A NEW CONTRA CULPRIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 12, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170023-7
ONPAGE Lis PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
A new
contra
culprit
Some see Congress
lax on oversight
./ By Charles Green
and R.A. Zaldivar
Inquirer Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - When Congress
begins hearings on the Iran-contra
affair next month, the failings of the
Reagan administration will be on
display. But another aspect of the
controversy will receive scant atten-
tion: the shortcomings of Congress
itself.
While no one contends that anyone
but President Reagan and his admin-
istration are to blame for selling
arms to Iran, some question whether
Congress doesn't bear some responsi-
bility for what happened with regard
to the Nicaraguan contra rebels.
"All through this issue there hasn't
been any clear-cut congressional po-
sition, other than the fact they
wished it would go away," said a
former government official who sup-
ported the contras and asked not to
be named. "A lawyer for the defense
can accurately portray a situation of
'Will the real Congress please stand
up?' "
The criticisms boil down to these-
* Congress was inconsistent and
ambiguous in deciding how far the
U.S. government could go in aiding
the Nicaraguan rebels. Laws some-
times were so murky that even the
legislators who wrote them could not
agree on what they meant.
? Congress failed to oversee the
administration's dealings with the
contras adequately despite suspi-
cions about the activities of Lt. Col.
Oliver L. North, the National Secu-
rity Council aide who ran a secret
supply network that funneled mil-
lions of dollars in weapons, materiel
and cash to the contras at a time
when Congress banned direct gov-
ernment assistance.
Lawmakers who subscribe to the
criticisms - and there are many
who do not - say one reason con-
gressional scrutiny fell short was
that Democrats were .leery of con-
fronting a popular president and of
being portrayed as soft on commu-
nism.
12 April 1987
"Congress didn't seem to care that
the law was being violated," said
Rep. Jim Leach (R., Iowa). "I think
the Democrats basically let the coun-
try down when it became clear the
President was extremely popular.
They were afraid to take him on."
Some even suggest it served the
purpose of skittish lawmakers to
look the other way when reports of
the NSC's involvement with the con-
tras began surfacing in 1985. To the
extent the NSC could keep the rebels
funded through outside sources,
Congress could avoid another
wrenching vote on contra aid, per.
haps the most contentious foreign
policy issue since the Vietnam War.
"As long as that [the secret supplyl
was going on, clearly there was some
life-support system for the contras,"
said a former congressional aide in-
volved in the contra legislation who
asked not to be identified. "It filled
in the cracks a little bit so that Con-
gress would not have to vote on the
issue and take the heat on it."
?
Such criticisms, not surprisingly,
largely have been dismissed on Capi-
tol Hill. "Balderdash!" said Rep. Dan-
te B. Fascell (D., Fla.), chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee. "The administration didn't get
what it wanted, so they went ahead
and did it another way."
He and others said the intent of
Congress was always clear, even if
laws were sometimes imprecise.
Moreover, they said, congressional
oversight of the contra program was
a victim of administration deception,
not a partner to it.
The question of NSC involvement
with the contras will be first on the
agenda when congressional hearings
into the Iran-contra affair begin May
5. The sessions will examine a net-
work run by North and his allies that
raised tens of millions of dollars -
some allegedly diverted from Ira-
nian payments for U.S. arms - to pay
for guns, aircraft, equipment and liv-
ing expenses for the contras.
The aid clearly violated the spirit
of the law; whether it violated the
letter of the law remains to be
proved.
For four years, that law kept
changing. In 1983, military aid to the
contras was legal; in 1984, it was
forbidden. In 1985, only humanitar-
ian aid was allowed; by 1986, it was
all right to send guns again.
Throughout, there were no penalties
for violating the statutes. "What
emerged," said the Tower Commis-
sion, "was a highly ambiguous legal
environment.
Contra aid becaine a series of com-
promises tailored to win the votes of
several dozen House and Senate
members who held the balance of
power in a divided Congress.
"There was no particular rationale
to the various restrictions and limi-
tations on contra aid," said Jeffrey
Bergner, who was staff director of
the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee when Sen. Richard G. Lugar
(R., Ind.), a contra supporter, headed
the panel. "It would be a mistake to
look for coherence or strategy. It
didn't reflect conscious planning. It
reflected legislative compromise."
Much of the ambiguity centered on
the various incarnations of the Bo-
land amendment, named after its
sponsor, Rep. Edward P. Boland (D.,
Mass.). Passed in 1982 after Reagan
authorized covert aid for the con-
tras, the first Boland amendment
prohibited the CIA and the Defense
Department from spending funds to-
ward "overthrowing the govern-
ment of Nicaragua or provoking a
military exchange between Nicara.
gua and Honduras."
But the covert CIA aid continued
- after Reagan said the rebels were
not seeking to topple the Nicaraguan
government but rather to prevent it
from sending arms to other Central
American revolutionaries.
"It became clear the administra-
tion was going to cynically ignore
the Boland amendment," said Leach,
a staunch opponent of contra aid.
"But Congress passed the funds to
allow the executive to ignore the
law."
Congressional discontent grew in
1983 and 1984, after reports that the
CIA helped direct the mining of Nica-
raguan harbors and authored a con-
tra-training manual that sanctioned
assassination as a tactic in guerrilla
warfare. In October 1984, a new Bo-
land amendment was passed barring
any agency of government "involved
in intelligence activities" from
spending money to support military
operations in Nicaragua.
However, North stepped up his in-
volvement with the contra-supply op?
eration after the NSC received legal
advice that it was not covered by the
law. The Tower Commission said the
opinion apparently came from the
President's Intelligence Oversight
Board, an unusual source of legal
advice for the NSC, which has its
own counsel.
?
In any event, the ban did not re-
main firm. In 1985, under intense
pressure from Reagan, Congress
agreed to provide $27 million in "hu-
manitarian" aid to the contras.
Within a few months, it agreed to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170023-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170023-7
broaden the definition of humanitar.
ian aid to include radios, trucks and
other gear useful in combat.
Then, in December 1985, Congress
relaxed restrictions on the CIA, al-
lowing it to offer "advice" to the
contras as long as it did not involve
individual military operations. Even
the legislators who wrote the law
couldn't agree where to draw the
line. Within days of the law's pas?
sage, House Intelligence Committee
Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D., Ind.)
told the CIA it could not advise the
contras on logistical matters, while
Senate Intelligence Committee
Chairman David Durenberger (R.,
Minn.) told -the CIA it could.
Finally, last year, a sharply divided
Congress agreed to provide $100 mil-
lion to the contras, including $70
million in military aid. All restric.
tions on CIA involvement were lift-
ed.
Administration officials said that
they were frustrated by the shifting
rules - and acknowledged that they
wanted to stretch the limits of the
law to aid the contras. "Almost every-
one in the administration wanted to
go right up to the line," said a former
administration official involved in
the contra-aid issue, who spoke on
the condition he not be identified by
name or former position. "And ev
erybody thought Ollie was dancing
on the line."
Adm. StansfieldTurner, CIA direct
for dine ng the Carter administra.
tion, recalls newspaper reports in
1985 that North was aiding the con-
tras despite congressional restric-
tions and said he was upset that
Congress wasn't cracking down on
the gung-ho Marine; He said Demo-
crats told him "they just weren't
willing to take on a popular Presi-
dent."
Those investigations that were be.
gun didn't get far. The House Intelli-
gence Committee questioned former
national security adviser Robert C.
McFarlane about North's activities in
1985 and was assured in writing that
.,at no time did I or any member of
the National Security Council staff
violate the letter or spirit of the
law." In 1986, the committee ques-
tioned North directly and was simi-
larly assured that the law was being
followed, panel members said.
"We learned from bitter experi-
ence that we were lied to," said com-
mittee member Rep. Matthew F. Mc.
Hugh (D., N.Y.).
"You could make the argument
that we didn't go far enough in push-
ing it," said Rep. David E. Bonior (D.,
Mich.), a leading opponent of contra
aid. "But this is a place that gives the
benefit of the doubt to the adminis-
tration, usually. We don't like to ad-
mit that people come before us and
just lie to us."
But even some contra sympathize
ers believe Congress could have
done a better job of oversight on the
contra issue by exhibiting the same
kind of investigative ardor in evi-
dence now.
"Congress is like Dalmatian dogs
in the fire station," said the former
administration official involved in
the contra issue. "The bell goes off
and they jump on the machine
whether it's a false alarm or not.
Those guys are jumping on investiga? '
tions all the time. And 80 percent of
them, they just root around and
come up with nothing.
"Maybe the problem is that they're
trying to root out too many rabbit
holes instead of concentrating on the
serious ones. And maybe this was a
serious one."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170023-7