ISRAELI INVASION SETS SOOTHSAYERS TO SEARCHING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000100150088-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 29, 2012
Sequence Number: 
88
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 18, 1982
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000100150088-2.pdf75.49 KB
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STAT ~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100150088-2 . l?~?. ~' ::; ~: ~' :..'PEALED 7 ~ r n Tr OTC t ~4~_ Israeli Invasion Sets Soothsayers To Searching THE WASHINGTON POST 18 June 1982 River and Beaufort l;astle. Most of the population, largely Catholic, will be driven out, as in 1978. "It is unlikely that Israel will allow United Nations. peacekeeping forces in the expanded Haddad corridor, nor is it likely that the nations con- tributing to the forces will wish to maintain troops in Lebanon under the circumstances. "Syrian forces are unlikely to se- riously engage Israel, except in demonstrative air intercepts, unless Israeli forces penetrate Bekaa Val- ley. Even demonstrative actions have potential for escalation, of course." Other estimates warn that full- scale Syrian-intervention might well occur if local Syrian commanders elect to attack the wide-ranging Is- raeli troops; in this situation, the entire Syrian army could' be dragged into the conflict. 'And because the Syrians are no match for Israeli forces, this leads to the most omi- nous short-term prediction of all: "In the event of a serious threat to the Syrian government, direct Soviet intervention becomes a distinct like- lihood." Now for the long-range predic- tions: "Israel will continue to supply arms to Phalangist [right-wing Christian] forces in the north. The combination of increased Phalangist military strength, the weakened Pal- estinian position and the influx of refugees to the north is explosive, and may reignite the civil war. Within hours after the Israeli in- vasion of Lebanon, the State Depart- ment threw together a "crisis task force" of its top Mideast specialists to give President Reagan and his foreign policy advisers the answer to the big question: what -will happen next? Based on their years of expertise in the arcane business of linking cause and effect in the tumultuous Middle East, the analysts produced their best estimate of the likely turn of events. One of these estimates, stamped "Secret," was shown to my associate Dale Van Atta. The report breaks down the soothsayers' conclusions into short- term and long-term possibilities. In appraising the clarity of the experts' crystal ball, it is important to re- member that these are the forecasts the White House relies on to plan U.S. responses in this vital part of the world. First, the short-term predictions, which were made 10 days ago: "Israel will expand the `Free Leb- anon' corridor nominally controlled by Maj. [Seed] Haddad's militia to include, at a minimum, the Litani "Much depends on the restrictigns placed on Haddad's forces after ~lae main elements of the IDF (Israeli Defense Force] have withdraw. ~In the past, Israel has encouragedl-Iad- dad's unprovoked attacks - oQ ~- banese civilian targets as a raea~of increasing popular resentment against the Palestinians: ~ ~~~-~ , "European frustration with Atrr[e}- ican initiatives in the Middle~~East will probably result in a re~ae~aed European initiative. ~i~,:~ "Further American .efforts . ba+i;e~- terest moderate Arab nations Iri the Camp David formula would pi+ci#~a- bly becounterproductive. ' ???~:~ "The future of the . Palestine= );~5- eration Organization is uncert~Yi -~f [Yasser] Arafat falls, tke Paleat~nian movement will probably disintegl~e into radical splinter groups :. ? "": Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/29 :CIA-RDP90-009658000100150088-2