AFGHAN REBEL AID ENRICHES GENERALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST A -r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/05: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110017-4
WASHINGTON POST
ARTICLE APPEARED 8 May 1987
ON PAG
J' [JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA
Afghan Rebel Aid Enriches Generals
T he Central Intelligence Agency has'spent $3
billion on arms for Afghan rebels,,.--half of it
put up by U.S. taxpayers. Yet not a single
American decides who gets the weapons.
The CIA leaves those decisions to a secret
five-member directorate of top Pakistani officials,
who have their own agenda. This means the CIA's
largest covert aid program since Vietnam has made
rich sugar daddies out of Pakistani generals.
From our investigation, which included a trip by
Dale Van Atta to Pakistan, we have found that the
CIA's secret arms pipeline to the mujaheddin is
riddled with opportunities for corruption. The
losers are the poorly equipped guerrillas fighting
the Soviets in Afghanistan and the American people
whose congressional representatives have been
betrayed by the CIA.
Here's how the Pakistani portion of the pipeline
works:
The CIA purchases Soviet-designed weapons
primarily from Egypt and the People's Republic of
China. Some Chinese weapons are shipped in
convoys along Karakoram Highway, a rugged road
cut through high mountains into Pakistan. But most
come to the country's southern port, Karachi.
There customs agents look the other way as the
shipments-labeled as food, engineering parts and
such-are loaded on trucks and trains headed to
distribution warehouses in Peshawar and Quetta.
The CIA's orders are unequivocal: No CIA
official is to have direct contact with the
mujaheddin, except to train them on U.S. Stinger
antiaircraft missiles. Because the Pakistanis risk
retaliation from the Soviet Union, the CIA lets
them decide which competing rebel factions get
what weapons.
For several years, those decisions were made by
a five-member committee including Maj. Gen.
Akhtar Abdul Rahman, head of military intelligence;
Gen. Rahimuddin, chairman' of the Pakistani joint
chiefs of staff; Gen. Fazal Haq, the former governor
of Peshawar, and Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan.
(Haq and Rahimuddin recently retired; Rahman was
recently made vice chief of the Army staff.)
Once the arms are assigned, 200 troops and 11
officers under the orders of Brig. Gens. Reza and
Youssef distribute them. Youssef, who has a
reputation for integrity, has attempted not only to
give the most deserving rebel groups the right
arms but to help the mujaheddin plan battles. But
he is an exception.
Intelligence sources (including CIA officials) and
Pakistani sources charge that some Pakistani
soldiers have become rich in the process.
Another intelligence source, however, maintains
that the Pakistanis "are good soldiers, and they want
to help .... They really want to win this war."
The Pakistani generals also transfer intelligence
packets the CIA gathers for the mujaheddin. The
mujaheddin have privately complained that the
packets are usually opened by Pakistani officials
before they receive them-which suggests
information may be compromised.
Still, one source intimate with the entire
operation concluded-as we have in previous
columns-that "the opportunities for diversion and
corruption are far greater before the arms get to
Karachi than after."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/05: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110017-4