A MOUSE THAT WANTED TO ROAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110044-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: December 7, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110044-4
F1 "Ira WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1986
4 F.
Lr
Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta FILE +
Y
A rouse That
Wanted to Roar
Congressional investigators conducting the au-
topsy of "ident Reagan's Iranian/Nicaraguan
misadventii a began with the assumption that the
National Security Council was a rogue elephant
crashing out of control through the foreign policy
jungle. Their preliminary conclusion, however, is
that the NSC was nothing but a rogue mouse.
According to this view, the NSC has become a
nest of second-raters who deluded themselves
into thinking they still had the clout their prede-
cessors enjoyed under Henry Kissinger and Zbig-
niew Brzezi ski- So they embarked on a hare-
brained,,foredoomed escapade that even such a
master of 'intrigue and manipulation as Henry
Kissinger cdilldn't have brought off-and would
not have attrsjtnpted in the first place.
Unlike ttW'classical Greek tragedies, this was
not a case ofgreat and powerful men betrayed by
hubris, but `of ambitious little men betrayed by
their orvn mediocrity. The plot and the cast of
characters suggested farce, but the resulting
production was a tragicomedy with grave conse-
quences for the Reagan administration and the
United States.
As explained to our associate Lucette Lagnado
by experts inside and outside the government,
the stage was set for the NSC's pratfall not this
year or last, but in 1981 when Reagan first took
office.
The new president was determined to avoid
the bad press that previous administrations had
suffered because of the constant feuding between
the NSC and the State Department. The way to
do this, Reagan decided, was to appoint Richard
Allen as his national security adviser and Gen.
Alexander Haig-as secretary of state. Allen was
not the man to challenge the formidable Haig,
Reagan's self-proclaimed foreign policy 'vicar."
Those who were at the NSC in those days still
recall the resentment over their subordinate
they were The
to steal the show from the State
Department. It was made dear to them that their
agency was to be merely a clearinghouse for
Policy ideas, a coordinating agency to expedite
communications among the policy-making and
operational departments.
The NSC's humiliating role as water boy for
the real foreign-policy players was formalized in
National Security Decision Directive No. 2, pre-
pared during Allen's tenure though actually is-
sued by his successor, William Clark.
The NSC's morale revived under Clark, whose
arrival was greeted with misgivings by the pro-
fessionals. Though a foreign policy novice, he
proved to be a strong leader, he also had a close
relationship with the president. Clark stood up to
the State Department and demanded-and
got-the removal of-Thomas Enders, the assist-
ant secretary for Latin American policy.
But any dreams of revived power were shat-
tered when Clark was replaced by Robert (Bud)
McFarlane. "He was over his head in the job,"
recalled one source. "He was dry and military,"
said another.
According to these and other sources, McFar-
lane felt threatened by strategic deep-thinkers
and conservative ideologues, whom he conscien-
tiously weeded out of the agency. Though this
made McFarlane popular with Foggy Bottom and
the media, critics say it deprived the NSC of its
intellectual heavyweights and put bureaucrats
and military types in control.
"Bud's inclination was to rely on the Foreign
Service, th CIA an the career mditary~one
The process of freezing out intellectuals and
ideologues expanded under Adm. John Poindex-
ter, who, predictably, favored military people in
key positions.
Congressional foreign policy specialists are
nnenly contemptuous of the present NSC staff.
'There are no thinkers there," complained one,
only people capable of shuffling papers." Another
Senate source-a Democrat-said "Kissinger's
outfit looks really good" compared with the NSC
today, and added: "Even Brzezinski looks good."
One congressional critic summed it up this
way: "The Kissinger NSC was high-powered. It
had credibility. The Poindexter NSC is staffed by
nerds and gnomes from top to bottom."
The recent fiasco suggests that the NSC staff
returned the uncomplimentary aspersions heaped
on it, and a bunker mentality set in. Everyone
looked down on them, so they'd go it alone and
show their critics. They would tackle the Arab-
ists in Fo Bottom-wTio coune7a tti- toward
raq, and the wimps at the %C1A, who were
>=eliktaa y wing o o rs a nit
a _ to t e icara_ an contras,
Thus did the scorned, downtrodden Walter
Mittys at the National Security Council seek to
restore their agency to its once-lofty pinnacle of
power with a foreign policy coup that was
equaled in its audacity only by its lunacy. They
thought they were Rambo; if they'd only looked
in the mirror, they'd have seen . . . Mickey
Mouse.
01986, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110044-4