EMBASSY SECURITY: STORY OF FAILURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 19, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820008-4
EMBASSY SECURITY:
STORY OF FAILURE
Little Action Taken in Moscow
on Well-Known Problems
19 April 1987
A former State Department official
acknowledged that while "we were
serious about security, we obviously
did not get enough done."
'The acid test is that there were sig-
nificant security violations," he said.
"The system was not good enough."
The Bottom Line:
Who Is Responsible?
T By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Specipi to The New York Time$
WASHINGTON, April 18 - Three
years ago, President Reagan and his
advisers gathered for a slide show
about the vulnerability of the Amer-
Embassy in Moscow to Soviet es-
ican
pionage.
The President was told that a visiting
team of security experts had observed
Marine guards socializing at parties
with Soviet women employed at the
embassy. An official from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation recounted how
the team, in a test, had found that it.
was possible to break into the embas-
sy's sensitive communications rooms
without being detected by guards or
alarm systems.
Changes Made In Three Years
President Reagan listened to ac-
counts of Soviet antennas planted in the
embassy chimney, and of the bugging
of embassy typewriters, aides recall.
Those present agreed that immediate
steps were needed.
Over the next three years, studies
were done and some changes were
made. But officials say that efforts by
the White House and by intelligence
agencies to improve security were
hampered by interagency disputes.
To these officials, the embassy was a
disaster waiting to happen, fears real-
ized this year with charges that two
Marine guards had allowed Soviet
agents to enter sensitive areas.
The breaches of embassy security
and the publicity surrounding the af-
fair have crippled American Intelli-
gence gathering, harmed relations
with the Soviet Union and turned into
an American political embarrassment.
Much of the blame is being leveled by
counterintelligence officials and mem-
bers of congress against the State De-
partment for failing to head warnings.
ngs.
Under Secretary Ronald
the State Department official responsi-
ble for security, delved thb charge, say
ing: "We were quite aware of the p th-
lem, and we put together a complete
program, which took a while to do."
He said that if technical improve-
enu that have now been made
ments
been piece a mucha o off theed -damage
have p prevented
attributed to the Marine guards-
Some members of Congress and in-
telligence officials say the highest offi-
cials in Government like secretary of
State George P. Shultz and President
Reagan are ultimately responsible be-
cause it is up to them to force unwilling
or slow-moving agencies to deal with a
problem.
Lieut. Gen. Lincoln D. -EAUMz. who
headed the a ono ecurty Agency
in the early 1980's, said all agencies
shared responsibility. Even his own
agency eventually muted its com-
plaints, he said.
"There is enough blame to go
around," he said. "You ought to keep
screaming until someone hears. We did
not keep screaming and screaming."
Administration ? officials and mem-
bers of Congress gave these explana-
tions for the breakdowns in Moscow:
9Agencies bickered among them-
selves, defending their conflicting in-
terests. The State Department resisted
advice about commtmications security
from the National Security Agency.
The Central Intelligence Agency
blocked a Congressionally approved
study of the situation that would in-
volve all intelligence agencies. an the
ground that the C.I.A. alone had the
right, by law, to protect intelligence
sauces and methods.
gWhile the State Department was
to improve relations, counterin-
specialists angered the Rus-
sians by cutting the number of Soviet
diplomats in the United, States. "You
had an informal war going_on between
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee.
There was no clear authority or
coordination of security measures. The
Marine Corps assigned young, unmar-
ried guards while the State Depart-
ment set up rules banning ializing,
Kenneth W. Dam, a former Deputy the
1984 briefing of State who an behalf of the attended Do-
partment. said he did not tell Mr.
calers about its tlnrally Mr. Dam with
called that he generally
the department's European Bureau
which is responsible for Soviet affairs,
qcuts in the State Department's
budget 'harmed security. To save
money, it ended 24-hour staffing of-the
Moscow I communications center,
where guards are suspected of having
admitted Soviet agents. Former Intelli-
gence officials said spending limits on
embassy construction also led to the
Soviet Union's prefabricating parts at
the new building.
'-Reversing the Trend:
A New Program
A program to secure embassies
against terrorism and espionage, ap-
proved by Congress last year, has
helped reverse the trend. Mr. Spiers
said the State Department was now
reducing diplomatic staffs to add se-
curity personnel.
When the Reagan Administration
took office in 1981, newly appointed in-
telligence officials made security im-
provements in Moscow a top priority.
They found allies in the National Se-
curity Agency, the Congress, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. Spiers said the State Department
improved systems in November 1985,
added a roving Marine guard for sensi-
tive areas in 1988, and reduced the
number of Soviet employees at the em-
bassy. Ultimately, the Soviet Govern-
ment withdrew all Soviet employees in
retaliation for American orders that
Soviet diplomatic personnel be cut
back in the United States.
Arthur A. Hartman, who was the ,
Ambassador during this period, pro-
tested in a 1984 cablegram titled
"Counter-Productive Counter Intelli-
gence against cutbacks in the number
of Soviet diplomats in the United States
and in the number of Soviet employees
in the American Ambassy.
The cablegram, which said "counter-
intelligence drum beaters" in the
White House were trying to disrupt
Soviet-American relations, was the
subject of an angry exchange between
Vice President Bush and Mr. Shultz at
a meeting of the National Security
Council, Government officials said Mr.
Bush, the officials said, cited the cable-
gram as example of State Department
opposition to security proposals.
An example of the problems at the
Moscow embassy is the Inadequacy of
alarm systems and' remote television
camera
False alarms were frequent in 1986
and 1986, and the State Department
sent a team to Moscow to figure out
whether Soviet agents were deliber-
ately setting them off to reduce confi-
dence in the system. Administration of-
ficials acknowledge that the system
could not record how long secured
doors were left open.
Keeping Watch:
Marines and Cameras
The remote cameras fed pictures
back to a monitor viewed by Marine
with espionage. including those now charged
Mr. Splers said the State Department
did not investigate cases in which Ma-
rine guards socialized with women.
"When we found fraterization, we
just sent them home, we did not follow
up with security investigations. In ret-
rospect, we shouldn't havedons that."
Continued
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820008-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820008-4
A.
The charge that two guards had been
seduced by Soviet employees of the em-
bassy followed years of disputes be-
tween the intelligence agencies and the
State Department over the presence of
the Soviet employees. .
Ambassador Hartman said he op-
posed plans to eliminate the Soviet em-
ployees, whom he termed essential to
the smooth running of the embassy.
The Americans who might replace
them, he said, would be susceptible to
recruitment.
The counterintelligence officials dis-
agreed, and their concern was shared
by members of Congress. In a closed
hearing before the Senate Intelligence
Committee in 1985, Mr. Spiers testified
that cost was the main reason for not
replacing the Soviet employees.
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Demo-
crat of South Carolina, said the Con-
gress was prepared to appropriate
whatever money was needed, accord-
ing to a Government official present.
Senator Cohen echoed the concern, The
offer was not accepted.
Administration officials said the
State Department resisted some of the
suggestions that security was inade-
quate at the Moscow embassy. In one
meeting shortly after the 1984 briefing,
the officials said, questions were raised'
about whether it was really possible to
break into the secured communica-
tions room, as the F.B.I. said its team
had demonstrated in the 1983 inspec-
tion visit.
"It is the State Department position
that this could not happen, the State
Department representative replied, ac-
cording to one official.
Embassy Typewriters:
More Than Typing
In the mid-1970's, American intelli-
gence officials suspected that the type-
writers in the embassy were being
bugged. The Americans learned that
Soviet diplomats in Washington were' writing their messages in longhand
A 1979 inspection trip yielded noth-
ing, perhaps because the Russians
learned in advance about the trip
through memos typed on the compro-
mised machines. In 1984, the experts
returned, armed with a letter signed by
President Reagan that ordered em-
bassy personnel not to initiate any
communications with Washington
about a pending swap of equipment.
Hours after the team arrived in Mos-
cow, according to Administration offi-
cials, a cable directly violating the or-
der was sent from the embassy. But
X-rays revealed that the typewriters
had indeed been compromised.
Beginning in the early 1980's, sortie of
the most sensitive American opera-
tions in Moscow were going sour. With
the espionage case against a former
C.I.A. officer, Edward Lee Howard, in-
telligence officials believed they had
found the cause. But now Administra-
tion officials speculate that both Mr.
Howard and the embassy breaches
were at fault.
Whatever the cause, American espio-
nage in the Soviet Union has been
devastated. American officials say it
will be years before the agent networks
can be rebuilt. The C.I.A. is reviewing
intelligence gathered from the Moor
station because of suspicion that, at
least some of the agents who worked
for the United States were double
agents providing disinformation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820008-4