'MASTER SPY' GIVES NEWSLETTER AT U.N. A NEW SLANT ON EVENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201240003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 14, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201240003-3
WASHINGTON TIMES
14 March 1985
91Vlaster spy' gives newsletter
at U.N. a new slant on events
By Gus Constantine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
UNITED NATIONS -
"U.N.'Clerk' Is Kremlin's Master
Spy in New York;' a headline in a
major tabloid here told New
Yorkers.
The story produced predictable
reactions.
On the city streets, a series of ran-
dom queries to New Yorkers brought
knowing smiles, expressions of out-
rage and of helplessness over the
"spies in our midst."
At the U.N., there were expres-
sions of outrage of another sort. An
employee of the world organization
called the article "pure sensational-
ism, garbage."
At the U.S. Mission, mum was the
word at first and only repeated prod-
ding shed some light on what appar-
ently happened. -
At the FBI's New York office, the
response was that any interviews
concerning counterintelligence
matters would have to be cleared
with headquarters in Washington. '
The story that the New York tab-
loid told involved Viktor Andree' ; a
Soviet national who arrived here last
July as special deputy to the U.N...
undersecretary-general who heads
the secretariat's Department of Spe-
cial Political and Security Council
Affairs. The undersecretary-
general himself is a Soviet national,
and the post has traditionally been a
Soviet plum.
The article charged that Mr.
Andreev "runs a vast Soviet spy net-
work operating openly at the U.N."
But on specifics, the article's
charges were more modest. It said
the Soviet "master spy" converted a
newsletter produced by the secre-
tariat for top-level officials into an
"outrageous propaganda sheet"
which is "edited to favor the Soviet
Union and make the U.S. look bad.".
While the specific accusation
hardly justifies the charges of espi-
onage, it points clearly to the length
the Soviets will go to exert influence
over the U.N. and its highest offi-
cials.
The story of the secretariat news-
letter, pieced together from U.N.
employees, and official and unoffi-
cial U.S. sources here and in Wash-.
ington, begins in 1982 during the
Falklands war. "The secretary-
general [Javier Perez de Cuellar)
expressed an interest in getting a
wider range of views on issues, par-
ticularly in times of crisis, and asked
that a newsletter be produced from
wire service sources to serve that
need;' a U.N. official said.
The issue came before the Secu-
rity Council, where some member
states expressed an interest in
receiving the newsletter.
According to the U.N. source., U.S.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
expressed concern that the product
be impartial and fair but was told
that it was not designed for dissemi-
nation to member states and let the
matter drop.
There it stayed until July. Enter
Mr. Andreev. Things began to
change.
U.N. sources said the decision was
taken to expand the newsletter, add-
ing more wire services, increasing
its size and frequency of output and
upgrading the quality. Its name was
"The thing began to
look and sound like it
was coming straight
from the Soviet
mission," a ?
non-official source in
Washington said.
changed from Political Information
News Service, or PINTS, to Political
and Security Council Affairs News
Service.
"The thing began to look and
sound like it was coming straight
from the Soviet mission:' a non-
official source in Washington said.
The impression was seconded by a
source in New York who refused to
be further identified.
The change brought Ambassador
Kirkpatrick back into the picture
with an expression of concern to the
secretary-general on July 25.
What was she concerned about?
U.S. sources were reluctant to say.
The U.S. mission at first refused to
say anytdiing at all and also refused
to allow any U.S. official to be inter-
viewed on the subject.
President Reagan also is reported
to have brought up the matter on
Sept. 23 when he held a reception
here for the secretary-general. It
was the day before the president
addressed the U.N. General Assem-
bly.
An examination of the newsletter
reveals the subtlety of approach to
the subject matter.
For example, a copy of the 4:30
p.m. report dated March 5 contains
six items, none reflecting remotely
a point of view critical of the Soviet
Union or its U.N. allies. There is a
warning by Vietnam of a Chinese
invasion, an item on Israel summon-
ing envoys "to explain its tough anti-
guerril la campaign" in Lebanon, a
denial by New Zealand that it was
moving towards neutrality and a
report on President Reagan telling
members of Congress that "his MX
nuclear missile program was vital to
the success of U.S.-Soviet arms
talks."
On that same date, South Korea
ended its ban on 14 dissident politi-
cians and Vice President George
Bush visited a refugee camp in
Sudan to dramatize the plight of
famine-haunted Africa. Both events
went unreported in the newsletter.
The whole secretariat newsletter
affair threw into bold relief the prob-
lems that grow out of Moscow's. New
York operation.
Here the Soviets maintain a huge
corps of officials - 110 diplomats at
the Soviet Mission to the U.N. and
427 more who serve in the U.N. Sec-
retariat, 90 percent of whom are
"professionals" rather than "general
service" clerical workers.
Soviets in the secretariat,
although theoretically international
civil servants, are at Moscow's own
insistence treated as Soviet
nationals first, serving for fixed
five-year terms followed by rotation
home. They live together in the same
compound and, according to secre-
tariat sources, stick pretty much to
themselves.
Because the Soviet contingent in
the secretariat does not operate in
ffe--U-nited States under the travel
restrictions that an-.,iv to Soviet
diplomats, the potenti for espi-
onage under the direction of the
Soviet intelligence agency, the KGB,
is red and undou toy taken into
account v the I.
The potential for exerting influ-
ence over the work of the U.N. is
greater still and far less controlla-
ble. And the potential for mischief is
enormous.
In this intrigue-laden environ-
ment charges of KGB activity sur-
face and resurface.
How uch Uoo they go on? Only the
FBI and other U.S. intelligence agen-
cies have the data to make a determi-
nation. And for a variety of reasons,
deeming with the protection of
sources and methods, these agen-
cies are not in the habit of talking.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201240003-3