USUALLY WHEN CIA ANALYSIS IS REPORTED INACCURATELY, WE MUST SUFFER IN SILENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 18, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-
Central Intelligence Agency
18 November 1983
TO: The Editor,
The Washington Post
Usually when CIA analysis is reported inaccurately, we must
suffer in silence. However, in the case of Stephen Rosenfeld's
November 18 column "Knockdown of a Soviet Buildup," because we
prepared an unclassified version of our work on trends in Soviet
defense spending for the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress, I am able to put in proper perspective Mr. Rosenfeld's
account of our analysis.
He suggests that our analysis of the Soviet defense effort
portrays "a steady Soviet performance at a relatively low level"
and that the Soviets used detente "to give themselves something
of a breather."A balanced examination of our testimony conveys no
such message.
We stated explicitly to the Committee that "our latest
comparisons of US and Soviet defense programs show that despite
somewhat slower growth in recent years the costs of Soviet
defense activities still exceed those of the United States by a
large margin. In 1981 the dollar costs of Soviet defense
activities were 45 percent greater than US outlays; procurement
costs alone were also 45 percent larger." Moreover, the
Committee was reminded that the Soviet defense effort still is
running between 13 and 14 percent of GNP -- that is, over twice
the percentage of GNP devoted to defense spending in the United
States.
We also stressed to the Committee that "trends in Soviet
military spending are not a sufficient basis to form judgments
about Soviet military capabilities, which are a complex function
of weapons stocks, doctrine, training, generalship, and other
factors important in a potential conflict. The cost estimates
are best used to identify shifts in priorities and trends in
resource commitments to military programs over an extended period
of time. Moreover, the spending estimates do not give an
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appreciation of the large stocks of strategic and conventional
weapon systems already deployed. Indeed, current levels of
spending are so high that despite the procurement plateau noted,
the Soviet forces have received since 1975 about 2,000 ICBMs and
SLBMs, over 5,000 tactical combat and interceptor aircraft,
15,000 tanks and substantial numbers of major surface combatants,
SSBNs, and attack submarines."
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Soviet efforts to
develop advanced weapon systems continue in the eighties at least
at the rapid pace of the previous two decades. Among these are
fighter and airborne control aircraft, ballistic and cruise
missiles, space systems and submarines. The new systems cover
the full range of technologically advanced weaponry the Soviets
will need to modernize all major forces.
In sum, Mr. Rosenfeld's description of our analysis does not
provide a balanced account of our testimony to the JEC. Our
costing of the Soviet defense effort is very complex and
susceptible to misrepresentation and misuse. Those who over-
simplify or cite out of context our work in this important area
do not contribute to needed public understanding of these
issues. They also do an injustice to the professional,
independent analysts in all of the agencies of the Intelligence
Community working to broaden our knowledge and understanding of
the Soviet defense effort.
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs Office
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00845R000201250017-0