HEARTS AND MINDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920021-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: March 25, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920021-7
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BALTIMORE SUN
25 March 1985
Opinion ? Commentary
Hearts and Minds
THE contours of the Reagan
administration's policy to-
ward Nicaragua have been made
sharper in the past several weeks.
Thus, the CIA guerrilla warfare
manual closely tied to that policy
deserves greater scrutiny.
First, the policy itself. The cur-
rent debate concerns continued
congressional funding of the Con-
tras, the Nicaraguan rebels, con-
sisting of two main groups having
many factions, who are fighting
the Sandinista government. At
his February press conference,
President Reagan called the Con-
tras "freedom fighters," and he
has previously referred to them as
the "moral equal of our Founding
Fathers." He has been pressing
Congress to approve $14 million
in aid for them.
As part of the president's legis-
lative stiategy, he has tried to
demonstrate that he still seeks a
peaceful settlement with Nicara-
gua over the composition of its
government and its relationship
with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the president
says he wants the Nicaraguan
government to "say uncle" ? to
democratize its regime, expel all
Cuban and other foreign military
advisers, stop spreading subver-
sion in Latin America and main-
tain a military force consistent
with defensive purposes,
The prospects for achieving
these goals through a negotiated
settlement are dim. The CIA
pamphlet on guerrilla warfare,
which circulated last year in Nica-
ragua, now becomes one of the
central features of the Reagan
policy. This policy is in direct
conflict with the president's anti-
terrorism statements and the 1982
federal law prohibiting the CIA
and the Pentagon from attempt-
ing to overthrow the Sandinistas.
But these are only part of the
ironies.
By Jack Fruchtm.sui, Jr.
The CIA has designed this
pamphlet, "Psychological Opera-
tions in Guerrilla Warfare," to
"win the hearts and minds" of the
people, precisely what the Amen-
cans tried and failed to do in Viet-
nam. Some of the language is in
classical liberal-democratic tones.
1The irony is that the tactics used
to accomplish a change in the
; government are far from being lib-
eral or democratic. They ? are
drawn from the guerrilla warfare
concepts of Mao Zedong and Ho
Chi Minh as well as the anti-per-
sonnel procedures of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
This makes for a curious mix-
ture of ideas that have very little
theoretical coherence.
The manual characterizes the
Sandinistas as "puppets" of Sovi-
et and Cuban "foreignizers" and
"imperialists," who for their own
political and military reasons
want to enslave the Nicaraguan
people. The manual reiterates
over and over again the sentiment
that "our insurrection" consists of
"Freedom Commandos" and that
"we are determined to win free-
dom, equality, a better economy
with work facilities, a higher stan-
dard of living and a true democra-
cy for all Nicaraguans without ex-
ception."
The manual even lists several
basic human rights, such as free-
dom of expression and the press,
which could have been lifted di-
rectly from the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
There also is a tinge of demo-
cratic messianism in it. This par-
allels President Reagan's view of
America as being divinely blessed
to bring peace and prosperity to
earth: America as "a city on a
hill," as "a beacon of light" for all
nations to emulate is a constant
millenarian theme in American
history. No one better expresses
this than Mr. Reagan. The CIA
manual often refers to the "Chris-
tian guerrillas" who are fighting
godless communism. These fear-
less Christian Crusaders "are not
afraid of anything or anyone, nei-
ther the Soviets nor the Cubans."
The new democracy is to be
achieved mainly by nonviolent
means through education and per-
suasion. But this espousal of non-
violent tactics is inconsistent with
the reality of the Contras' activi-
ties which have recently come to
light. At least one faction has
been accused in two separate
studies of widespread attacks and
atrocities against the local popula-
tion including rape, murder and
kidnaping.
The fact is that the manual it-
self suggests that the civilian pop-
ulation ought to be convinced that
the intentions, if not the actions,
of the guerrillas are peaceful and
nonviolent. The tactics are nei-
ther. The success of the move-
ment hinges on what the CIA calls
"Armed Propaganda Teams,"
whose task is to persuade the peo-
ple that a direct link exists be-
tween the gerrrillas' armed might
and the people's future freedom.
These teams resemble the
"armed propaganda brigades"
that Ho Chi Minh created in 1944
under the command of his chief
tactician General Vo Nyuyen
Giap to combat the Japanese
(later the French, then the Ameri-
cans). According to Ho, these
units proved that "greater impor-
tance should be attached to the
political side than to the military
side." This would lead to the lib-
eration of Vietnam.
What are the composition of
these teams? The individual guer-
illa must be someone unquestion-
ably dedicated to the cause. He
must be able, says the CIA, to
"persuavively justify his actions
when he comes into contact
with . . . the people of Nicara-
gua." Moreover, he must be will-
ing to make sacrifices and to suf-
ariLratied
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920021-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920021-7
fer "hunger, cold, fatigue, and
insecurity" as he participates "in
the cause of the struggle."
The CIA could have extracted
this language directly from the
Nineteenth-Century Russian
anarchist, who; most likely along
with Mikhail Bakunin, wrote the
notorious "Catechism of a Revo-
lutionary." The "catechism"
spoke of the revolutionary as a sa-
cred person, who "has no personal
interests or activities, no private
feelings, attachments, or property,
not even a name. He is absorbed
by one single aim, thought, pas-
sion ? revolution." It could well
have served as a model for the
CIA to create an imperfect repro-
duction of Nechaev's hero in
Nicaragua.
Once formed, the Armed Prop-
aganda Teams are to grow gradu-
ally in size and number. Accord-
ing to the manual, the teams' ac-
tivity "allows the expansion of the
guerrilla movement, since they
can penetrate areas that are even
under the control of the combat
units." As early as 1929, Mao Ze-
dong envisioned the same thing
occurring in China. "In an inde-
pendent regime with stabilized
territory," he wrote, "we adopt
the policy of advancing in a series
of waves." His idea was to widen
the area of indoctrination, and
thereby increase political support
"wave after wave."
Mao's oft-quoted statement
that "political power grows out of
a barrel of a gun" also contains
this meaning. With guns, "we can
also create cadres, create schools,
create culture, create mass move-
ments." In other words, the guer-
rillas must teach the people, just
as the CIA I manual says, that "our
weapons are, in truth, your weap-
ons, yours." This is another way
of saying that political power is
inextricably linked to the barrel of
a gun.
Once the people can identify
with the guerrillas' weapons, two
tactics will help the freedom fight-
ers achieve a successful indoctri-
nation campaign.
First, they will win the people's
trust by living and working among
them. Mao did this in China from
1935 until his victory in 1949
when he sought to forge a link be-
tween "the masses of the people,"
as he called them, and "the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army." In liber-
ated areas, guerrillas should there-
fore help grow crops and provide
rudimentary social services.
The other tactic, terror, is also
necessary. Those who are suspect
or antagonistic to the Contras will
have to be harshly dealt with by
"the selective use of violence for
propaganda effects." Thus, "it is
possible to neutralize (emphasis
, added) carefully selected and
planned targets," such as various
political and military leaders asso-
ciated with the Sandinistas. The
term "neutralize" is emphasized
because it is the term the CIA it-
self used in Vietnam in its highly
controversial "Phoenix Program."
From 1967 on, the CIA devel-
oped this program to neutralize
suspected agents of the Vietcong
or North Vietnam. According to
Vietnam historian Arnold R. Is-
sacs, this program had "the image
of an indiscriminate CIA-con-
trolled Murder, Inc., in Vietnam."
Provincial and district chiefs were
given quotas for the number of
suspects they were supposed to
neutralize. Mr. Isaacs says up to
90 percent of these quotas were
filled by counting in thousands of
Vietcong killed in battle. Because
of that, Mr. Isaacs adds, the pro-
gram was not particularly success-
ful.
But Stanley Karnow, another
expert on Vietnam, disagrees. He
cites a number of former Vietcong
and North Vietnamese leaders
who admitted that it was "an ex-
tremely destructive" and "a very
dangerous" program. The point
here is that the neutralization
that the CIA advocated years ago
in Vietnam is now once again be-
ing promoted in Nicaragua.
Yet another CIA tactic the
manual advances is the recruit-
ment of "the unemployed" and
"professional criminals" to "carry
out specific selective 'jobs.' "
These "jobs," while left vague, are
placed in that section of the man-
ual having to do with political
agitation and demonstrations.
I These criminals are to "be
equipped with weapons (knives,
razors, chains, clubs, bludgeons)
and should march slightly behind
the innocent and gullible partici-
pants." This use of the "lower
sort" is highly reminiscent of CIA
actions in Iran in 1953.
At that time, the agency's chief
operative in Tehran, Kermit
("Kim") Roosevelt (Theodore
Roosevelt's grandson), carried out
orders to bring down what the
United States thought was a
Communist-dominated Iranian
government. Mr. Roosevelt creat-
ed so much turmoil and unrest
that the civil order was destroyed.
Moving from the steamrooms and
the gymnasiums to the streets,
CIA agents put togeether a huge
crowd of musclemen and weight-
lifters chanting pro-shah slogans.
They eventually gathered mobs of
the unemployed, criminals, and
the lumpenproletariat to run
rampant through the streets of
Tehran. '
According to Eisenhower biog-
rapher Peter Lyon, "the uprising
brought riots, terror, violence,
bloodshed, and death." And ulti-
mately the return of the shah who
had been in Rome meeting with
Allen Dulles, the then-head of the
CIA.
What, then, can we say about
this manual? First, it is obviously
quite explicit in its goal of ending
or at least substantially altering
the Sandinista government. Sec-
ond, it is a curious compilation of '
factors ranging from liberal-demo-
cratic ideals to their complete op-
posite, namely terrorist subver-
sion, precisely what the United
States has traditionally found to
be reprehensible and disgusting.
And finally, it represents a direct
interference in the affairs of a sov-
ereign country in violation of
American law and norms.
The greatest irony is that the
American government now seems
to be in the position of trying to
change or overthrow a govern-
ment it claims to be totalitarian
by using the very means it says it
is trying to destroy.
Mr. Fruchtman teaches politics
at Towson State University.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000301920021-7