IF CONGRESS PULLS THE LATIN PLUG...

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 18, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-R
ART ICL
THE WASHINGTON POST
18 Way 1983
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
DP90-00965R000301900040-8
If Congress Pulls the Latin Plug;..
TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras?Although
the effort to terminate "covert" American
aid to anti-Sandinista guerrillas in neigh-
boring Nicaragua is stalled for now, it has
cost the "contras" no momentum and
raised excruciating questions for the fu-
ture.
Uncertain about continuing U.S. sup-
port, logistical supply lines slowed to a
crawl two months ago. "The debate in
Congress put a dead spot in the 'pipe-
line," an official intimately involved in
the contras' anti-Sandinista insurgency
told us.
That revealed how significant a player
American ambivalence has become in the
harsh, thickly forested guerrilla country
across the long, undefended Honduran- ?
Nicaraguan border. The unannounced
plan of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN) had been the overthrow of the
Sandinistas by September?at the latest.
Despite the surprising successes of the
FDN's claimed 10,000 insurgents now
operating in small units deep in Sandin-
ista territory, that goal was forced back
by congressional liberals trying to end.
the covert aid program altogether.
The FDN's overall military command-
er, rotating between the field and a safe
house here, has devised a strategy that,
counts on a short war. "We do not think
about a long war," Emilio Echeverie told
us. "We will win this war, between Sep-
tember and December."
But if Congress vetoes U.S. assistance,
covert or otherwise, what then? "Our
momentum is excellent ? today," said
Echeverie, a highly impressive former
military engineer. "A cutoff would hurt
us but it would not be devastating." One
reason: Echeverie's insurgents have -al-
ready captured 2,500 weapons, including
mortars, in their 'attacks on Sandinista
military units. -
In fact, however, a congressional veto
switching Reagan administration policy
might cripple the FDN. That's because a
180-degree switch would have dramatic
political impact in Nicaragua?.particu-
larly in Managua, the Sandinista strong-
hold that must turn against the Sandinis-
tas if the FDN insurgency is to succeed.
The outpouring of anti-Sandinista emo-
tion in Nicaragua since the FDN took the
field would be bitterly affected if the U.S.
forsook the guerrillas.
The fiction that the Objective of the
FDN was ever anything less than the
overthrow of the Sandinistas serves di-
plomacy and, back in the United States,
congressional politics. Their objective
was never simply cutting the arms flow to
Marxist rebels in El Salvador. That was
clearly understood?but not advertised
?by the Reagan administration when
the CIA first sought congressional ap-
proval to finance its clandestine help to
the contras.
Actually, one cause of delay in the
Reagan administration's moves against
the Sandinistas was its initial selection of
Eden Pastore as the natural future leader
of a post-Sandinist Nicaragua. Pastore is
the celebrated "Commander Zero" who
accused the Sandinistas of betraying
their revolution and fled to exile. Pastore
now has his own anti-Sandinista guerril-
las in the ?xtreme Nicaraguan -south: j
along the Costa Rican border. , ;
As an original antiornoza 1eader,13as2'
tore was viewed in Washington to be polit-1.
' ically safer With American liberals as the
chief guerrilla. leader=end potentially as
her Apparent in Managua: While. he was
.-
"pure," a. small percentage of the MR&
forces had been involved with. Somoza*
National Guard. -
- ? .
The dispute pversPastora .was finally,
resolved in favor of the .FDN; but Thai
delay fiustrated its leadership. If the U.S
objective had ever been limited to cutting
'arms supplies to El Salvador, the disputic:
would never have ocourred. ?
That raises the question of-future
tions of Congress as the rest significance of '
the operation seeps.under sensitive liberalr'
skins.-But the question may not be.as fate-
ful as it once semed. if Echeverie's guer-
rillas can administer the coup de grace to
? the Sandinistas' between September and
DeCember, Presidentlleagan would easily
carry the 'United States with him in .de-
ifending his anti-Sandinisti policy from
ieral attackers claiming they had not beer('
told the whole truth. One diplomat here,
'dismissed that potential trouble Bs "4; ,
problem we would love to have."
But if the Sandinistas stop the inspr-,
gents and Congress then 'cuts US. ai4i*:
the blow .would be "devastating," what:?.
ever- .Echeverie says today. It would
devastate the FDN, and it would supply:
more evidence to American allies every-; -
where that a pledge of U.S. support
worthless.
to1983, Field Enterprises, Inc.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301900040-8