REAGAN DOCTRINE'S DARKEST DAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000200830002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 16, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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16 March 1987
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411
ne's
Reagan Doctri
Darkest Days
SUMMARY: The Reagan Doctrine - the pledge to aid democratic
farces throughout the Third World - Is beset by enemies from the
Politburo to the Pentagon. The Iran-Contra affair has been an
especially damaging blow. But It Is competing factions within the
government, combined with an Increasing congressional role in
making foreign policy, that has left the doctrine Impotent., The
president's penchant for compromise has allowed the bureaucratic
warfare to continue, dealing a potentially deadly blow to his policy.
S oviet special operations forces
attack Afghan rebel camps at
the Pakistani border, killing
hundreds of Afghans who
are resisting the Soviet occu-
pation of their country. Nica-
raguan troops cross into
Honduras chasing anti-Sandinista rebels
and clash with Honduran soldiers. prompt-
ing the United States to fly 200 Honduran
troops to the border area in U.S. helicop-
ters. Fidel Castro increases the number of
Cuban troops in Angola, propping up a
brutal :Marxist regime against a well-
advanced insurgency. In a radical policy
shift. Castro vows to keep his troops in
Angola until "apartheid is dismantled in
South Africa."
If this reads like a nightmare scenario
dreamed up by a low-intensity warfare ex-
pert operating in the bowels of the Pen-
tagon, read again. Each of these virtually
unnoticed events occurred in the weeks fol-
lowing the public revelations of the [ran-
Contra affair in November. And it is no
accident that each of these Soviet-backed
offensives is a challenge to the Reagan
Doctrine and specifically to President Rea-
gan's pledge to aid anticommunist "free-
dom fighters" throughout the Third World.
As the U.S. government is engulfed in
one of the deepest foreign policy crises in
recent history, opponents of the Reagan
Doctrine in the Soviet Politburo. in Con-
gress and in the administration itself, who
have been chipping away at the premier
pillar of -Reagan foreign policy since its
genesis. are moving with renewed intensity
to kill it. They are taking advantage of
prevailing confusion. inertia and infighting
in the highest foreign policy councils of the
government.
The critical findings of the presidential
commission examining the role of the Na-
tional Security Council have made a des-
perate situation worse. The commission,
named after its chairman. former Sen. John
G. Tower of Texas, concluded that connarv
to President Reagan's denials. the United
States did seek to trade arms for American
hostages in its overtures to Iran. It also
found evidence that some proceeds from
the arms sales went to the rebels fighting
the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua. In both covert initiatives. Lt.,
Col. Oliver L. North. an NSC deputy. ex-
ceeded what higher-ranking White House
officials had intended and approved, in the
opinion of the commission.
In piecing the puzzle together. the com-
mission relied heavily on internal NSC
memos, which indicated that North had set
up a subterranean foreign policy apparatus
that operated outside normal government
channels. The legal questions raised by
these activities have been referred to in-
dependent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh.
who is investigating charges of criminal
wrongdoing. Two congressional commit-
tees also are conducting inquiries.
More important than specific findings
of wrongdoing is the fact that this scandal.
unlike Watergate, has cast a pall on U.S.
foreign policy. The Tower commission's
report is likely to cause bureaucratic grid-
lock. Says Neil Livingstone. president of
the Institute on Terrorism and Subnational
Conflict, "How would you like to be on the
NSC and have to approach [adviser Frank
C.I Carlucci with an imaginative idea''"
Or Howard Baker, for that matter. The
new White House chief of staff is going to
be so busy cleaning up after the departure
a Muskie and Tower (right): Critical
report further damaged the doctrine.
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The Opal Office: Some say the doctrine's weakness stems from the president's failure to settle policy disputes himself.
of Donald T Regan that new initiatives will
be the furthest thing from his mind. The
Reagan Doctrine has
already lost Director
of Central Intelligence William J. Casey,
who resigned in January for health reasons.
The commission has also fueled a much
larger political conflict, as President Rea-
gans opponents seek to gain control of the
da from the a_ dministra-
tion and to divulge wholesale U.S. intel-
ligence secrets related to both the CIA and
the NSC._.
The Iran-Contra affair strikes particu-
larly hard at the heart of the Reagan Doc-
trine, a bold and imaginative policy that
includes support for the democratic center
in countries under authoritarian or totalitar-
ian rule. It was the sense of deep frustration
among high-ranking Reagan Doctrine sup-
porters in the administration at their inabil-
ity to push the foreign policy bureaucracy
and Congress to embrace the doctrine that
led to the course of events detailed by. the
Tower commission.
"The opponents of the Reagan Doc-
trine. who pushed the administration to
adopt these unorthodox approaches in the
first place, are now getting their wish:' says
a Pentagon expert on guerrilla insurgency.
'At least we were implementing the Reagan
Doctrine for a time. Now, no one is."
Two themes run through the history of
the Reagan Doctrine. One is a tale of bu-
reaucratic warfare that has wounded the
doctrine from the outset. The most recent
,example: the internecine batt a between the
rate eoartment and the Central lntel-
ligen ce Agency over the political and mili-
tan' strategy of the Nicaraguan rebels.
"There has never been one predominant
strategic thinker in this administration who
could settle the competing agendas of the
various bureaucracies:' says Zbigniew
Brzezinski. national security adviser in the
Carter administration. Ultimately, of
course, it was Reagan's duty to till that
vacuum, by replacing aides who did not
share his views and settling high-level
stalemates himself. That he w'as unwilling
or unable to do either has now threatened
the foreign policy doctrine that bears his
name.
The other theme is what Lawrence S.
Eagleburger, a former under secretary of
state in the Reagan administration, calls
"Congress's penchant for making foreign
policy by committee.' Ever since Congress
passed the War Powers Act in 1973, mak-
ing explicit its role in the commitment of
U.S. troops to. combat, it has been en-
croaching on the authority of the president
to conduct foreign policy. Congress has
scotched arms sales, proposed arms control
negotiating positions. tiedstrtnes to-foreign'
aid and circumscribed covert intelligence
actions': all as an expression of a desire to
be informed and consulted. Says Eaglebur-
ger: "Congress has made it more and more
difficult to conduct foreign policy in any-
thing but a defensive way"
While it has yet to be established con-
clusively that money from U.S. arms sales
to Iran was funneled to the Nicaraguan
rebels, it is clear that the president at least
tacitly approved of efforts by some mem-
bers of his staff to implement the Reagan
Doctrine secretly. particularly the effort to
keep the rebels alive after Congress cut off
official U.S. aid in 1984. .
It all started with a June 1982 speech
Reagan gave to the British Parliament, the
first in a long line of official statements
setting forth the ideals embodied in the
Reagan Doctrine. (Two years earlier, can-
didate Reagan's imagination had been ig-
nited by tales of the success of Jonas
Savimbi. anticommunist rebel leader in
Angola.) In that speech. Reagan spoke of
cultivating "the fragile flower of democ-
racy" to foster "democratic ideals in au-
thontarian regimes.-
U.S. actions in implementing that-doc-
trine ran the gamut. from the outright
invasion of Grenada to liberate the Ca-
ribbean island from communism to behind-
the-scenes diplomatic maneuvering in sup-
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The generally popular invasion of Grenada was a Reagan Doctrine success.
port of the democratic center in El Sal-
vador. Those policies were successful and
won bipartisan praise.
But the policy in Nicaragua was a stick-
ing point. By late 1982 the White House
had grown increasingly unhappy with the
State Department's low level of enthusiasm
for its Central America policy, particularly
with State's efforts to negotiate the Nicara-
guan rebels out of existence. According to
former administration officials involved in
the effort, the White House believed that
some Reagan Doctrine initiatives had to be
run covertly then in order to circumvent
opposition from others in the administra-
tion - in this case, primarily Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs Thomas 0. Enders - and in Con-
gress.
R esponsibility for coordi-
nating the covert initia-
tives fell to the National
Security Council staff. In
January 1983, the pres-
ident signed a national
security decision direc-
tive - a classified executive order - that
permitted the council to coordinate inter-
agency "political action strategies:'. the
purpose of which was to counter moves by
"the Soviet Union or Soviet surrogates:'
The directive gave the Reagan Doctrine
teeth for the fast time.
One of these covert actions, carried out
by the CIA ut conceive y former na-
tional security adviser Robert C. McFar-
lane, was the mining of Nicaragua's_har-
bors in 1984. When the action was
revealed, demonstrating that the U.S. co-
vert role in Nicaragua was larger than pre-
viously believed, an outcry erupted on
Capitol Hill. Six months later, Congress
voted to cut off further aid to the rebels.
By the time Congress had acted, North
was coordinating a wide range of covert
activities from the White House, including
the raising of money from wealthy indi-
viduals and foreign governments for the
Nicaraguan rebels. North set up a host of
offshore companies and secret bank ac-
counts that kept the Contra movement alive
with money and equipment. Evidence also
points to payments to the anticommunist
rebel forces in Angola and Afghanistan.
The resulting public revelations of
North's activities have not so much undone
the Reagan Doctrine as unmasked its pre-
canousness. For the most telling fact about
the Reagan Doctrine is that unlike other
presidential doctrines - the Truman Doc-
trine or the :Nixon Doctrine - no Reagan
administration official has actually pro-
nounced U.S. support for democratic revo-
lution to be a "doctrine." Thus, the level of
commitment and clarity such a doctrine
would entail was never forthcoming from
the administration.
"I remember going to the White House
and pointing out on a map what was hap-
pening. that these democratic ti>rces were
rising up:' says Jack Wheeler. the executive
director of the Freedom Research Founda-
tion. "Since then, the idea of backing dem-
ocratic liberation was adopted rhetorically,
but there were no policy directives to back
up the rhetoric.'
It took Charles Krauthammer, writing in
Time magazine in 1985, to explain coher-
ently what Reagan said he had been truing
to achieve and to give it a name. A year
later, after the regimes of Ferdinand E.
Marcos in the Philippines and Jean-Claude
Duvalier in Haiti fell with a shove from the
U.S. government, policy analysts, journal-
ists and some U.S. officials began touting
what they called "the other side of the
Reagan Doctrine" - support for democ-
racy everywhere, including challenging
friendly dictators.
It was in fact this half of the Reagan
Doctrine - pressure on friendly but des-
potic rulers in Haiti and the Philippines,
.and support for democratic institution-
building in the new democracies of Latin
America - that had raised hopes and elic-
ited bipartisan kudos at this time last year.
But now, some of that luster has worn off.
The administration and Congress have
failed to follow up and help these countries
solve the intractable problems they face.
In the Philippines, President Corazon
Aquino faces the same communist threat
a and the economic mess that Marcos left
behind when he fled the nation in Februarv
S 1986 on the advice of the Reagan admin-
istration. She also has confronted, and con
founded, several coup attempts by Marcos
loyalists. After first voting it down, Con-
gress approved S200 million in additional
aid to the Philippines last fall, but Aquino
said it was not nearly enough.
Haiti has not fared much better since the
United States helped engineer the ouster of
Duvalier: Unemployment remains at 60
percent and per capita annual income at
$300. "Expectations were too high last
February," says Leslie Delatour. Haiti's fi-
nance minister. "We are making progress
in restructuring our economy and bringing
in capitalism, but resources are a problem.
We need more U.S. aid,"
Inadequate foreign aid is a stumbling
block. All of the Latin American democra-
cies (many of which are still green) have
been hit hard by congressional cuts in the
foreign aid budget. which dropped to S 13.3
billion for fiscal 1987 from S 15.4 billion in
1986. Since certain countries specially ear-
marked by Congress got no cut in aid (pri-
manly Israel and Egypt). the Latin Amer-
ican nations bore the brunt of the cuts. In
addition, neither Congress nor the admin-
istration has managed to find the funds to
Nupply the S300 million in economic aid
approved last August for El Salvador, Costa
Solarz, not Reagan, pushed for aid to
the guerrillas in Kampuchea.
3.
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Rica. Guatemala and Honduras.
Congress finally got around to sending
the Philippines sore-
ome money, but it took a
passionate speech by Aquino to turn the
tide. That hesitation on the part of Congress
was another sign that the Reagan Doctrine
had failed to catch fire, even with such a
popular policy as the one in the Philippines.
In addition, the administration took so
many stutter steps on the way to its policy
in relation to Aquino that many wonder it
worked out at all. "if you look at the case
of the Philippines. we acted correctly. but
it was in response to events.' says one
former National Security Council aide. "it
was no grand design. It was sort of an
accident."
All of which suggests that intellectuals
and analysts outside the administration
were attempting to supply the administra-
tion with a strategic vision it had not
adopted and, perhaps. did not even share.
Brzezinski dismisses the Reagan foreign
policy as "ad hoc-ism.'
Resistance within the executive branch
of the eovetnment o e eaean Doctrine
does not fit the traditional anal- sis of the
competing foreign policy baronies: State
Department doves. Pentagon hawks and
CIA rogue elephants. According to a num-
ber of current and former administration
officials. there were essentially two com-
peting factions with adherents in each of
the agencies.
The first group - most of the State
Department. the military officers in the
Defense Department and some key CIA
officials - believed that negotiations
should play the primary role in resolving
the anticommunist insurrections in Af-
ghanistan. Angola and Nicaragua. These
regional arrangements would allow the
communist governments to stay in power
but would render them less threatening to
their neighbors and to U.S. interests by
eliminating their reliance on the Soviet bloc
and by loosely committing them to under-
take democratic reforms.
The second group key members of
the National Security ounc I staff rank-
ing Defense Department civilians. CIA
chief Casey and his close aides -generally
favored a policy of liberation, with an em-
phasis on military pressure to force the
replacement of the communist regimes
with democratic ones.
1trFsecond group believed that the
communist regimes. if not squeezed mil-
itarily, would merely use the negotiation
time to consolidate and then export their
tyranny. When Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams
A CIA official was blamed for keeping effective arms from the Afghan guerrillas.
took charge of Central America policy in
the spring of 1985. his views on Nicaragua
put him more in line with the second group.
but other State Department officials re-
mained unconvinced. On Afghanistan and
Angola. the State Department stuck with
the first group.
The result'' 'All we did was nickel and
dime the resistance forces. giving some
level of commitment. but not enough:' says
one NSC aide. "There really was no
policy." This U.S. indecision fostered fear
of embracing the freedom fighters on the
part of such allies as Pakistan and the Cen-
tral American democracies, further damag-
ing the credibility of U.S. policy.
The responsibility for resolving these
policy disputes rested with the president.
says one Ion-time Reagan aide. but "the
president's impulse was to compromise.
Actually, he is not the ideologue his detrac-
tors have tried to create. But in policy-
making, the desire to compromise some-
times means never taking decisive action.'
The high point of the Reagan Doctrine
probably came in July 1985. in a series of
key votes in the House. First. Democrats
ended up voting for humanitarian aid to the
Nicaraguan rebel forces after a nine-month
cutoff. Two days later. the House approved
a military aid package to the noncommu-
nist forces fighting the Vietnamese occupi-
ers of Kampuchea. The next day. it over-
turned the Clark Amendment. a 1976
prohibition on U.S. aid to the Angolan
insurgents. And before the month was out.
a symbolic payment of S5 million in overt
humanitarian aid for the rebels in Afghan-
istan was approved.
But a closer look at these votes shows
that the impetus for aiding several of the
rebel groups came not from the administra-
tion but from Congress. The aid to the
Kampuchean rebels was pushed by Rep.
Stephen J. Solarz. a New York Democrat.
and was opposed by the State Department.
In the case of Angola. the State Depart-
ment actively opposed scuttling the Clark
Amendment. Secretary of State George P.
Shultz sent a letter to House Minority
Leader Robert H. Michel asking him to
oppose the legislation because it would
open the way for aid to Savimbi's UNITA
rebels. contrary to the State Department's
negotiating stance.
The Angolan case illustrates perfectly
the two-track policy followed by an indeci-
sive administration. The State Depart-
ment's Africa bureau continues to pursue
negotiation between Angola's communist
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government and South Africa. State's ob-
jective in the Angolan negotiations is to get
South Africa to turn over Namibia to the
communist South-West Africa People's Or-
ganization and cut off all support for
Savimbi. in exchange for which the Ango-
Ian regime is supposed to expel 35.000
Cuban troops and Soviet bloc personnel..
As a compromise. after a personal
pledge from Reagan to Savimbi during a
White House meeting in January 1986.
U.S. officials agreed to give about S15
million in military aid to UNITA last year.
The administration will provide about S 15
million again this year, as against a S t
about 6,000 Afghan rebels who are battling , back talks being held in Geneva among the
approximately 120,000 Soviet troops. Soviets. the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul'
Each year. according to congressional corn- and Pakistan but excluding the resistance'
mittee sources, supporters of_thhee ---- s.in. forces. The aim of the talks is to exchange'
Congress have doubled the administration's__ a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan for
aid request, yet effective US.-made weap_ Pakistan's refusal to serve as a conduit for'
ons, particularly Stinger missiles, were not aid to the Afghan rebels.
'
supplied to
the reels until after the resigna-
tion last March of CLA. DepuqLDiteztor
John N. McMahon. who adamantly op-
pose the program.
It took seven years to get what we
needed.' says Henry Kriegle, director of
the Committee for a Free Afghanistan in
Washington. "McMahon was able to block
While aid to the Contras is debated, Sandinista troops train near Honduras.
billion annual investment by the Soviet bloc
in the Luanda government. "The S15 mil-
lion was enough to make a 'dent but not
enough to make a policy. You still have
State's policy of negotiation:' says one Pen-
tagon critic of the compromise.
Even 'so. Savimbi's rebels, recently
armed with U.S. Stinger antiaircraft mis-
siles, are beginning to make some gains.
They are believed to control one-third of
the country. UNITA has shot down more
than 40 Angolan aircraft in the past few
months, convincing the Luanda regime that
military victory against it is improbable.
The Afghan program has incurred a
similar fate. The United States has pro-
vided covert military aid in amounts that
have increased annually from $75 million
in 1983 to $500 million last year to help
it while he was there." Administration
sources say more Stingers will be provided
this year, but Kriegle thinks it will likely be
"too little, too late. Only three of the seven
rebel groups have them, and the Soviets
have begun mounting a major offensive
after the failure of the [January] cease-fine:"
On the political front, the Afghan resis-
tance has had even less luck in Washington.
Eighteen months ago, the tribal groups
made an alliance to try to establish a gov-
ernment in exile. Last June, the groups'
leaders came to Washington seeking diplo-
matic recognition, which might give them
a role in negotiations over Afghanistan's
future. Several Pentagon officials favored
the move, as did many senators.
But the rebels. were turned down be-
cause the State Department continues to
As in Angola, and possibly Nicaragua.'
the State Department would have-the United States cut off the freedom fighter
when an accord is reached. Shultz, sources
say, is ready to accept any regime in Kabul,
so long as the Soviets pull out. But others'
in the administration, notably the Penta-'
gon's Fred C. Ikle, under secretary for'
policy, have declared that a communist-
front government in Afghanistan is unac-
ceptable to the United States.
"All along:' says Kriegle. "U.S. com-
mitment to negotiations and interest in
Soviet feelers about a withdrawal have
raised concerns about sacrificing the resis-
tance to a compromise.','
The battle of the Nicaraguan rebels has
attracted by far the most attention in the
debate over the Reagan Doctrine, and it too
has been a victim of both bureaucratic re-
sistance and congressional recalcitrance.
The main problem, in the view of many
observers, has been the administration's
seemingly endless revision of its aims in
Nicaragua.
The Reagan Nicaragua policy had early
setbacks at the hands of both internal and
external opponents. In 1982, the reasons
for U.S. support of the Contras had not
been enunciated clearly by U.J. ortcials.
Opponents of the program convinced the
admi
i
t
ti
h
n
s
ra
on t
at aid could be obtaind
e from Congress only if it would not be used
d in an effort to change the government of
Nicaragua. Thus the administration's strat-
egy was defined quite narrowly: interdict-
ing the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El
Salvador's guerrilla insurgents.
Since the policyal..was, constricted,
the CIA determined that the Contras did not
need the heavy weapons. antiaircraft and
logistics essential to mount a winning mili-
tary struggle against the Sandinistas, a
Contra goal that went far beyond halting
arms-to.. _El.Salvador.
By 1984, the State Department was
again sending mixed signals about Nicara-
gua policy. CS. officials were putting pres-
sure on Honduras and Costa Rica to sign a
draft treaty that would have cut off support
for the Contras in exchange for a commit-
ment by the Sandinistas to discuss reducing
their sources of foreign support and better
treatment of the opposition. Langhorne A.
Motley, the assistant secretary for Latin
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S. . ~.
r KINS
. KST1TCORYS
'?T ICN .
A January pro-Marcos rally in Manila indicative of the problems Aquino has faced. But U.S. help has been sh
ow corning.
American affairs, was forced out in the Cruz, Alfonso Robelo Callejas and Adolfo will be formed soon. They would like to
spring of 1985 for backing this proposal Calera Portocarrera, have been bickering see Calero return as a member of the new
and was replaced by Elliott Abrams. and jockeying for position within the rebel grou, and Cruz and Robelo Under Abrams. most administration of- organization for weeks. Cruz, a professo- But State Department officials say that
ficials closed ranks behind the Contras' rial former Sandinista who is popular on without Cruz and Robelo, they have little
political and military effort. But there have Capitol Hill. had threatened to resign from hope of persuading Congress to approve the
been occasional miscues. Last May, pres- the United Nicaraguan Opposition, the administration's $105 million request for
idential envoy Philip C. Habib sent a letter Contras' political directorate, if Calero did the Contras in the fall. They admit that Cruz
to congressional Democrats which many not quit the organization.
conservatives interpreted as signaling his and Robelo do not have much of a follow-
support for wptreaty that would ing among rank and file Contras , but they
have r or weak e aid peace
the rebels. At the alero is the president of charge that Calero does not either. Further.
have Rep, lack Kemp, a NYork Re u e the Nicaraguan Demo- officials say that neither Calero nor Ber-
time. d lack Kemp, a New e fire Habib b- cratic Front. or FDN. mudez has operational control over the
ilic n, urge uree the faith in the as in the fi
efor ldo the bulk of the rebels' Cruz and Robelo do;' says one State De-
away strength. Cruz. backed partment official. The real fighting power
from the democratic resistance for false C by the State Department. is held by the regional field commanders.
promises of an unenforceable treaty." .. believed Calero was cutting the directorate struggle
Currently, both the United States and out of important decisions, affect The Contra outcome aid of this prospects. Scts. Swill likely
Nicaragua have warmed to a ro sal ad- So will
will
vanced by President Oscar Arias proposal
report-
presidency of the FDN 6H but retained e His posit ondis edlyoare introin the . ducing lhundreds of better-
of Costa Rica. The plan would require all supported by the CIA managers of the co- equipped troops into Nicaragua each week
Central American countries to guarantee vent Contra pro gr am and some members of and are meeting little resistance from the
"full observance of civil rights" and "real the National Security-.Councilsta , a-_ . Sandinista army. The aid flow has enabled
pluralistic and democratic processes' It cording to a council aide. They believe that the rebels to regain the initiative.
also would require free elections overseen Calera and his military commander, En- But some rebel leaders complain that,,.
by foreign teams. Abrams and other U.S. rique 8 ermud
officials are not prepared to halt aid to the CIA, have the ability too dirfeectsome Contra tooe slowly dry atchin
has to mili vi mem e rebels. however, until the terms of any military successes against the Sandinistas much heavy or s phisticatedequipment.
peace plans are enacted by the Sandinistas, in ttie corning months and that Cruz and ' And some of the - ui rrienr we have got-
not merely agreed to. brio are lackluster fi ureheads installed ten is not working pperly," says Calero.
More serious disagreement has broken by-. iate o-- Ite-ben of on Administration officials say their hesi-
out within the administration over political ese officials believe that "UNO is tancy in resupplying the rebels is the result
and military strategy in Nicaragua. The finished." according to the aide, and that a of the complex funding cycle set up by
three main. Contra leaders, Arturo Jose broadened political and military directorate Congress. The system has dispatched aid
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Aid for the Angolan guerrillas was opposed by the State Department.
in three waves: $40 million when the law
was enacted last August. $20 million in
October and S40 million this month. Until
this month, the legislation specified the aid
could be used only for defensive purposes
- training, intelligence gathering and de-
fensive equipment.
Indeed, it has been congressional oppo-
sition that has proved most damaging to the
rebel program. The rebels are now engaged
in an effort to regain the position they lost
two years ago. when Congress cut off aid.
Calero says. But the revelations that during
that time North and other U.S. officials
helped money continue to flow is not likely
to sit well on Capitol Hill.
Last month, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, now controlled by Dem-
ocrats. voted along party lines to halt U.S.
funds that were approved by Congress last
summer but had not vet been given to the
rebels. Supporters of the bill admit that
even if it passes both chambers, it will not
sustain a presidential veto. Still, the vote
was seen as an important dress rehearsal for
the battle over the administration's upcom-
ing request.
The vote on the new aid, probably in
September. will likely be close. Many Rea-
gan Doctrine supporters hope that the
Democrat-controlled Congress will con-
tinue to fund the rebels, at least through the
presidential election in 1988, "if only to
avoid blame for losing Nicaragua:' says
foreign policy analyst Joshua Muravchik.
But others are seeking a more affirma-
tive strategy from the administration. Gen.
Paul Gorman, former commander of the
U.S. Southern Command. and other U.S.
officials, have suggested that the Defense
Department be given primary operational
responsibility for the Contra program. The
Pentagon has resisted such a move. Some
Pentagon officials are privately advocating
a U.S. naval-air blockade designed to halt
the flow of Soviet weaponry into Nicara-
gua.
One former NSC aide says the adminis-
tration should begin thinking about how to
achieve its Reagan Doctrine goal - the
establishment of a democratic government
- without the rebels, who are beset with
organizational chaos and face a bleak fu-
ture in Congress. A U.S. invasion, if it
came while the Contras were still in the
field, would require less than a week and
fewer than 30.000 U.S. troops. some ex-
perts say.
Conservatives in Congress also are
pressing the administration to revitalize the
Reagan Doctrine by supporting the Mo-
zambique National Resistance Movement.
which is generally deemed the most suc-
cessful anticommunist insurgency in the
world. The 10-year-old popular uprising.
which now reportedly controls 85 percent
of Mozambique. has as its goal the estab-
lishment of democracy in a country suffer-
ing since 1975 under a Soviet-backed
Marxist regime. The Soviet Union has
spent more than a billion dollars to keep its
client afloat, and troops from Cuba and
Ethiopia have helped hold off the rebels.
But the United States has repeatedly
spurned the rebel group. And not only that,
last year the United States gave the Mozam-
bique regime 570 million in aid.
Conservatives charge that the Reagan
Doctrine has gone haywire . in Africa.
Kemp's strategy for rebuilding the doctrine
is to fire Shultz. He recently called for
Shultz's resignation for "violating the Rea-
gan Doctrine" by "rolling out the red car-
pet" for Oliver Tambo, the leader of the
radical. nondemocratic African National
Congress in South Africa.
At the conservative Heritage Founda-
tion in Washington, foreign policy analyst
James T. Hackett has drawn up a list of
other actions that Reagan could take with-
out the consent of Congress to shore up his
foreign policy and go on the offensive. The
list includes such measures as breaking
diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, An-
gola and Afghanistan, and recognizing the
freedom fighters as governments in exile.
Whether or not the administration is up
to the challenge of moving more decisively
on the Reagan Doctrine, the doctrine is
likely to live on, at least through the pres-
idential race in 1988. At a recent Conser-
vative Political Action Conference in
Washington. the elusive Reagan Doctrine
was voted the No. I priority issue in the
1988 campaign - which means that Re-
publicans everywhere will be paying it se-
rious lip service as the party marches to-
ward the bloody battle of 1988.
- David Brock
Shultz's meeting with Tambo provoked
a call for the secretary's resignation.
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