UPGRADING GERM-WARFARE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 30, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130011-8
ARTICLE APPE "'
ON PA6r 9--7
WASHINGTON POST
30 November 1984
JACK ANDERSON j
Upgrading Germ-Warfare Intelligence
There is a worrisome tendency in this country
to bury our heads in the sand and pretend that
no civilized nation would stockpile germ- and
chemical-warfare weapons. But there is evidence
that the Soviet Union is doing exactly that.
In 1980 1 was condemned for reporting that the
Soviets had shipped chemical weapons and
technology to Iraq. The U.S. government
subsequently confirmed that Iraq had used them in
its war against Iran.
Now there are disturbing rumors that Soviet
chemical weapons have been sent to Nicaragua.
That's because detection of chemical- and
biological-weapons stockpiling is a frustrating,
costly and time-consuming process, and this type of
intelligence had always been a low priority for the
entra Intelligence Agency.
It's the assignment of priorities-"Priority 1"
being the most urgent-that determines how much
spy satellite time and other intelligence-gathering
assets will be devoted to a particular problem.
CIA Director William J. Casey dealt with the
question of priorities in a secret report,
"Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin
Weapons for U.S. Security Interests," sent to
President Reagan. It was prepared b the CIA and
eight other federal intelligence agencies, and was
reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta.
"Historically," the report points out, "both
collection and analysis of intelligence on chemical
and biological warfare have suffered from
persistently low priorities. Not until after the 1973
Yom Kippur War did the issue receive some
recognition." That was when the Israelis gave CIA
analysts tons of Soviet chemical and biological
equipment captured from the Egyptians.
Priorities for gathering intelligence on various
countries are assigned by the National Security
Council. After the 1973 eye-opener, chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) development in the
Soviet Union was raised to "Priority 3" in 1975, and
to "Priority 2" in 1977. In 1981, after President
Reagan took office, CBW intelligence on the
Soviets was given an unprecedented "Priority 1."
The difficulties of detecting chemical-biological
weapons are enormous. The CIA report states:
"Unlike most other systems, chemical and toxin
munitions can be deployed and perhaps even
employed without our being able to assess their
characteristics .... A gas is usually invisible and
usually leaves no discernible trace."
Gathering raw data is not the only problem. "On
the analytic side, the intelligence effort still suffers
from many years of neglect," the report says.
Officials at the policy-making level didn't learn of
Soviet biological-weapons facilities until long after a
suspicious anthrax epidemic broke out in 1979 near
a suspected plant at Sverdlovsk.
The recent report to the president indicates that
the bureaucratic situation has improved.
But the report concludes with a grave warning.
Despite the steps that have been taken recently to
improve intelligence gathering on Soviet chemical
and biological weapons, the report says: "There
should be no illusion about the feasibility of
achieving a highly reliable verification scheme for a
chemical weapons ban. Substantial uncertainties_
will still remain."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130011-8