DEBATE REKINDLES ON FAILED IRAN RAID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 25, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE 25 April 1982
Scope 0 f HHosta-ge Mission Unfolds.
Debate Rekindles ion ..Failed Iran Rai
President -Carter's intelligence
chief says a new inquiry; should be.
made into the failed Iraaiari hostage
rescue mission attempted? two. years,
ago today..
Retired Na,,y'?Adm. Stansfield.:
Turner, director of Lie, Central In-
telligence Agency during the Carter1
11 ' presidency, called the raid a "searing
ieeht ht
national expernc taas no
'
-':for the,
been completely plumbed
lds
---- .
he
'
-..-
lessons ......
-
S
Gen. David C. Jones, -chairman of s
principal architect of the rescue mis-
sion, which ended in flaming disaster
on the Iranian desert, said yesterday
that -such an , investigation. would
serve no useful purpose -because',
there is little about the.raid,that has
not already been explored.
This article was reported and I
written by staff writers Scott:.Arni
strong, George C. Wilson and Bob
Woodward..,
This difference of opinion over
whether a new review is in. order
comes at"a time when other senior'
officials involved with the April 25,
a3
1980, midnight attempt to extract
hostages from. Tehran are confirming
that the operation was much bigger
and bolder than the public, has been ,;
told to date.
A series of interviews conducted
by The Washington Post disclosed a
sharp difference in perspective
among top military leaders, some
lower level planners and other-Car-
ter administration officials who knew
what American ;,troopers and war-
planes were prepared to do. Contin-
gency plans included rushing in a
backup force of 90 more commandos
if the initial assault force of 100,men .~
under', Col. Charles A....(Chargin'"
Charlie) Beckwith got trapped in
Tehran or the nearby airport des-
tined to be the takeoff. point for
their long-distance escape from Iran.
Military leaders insisted they were
counting heavily on speed, surprise
. and. stealth and believed it might
even be. possible to pull off the res-
cue without firing a shot at anybody.
Carter and his top aides were willing
to ,,accept limited casualties and
some officials believed there would
inevitably be deaths, perhaps hun-
dreds if the firepower available to
Beckwith was called in.
Noting such conflicting viewpoints
and arguing that the raid has too
many policy implications, to ignore
any longer, Turner said:
"It is. now time to appoint a small
group to examine how the operation
was planned and executed. The pur-
pose would not be to look backward
and cast-blame but to look forward
and learn the lessons that surely lie
buried in" the complicated mission.
"Some of the questions that
should be addressed would be: What
does the experience tell us about
national decision making? About our
military capabilities, organization
and motivation? About the problems
of totally secret military operations."
Contended Jones in a separate
interview:
"We're not going to have another
situation just like the Iranian situ-
ation. They never repeat themselves.
Let's look at the fundamental prob-
lems Like organization rather than-i
taking an isolated case. We don't
need to go back and look at things
that happened two years ago. Let's
get on with solving those fundamen
tal problems," with reorganizing the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, a priority high
on Jones' list
Reforms made since the 19801
raid, particularly integrating military
forces of the various services into a
ready-to-go anti-terrorist outfit,
Jones said, make the United States
"much better off today" to pull off a
rescue successfully. He noted that a
pane`:of officers under retired Adm.
James L. Holloway III has already
delved into the Iranian rescue mis-
sion and issued a critical report.
Turner and some other former
senior administration officials and
military planners are known to think
that the Holloway investigation was
too limited. land' amounted to the
military investigating itself.
That - Carter's chief intelligence:,;
executive, who was in on the top se=
cret planning for the raid, is willing
to urge a new inquiry strongly sug-
gests there is still, on the second an-
niversary of the raid, a lot more that.
Interviews with Carter adminis
tration officials, military leaders and
people ` who went on the raid but-
tressed that viewpoint in bringing
these fresh disclosures, some of them
contradictory, about the most daring
rescue ever attempted by,,the Amer-
. -
ican military-
e Getting into the embassy unde
tected depended in part on informa
tion secured by the CIA from a
handful of infiltrated agents and
bribed guards among the student
militants, including some who were
scheduled to be on duty as guards
the night of the raid.
Some Carter administration offr- i
cials said the plan called for all the I
guards to be killed, while mill
leader's insisted the "Delta" force
under Beckwith was equipped with..
special hand and leg cuffs that could
be snapped on the guards in an in-
stant-and would have been if the
troopers had sneaked into the em
bassy as anticipated. Military leaders
doubted the CIA or anyone else had
managed to' co opt the guards, but
acknowledged they were not'respon
Bible for that part of the mission:-w-,;.
COIN lU
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
? Although Carter firmly ordered
that every effort be made to keep
the loss of Iranian life to a mini-
mum, he gave the' chairman of the
Joint Chiefs virtually a free hand
once the mission got under way.
One top Carter aide who partic
ipated in the planning meetings re-
called that the president said the
military could -use what was neces-
sary to get the Delta team [Beck-,
with's men] - in" and then get : the
Delta team and the hostages out."
Jones said' everybody._ understood
before launch that the tmlitary'was'
to go to great lengths to avoid brood.
shed.
? Carter increased the air .support }
himself in what one aide called "mil-
itaryoverkill"
-While acknowledging three C130
gunships and dozens of fighters and -
fighter-bombers were committed to-
provide cover :directly over Tehran,
along the exit, routes and over. Iran--:;.!
ian air force. fields, military. leaders
said they would not have strafed or
bombed unless things went wrong on
,the ground. No more than four. U.S.
fighter planes would have been over
Iran at any one time, top military
leaders said-
(As it turned out, `Carter ordered
the rescue mission aborted during
the first phase because 'of mechan-
ical failures in two of the eight he- .
licopters and the return of a third to
the Nimitz aircraft carrier Ffter run-
ning into an unpredicted dust storm
on the way to the first stop, called
Desert One, ~ in the Iranian back
country near Tabas, 270 miles from
Tehran. Eight American servicemen
were killed in a refueling accident at
Desert One after the mission had
been called off.Y..
? The Air Force had three C130
gunships deployed, code-named
Hammer, one to orbit over the em-
bassy compound, the second to cover
Iranian warplanes at the Tehran air-
port and a third to protect the raid-
ers as they left Iran. The gunships
were authorized to lay down a.cur
,.twin of machine-gun fire to repel any
crowd that"might try to block the
way of the rescue team and hostages,
,who were to rush across the street to
a soccer stadium to board heliicop-
tern fi': " v 5 4R wN
? The Pentagon deployed . to
Egypt a 90-man backup force code-
named Python. It was to rush in to
help Beckwith's team if an emergen-
cy developed. An 83-man force of
Army Rangers also was deployed to ,
seize the escape airfield outside of
Tehran called Manzariyeh.
? Soon after taking over-the CIA,
the new director, William J. Casey,
forwarded a highly classified CIA
report to President Reagan that se-
riously questioned whether the co-
vert and overt support of the rescue
Several former Carter' aides vehe-
mently denied that there -was- any,--
such inadequacy, while military of-
facials said they were often furious
that, the CIA could not , give them
better' information to help ensure
success of the raid. Turner is said to
believe that, CIA - infiltrations and,
penetrations 'in Tehran were 'good"
ranging from ."adequate'to'superla
tive.
? One reason for the expected sue "
cess'of the latter stages of the mis-
sion, which were planned in detail'
but never executed, was that the
Delta team helicopters would be dis-
guised with Iranian military insignia.
Iranian agents accompanying the
Delta team would be dressed in Iran-
ian uniforms as well. This was ex-
pected to generate mass confusion
near the embassy and create the im-
pression that the American raiders
were an Iranian military outfit re-
sponding to a rescue or a coup at-
tempt
? Iranian air defenses guarding
U.S. entrance routes had been sharp-
ly reduced on the planned rescue
night because a high-ranking Iranian
defense official recruited by the CIA''
had ordered the mobile ground-to-
air missile and radar facilities relo-
cated to the northwestern border of
Iran or sent out on maneuvers. Sev-
eral U.S. military leaders said they
had no knowledge of this arrange
ment.
? Before he resigned because of
his objections to the mission, Secre-
tary of State Cyrus R. Vance told
Carter that the overall hostage crisis
was not causing extensive damage to
national security..
The planned rescue mission
might, however, harm national se-
curity, he warned. Vance said the
-Iranians might well round up anoth-
er bunch of Americans, such as oil
company employes and journalists,
putting the U.S. government back in
the same bind.
? Counting air crews and backup
forces of troopers, more than 400
Americans and others supporting the
mission'could have been involved on
the ground in Iran at the moment
when the raiding party was to free
? Carter, withheld final approval
for the mission until the weekend of
April 19-20 and never seriously con-
sidered . a punitive or retaliatory
strike against Iran, though his na-
tional security adviser " , Zbigniew
Brzezinski,.,repeatedly urged .such
action. Brzezinski also suggested
that in order to emphasize the mis-
sion's importance, the president send
Brzezinski along . with Beckwith's
team. C-after quickly dismissed the
idea.
? Consideration was given to
knocking out the main rad~ trans-
mitter in Tehran during the'raid in
order to prevent a warning broadcast
,"that might trigger retaliation against
the 200 U.S. civilians and journalists
in Iran. Carter finally rejected the
option.
The rescue mission is likely to
grow increasingly controversial as
new details and disputes emerge
from the books now being written by
at least six Carter administration
officials.
The U.S. Embassy in Tehran was
overrun on Nov. 4, 1979. Concerned
that the militants might kill the hos-
tages, a small cadre of Pentagon
planners working in the Office of the'
Joint Chiefs of Staff began outlining
rescue contingencies that afternoon.
Initially, military and civilian of-
ficials- doubted -a successful, small-
scale rescue of the hostages could be
done... ,
W. Graham Claytor, deputy sec
retary of defense under Carter, re-
called: "The entire problem was that
the hostages were in Tehran, which
is way. inland. If it had been on or
near the coast, we could have got
them out .t.That was a big")' un
prece&
n
led problem.. ir: m kl,~i ,~u
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
There was no U.S. base nearby,
and, 'as Claytor says, "We had no
plan, no training, no intelligence."
The planners concentrated their
approach on the Egyptians. who had
several airfields near the Aswan dam
that looked promising and were
within 1,400 miles of the Iranian
coast. By December, Egyptian Pres-
ident Anwar Sadat had agr"ed to
provide a staging- base at Qena, an
airfield north of the dam. U.S. radar
surveillance planes and airborne
command posts moved in almost
immediately.
During the late- winter, a negoti-
ating back chanhel between White
House chief of staff Hamilton Jor
dan and Iranian officials began to
look promising to Carter. When the
negotiations ran into trouble, the
White House began to consider ask-
ing U.S. allies to join in an economic
boycott of Iran. But these new strat-
egies would take months to imple-
ment and months more to work. The
level of White House frustration was
building daily.
"We got into a posture of threat-
ening reprisals," one senior official
said. "We got in a box. It was nego-
tiate, negotiate, then threaten,
threaten, and what could we do
next? The rescue mission was the
only military option that could lead
to the release of the hostages."
On April 16, the Pentagon plan- i
ping group briefed the president on
a mission it thought could succeed..
After flying from Qena airbase in
Egypt and stopping at Masirah Is-
land, Oman, the first day of the mis-
sion would open at 6:55 p.m. when
an MC130 transport plane- with a
.radar-guidance system. that allowed
it to fly undetected would penetrate
The entry point near Chah Bahr,
where U.S. construction crews and
military planners had been building
a large naval base when the Fhah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fell, was I
.chosen because it was largely
deserted. The Iranian coastal radar
system left a substantial gap-one
that was supposed to have been
filled, at least sporadically, by, the
Airborne Warning and Control Sys-
tem (AWACS) the shah had ordered
but never received.
Five: more planes'.' would follow
north and then northwest through
the mountains. All six would then
head for an unpaved but hard land-
ing strip 500 miles inland in the
middle of the Iranian desert. The
spot was near a road that intelli-
gence experts expected to be lightly
traveled.
The first plane ` would arrive 34
minutes before the others so it could
swoop low to check the unmarked
spot and land with a specially
trained company of ' Rangers who
would secure the area and set out
infrared markers on the edge of the
runway.
Within the' next hour, Beckwith's
Delta team would arrive in two more
MC130s, accompanied by three
C 130s carrying fuel. Behind them
would come the eight slower helicop-
ters flying from the aircraft carrier,
USS Nimitz.
After an hour to refuel the heli-
copters, the Beckwith force of 100
men, plus the dozen or so Iranian
agents, would board them and fly for
2 hours, 13 minutes, straight toward
Tehran.
Fifty miles southeast of the city,
A he ' choppers would deposit the
Delta team out of sight of trains
moving along nearby tracks then fly
three miles away to a bulldozed
hideout; in 'the mountains, code-
named Figbar. Guards were de-
ployed around the hiding spots and
would have temporarily detained
any intruders:
Eight trucks would pick up Beck-
with's team before dawn at an old
caravan stop near Figbar and drivel
them on a main highway and then!
on a back road to a remote ware-
house (code-named Charley) provid-
ed by a local merchant. The trucks
would be dispatched at intervals re-I
sembling normal commercial pick
ups and deliveries.
During the next day, covert teams!
previously filtered into Tehran
under false passports issued by other,
countries, would brief the Delta l
team. At the end of the day, the
.Delta team would break up into
smaller units and, masked by com-
muter traffic, drive the last 15 miles
to hideouts in the city, where they
-would remain until late that night.
The most recent intelligence re
port from informants among the mile
itants indicated that there were like-
ly to be as few as 15 guards in the
entire embassy compound. Only
three or four would be stationed out-
side. One habitually leaned his rifle
against the building and slouched
against the wall. The stories about
extensive booby traps and mines ap-
peared to be false.
"We had an intelligence break-
through at the last minute," said one
senior official. "We had predicted
where the hostages. were . and we
learned. later we were right."
Drum Beat, the code word for the:
moment', when Beckwith's ? assault
team was to hit the embassy wall,
was scheduled for 10 minutes after
midnight. One group would' cut
phone and electrical lines. One of:
ficial said perhaps only one guard on
the outside of the wall would have to
be killed to get inside without detec-
tion.
Based on intelligence and a study
of architectural drawings of the two'
buildings housing hostages, the team
knew where the guards and hostages
were likely to be. The team was con-
fident it could overcome the, guards
silently, before they could harm the
hostages. .
The president "was not naive that
we were going to tie the hands of the
guards," one senior Carter. aide said
last week. "You weren't going to
spend time tying the hands of people
and jeopardize the mission." They
would all have to be killed, even
those on duty who had helped.
When the hostages were assem-
bled, the hostages and raiders would
move to the northeast corner of the
compound. Using the code word Dy-
namo, Beckwith would call in the
helicopters, the group would move
briskly across the broad intersection
of Roosevelt. Street., to a nearby soc-
cer stadium. Teir movements
would be covered by a prepositioned
combat control team on the corners
of the stadium's walls. ,. :
Two helicopters would arrive at
the stadium moments later. Two
more that had been loitering above a
construction site five miles north
would arrive seven minutes after
that, and another two (if they made
it to Tehran) a few minutes later. In ,,
all, the plan alloted 30 minutes to'
load the helicopters.,-..:
G
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In the event that crowds gathered,
the Iranians accompanying the Delta
team, but dressed as if they were
Iranian revolutionary guards, were
prepared to shout in Persian either
that they were trying to prevent a
rescue attempt by the Americans or
a coup attempt. The planners hoped
that in the impending confusion the
crowd would disperse.
If the crowd got out of control or
if `snipers began fixing, one of three
AC130s (code-named Hammer) cir-
cling overhead ,.would spray the
streets with bullets.. Armed with a
rapid-fire cannon and four- machine
guns, and aided by searchlights and
infrared night-viewing- devices,. the
Hammer team also was carrying spe-
cial ammunition that would explode
on hitting the pavement.
The briefers assured the president
that the spectacle of the AC130s lay-
ing down a carpet of bullets- would,
frighten off even the most zealous
Iranian.
While the main Delta team hit',
the embassy, another squad would'I
hit the ministry of foreign affairs,,
where three ranking diplomats were
being held. The ministry was in the
middle of a cloister of government
buildings. However, the area would
be virtually-, deserted on .Friday
night. The buildings was considered
to be lightly guarded and easy to
enter. Two helicopters were to pick
up the team and fly south to Man-
zariyeh.
The helicopters and AC130 would
fly for 38 minutes south from Teh-
ran toward the deserted Manzariyeh
airfield secured by a team of Rang-
ers. There they would. board three
C141 transports, two of which were
flying hospitals, and head south and
then west over the. Persian .Gulf,
across Saudi Arabia and on to
Egy,pt.
There also were Iranian air bases
with F4 fighter-bombers purchased
during the shah's regime. They were
clearly within striking distance of
the route of the cumbersome heli-
copters and AC130. The ?F4s .at the
Tehran airport' posed a particular
threat, since it was directly on the
route south, t;
The Pentagon planners knew that)
the Iranian pilots had never been
trained in night fighting. Still, the l
possibility that some planes would
attempt to interdict the force in the
nearly three hours it would be in
Iran,before exiting could not be ig-
nored.
To combat the threat from Iran-
ian warplanes, U.S. electronic war
fare planes would be in place not
only -to jam radar and communica-
tions but to detect when ' the Fos
were about to take off. '
They would be able to order in a
portion of the 48 Fos and A6Es off
the carrier.-Coral Sea 'and 24 A6&
from the Nimitz to bomb Iranian:''
runways. A dozen A i Es from each of
the carriers could provide additional
cover against Iranian groundforces.
And if planes should get off the
ground, the 24 F14s from the Nimitz
could join the F4s in intercepting
Iranian planes.
If possible, the plan was to min-
imize the damage to Iranian airfields
so that they would not be vulnerable
to attack by some other regional
force. The superior equipment, such
as special night-flying vision devices
available to the better trained Amer
ican pilots, should make the contest
no match.
The White House had prepared a
message to the Russians to explain
the rescue mission if there-was any
indication that the Soviets were, in'
,the words of one Carter aide, "get-:
ting the-wrong idea than this was
anything more than just a hostage .
rescue.",
If. Soviet forces made a move, the
U.S. was ready to call in additional
forces from Europe and two carrier
groups sailing toward the Indian
Ocean.
When Gen- Jones and his briefers .
finished describing these plans at the
April 16 meeting in the White House
Situation Room, they introduced
Beckwith. Beckwith assured the
group that there was no team better,
suited for the task-anywhere... .
Carter asked lots of questions and
wondered if there were anything
more he'could do to assure, the mis-
"
sion's.success.
; rz:.y,
Jones was blunt, according to the
notes of one participant. "We want
to answer all your questions now,
Mr. President, and not be bothered
with questions about why not do
this, why do that" during the mis-
sion.
"Once you start," Carter pledged,
"I'll stay out of your business."
After the , meeting. Jordan . ap
proached Vance, who had opposed
the mission on the grounds that it
would not work, while negotiations
combined with economic sanctions
eventually would. Jordan asked the
secretary if he felt better about the
plan.
Yes, he replied, but indicated he
still opposed it. "Don't forget, I was
at the Defense Department for years
and the military will never tell you
they can't do anything." '
Special , assistants Jan Austin.
Malcolm Byrne, Robin Gradison
and Michael Meyer contributed to
this report...
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t
7MW
"What does the
experience tell us
about national
decision making?"
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0
ARTICLE pPPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE 25 April 1982
Scope of Hostage Mission Unfolds
ijebate`- kindles o . Fai .e
President -Carter's intelligence
chief says ?a new inquiry: should be.
made into the failed Iranian hostage
rescue mission attempted'two, years.,_
ago today.. ,
Retired Navy Adm . Stansfield:
Turner, director of the Central ? In
telligence Agency during the, Carte
presidency, called the raid a searingr.,;
national experience" that has not
been completely plumbed 'for the_
lessons it holds for the nation
Gen. David C. Jones, -chairman of
the Joint Chiefs -of Staff: and' the
principal architect of the rescue mis-
sion, which ended in flaming disaster
on the Iranian desert, said yesterday
that. -such an investigation. would
serge no useful purpose'- because
there is little about the, raid that has
not already been explored.
This article was reported and
written by staff writers Scott:. Arm-
strong, George C. Wilson and-Bob
Woodward..., "'
This difference of opinion over
whether a new review is in order -
comes at ` a time when other senior
officials involved with the April 25,
1980, midnight attempt to extract 53
hostages from. Tehran are confirming
that the operation was much bigger
d b tanr tl,e.i the plthlic has been
n
told to date.
A series of interviews conducted
by The Washington Post disclosed a
sharp difference in perspective
among top military leaders, some
lower level planners and other Car-
ter administration officials who knew
what American ,troopers an d war-,.
planes were prepared to do. Contin-
gency plans included rushing in a
backup force of 90 more commandos
if the initial assault force of 100;men
under Col. Charles A.:.:(Chargin'
Charlie) Beckwith got trapped in
Tehran or the nearby airport des-
tined to be the takeoff. point for
their long-distance escape from Iran.
Military leaders insisted they were
counting heavily on speed, surprise
and. stealth and believed it might
even be possible to pull off the res-
cue without firing a shot at anybody.
Carter and his top aides were willing
to accept limited casualties and
some officials believed there would
inevitably be deaths, perhaps hun-
dreds if the firepower available to
Beckwith was called in.
Noting such conflicting viewpoints
and arguing that the raid has too
many policy implications to ignore
any longer, Turner said:
"It is now time to appoint a small
group to examine how the operation
was planned and executed. The pur-
pose would not be to look backward
and cast, blame but to look forward
and learn the lessons that surely lie
buried in" the complicated mission.
"Some of the questions that
should be addressed would be: What
does the experience tell us about
national decision making? About our
military capabilities, organization"
and motivation? About the problems
of totally secret military operations."
Contended Jones in a separate
"We're not going to have another
situation just like the Iranian situ-
ation. They never repeat themselves.
Let's look at the fundamental prob-
lems like organization rather than-i
taking an isolated case. We don't
need to go back and look at things
that happened two years ago. Let's
get on with solving those fundamen
tal problems," with reorganizing the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, a priority high
.on Jones' list
-u,-AY ueu-e vu. wuay to lull ofI a
rescue successfully. He noted that a
pane `:of officers under retired Adm.
James L. Holloway III has already
delved into the Iranian rescue mis-
sion and issued a critical report.
Turner and some other former
senior administration officials and
military planners are known to think
that the Holloway investigation was
too limited and' amounted to the
military investigating itself.
Than ` Carter's chief intelligence
executive, who was in on the top se
cret planning for the raid, is willing
to urge a new inquiry strongly sug-
gests there is still, on the second an-'
niversary of the raid, a lot more that
could be told.
Interviews with Carter adminis
tration officials, military leaders and
people `who went on the raid' but
tressed 'that viewpoint in bringing
these fresh disclosures, some of them
contradictory, about the most daring
rescue ever attempted by,the Amer-.
' -
ican military:
? Getting into the embassy unde
tected depended in part on informa
tion secured by the CIA from a
handful of infiltrated agents and
bribed guards among the student
militants, including some who were
scheduled to be on duty as guards
the night of the raid.
Some Carter administration offs
cials said the plan called for all the
guards to be killed, while raili
leaders insisted the "Delta" force
under Beckwith was equipped with ;
special hand and leg cuffs that could
be snapped on the guards in an in-
sible for that 'part of the-mission;---;F
acknowledged they were not 'respon
managed to co-opt the guards, but
doubted the CiA or anyone else had
bassy as anticipated. Military leaders-
stant-and would have been if the
troopers had sneaked into the em-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100210010-0