A CIRCUMSTANTIAL CASE AGAINST THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 2, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890013-0
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WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1987
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
A Circumstantial Case Against the CIA
When the first draft of his inspector
general's report outlining the CIA's
defense in the Iran arms scandal
reached his desk, acting director Rob-
ert M. Gates returned it for more
work?an unwitting signal to Republi-
cans in Congress that the CIA may be
in trouble.
Gates read the report, sources told
us, and sent it back for more specifics
on "mistakes made and lessons t
learned." Those words might mean
very little. But they fit ominously with 3
circumstantial evidence that the CIA
collaborated too closely with Lt. Col
Oliver North in his clandestine n
operations t,hat never were reported k
to Congress.
That threatens renewed hard times
for the agency that ailing Director h
William J. Casey brought back from N
its disrepute of the '703 to the leading pi
role in the Reagan Doctrine of the a
'80s. In fact, that resurrection under- lo
lies the case against the CIA now
su
being made on Capitol Hill. Its role in cy
fleshing out the Reagan Doctrine, ua
particularly with the Nicaraguan con-
tras, makes Congress suspicious. the
about whether the agency always has ove
operated within strict boundaries of net
legality.
Gear
No smoking gun has been found. f
Congressional watchdogs carefully
describe the case against the CIA as U.
strictly circumstantial. They have no can
evidence?as yet?that the CIA act
knew about diversion of Iran arms
money to the contras, and the CIA CIA
denies any knowledge. with
But the string of circumstances woo
creating suspicion is long. It starts er,
with a secret phone call from then- appea
National Security Council aide North rush
a little over a year ago to a prominent Nort
conservative ?Republican on the Sen- men
See-
ate Judiciary Committee. quic
North complained about the long Tran
delay caused by a handful of conserva- airlin
tive Republicans' blocking the nomi-
nation of then-CIA general counsel tives
Stanley Sporkin, a liberal Democrat, tous
to a federal judgeship. As the recipi- Doct
ent the call remembers the conver- quart
sation, North told him a gross disser- munist
vice was being done Sporkht. U.S.
"Sparkle is one of us," North
outlining how at the CIA he
wrought a miracle in threading a
path for the agency to keep su
lines running for the contras wit
violating the now-expired Bo
Amendment, which barred "direct
indirect U.S. funding of military aid.
Without Sporicin's legal brilliance,
North is recalled as saying, the con-
ras would be finished.
North's clout, officially as the NSC
taff emissary handling the contra
account and very unofficially as CIA
surrogate, was enough to send the
omination to the Senate floor. Spar-
in was confirmed as a federal district
judge on Dec. 16, 1985.
That year-old incident suggests
ow intimately the CIA, through 011ie
orth, was tied into contra resup-
y?essential to prevent Reagan's
nti-Sandinista policy from collapsing
ng before it could have a chance to
cceed. "The CIA designed the poli-
," a Capitol Hill Republican told us,
nd North carried it out."
Then in January 1986, Casey and
CIA were powerful enough to
nide two of Reagan's senior Cabi-
officers, Secretary of State
ge Shultz and Secretary of De-
ense Caspar Weinberger, on Iranian
policy. The agency designed a new,
S.-managed (as contrasted to the
ier Israeli-managed) arms trans.
ion with Tehran.
at until December 1985 did the
accept Israeli predictions that
U.S. arms, hostages in Lebanon
Id be freed. But one month earli-
the agency did agree to a sudden
I from North for an aircraft to
arms (apparently described by
h to the CIA as oil-drilling equip-
t) to Tehran. The aircraft was
kly obtained from Southern Air
sport, the same CIA-contract
e used in the contra resupply.
ithout telling North, CIA opera-
tracked every step of his ubiqui-
journeys to advance the Reagan
rine: to Jamba, Angola, head-
ers of Jonas Savimbi's anticom-
movement; to Iran to seek
hostages and secretly skim
said. anns-sale profits for the contras; to
had Europe to plot with Israelis and Arabs
legal in the Iran arms deals.
7?1,,, Reports to the CIA on persons
;1;1 contacted by North and conversations
land he held came from CIA and allied
or intelligence agents. The purpose, in
the opinion of congressional sources,
was clear keep the agency on top of
North's dealings but at arm's length,
preserving CIA deniability.
As these circumstantial links
mount, Casey recuperates from brain
tumor surgery. President Reagan is
not about to name a successor unless
his longtime political supporter him-
self gives the word. The vacancy adds
an extra burden in the CIA's coming
time of trials as three major probes
begin. CIA allies in Congress hope the
agency comes through with flying col-
ors, but accumulating circumstantial
evidence alarms them. In a climate of
shadows and suspicions, their fears
were heightened when Gates re-
turned the inspector general's report
for more work.
l987. Neve Amnia Synclines
? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301890013-0