WHAT'S BEHIND REAGAN STRATEGY IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 23, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
FCxecutive Fiec~~stry
85- 1934
6 May 1985
-~ ~~.,
Joe Fromm of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT has
asked if you might be interested in doing another
interview with them, similar to the one you did
last year (copy attached). Again they will give
you final approval of the text.
Fromm says the new regime there is
interested in meeting with you and that the
interview would be followed by an off the record
luncheon with chairman and editor-in-chief Mort
Zuckerman and editor Shelby Coffey. Their
schedule is flexible, but they'd like to do it
within the next month.
Accept interview with U.S. NEWS
Decline interview
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r~'.'' --- -- -- ----
l;;ten~iew t~~itn V/illia,;~ C2sey, Director, Cent,~al Ir,telligenc
V~'ashington's ultimate goal, the
CIA chief contends, is heading
off a massive refugee crisis on
America's southern border.
Q Mr. Casey, with so much attention 1o-
cured right now on Nicaragua and the con-
tras, can you give us your assessment of
the impact of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas?
A T'nev're creating a great deal of cii-
array and pressure on the regime.
They've damaged the economy. Daniel
Ortega Saavedra [leader of the Sandinis-
ta junta) said a couple of weeks ago that
the contras have cost them about one
third of their exports.
The main impact, however, is to di-
vert Sandinista leaders from supporting
the insurgency in El Salvador and bring
pressure on them to negotiate sensibly
to a more peaceful situation in that
EFL
~?hole area i ne}? aze perceived to be
the ttueat to the peace by ail the surrounding countries
becau_ce Nicaragua is the bzse for supporting insurgencies
not only in E) Salvador but in Costa Rica, Guatemala and
Honduras as well.
Q Wnlle the United States may want to pressure the Sandi-
nistas to end support for Marxist guerrillas elsewhere, is that
really the goal of the contras in Nicaragua? Aren't they bent on
overthrowing the regime? '
A Tnose t'~ings are always mixed. They would like to
unseat the regime. Tne question is: What is th'e U.S. govern-
ment's purpose? After ali, in World Waz II ~ were helping
the Communists, the Royalists, the Gaullists and everybody.
They were all trying to get power. VGe didn't care about
that; we just wanted to get help against the Nazis. It's sn
analogous situation we have here. Our own national inter-
ests need not be strictly tied to any one group's goals.
Q What chance do the contras have of overthrowing the
Sandinista regime?
A I thin]: there's no chance that they will be able to
overthroK~ the government In the resistance, you have, it is
said, perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered around the
open, unpopulated parts of the country, which is where
guerrillas caa hide. They can't go into the cities, which the
government is protecting with tanks and 75,000 men in the
Army, the militia and the securit}? forces. So they're not
going to overthrow that government
It could be-but it's a very long shot and unlikely-that
the government would dissolve because the people would
get fed up and fall away from the regime. But it's hard to
change a government that operates a system of control
where everybody in every block is counted a-,d say strang-
ers ~?ho show have to explain themselves.
Q Whaf Is your response to published reports that the CIA
was involved in the mining o1 the Nicaraguan ports?
A 1 can't comment on such allegations.
Q What about reports that the CIA is actively running this
A 1 never comment on such reports.
Q Are the Cubans still heavily in-
volved in Nicaragua or have they reduced
their presence there as some recent re-
ports suggest?
A ~'~'hile the Cubans have been
tal]dng about )owerin? their presence,
they've actually been moping in more
people. The Cubans run the security
ser~~ces that manage the block-popu-
lation-control system.
There are about 7,000 to 9,000 Cu-
bans in ?~icaragua including 3,000 to
3,500 military advisers interh~ined
with the Nicaraguan military. They
ako have 5,000 to 6.000 teachers,
construction and health workers u?ho
are regularly taken back to Cubs on
rotation. The replacements nor be-
ing sent have had military training
and are under 40.
As we saw in Grenada, Cuban con-
struction workers carry rifles as well
a< shovels. There have been occasions
where these Cuban construction
workers joined in the fighting in Nie?
azagua when contras tangled with the
Nicaraguan military.
- t1 is there any evidence that Cuba or
the Soviet Union is ~eonverting Nicaragua into a kind of strategic
base along lines you've warned about in the pastT
A We were concerned about that because they were
lengthening aimelds in Nicaragua to make them long
enough to handle supersonic planes. And we ?mow, Nicara-
guan fliers were going to Bulgaria, to the Soviet Union and
Cuba to be trained. Now, that ha< continued. The ta-aining
has been completed. We believe that MiG2:ss are in Cuba
earmarked for Nicaragua and that Nicaraguan pilots are
practicing in them. We believe the planes haven't been
sent over to Nicaragua, because the}>'re concerned about
our- response.
Q How many Nicaraguan pilots have been trained?
A We don't have an exact figure, but it's substantial-
something like 40 pilots, enough to handle a souaaron of
planes, which is what we think they have in Cuba
One thing you've got to understand is that both the
Soviets and the Cubans go to great lengths to keep their
military support for Nicaragua quiet and ambiguous. The
hea.ti? Soviet weapons come largely in Bulgarian and Alge-
rian ships. Soviet and Cuban ships bring..jn the lighter stw's
mv;ed with commercial cargo. We have intelligence that
the Cubans in I~'icaragua shave their mustaches and hide
their dog tags. Tney are mixed in vflth Nicaraguan units,
not kept in separate Cubaa formations that could be
identified.
Q You mentioned that an oblectlve of the contras was to
divert the Sandinistas from their support of the Marxist guerri}-
tas in Et Salvador. Are they having an lmpacf on the flow of
supplies to the Salvadoran rebels?
A Oh, they certainly have had an impact, though it's
hard to Quantify. To start oft vr-ith, the Nicazagvans have to
use their weapons and ammunition to fight the contras
instead of sending them to E) Salvador to fight the govern-,
went. That's got to have an impact The supplies aze still
coming in from Nicazagua, but we think it's in reduced
CO;I~111U9~
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amounts. \'t'e l~o~? that the Nicaraguan government and
the Arm}' are having to pay greater attention to dealing
with the internal resists.-ice, ve to emerting revo ution.
much less attention they can g' cific than that.
But I can't be ~?ery much more ape
Q It Nicaragua Is txing torcad to divert tts attention from EI
Salvador, why do the ?arxist guerrillas In EI Saivsdor seem to
have been gaining In rocent months?
A Well, they might be doing better without that diver
lion. \tie do kno~? that the Salvadoran guerrillas have been
able to increase then numbers by training and, arming
some of their support people. At the same tune, we have
pram' good reporting that they're short of ammunition end
they're short of funds and they're not as effective as they
would be i{?~icaraguan support were ununpaired.
Also, the Salvadoran Army has been getting more effec-
tive. Before the period leading up to the elections, the
Army had the guerrillas Pratt}' well broken up and pushed
back into their bases in mountainous areas.
Q How do you reconcile your Balm that tt-e Salvadoran Army
ks getting better wtth the constant crttlclsm that tt's still too
Incompetent to make headway against the guerr111as?
A It has a lot of deficiencies but it is improving steadily
through better training, better leadership, more-aggressive
tactics and more-sustained operations. It needs more mobil-
ity. It is not a perfect world, and there is still plenty of room
for improvement. That can be said about any army.
The main problem in El Salvador from the military stand'
point is this: As a rule of thumb, ezpertr say that an army
needs an 8 or 10 to 1 advantage to win a guerrilla w'ar' Look
at the Nicaraguan Arm>' and militia 75,000 men under
arms--and they are unable to cope with 15,000 contras.
Now the ratio of the Salvadoran Army to the guerrillas is
something like 4 to 1, and the guerrillas have a safe haven, a
supp}v and a cominand-and-rontrol base right across the
border in Nicaragua. Given that situation, the Salvadoran, ?
Army is not doing badly'
The only way you're going to resolve the conflict in F1
Salvador is if two things happen: You have to deprive the
guerrillas of their safe haven and further reduce the flow of
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'issue some:krlPoriani~dvantages" ftsaf ,
'ftis~ranians ' ,?.f,,
f~'~;rpl~a grave dangers~,for entire guK fegloR .,
"`i'-?="`~ - ' tg~{ ~''lriteme8orta) cornmuni-
!_ty,stsould isolate diplomaticatty-and impose sanctio?ss
~'~gainst countries sponsoring terrorism.
~.
supplies end build up the Salvadoran Arm>' by :S Percent
to 40 Percent to improve the ratio of Army to guerrillas.
Q How do you handle the growing prosaun In Congnaa to
cut oft military aid to EI Salvador H tha d?sath agwds contJnue to
operate there? Why !s the Satvadoran government unwRling or
unable to deal with the death squads?
A I think it's a cultural problem. It's a violent society like
most of the societies down there. Everybod}? talks about the
right-v,?ing death squads. During recent months, most of
the assassination victims have been supporters of the Ro-
berto D'Aubuisson movemenua e ~eallee n~h~t "'>n8h~
there are left-vvir-g death sq gu P
intimidation, and the}' slaughter people as they did in Viet-
nam. It's a civil war. And the}' also have this special kind of
free-lance, nongovernmental death squad that practices re-
venge. That works both ways right across the society.
Besides that, the judicial s}?stem in El Salvador leaves
much to be desired. They have a hard time getting any
convictions. But basically what we're talking about is
whether our primary Purpose is to establish a better society
in El Salvador, which isn't likely to happen quickly under
present circumstances, or to protect the security interests
of the United States and give Salvadoran democracy a
chance to develop.
Q Are you worried that Central America will become a major
Iswe In the political campaign and undermine popular wpport i
for the administration's strategy them? ~
A I think that people in the long run are less concerned
about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors than they are
about the danger of creating a wave of immigration into
this country if Central America or any part of it should fall
under Soviet-Cuban domination. If we have another Cuba
in Central America, Mexico will have a big pr aUlonm. The
we're going to have a massive wave of immigr
effort to prevent this from happening is not going to excite
Americans as much as the threat they would face if things
go wrong.
Also, I think people are concerned about the military
danger. If the Communists solidify their hold on Nicaragua,
the other countries down there would have to accommo-
date in some vay. The Communists would nett be looking
at Mex;co, to find problems that they specialize in exploit-
ing. So what you're looking at for your children and your
grandchildren is a long-term prospect of a hundred million
hostile people immediately south of our border if we fail to
give democracy a chance to develop in Central America.
Q To tum to the other spot that worties Americana-the
IAlddie East What Is the likelihood of an Iranian victory In the
war wtth Irag4
A The Iraqis should be able to stave off this current
offensive because they have ~wea. B t the Iranians have
power and artillery and tank po
the numbers; they have the staving power; they've got the
economic resources' The Iraqis are motion ~ zeli oous
cally. Thev've also got a big Shia Po~on is that in th o ag
ties to Iran. I think the Prevailing op'
run the Iranians have some important advantages.
Q What dangers might the United State: tape K Iran doss
win?
A If Iran prevails and a radical Shute regime is estab-
lished in Baghdad similar to the Khomeini regime in Tehe-
ran, there are a lot of people they could turn loose against
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, which have avp-
ported Iraq'
The Iranians are in a vengeful frame of mind. We have
seen what they canes Kuwait andithe Marinte barracks fn
American Embassy le from those gulf states to
Beirut. They are taking PeoP
camps in Teheran foi terrorist training and sendinst them
Contintn~d
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3.
back. So already the}' have a
preth~ potent sub~~ersive poten?
tia] in those small countries.
Q K'h2t would the United States
do if Iran moved against these oil
states in the gulf region?
A I can't speculate on that.
The li.S. government said that
we would keep the Strait of Hor-
muz open. As to something hap-
pening in one or another of these
countries around the gulf, any re-
action, I .vould suppose, would
depend upon the circumstances
at the tune.
Q That brings up the problem of
state-sponsored terrorism that Sec-
retary of State Shultz has been talk-
ing about: What can the United
States do to counter terrorism
sponsored by Iran and other gov-
ernments-assassinate their peo-
ple, bomb their capitals or what?
A Don't put words in my
mouth. As Secretary Shultz said,
we're dealing with a new phe-
nomenon in state-sponsored ter-
rorism~a new weapons system
that obliterates the distinction
between peace and war.
The Iranians use their diplomatic facilities as a platform
to make revolutionary guards, communications facilities
and money available for terrorist planning and action.
They've attacked us twice in Beirut-the American Embas-
sy and the Marine barracks. They turn up in many coun-
tries in Africa, Asia and Europe, and we aze likely to see '
them here. They send their missionaries across the whole
Moslem world, from Morocco to Malaysia and Indonesia,
preaching Khomeini's brand of radical religious-social gos-
pel. It's a force that we're going to have to reckon with in
many dimensions.
t1 but what can you do about it? Do you getinto the business
of assassinating terrorist leaders? ~
A We don't engage in assassinations. We have to depend
on a combination of strong security measures and interna-
tional cooperation to deter and defeat terrorism. .
Let's look at the problem of state-sponsored terrorism'-
and international terrorism in a little more detail. There
aze more than 50 major terrorist organizations, and hun-
dreds of mom and pop shops-little groups that take on
operations for hire. We can count scores of terrorist-train-
ing camps in Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Bulgaria, the
Soviet Union, Romania, Cuba and other bloc countries.
Now, there are several things you can do to cope with
this ]dnd of terrorism. You can handle it by defending
yourself, defending potential targets. That's pretty. tough
because you haven't got enough policemen to protect ev-
ery- target and you don't know where they're going to hit
So we are engaged in helping security organizations in a
great many countries to improve their training and opera-
tional proficiency. These countries have their own .intelli-
gence capabilities to watch the terrorists. They're apt to be
better at it than we are because they've got to live with
them all the time and they're closer to them. A qualified
antiterrorist nehvork has -developed through the liaison
relationship between intelligence and security organiza-
tions. It is being improved by intensified intelligence ex-
changes and by training and other forms of assistance.
On top of that, there's a question of deterring terrorism
sponsoring terrorism have got to
know it's going to happen quick-
ly and with certainty.
Now, there's a third way to
handle state-sponsored terrorism
which, in my view, needs to be
developed faster.
by sending the message that if
the terrorists attack there will be
retaliation. lt's not necessarily a
matter of striking back directly at
the terrorists. The Israelis, for ex-
ample, send the message: "If
we're hit from your territory,
that's your responsibilit}' and
we're going to kick you in the
teeth somehow." I thin]: you will
see more of that-retaliation
against facilities connected with
the country sponsoring the ter-
rorists or retaliation that just
hurts the interests of countries
v~hich sponsor terrorism.
Some people say that you've
,got to find out who the terrorists
are and make sure you hit the
people who hit you. Well, usually
that means you're not going to do
it at all. If retaliation is going to
be a deterrent, the countries
Q What's that alternative way?
A That's a kind of international, diplomatic counterof-
fensive against international terrorism. In effect, it would
apply a modern version of the 18th-century international
law on piracy that charged every nation with responsibility
for picking up pirates and putting tbem away where they
could do no more harm. It's a little hard to get acceptance
of that in today's world, and I'm not quite sure just how' you
would implement it.
But nations could join together to invoke economic sanc-
tions against and isolate diplomatically countries, such as
Iran and Libya, that practice terrorism as a matter of state
policy. They could collaborate more intensively on the
screening and surveillance at entry and departure points of
travelers and visitors suspected of terrorist connections.
They could agree to respond more quickly and surely to
reouests from other countries for extradition and assistance.
So there are three ways you can deal with state-spon-
sored terrorism short of sending out hit squads. You can
defend, you can retaliate and you can impose international
barriers and sanctions of a nonviolent nature.
Q If we can turn finally to the Soviet Union: What, as you see
It, has been the effect of the change In leadership there trom
Andropov to Chernenkol
A Minimal. Chernenko is clearly a transitional leader,
but nobody knows whether he's going to be around six
months, two yeazs or five years, and it doesn't make much
difference. We predicted that China's T?4ao Ise-tong would
die 20 times before they finally buried him. So we are very
shy about predicting how long Chernenko will last.
My view is that under the So~~et system today ever}rthing
is worked out in a collegial way. Certainly with this kind of
short-term leader, no one man is going to have the power
to make a drastic change of direction. And there's no reason
to assume that when Chernenko goes, the situation will
change. What you've got in the So~~et Union is a generation
of septuagenarians Who are reluctant to forfeit their perqui-
sites by passing power. to a younger generation. They're
intent on hanging on to power.
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