OFFICIAL FORETOLD IRANIAN RETALIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170143-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 143
• Publication Date: January 31, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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03 PAGE 04 '
Jack Anderson
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1980
Official Foretold frarii~~ Retali~ iOn
By an irony of fate, the man who fore.
cast most clearly the frustrating di-
lemma of the Iranian crisis was himself
caught in the middle of it. He is Bruce
Laingen, the U.S charge d'affaires in
Tehran who was taken into "protective
custody" at the Iranian Foreign Office
the day our embassy was seized by radi-
cal militants.
The 57-year old diplomat arrived in
the Iranian capital only last June. But it
didn't take him long to size up the situa-
tion with remarkable perception.
Nor did it take long for Washington to
start peppering Laingen with disturbing
cables about the possibility that the ex-
iled shah would be given sanctuary in
the United States. On July 26, Secretary
of State Cyrus R Vance cabled Laingen:
"I would like to have your personal and
private evaluation of the effect of such
a move on the safety of Americans in
Iran, especially the official Americans in
the compound."
Laingen promptly replied that admis-
sion of the shah to the United States
would undoubtedly touch off anti-
American retaliation, including action
against the embassy, which he noted
was poorly secured against attack
On Aug. 2, an even . more disturbing
cable arrived from Henry Precht, head
of the Iranian desk in Foggy Bottom.
His use of the peculiar, telltale phrase,
"when the decision is made to admit the
shah," indicated that the decision was
no longer in doubt - only the timing of
its announcement. Precht suggested a
plan for counteracting the anti-Ameri
can outburst Laingen had - predicted
would follow the shah's entry. : -
First, Laingen counseled against let-
ting the shah in. Then he laid out his
reasons in a., penetrating, ?I,000-word
analysis of the Iranian character that
proved to be an incredibly accurate
prediction of subsequent events. Basi-
cally, Laingen told his superiors in
Washington that the Iranians were im-
possible to negotiate with.
Noting his difficulties in dealing with
Iranians, Laingen said, "Underlying cul-
tural and psychological qualities that ac-
count for the nature of these difficulties
are and will remain relatively constant"
He explained: "The single dominant
aspect of the Persian psyche is [perhaps]
an overriding egoism. Its antecedents lie
in the long Iranian history of instability,
which put a premium on self-preserva-
tion."
The result is "an almost total Persian
preoccupation with self [that] leaves lit-
tle room for understanding points of
view other than one's own," Laingen
cabled, adding: "Thus, for example, it is
incomprehensible to an Iranian that
U.S immigration law may prohibit him
a tourist visa when he has determined
that he wants to live in California."
The Iranians' "unease about the na-
ture of the world in which one lives"
has led to a certain paranoia, Laingen
indicated. "The Persian experience has
been that nothing is permanent and it is
commonly perceived that hostile forces
abound," he wrote. "In such an environ-
ment, each individual must be con-
stantly alert for opportunities to protect
himself against the malevolent forces
that would otherwise be his undoing."
This every-man-for-himself "bazaar,
mentality," Laingen cabled, produces a
"mind-set that often ignores longer
term interests in favor of immediately
obtainable advantages, and counte-
nances practices that are regarded as
unethical by other norms." -,.
These psychological quirks, added to
the Iranians' faith in the omnipotence
of God, blind even Western.educated
Iranians to the interrelation of events,
Laingen wrote. He noted, for example,
that Ibrahim Yagd"t, then the Iranian
foreign minister, was "resisting the idea
that Iranian behavior has consequences
on the perception of Iran in the U.S., or
that this perception is somehow related
to American policies regarding Iran."
Other Iranian character traits Lain.
gen noted were k"an aversion to accep-
ting responsibility for ones own actions
... a proclivity for assuming that to say
something is to do it - - . [and] the Per?
sian concepts of' influence and obliga-
tion.,, . . k
Iranians "are consumed with develop.
ing parts ban - the influence that will
help get things done -while favors are
only grudgingly bestowed and then just
to the extent that', a tangible quid pro
quo is immediately perceptible?
Finally, Laingen warned that "one
should never assume his side of the
issue will be recognized, let alone that it
will be conceded to have merits"
Unfortunately for' Laingen, the other
American hostages. and the United
States as a whole, Jimmy Carter and his
policy advisers chose to ignore the
prescient warnings of their, expert on
the scene. Meanwhile, events in Tehran
have unfolded precisely the way Lain-
gen predicted they would.
Footnote: Sources told my associate
Dale Van Atta that Laingen, like a front-
line soldier who winds up paying with
his neck when his advice is brushed off
by the brass; has refrained from remon-
strating with his superiors in Foggy Bot-
tom. The least he might say. in all fair.
ness, is "I told you so."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100170143-8