COUP, TERRORISM SEEN AS POSSIBLE IN ARGENTINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 11, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140012-6
VI
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE ,_~ WASHINGTON POST
11 November 1983
Coup,- Terrorism
Seen as Possible
In Argentina
Intelligence sources 'raise.. two
equally alarming-possibilities' in the
wake of the election of moderate
Radical Party leader Raul Alfonsin
as president of Argentina; a military
coup to prevent his scheduled De-
cember inauguration or renewed left-
ist terrorism if he makes it into of-
fice.
I sent my associate Dale Van Atta
to Buenos Aires to look behind the
scenes of Argentina's first election in
10 years. He spoke to Argentine and
American sources and found that
they shared the same concerns over
the country's future.
Heading the secret agenda of a
recent meeting of the U.S. Embas-
sy's "Intelligence Group"-senior
Central Intelligence Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency and Foreign Ser-
vice officers-was this ominous item:
"Possibility of military intervention
prior to inauguration."
The sources would not estimate
the likelihood of a military coup but
they agreed that Alfonsin's landslide
victory over Peronist candidate Italo
Luder was probably the best deter-
rent to the generals and admirals.
His clear popular mandate is in
sharp contrist to the public's con-
tempt for the top military brass,
which capped years of misrule with a
humiliating defeat in the Falklands
war.
The chief cause of apprehension is .
Alfonsin's emphatic pledge to bring
the top brass to book for the disap-
pearance of perhaps - 20,000 Argen-
tines during the anti-leftist "dirty
war" of the 1970s. If he persists in
this determination, the military may
move in to save' their skins. The
armed services still are controlled by
men with plenty to hide. It seems
improbable that they'll hold still for
open public disgrace.
That's why many military leaders
quietly backed the Peronist candi-
date. Luder indicated he might be
willing to make a deal with the gen-
? erals, in the tradition of Peronist-
military back-scratching that has
endured through four decades of see-
saw power.
Alfonsin dropped no such com-
forting hints. But he undoubtedly
will have to compromise, probably
by prosecuting enough of the respon-
sible military leaders to set an exam-
ple, but not so many that the entire
officer corps feels threatened.
The second item on the Intelli-
gence Group's agenda was "Terror-
ism potential after inauguration." In
the worst of the "dirty war," leftist
terrorists murdered 800 Argentine
officials and family members.
The biggest terrorist group was
the Montoneros. They were original-
ly Peronist-backed and, in fact, doi-
ens- of them marched in hoods at a
pre-election party - rally. Though
some, in the crowd gave them the
Argentine equivalent of a Bronx
cheer, the Montoneros AM have Per-
onist supporters . who may turn to
terrorism to avenge the party's elec-
tion defeat .
The election and its immediate
aftermath were surprisingly nonvi-
olent, considering the bitterness'
manifest in the campaign. Peronist'
posters depicted Alfonsin as the,
"Coca-Cola candidate"-a puppet of
President Reagan, multinational cor-
porations and Jews. The Star of
David over his head was a clear ap?
peal for the anti-Semitic vote.
The wealthy aristocrats backed
Alfonsin, whose left-of-center views
suited them better than the radical,
populist rhetoric of his opponent. In
conversations with my associate at
an exclusive club, several members
of the upper crust referred to the
Peronist party as "a zoo," and its
supporters as "animals let out of
their cages."
Interestingly, according to intel-
ligence sources, both presidential
candidates received modest covert
campaign contributions from the
CIA, which was hedging its bets on
the outcome.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140012-6