- guan fliers were going to Bulgaria, to the Soviet Union and Cuba to be trained. Now, that ha< continued. The ta-aining has been completed. We believe that MiG2:ss are in Cuba earmarked for Nicaragua and that Nicaraguan pilots are practicing in them. We believe the planes haven't been sent over to Nicaragua, because the}>'re concerned about our- response. Q How many Nicaraguan pilots have been trained? A We don't have an exact figure, but it's substantial- something like 40 pilots, enough to handle a souaaron of planes, which is what we think they have in Cuba One thing you've got to understand is that both the Soviets and the Cubans go to great lengths to keep their military support for Nicaragua quiet and ambiguous. The hea.ti? Soviet weapons come largely in Bulgarian and Alge- rian ships. Soviet and Cuban ships bring..jn the lighter stw's mv;ed with commercial cargo. We have intelligence that the Cubans in I~'icaragua shave their mustaches and hide their dog tags. Tney are mixed in vflth Nicaraguan units, not kept in separate Cubaa formations that could be identified. Q You mentioned that an oblectlve of the contras was to divert the Sandinistas from their support of the Marxist guerri}- tas in Et Salvador. Are they having an lmpacf on the flow of supplies to the Salvadoran rebels? A Oh, they certainly have had an impact, though it's hard to Quantify. To start oft vr-ith, the Nicazagvans have to use their weapons and ammunition to fight the contras instead of sending them to E) Salvador to fight the govern-, went. That's got to have an impact The supplies aze still coming in from Nicazagua, but we think it's in reduced CO;I~111U9~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 amounts. \'t'e l~o~? that the Nicaraguan government and the Arm}' are having to pay greater attention to dealing with the internal resists.-ice, ve to emerting revo ution. much less attention they can g' cific than that. But I can't be ~?ery much more ape Q It Nicaragua Is txing torcad to divert tts attention from EI Salvador, why do the ?arxist guerrillas In EI Saivsdor seem to have been gaining In rocent months? A Well, they might be doing better without that diver lion. \tie do kno~? that the Salvadoran guerrillas have been able to increase then numbers by training and, arming some of their support people. At the same tune, we have pram' good reporting that they're short of ammunition end they're short of funds and they're not as effective as they would be i{?~icaraguan support were ununpaired. Also, the Salvadoran Army has been getting more effec- tive. Before the period leading up to the elections, the Army had the guerrillas Pratt}' well broken up and pushed back into their bases in mountainous areas. Q How do you reconcile your Balm that tt-e Salvadoran Army ks getting better wtth the constant crttlclsm that tt's still too Incompetent to make headway against the guerr111as? A It has a lot of deficiencies but it is improving steadily through better training, better leadership, more-aggressive tactics and more-sustained operations. It needs more mobil- ity. It is not a perfect world, and there is still plenty of room for improvement. That can be said about any army. The main problem in El Salvador from the military stand' point is this: As a rule of thumb, ezpertr say that an army needs an 8 or 10 to 1 advantage to win a guerrilla w'ar' Look at the Nicaraguan Arm>' and militia 75,000 men under arms--and they are unable to cope with 15,000 contras. Now the ratio of the Salvadoran Army to the guerrillas is something like 4 to 1, and the guerrillas have a safe haven, a supp}v and a cominand-and-rontrol base right across the border in Nicaragua. Given that situation, the Salvadoran, ? Army is not doing badly' The only way you're going to resolve the conflict in F1 Salvador is if two things happen: You have to deprive the guerrillas of their safe haven and further reduce the flow of _,.,? .~ ~=~-~- an ~PoiRts tJEade~~,CiA ~c~~ctoc'~ . '.:._?Coriiroveray-aver ~stlning.~~'?People~~r :~'=` :;,d _$~~~p~5-afi.~siining~~Jicataguan`.tsarbors?~ ,~ ,...? :~f . another:Ltiba .:x> ? . .~grt_~}1@y_Sre ~6bOttt ~- - ~. i ._~L WRY ~.: ^~. -: - .,CerYlral ~rnerica- ~? :: : z; ,~'. "'*? ? ? .~ _: ~.- ? ;^:.ltrtpaet o4 cantras 1n Nlcsra9tls. Whle "lhey'w;rre- T Ong ~ Bit -deal ai ~~satsay.'and ~presstxe.:.on :2t-e :there's ;rb - c7tance -3hat Zhey "well .be `sble'to ., over>tuow ihe~ovemmer+t. ~ 1 ~~ ~, ~ _: ?Y"''~-^~- - ~uemlia ~peraborss ,Artrss ao -Satvador?an .~?ebels.?:: ~' _saga~nstt~T+caragua's. Sarid~nls~a-re9tme.:"certainy ;~+ave':.. ?;~: .t -of;ari .to::iJlerxss2 insuf-:;,~ -sn~iTipad~-flrl";flvw ?"Y`:' ~ v~- .r I - ~~61't~$.)irt ~ SatVOw~."~"' Sy~sa-*'~'-- 'i ` ~ ~- ".c het' ~ k- r.: ``" :iJS.~carice~ri about ~estti at~uad~s.. -The real issue ~is '. "^~,itiether.nta.primsrY-PufP~ +a -~ sstab{ish a better-''. ~.t soca`etYm~3 BatYedot 'ar*opratect the securrtytrtter - ? .?: esks~f:~tieiltiiied States:-?_s-*~" ~'~` a "'' -X " ~x s}- ;,: ~?"-ra~ Was: `Preva~-n9 _%>piri-~n is ~?iat in? ii''te~o?~g;s.? 'issue some:krlPoriani~dvantages" ftsaf , 'ftis~ranians ' ,?.f,, f~'~;rpl~a grave dangers~,for entire guK fegloR ., "`i'-?="`~ - ' tg~{ ~''lriteme8orta) cornmuni- !_ty,stsould isolate diplomaticatty-and impose sanctio?ss ~'~gainst countries sponsoring terrorism. ~. supplies end build up the Salvadoran Arm>' by :S Percent to 40 Percent to improve the ratio of Army to guerrillas. Q How do you handle the growing prosaun In Congnaa to cut oft military aid to EI Salvador H tha d?sath agwds contJnue to operate there? Why !s the Satvadoran government unwRling or unable to deal with the death squads? A I think it's a cultural problem. It's a violent society like most of the societies down there. Everybod}? talks about the right-v,?ing death squads. During recent months, most of the assassination victims have been supporters of the Ro- berto D'Aubuisson movemenua e ~eallee n~h~t "'>n8h~ there are left-vvir-g death sq gu P intimidation, and the}' slaughter people as they did in Viet- nam. It's a civil war. And the}' also have this special kind of free-lance, nongovernmental death squad that practices re- venge. That works both ways right across the society. Besides that, the judicial s}?stem in El Salvador leaves much to be desired. They have a hard time getting any convictions. But basically what we're talking about is whether our primary Purpose is to establish a better society in El Salvador, which isn't likely to happen quickly under present circumstances, or to protect the security interests of the United States and give Salvadoran democracy a chance to develop. Q Are you worried that Central America will become a major Iswe In the political campaign and undermine popular wpport i for the administration's strategy them? ~ A I think that people in the long run are less concerned about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors than they are about the danger of creating a wave of immigration into this country if Central America or any part of it should fall under Soviet-Cuban domination. If we have another Cuba in Central America, Mexico will have a big pr aUlonm. The we're going to have a massive wave of immigr effort to prevent this from happening is not going to excite Americans as much as the threat they would face if things go wrong. Also, I think people are concerned about the military danger. If the Communists solidify their hold on Nicaragua, the other countries down there would have to accommo- date in some vay. The Communists would nett be looking at Mex;co, to find problems that they specialize in exploit- ing. So what you're looking at for your children and your grandchildren is a long-term prospect of a hundred million hostile people immediately south of our border if we fail to give democracy a chance to develop in Central America. Q To tum to the other spot that worties Americana-the IAlddie East What Is the likelihood of an Iranian victory In the war wtth Irag4 A The Iraqis should be able to stave off this current offensive because they have ~wea. B t the Iranians have power and artillery and tank po the numbers; they have the staving power; they've got the economic resources' The Iraqis are motion ~ zeli oous cally. Thev've also got a big Shia Po~on is that in th o ag ties to Iran. I think the Prevailing op' run the Iranians have some important advantages. Q What dangers might the United State: tape K Iran doss win? A If Iran prevails and a radical Shute regime is estab- lished in Baghdad similar to the Khomeini regime in Tehe- ran, there are a lot of people they could turn loose against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, which have avp- ported Iraq' The Iranians are in a vengeful frame of mind. We have seen what they canes Kuwait andithe Marinte barracks fn American Embassy le from those gulf states to Beirut. They are taking PeoP camps in Teheran foi terrorist training and sendinst them Contintn~d Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3 3. back. So already the}' have a preth~ potent sub~~ersive poten? tia] in those small countries. Q K'h2t would the United States do if Iran moved against these oil states in the gulf region? A I can't speculate on that. The li.S. government said that we would keep the Strait of Hor- muz open. As to something hap- pening in one or another of these countries around the gulf, any re- action, I .vould suppose, would depend upon the circumstances at the tune. Q That brings up the problem of state-sponsored terrorism that Sec- retary of State Shultz has been talk- ing about: What can the United States do to counter terrorism sponsored by Iran and other gov- ernments-assassinate their peo- ple, bomb their capitals or what? A Don't put words in my mouth. As Secretary Shultz said, we're dealing with a new phe- nomenon in state-sponsored ter- rorism~a new weapons system that obliterates the distinction between peace and war. The Iranians use their diplomatic facilities as a platform to make revolutionary guards, communications facilities and money available for terrorist planning and action. They've attacked us twice in Beirut-the American Embas- sy and the Marine barracks. They turn up in many coun- tries in Africa, Asia and Europe, and we aze likely to see ' them here. They send their missionaries across the whole Moslem world, from Morocco to Malaysia and Indonesia, preaching Khomeini's brand of radical religious-social gos- pel. It's a force that we're going to have to reckon with in many dimensions. t1 but what can you do about it? Do you getinto the business of assassinating terrorist leaders? ~ A We don't engage in assassinations. We have to depend on a combination of strong security measures and interna- tional cooperation to deter and defeat terrorism. . Let's look at the problem of state-sponsored terrorism'- and international terrorism in a little more detail. There aze more than 50 major terrorist organizations, and hun- dreds of mom and pop shops-little groups that take on operations for hire. We can count scores of terrorist-train- ing camps in Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Romania, Cuba and other bloc countries. Now, there are several things you can do to cope with this ]dnd of terrorism. You can handle it by defending yourself, defending potential targets. That's pretty. tough because you haven't got enough policemen to protect ev- ery- target and you don't know where they're going to hit So we are engaged in helping security organizations in a great many countries to improve their training and opera- tional proficiency. These countries have their own .intelli- gence capabilities to watch the terrorists. They're apt to be better at it than we are because they've got to live with them all the time and they're closer to them. A qualified antiterrorist nehvork has -developed through the liaison relationship between intelligence and security organiza- tions. It is being improved by intensified intelligence ex- changes and by training and other forms of assistance. On top of that, there's a question of deterring terrorism sponsoring terrorism have got to know it's going to happen quick- ly and with certainty. Now, there's a third way to handle state-sponsored terrorism which, in my view, needs to be developed faster. by sending the message that if the terrorists attack there will be retaliation. lt's not necessarily a matter of striking back directly at the terrorists. The Israelis, for ex- ample, send the message: "If we're hit from your territory, that's your responsibilit}' and we're going to kick you in the teeth somehow." I thin]: you will see more of that-retaliation against facilities connected with the country sponsoring the ter- rorists or retaliation that just hurts the interests of countries v~hich sponsor terrorism. Some people say that you've ,got to find out who the terrorists are and make sure you hit the people who hit you. Well, usually that means you're not going to do it at all. If retaliation is going to be a deterrent, the countries Q What's that alternative way? A That's a kind of international, diplomatic counterof- fensive against international terrorism. In effect, it would apply a modern version of the 18th-century international law on piracy that charged every nation with responsibility for picking up pirates and putting tbem away where they could do no more harm. It's a little hard to get acceptance of that in today's world, and I'm not quite sure just how' you would implement it. But nations could join together to invoke economic sanc- tions against and isolate diplomatically countries, such as Iran and Libya, that practice terrorism as a matter of state policy. They could collaborate more intensively on the screening and surveillance at entry and departure points of travelers and visitors suspected of terrorist connections. They could agree to respond more quickly and surely to reouests from other countries for extradition and assistance. So there are three ways you can deal with state-spon- sored terrorism short of sending out hit squads. You can defend, you can retaliate and you can impose international barriers and sanctions of a nonviolent nature. Q If we can turn finally to the Soviet Union: What, as you see It, has been the effect of the change In leadership there trom Andropov to Chernenkol A Minimal. Chernenko is clearly a transitional leader, but nobody knows whether he's going to be around six months, two yeazs or five years, and it doesn't make much difference. We predicted that China's T?4ao Ise-tong would die 20 times before they finally buried him. So we are very shy about predicting how long Chernenko will last. My view is that under the So~~et system today ever}rthing is worked out in a collegial way. Certainly with this kind of short-term leader, no one man is going to have the power to make a drastic change of direction. And there's no reason to assume that when Chernenko goes, the situation will change. What you've got in the So~~et Union is a generation of septuagenarians Who are reluctant to forfeit their perqui- sites by passing power. to a younger generation. They're intent on hanging on to power. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/28 :CIA-RDP90-008458000201190020-3