U.S. CAN'T TELL IF RUSSIA CHEATS ON TEST BAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100150071-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: August 10, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ons,...mponents,, it turns out with:
some regularity that individual com-
ponents fail or degrade.'Even accept-
able componenti; may become uni ?
available as manufacturers shift
product lines or go out of business."?
This means that new components
or different materials have to be
-used, sOd the resulting weapon may
not work.. As the report states:
"Developing weapons remains to a
considerable extent an art rather
than a science. Weapons designs
which seem appropriate, based on,
computer models, fail to work as
predicted when actually tested." In
short, a test-ban treaty would leave
the Unit& States doubly in the.
dark?abott the reliability of our
own nuclear weapons and about any
violations by the Soviet Union.
ST
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29: CIA-R
THE WASHINGTON POST
10 AUGUST 1982
.1.72PEARED
Ori 1);1C;..Y.
JACK
P90-00965R000100150071-0
ANDERSON.
U.S. Can't Tell
If Russia Cheats
On Test Ban
President Reagan decided at a
July 19 National Security Council
meeting that he didn't want to re-
sume talks with the Soviet Union
and the British on a comprehensive
nuclear testing ban. The talks were
suspended in 1980.
Secret documents and intelligence
sources disclose the appalling reason
for the president's decision: U.S. PIC.
perts do not at present have ade-
ckuate means to catch the Soviets in
violations of a test ban.
Eight years ago, the United States
and the Soviet Union agreed to limit
underground nuclear tests?the only
kind permitted?to 150 kilotons, or
roughly 10 times the size of the Hi-
roshima bomb. The Threshold Test
Ban Treaty was never ratified by the
United States, but. the 150-kiloton
limit was observed by both powers.
Then, in 1978, U.S. scientists, un-
sure of their measurement system,
secretly changed their methods of
calibrating a kiloton, in effect dou-
bling the size of permitted test ex-
plosions.
When the Soviets subsequently
doubled the size of their blasts, in-
telligence experts were alarmed; they
suspected a leak to the Kremlin at
the highest levels.
Even with the new measuring
method, the Soviets appear to have
exceeded the 150-kiloton limit at
least 11 times since 1978. One test?
in September, 1980?was clocked at
a likely size of 350 kilotons, accord-
ing to my sources.
As recently as July 4, the Soviets
set off a huge nuclear blast It was
estimated at a likely 260 kilotons, or
at least 110 over the limit.
Reagan asked for the precise mea-
surement of the Soviet explosion, so
that he could lodge a vehement pro-
test with the Kremlin. It was then
that he learned such precision was
impossible. A secret, highly technical
Pentagon briefing disclosed that, in
fact, the United States could not
verify Soviet compliance with a test
ban.
There was another, perhaps even
more persuasive reason the president
decided against a test ban treaty.
U.S. scientists want to be able to test
our nuclear weapons to make sure
the stockpile is up to snuff.
? A highly sensitive White House
report shown to my associate Dale
Van Atte states that the people in
charge of U.S. nuclear weapons lab-
oratories "insist that they must test
up to approximately five kilotons in
order to be able to verify perform-
ance of the weapons for stockpiling
certification."
The report explains: "In the con-
tinued non-nuclear testing of weap-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100150071-0