JUSTICE PROBE FAILS TO DISCLOSE SOURCE OF LEAKS ON MIDEAST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 25, 2012
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 16, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3.pdf137.67 KB
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L --r AT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3 STAT ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A -1 WASHINGTON POST 16 December 1983 Justice Probe Fails To Disclose Source of Leaks on Mideast By Lou Cannon Washington Post titan writer An extensive Justice Department investigation into purported unau- thorized disclosures of U.S. military and diplomatic strategy in Lebanon has ended without identifying the source of the disclosures or deter- mining whether national security was compromised, administration officials said yesterday.. "There is no evidence that report- ers were told anything we didn't want them to know," one official said. The inquiry triggered an angry confrontation between then-national security affairs adviser William P. Clark and White House chief' of staff .James A. Baker III, reportedly prompted Secretary of State George P. Shultz to say he would resign if asked to take 'a polygraph test, and caused widespread concern among many top administration officials questioned at length by the FBI. One official said the investigation may have had "a preventive effect" on information leaks. But another official contended that the inquiry had damaged the administration by "trivializing national security" and involving the Justice Department in a White House power struggle. President Reagan ordered the in- vestigation of his senior White House staff, Cabinet officers and foreign policy advisers Sept. 1:3.. He acted after being told by Clark that new,, accounts, including a story on the front page of that, morning's Washington Post, containing classi- ired i nformation had jeopardized special envoy Robert C. McFarlane's efi'ort~, to obtain a cease-fire in Leh- anon and may have endangered his life. NBC News reported on the eve- ning of Sept. 12 that "top adminis- tration officials have asked the pres- ident to seriously consider ordering U.S. air strikes on Syrian positions in Lebanon." The NBC account, by White House correspondent. Chris Wallace, was confirmed by admin- istration officials in time for both CBS and ABC to carry the item on their evening newscasts. The Washington Post. then re- ported on Sept. 13 that Reagan had authorized Marines to call for air strikes "against forces shelling their positions." This report also was quickly confirmed for several other newspapers. One official said yesterday that the information had been confirmed "and apparently disclosed in the first place" because some administration officials wanted the Syrian-backed forces to know that the Marines would retaliate if fired upon. In addition, sources said yester- day, .the threat to McFarlane's life, though real, may have been exagger- ated to encourage Reagan to order the investigation. They said McFar- lane had been told of concern for his safety and had declined additional protection. Officials said that. Clark and oth- ers in the White House had received reports that McFarlane was a likely target. of terrorists opposed to the Lebanese cease-fire he was trying to negotiate. But one senior official said there was "no warning of an actual event," meaning a specific attempt on McFarlane's life. - Clark - subsequently has become Reagan's secretary of the interior and McFarlane has replaced him as national security affairs adviser. Clark's recommendation to Rea gan to launch the investigation, strongly supported by White House counselor Edwin Meese 111, touched off a bitter battle with Baker. Sources said the original draft of the letter submitted to the president by Clark and Meese specifically em- powered the use of polygraphs and also put Attorney General William French Smith in charge of the inves- tigation. The draft letter gave Smith the authority to determine the source of the disclosure and went on to say that the person so identified would be instructed to resign, in ef- fect giving Smith the authority to fire the suspected "leaker." Clark reportedly said he was "damned angry" over what ' he de- scribed as repeated unauthorized disclosures of national security in- formation. But his proposal to have Reagan approve an investigation of his own staff provoked an equally angry reaction from Baker, who op- posed the use of polygraphs in the inquiry and also opposed putting Smith in-charge of it. Baker contended that Reagan would be politically embarrassed if it became known that he had author. ized an investigation of his own staff over a relatively minor issue. He also defended his own prerogatives, pointing out that Reagan previously had signed an order putting Baker in charge of such investigations when they involved the White House staff. Baker was backed by Shultz, who said he would resign rather than have his loyalty questioned by a lie detector test, and by deputy chiefof staff Michael K. Deaver. sources said. Reagan deleted the passages spe- cifically authorizing polygraph tests and giving Smith the authority to ,COLNINUED Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3 2. order resignations. But he 'then signed a letter directing the attorney general to launch the investigation usin,, "all legal means." Despite. the omission of the reference to he de- tectors. officials said it was clear the FBI had authority to use them. ' The inquire spread fear among White House aides as the FBI con- ducted interviews centering on meet- ings of the National Security Council on Sept. 10 and Sept. 11. Some aides said they feared that their' phones were tapped and complained that the "threat of lie detector tests" was implicitly present even though no - polygraph tests were administered. Officials were reluctant to talk about the investigation because they- were warned by the FBI that the inquiry was classified and that any disclosure could have serious conse- quences. But several officials also praised the FBI for its conduct of the investigation, and one said that "it must have been quickly apparent to them that they were looking for the source of information which had been deliberately released." The investigation was complicated by the fact that the information dis- closed was widely known throughout the government, even though Rea- gan may not have realized this when he ordered the investigation. It was discussed with the president 'at a small NSC meeting on Sept.. 11, but also was brought up at, a larger NSC meeting the day before and -put in' written form on that day. "The potential list of suspects was quite large," an official said. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020016-3