MISINFORMATION ON DISINFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100440036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 16, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Misinformation on disiniormanon
16 July 1985
RTlc r A'flEARED
recently read a review, pub-
lished in a certain magazine to
be identified later, of a book,
Dezinformatsia, by two
respected academics, Professor
Richard H. Shultz Jr. of Tufts Uni-
versity's Fletcher School of Diplo-
`Macy and Roy Godson of
Georgetown University. The review
ttmde the following serious charges
against this book:
0 The book was said to use "spe-
eious arguments to prove the obvi-
oyp.
.. ? It misrepresents reality to prove
a simplistic point.
? It is "misguided:' exhibits. a
"total lack of understanding" about
Clausewitz, shows "a superficial
understanding of . current history
and the Soviet Union:'
? It didn't "fairly report" the con-
tent of Soviet journals, it has treated
the subject "irresponsibly:" it suffers
from "extraordinarily naive
assumptions" and "erroneous his-
tory"
? And the book was said "ulti-
mately" to serve "neither
scholarship nor the national inter-
est:'
Such harsh language about the
published work of academics can be
defined as a form of character assas-
sination, since it questions their
honor as teachers and researchers.
For my part, to be even harsher, I
would say that this review could,
with little editing, have appeared in
a Soviet publication.
Now, then, would you like to guess
in what left-wing, pro-Soviet, pro-
gressive journal this book review
appeared? If you're very smart and
sophisticated, you might try and
guess, but you'd be wrong. I'll have
to tell you:
. This book review appeared in an
official magazine of the government
WASHINGTON TIMES
of the United States, a magazine pub-
lished by the Central Intelligence
Agency - yes, by the CIA under the
supervision of the Deputy Director-
ate ate for Intelligence that is responsi-
ble for all CIA analyses of world
affairs.
The publication, a quarterly
called Studies in Intelligence,, is an
"in-house" publication. It is not dis-
tributed publicly since some articles
are classified; others, such as the
book review I am discussing, are
unclassified. The essay-review, in
the magazine's winter 1984 issue,
was written by Avis Boutell, a CIA
analyst, who works for the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service.
When I read the Shultz-Godson
book some months ago to prepare
my own favorable review, I found it
a cool, scholarly examination of
Soviet propaganda and disinfor-
mation strategies. So did a number
of other distinguished Sovietologists
and publicists, such as Professors
Adam Ulam and Uri Ra'anan, Dr.
Robert Conquest, and Professor Sid-
ney Hook, who wrote the laudatory
introduction.
The book, now in its third edition,
included what I regarded as highly
informative interviews with defec-
tors who had specialized, while in
the service of the KGB in the
U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, in
"active measures.". The Soviet
strategy of "active measures"
involves, for the most part, covert
disinformation as "a non-attributed
or falsely attributed communica-
tion, written or oral, containing
intentionally false, incomplete, or
misleading information [frequently
combined with true information,
which seeks to deceive, misinform,
and/or mislead the target:' accord-.
ing.to-the Shultz=Godson definition.
In other' words, the book
describes a panoply of Soviet tactics
to manipulate the media in the
democracies, the use of "agents of
influence:' sponsorship of clandes-
tine radio broadcasts, and use of
international front organizations.
These strategies and tactics are
excellently described in this impor-
tant book
Not only is-Studies in Intelligence
an official government magazine,
but it also is published by a U.S.
secret service. It therefore must be
assumed that whatever is published
therein represents the official view
of the CIA or, at the very least, the
point of view of CIA analysts. As an
analogy, a Voice of America edito-
rial, for example, must be approved
by responsible State Department
officials before it can be read on the
air..
If the CIA book review reflects
the political culture of the CIA and
the world in which its analysts live,
then some of the egregious errors
about Soviet intentions made by the
CIA over the past 15 or more years,
errors which have been publicly dis-
cussed in the press and by the two
congressional committees on intelli-
gence oversight, become under-
standable.
One could take apart, paragraph
by paragraph, this CIA book review
to demonstrate its use of the rhetoric
of overkill.
Here I want merely to deal with
the political approach of a CIA ana-
lyst whose views, no matter what the
CIA might say, seem to harmonize
with the agency's ethos, which I pray
is not that of William J. Casey, CIA
director. That this review got past
Mr. Casey, I can understand; he has
more important problems to deal
with. But isn't there somebody in his
organization who has the wit, under-
standing, and common decency to
realize that the language used to dis-
cuss the Shultz-Godson book might
be better suited to a review of Hit-
ler's Mein Kampp
'hike this sneerina_ rMurtivp cpn-
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tence in the review: "They [the
authors) seem less concerned to
understand the Soviet Union than tq-
prove that it is irrational and the
West totally benign:'
Now anyone who has read this
book knows that the authors do not..
seek to prove that the U.S.S.R. is irra-
tional. On the contrary, what they; .
demonstrate is that the Soviet KGB
is performing with great skill its
assignment to further the Politbu-
ro's foreign-policy objectives. The
giveaway phrase in that sentence is
to prove ... the West totally benign.
Of course, the authors nowhere
try to show that the West is totally,
benign. Such a thesis is irrelevant to
the book since it is merely
attempting to discuss Soviet "active
measures;" not the good intentions of
the West.
But lets face it: couldn't a victim
of Soviet totalitarianism, rotting in
one of its prison camps - or an
Andrei Sakharov or Anatoly
Shcharansky - say that, in compari-
son to the wholly rational tyranny of
the U.S.S.R, the West is "totally
benign?"
What the author (and in this, I am
sure, the reviewer reflects the views
of the CIA establishment) clearly
rejects (and the targets of the
review do not) is the meaning of
Marxism-Leninism as a permanent
constituent of Soviet foreign policy.
What that doctine means is that
Mikhail Gorbachev cannot regard as
legitimate any system of rule other
than communism. Marxism-
Leninism sees other political sys-
tems as doomed to fall because of the
"contradictions of capitalism."
Since Marxism-Leninism carries
the banner of history and the future,
the U.S.S.R. alone has the right to
judge who shall live and who shall
die. That is why negotiation with the
Soviet Union, except on its own
terms, is doomed to fail until the
Soviet Union accepts - in practice,
not in joint communiques - an
amendment to the eschatology of
Marxism-Leninism.
The CIA reviewer demonstrates
- let's call it naivete - a surprising
naivete in assuming that the Soviet
media, during the Nixon-Kissinger-
Ford detente period, out of convic-
tion sincerely ascribed to the West
"realistic, positive qualities:' .
And she .attacks the authors for
not giving due credit to this thawing
of the eternal Soviet winter. Of
course, the Soviet media were will-
ing to be kinder and less strident
because it was during detente that
the U.S.S.R. engaged without West-
ern opposition in the greatest arms-
building program of any country in
history. The Soviets continue that
program to this very day..
But then there came came a time
when the kissing had to stop. The
Soviet media changed the lovey-
dovey% bear-hugging music. What in'
heaven's name did the West do that
forced upon a doting Soviet Union a
change of tune, from detente mel-
lowness to cold war harshness? Was
the error to accept sadly the
destruction of 269 lives on KAL 007?
Sadly accept the killing of Major
Nicholson? Sadly accept the attempt
on the pope's life? Sadly accept mar-
tial law for Poland? Sadly accept the.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?
But let us assume that the.
reviewer is correct in some of her
criticisms. Does that call for a sav-
age rhetorical barrage which bord-:'
ers on high-level billingsgate? Does
it call for a cannonade of unprovable
charges such as the claims that the
book "hurts" the profession of intel-
ligence, and the efforts to develop "a.
rational foreign policy," and that the
book serves "neither scholarship
nor the national. interest?" If any-:
body has "hurt" the profession of
intelligence, it would be Avis Boutell;
and whoever edits the CIA mag-
azine.
What kind of behavior is that, Wil-
liam Casey? Is someone down there
trying to get even with somebody
else?
Arnold Beichman, a founding
member of the Consortium for the
Study of Intelligence, of which'Pro-
>$ssor Godson is coordinator, fre-
quently writes about intelligence
matters.
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