WHY PRESIDENTS STUMBLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100140099-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 99
• Publication Date: March 13, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: C
A:~TICiE ~-:P-~.R~ -PARADE N.AGAZI:~E
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13 IV'ARCH 1983
Jack Anderson
? President Richard Nixon could have
prevented the ruinous 40-fold jump in
oil prices had he hooded the available
warnings. The federal government, with
all the agencies that watch over the oil
industry, had an immense early-alert
system.
~ President Jimmy Carter could have
spared the nation 444 days of humilia-
tion if he had just paid attention to the
State Department's Iranian experts. With
startling prescience, they warned of the
likelihood of an attack on the embassy
and the seizure of hosta?es. -
? President Carter could have stopped
Fidel Castro from shipping Cuba's crimi-
nals and crazies to Florida. when they
have aggravated the crime rate. The
CIA submitted at least five advance warTr
PRESID~N" 1 ~5
TUMBLE
HE U.S.
has eves and ears all over the globe. Yet
our Presidents often act like someone
who is blind and deaf. They seldom
seem to anticipate world events of mo-
mentous importance. They have been
caught napping by revolutions, inva-
sions and other developments of awe-
some consequence.
Why is the president invariably so
late to act that he can only react? I can
tell you that it's not from lack of sound
information. He is served by profession-
als who spend [heir lives srfting fact
from fantasy, truth from propaganda.
'They produce stunningly accurate as-
scssmentc-which aze routinely ignored
b}' the White House. Consider a few
examples of warnings that have gone
unhcedcd:
ings of Castro's intentions.
? President Carter might have dissuad-
ed the Sovieu from invading Afghani-
stan, thus preventing tfie breakdown of
dEtente, if he had acted on advance
information. He seemed to be the only
one in high places who was surprised
by the invasion.
? President Ronald Reagan might have
been able to avert the Falkland Islands
mess had he reacted promptly to intelli-
gencereports that the Argentines would
invade. Indeed, the Argentine generals
had the false impression that the im~a-
sion would have his blessing.
? President Reagan could have dealt
more effectively with the Lebanon cri-
sis if he had heeded intelligence ascess-
menu that an Israeli invasion was "in-
evitable." Earlier, the Israeli attack on
Iraq's nuclear reactor also was forecast
precisely.
In each of these disasters, a President
had access to information that would
have enabled him to take preventive
actions, rather than blunder along. May-
be thecorrect intell igencenever reached
the President. Maybe it had been so
twisted or toned down that it was easy
to ignore. Yet in some cases, I had
published the warnings long before evenu
got out of control.
Of course. a President geu bad ad-
vice as well as good. Conflicting infor-
mationcomes infrom various confiden-
tial sources available to him. The real
pros among those who provide informa-
von have been able to forecast or antici-
pateevents with faz more reliabiliq? than
any President has ever done. The prob- i
lem is that the politicos around the Pr+esi-
denteither don't lmow who the reliable
experts arc or prefer to ignore them.
How does crucial information get cut
off at the pass? First, let's examine how
a President reaches hie decisions.
Though different presidents have asked
for intelligence in different forms. each
has received what is known in the intelli-
gence community as the PDB, or presi-
dent'sDaily Brief. The idea is to give a
President the most sensitive informa-
tion U.S. intelligence agencies have
gathered in a document he can read in
15 minutes..
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Beyond the PDB ,each President since
mid-1975 has received a lengthier sum-
mary of events in even- important area
of concern to U.S. foreign policy. Called
the National Intelligence Daily, it goes
to about 100 top policytrtakers in Wash-
ington. In urgent cases-acoup, say, or ~
a mi[itary attack somewhere-special
"alert memorandums" are sent up.
Then there are the National Intelli-
gence Estimates and Special National
Inulligence Estimates. The NIEs and
SNIEs (known informally as "knees"
and "sneeze") are intended to predict
the military, political or economic fu-
ture of particular countries, along with
various options the United States can
take to affect the situation.
President Reagan likes his policy
memos boiled down to a single page.
complete with options. Perhaps once a
month, he also reviews a more detailed
foreign policy paper prepared by the
National Security Council.
With this elaborate intelligence ma-
chinery, you might think no President
could ever be caught by surprise. The
trouble is, these top-level reports are {
the product of a committee mentali-
t}'--aeonsensus with no rough edges to
irritate a President or nag him with doubts.
One insider described these assessments
as "a kind of sanitized groupthink."
Too often, the President's top advis-
ers see to it that he is told only v-?hat he
wants to hear-information that makes
his predetermined politics or campaign
promises look
wise and wonder-
ful. They tend. in
the w?ay of subor-
dinates, to ape
the President and
to view al] prob-
lems in the con-
text of his basic
beliefs.
This toadying
attitude has a
chilling effect on
the profession-
als who are usu-
allyblocked from
access tothe Przs-
ident. They see
their information
discarded and
thciranalyses ig-
norcd by politi-
cal aides who
know what the
boss wants to
hear. The most
striking examples of this sycophantic
system and its disastrous results went
probably seen in Vietnam and Irate: The
CIA loyally exaggerated the strength
and popularity of the South Viemamesc
government and the late Shah of Iran,
knowing it would please the man in the
V1'hite House.
"fhe NlE process discottrages dis-
sent, which is often relegated to foot-
note position, if mentioned at all," not-
~ a top-secret report that was intended
to alert President Reagan to the danger.
The stinging rebuke faults the system
on two lacy points: lack of competition
among intelligence analyses and failure
? to keep Hack of past performance to see
who was right and who was wrong.
"T'hese deficiencies exist notwith-
standing general recognition by virtu-
ally all governments tbaz competitive
analysis rs essential to accuracy and
that quality review is the best method of
weeding out those incapable or deliber-
ately prone to-
warddrawing in-
correct assess-
ments," the re-
port declared.
President Rea-
gan, thus put on
notice, did noth-
ing to change the
system. The as-
sessnxnts that go
to him, White
----~ House sources ad-
mil, are still tailored to fit his precon-
ceived notions. Intelligence summaries
and policy papers tend to be worded in
language that will be compatible with
~ his fundamental philosophy.
The public, of course, is kept in the
dark. These documents art hidden un-
der aprotective cover so secure that
even the classification labels stamped
on them are secret. The public has no ,
way of knowing what advice the Presi-
dent may have disregarded that could
have prevented a foreign polic}~ fiasco.
The secrecy that obscures the dedica-
tion of those who are consistently right
also covers up, unfortunately, the dere-
liction of those who are consistently
wrong. If the bad advice comes from
the higher echelons, as it so often does, ,
sometimes the security apparatus of an
entire agency is used to cover up the
embarrassment.
The report to President Reagan, in '
fact, warned scathingly, "At the CIA,
there appears to be today almost a direct
relationship between degrees of failure
to predict accurately ...and career suc-
cess."
To write this article, of course, I had
to penetrate the tightly guarded decision-
making process. I am in touch with the
professionals. I regularly read their se-
cret assessments.
I..et's consider some of the more egre-
gious blunders made by recent Presi-
dents despite solid evidence that a ca-
lamirywas inthe offing. Each time, the
warning flags were hoisted. Yet the skip-
per steered the ship of state right into
the typhoon:
THE GREAT OIL GOUGE
So long as world oil affairs operated
on any basis resembling the laws of
supply and demand, thcrc should not
have been an oil crisis. The presence of
gigantic surpluses and dirt-cheap pro-
duction costs mocked the hope of desert .
dreamers that oil could be somehow
captured and the world made to behave
as though it had suddenly become scarce
and costly. Nature and economics them-
selves would have to be overthrown. _
Only politics could repeal reality.
Here's what happened next: President
Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, wanted the Shah of Iran to
protect the Persian Gulf. which is the
industrial world's main oil spigot. The
shah insisted this would take a massive
arms buildup, which the American
taxpapers were in no mood to finance
so soon after the Vietnam war.
The secret documentation dons not
identif}~ whose idea it was to raise oil
prices to pay for the arms. What is clear
rs that the shah suddenly began clamoring
forhigheroil prices, withoutthc slightest
objection from the White House.
The shah's agitation-and Nixon's
acquiesccgce-led to the calamitous price
increases of the early 1970s. The CIA
secret)}' identified the shah as "a )cad'
ing proponent of an OPEC price rise."
Saudi Arabia, whose caunous rulers
feared a backlash against the oil care),
offered to block the price rise. But the
i Saudis were unwilling to stand alone
against the other oil-selling nations. As
the C1Aexplained in atop-secret dispatch:
"The Saudis are unlike)}~ to risk polio- ;
cal isolation and a breakup of OPEC."
No one was more agitated over this
than Nixon's Treasur}? Secretan~. ~'~~il-
Liam Simon, who was not privy to the
secret arrangements with the shah. In a
~ blisterin? memo to the White House,
Simon charged that the shah not onl~~
was "the dominant force in OPEC for
higher oil prices" but also u?as pro-
pounding "bogus economic arguments
... (that] should not go unchallenged."
The Saudi royal family had told him
personal)}-, Simon v-rou, that "Saudi
Arabia would press OPEC for lower
prices" but that tJiey "need the U.S. to
help tum the shah around ...They wonder
whether, in fact, we want laver oil prices, ~
since we never ever. raise the subject i
with the shah.''
Nixon had the means to prevent a ~
switch of the world balance of oil power
to the ambitious sheikdoms of the Mid- i
dle East. He did nothing; then it was too
late.
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THE SHAH'S DO~X~FALL
The Shah of lran was installed on his
Peaco~:k Throne through the good of-
fices ofthe C1Aand became the pampered
darling of successive Presidents almost
to the day he was overthrov~?n.
He was so favored that the C1A be-
came blind to the unrest that was seeth-
ing under the surface in Iran. But urgent
warnings came from other quarters. Per-
haps the most blunt was delivered by
Saudi Arabia's oil minister. Sheik Ahmed
Zaki 1'amani, in a conversation with
U.S. Ambassador James Akins.
The ambassadorreponed to Washing-
ton on Aug. 27, 1975. that Yamani had
told him "the shah was a megalomani-
I ac, that he was highly unstable mental-
, ly and if we didn't recognize this, there
' must be something wrong with our pow-
ers of observation."
Then came the warning. "lf the shah
departs." wrote Akins. "we could have
a violent, anti-American regime in
Tehran." 1 reported excerpts from Akins'
secret memo in 1976.
1'et as Gate as 1979, President Caner
was still calling the shah's regime "an
island of stabilit`~" in the turbulent Mid-
dle East.
THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
For months. the Caner White House
ignored explicit warnings from the field
that American Embassy personnel in
Te'tu?an would be in physical danger if
the deposed shah v,~ere admitted into the
Lnited Stairs.
This should not have surprised the
President. In Februan~ 1979. armed
attackers stormed the embassy and held
more than 100 persons hostage for near-
', h' two hours. Yet this "dress rehearsal"
' for the later seizure was shrugged off.
' No stringent securit`? precautions were
undertaken.
Not everyone was asleep. of course.
I Repeated cables from Tehran ~?arned
~ that a11oN'ing the shah refuge in the Unit-
; ed States could provoke an attack on the
embassy.
On July 26. for example. Secretary i
of State Cyrus Vance asked L. Bruce
Laingen, the charge d'affaires in Tehran,
for his "personal and private evaluation
on the effect of such a mo~'e. [granting
the shah sanctuary] on the safety of i
Americans in Iran" Laingen promptly
replied that the shah's admission would
touch oN retaliation and stressed that
the embassy w'as poorly defended.
On Aug. 2. Henn' Precht, head of
the Iranian desk at the State Department,
acknowledged that "the danger of hos- ~.
I rages being taken in Iran .Fill persist."
He added, "We should make no move ~
? toward admitting the shah until we have ~
obtained and tested a new and substan-
tiallvmore effective guard force for the
embassy."
~ Nevertheless, the shah was admitted.
! Yet the steps to beef ?up security were
nevei taken, and the hostages were seized
on Nov. 4:
-~
,~
THE FALxLA~.DS FIASCO
The bloody. unnecessary W'ar in the
Falkland Islands pTObabl}' could have
been avoided if President Reagan had
paid atuntion to ~inulligcnce reporu.
More than two months before the Ar-
gentine invasion, the CIA had pnydicted
that Argentina "will take over the is-
lands by force this year" if the ongoing
THE AFGHA~'IST.'~'` AFFAIR negotiations with Great Britain got
nowhere. Thc CIA explained that "the
in a rare episode of Presidential candor. Argentine government is again trying
dmitted that he was caught to use the issue of sovercigrm' over the
ds to divert
l
d I
C
arter a
an
s
Jimmy
British-held Falklan
completely by surprise when Soviet public atuntion from domestic strife."
' troops rolled across the border into That called it right on the money. The
Afghanistan in late December 1979. Argentine junta's decision to invade came
Leonid Brezhnev had lied to him'. ~ ~~ ~~ of escalating labor unrest;
Whauverthis startling admission says the invasion cams only days before a
about Carter's naivete. it also provides scheduled general strike.
a disturbing example of how the clabo- yet, once again, an American Presi-
rate intelligence pipeline to the Whiu dent was caught by surprise. By the
House breaks down. For the fact of the time president Reagan calledthe Argen-
matter is that the intelligence experts tine president to tall: him out of the
sent the President warnings of a post- invasion. it had already begun. What
ble Soviet invasion at least six months made things even worse was that the
before it happened. The warnings in- Argentines thought the Uniud Stasis
eluded reports of an unusual influx of would at least stay neutral in the conflict.
Sovietmilitaryadvisersand-morcomi- The}? had leaked word of their aggres-
nous still-Red Armytroop movements sive plans to U.S. intelligence sources
into districts near Afghanistan. and assumed that, in the absence of any
Unable to stir up anv concern at the protest from the White House. Reagan
R'hite House. the mulligenee agencies had no objection to an invasion. The
went ?to the Senau Foreign Relations Argentines didn't realize that the Presi-
Committee. wheretheygot betterresults. dent wasn't getting the .intelligence
The committee was so alarmed by the repo
intelligence informarion that it had a If Reagan had let the Argentine junta
copy of its secret report. dated Sept. 21. ~~,, earlierthat the United States would
hand-delivered to the V~'hitc House. support Britain when the chips were
The report cited "the somewhat in- I dowm. the unta robably wouldn't have
creased readiness of one Soviet airborne I J p
begun the war. The Argentines' belaud
division" near Afghanistan and said that. '! discovery of the true L'.S .position struck
despite the presence 'of several thou- them-and the rest of Laun America-
sand Soviet mtlttan' advisers. the new as a betrayal. It will take years to repair
puppet regime of President Hafizullah ~~ damage.
Amin had only "a sinuous hold onpow- ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACKS
er [that] continues to erode."
All this, the Senate report warned the
President, raised the probability of "an
unfolding covert plan to intervene mas-
sively to support Amin." It even mcn-
tionedthe Vietnam-style "creeping mili-
tary logic" pushing Moscaw to act
hoping that a lithe more Soviet involve-
ment would crush the Afghan rebels.
Despiu this wealth of warnings, Carter
chose to put his faith in Brezhnev in-
suad of his own inulligcnce experts.
The result is that the Soviets, however
embattled by the Afghan guerrillas, now
have bases less than 800 miles from the
Strait of Hormuz, the jugular vein that
carries Persian Gulf oil to the West.
After the Israeli attack on Iraq's
nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981, The
Washington Posy reported: "U.S. offi-
cialshave said repeatedly since the raid
that they had no advance knowledge of
Israel's plans."
Yet the Pentagon's own intelligence
analyse had given warning of just such
an attack months before it occurred. In
fact, on Sept. 30, 1980. Iquoted atop-
secret Pentagon report warning that Iraq
could become the first Arab nuclear
power with "a potential for threatening
Israel."
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The secret report concluded: "The
problem for the United Stasis is not the
pro>pect of a nuclear conflict involving
Israel and Iraq ...but rather the pros-
pect of a preemptive Israeli strike with
conventional weapons againstthe [Iraqi)
reactor." Here again, the inulligence
experts called the-shot accurately, yet
eight months laur the White House was
caught by surprise.
Similar warnings were sounded by
the CIA regarding the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon-{ven farther in advance.
On March 6, 2980-more than two years
before the invasion-the C1A warned
that Israel would strike across the border.
"The Israeli incursions, if not immi-
nent, are nevertheless inevitable," the
CIA warned. -`The question is not so
much whether or when such incursions
will occur, but the scope and purpose of
such incursions and their potential for
igniting a wider and more dangerous
confrontation. Alarge-scale incursion
might seek tolink Israeli-supplied Chris-
tian militia in the north, redrawing the
map of Lebanon."
This was no lonely cry in the wilder-
ness. Thc warning was repeated in oth-
er intelligence documents I have seen.
For example, on Jan. 6. 1982. a secret
analysis alerted the White House to "an
Israeli military initiative designed to
redraw the political map of Lebanon."
The document predicted with uncan-
ny exactitude: "Israel's inuntions must
be nothing less than dealing a knockout
blo.~~ against the Palestine Liberation
Organization and removing Lebanon as
a confrontational start or staging area.
If so, the Israelis must sweep into the
[United 1\ations) buffer zone beyond
the Litani [River], eliminating the 15.000
PLO forces and linking the two armies
under Lebanese Christian control."
In this instance, the warning never
reached President Reagan. Defense Sec-
retan~ Caspar Weinberger brushed it off,
choosing to believe instead that "it is
doubtful that a military operation will
rectif,~ the situation."
Speaking as Israel's defense minister,
Ariel Sharon told me he tried to explain
to Washington leaders 10 days before
the June 6 invasion that the PLO prob-
lem had become intolerable. But. he
said, Weinberger continued to urge
restraint, ignoring the Israeli warning,
which had been a clear signal that mili-
tar}~ action was imminent.
To sum up, the professionals ant able
to foresee events, but it is left to the
politicians to respond.
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100140099-1