IRAN DEFENSE FOR REAGAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820033-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820033-6
MW~pPRF~ NEW YORK TIMES
9i PM 8 January 1987
Iran Defense
For Reagan
White House Putting
Blame on His Aides
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special m The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 - As the
Iran-contra affair unfolds, the White
House finds itself in the strange posi-
tion of defending President Reagan
with the argument that some of his
News
Analysis
most powerful aides were
incompetent or deceitful.
The stance is notewor-
thy because it evokes one
of the most frequent criti-
That was clearly incorrect because,
by all other Administation accounts,
Mr. Reagan had approved the Israeli
shipments when a planeload of Hawk
missiles was flown to Iran in Novem-
ber 1985.
The North chronology asserts that
the President was angered by this sup-
posedly unauthorized Israeli shipment
in November and ordered that the mis-
siles be reclaimed.
Actually. the report ay that the
Central intelligence Agency aided th
November shipment at Colonel North's
tenuest and that the missiles were re-
turned because the Iranians were is-
satisified with their quality.
Could Be Embarrassing
Disclosures about the misleading
North chronology are potentially em-
barrassing to the Administration be-
cause senior officials relied on this
document to prepare their testimony
on the issue.
Still, the White House was eager for
the document to be made public, in part
because it bolstered the impression of
Colonel North as a renegade who em-
bellished the truth to suit his purposes.
The Senate report, according to
White House officials and members of
Congress, also shows that Colonel
North played a key role in keeping the
Iran shipments alive and in organizing
the diversion to the contras, as the
Nicaraguan rebels are called.
For instance, according to officials
who have, read it, it says he wrote in a
memo, "If this program collapses, the
hostages will die." Feeling that deeply,
the report says, Colonel North got to-
gether with an Israeli official and
worked out a method for resuming the
shipments after they were suspended
in December 1985.
The report also depicts Colonel North
and the White House as having been
taken in by Iranian promises to ar-
range the release all the American hos-
tages in Lebanon. The original pro-
gram of arms shipments, as laid out by
Colonel North in a memo on Jan. 24,
1986, called for the delivery of 4,000
anti-tank missiles and some anti-air-
craft missiles in exchange for a phased
release of the hostages.
Abrams Offers Defense
cisms of Mr. Reagan by Congressional
critics and others: that he is out of
touch with the details of government
and has given too much latitude to staff
members.
Nonetheless, senior White House
aides have apparently decided it was
better to suggest that Mr. Reagan was
unaware of or misinformed about key
decisions than to allow continued
speculation about his-'ihVOlVernent in
such activities as the clandestine diver-
sion to the Nicaraguan rebels of mil-
lions of dollars in profits from arms
sales to Iran.
This approach resulted this week in a
conflict between the White House and
Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence. with the Administration - in a
seeming paradox - pushing for re-
lease of a report on Iran that includes'
many unflattering details.
The committee demurred, with some
Democrats calling the report a "white-
wash." But White House aides are
eager to see the document made public
because in two key areas they believe it
helps the President's cause.
The polemics used by senior officials
has been striking because they under-
cut Mr. Reagan's image as a powerful
leader. One senior White House official
who favored release of the report, for
instance, said it showed that some
Presidential aides were "running
wild" and that "we didn't have control
over" foreign policy.
The White House was also eager to
make public details in the Senate re-
port about a chronology of the Iran
dealings prepared by Lieut. Col. Oliver
L. North that contained inaccurate
statements. It said the Israeli arms
shipments in September and Novem-
ber were not approved by Mr. Reagan
until January 1986, when he signed a
formal order authorizing the program.
The chorus of critical statements
about Colonel North, largely from Ad-
ministration officials, has reached
such a crescendo that Elliott Abrams,
the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American affairs, was moved to
offer a spirited defense.
"It seems to me, " Mr. Abrams said,
"that it has become a great national
sport to criticize Ollie North. I have no
criticism to offer. He was a good col-
league and a pleasure to work with."
The Senate report's focus on the ac-
tivities of Colonel North and Vice Adm.
John M. Poindexter, the former na-
tional security adviser, reflect only the
testimony and evidence the panel was
able to gather in three weeks of hear-
ings. The committee did not hear from
many of the key witnesses.
Among those who refused to testify,
citing their Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination, were Colo-
nel North, Admiral ' Poindexter, and
Richard V. Secord, the retired Air
Force general who played a crucial
role in arranging the logistics of the
arms trade and in getting money to the
contras.
suspect thattif Some Congressional investigators
officials other than just Colonel North
and Admiral Poindexter will be seen as
having known of or assisted in the di-
version of funds to the contras. This is
one of the reasons Democrats were so
quick to condemn the report as incom-
plete.
There is at least some reason for
skepticism about the suggestion that
members of the National Security
Council staff had run amok without the
guidance or knowledge of other senior
officials.
According to several Administration
officials, the White House in the last
few years had used the technique of
"plausible deniability." This term is
normally applied to intelligence opera-
tions and means that covert measures
should be "deniable" - nQt traceable
to the United States.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201820033-6
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