WHO WAS WATCHING KHOMEINI?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160060-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: September 6, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160060-1
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE-__C.1_._---
THE WASHINGTON POST
6 September 1981
Jack Anderson
Who Was
matching
Khomeini?
Western intelligence agencies have
mounted, a death watch on Ayatollah
Khomeini,., the- 81-year-old Iranian
mullah who is known to be in fragil
e
health. Politically, however, Khomeini
is as strong as an ox.
Three years ago Khomeini drew the
attention of Western intelligence by ar-
riving in Paris with his son Ahmed and
two Muslim -clergymen. French se-
curity agents tracked the ayatollah
from the minute -his plane touched
down- on Oct. 6, 1978, and obligingly
gave the CIA a copy of their report on
his activities during his first month in
France.
My reporters- Eileen O'Connor and
Dale Van Atta have studied a secret
CIA report based ion information the
agency got from French intelligence.
The very fact that French intelligence
devoted so much time and effort to an
assessment of Khomeini should have
been a clue to his potential importance.
But the CIA misread the French infor-
mation and concluded that Khomeini
was merely the puppet of forces be-
yond his control.
The CIA summary of the French re-
port notes that when Khomeini arrived
in Paris, he "was welcomed by two '
well-known Iranian activists of the so- i
called `Marxist-Islamic' group who are
also affiliated. - with the Iranian Na-
tional Front." It continues:
"The French police have ' long
records on these two-Abdel Hassan
Banisadr (age 45) and Sadegh Ghotb-
zadeh (age 40). They have been in-_
volved in an assassination attempt of a
SAVAK [Iranian intelligence] officer,
maintain close ties with pro-Soviet
Palestinians and have direct organiza-
tional links with the Libyans and other
radical groupings."
BaniSadr and Ghotbzadeh, ' who
were to be leading figures in Khomei
ni's revolutionary regime just a few
months later, "are the men who have
been handling contacts with Khomei-
ni," the CIA's Paris office explained to
Washington, adding that "French in-
telligence has kept a file on his con-
tacts.",.
"The ayatollah was informed upon
arrival in Paris, according to a message
from President Giscard. to the Iranian
ambassador, that 'his visit to France is
considered touristic, his stay is provi-
sional, and during his stay he must ab-
stain from all political activity,"' the
CIA report notes.
If the French were taking Khomeini
seriously, the shah was not. "The ini-
tial official Iranian reaction to this-
French intent to restrain Khomeini
was that Tehran was not requesting
that Khomeini be muzzled," the CIA in
Paris informed Washington,. adding:::
"In fact, the Iranians specifically asked
the French not to restrain Khomeini.
Subsequently, however, there was a di-'
rect request from the shah to Giscard
to stop the flow of vitriolic anti-Iranian
propaganda from the ayatollah."
There was no hint that the shah ap-
preciated the mortal danger Khomeini
posed to his throne. It was characteris-
tic of the shah-and his CIA buddies-
that Khomeini's anti-shah pronounce-
ments were called "anti-Iranian. As
events would soon show, the ayatollah
was more in tune with the Iranian peo-
ple than the shah was.
The CIA report finally shows a faint
glimmer of understanding: 'Regardless
of his own basic motivations, Khomei-
ni's influence is destructive and posai-
biy the most dangerous currently being
employed against the shah." "I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100160060-1