K.G.B. DEFECTOR HELPED THE C.I.A. BRIEF REAGAN BEFORE SUMMIT TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 9, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0
PILVI YORK TIMES
9 August 1986
K.G.B. Defector Helped the C.I.A.
Brief Reagan Before Summit Talks
The following article is based on reporting by Lulls H. and Ph_lip
Shenon and was written by Mr. Gelb.
Special to The New York Thou
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 ? A Soviet
intelligence agent who defected to the
West last year provided President Rea-
gan with important insights into Mi-
khail S. Gorbachev and Soviet policy
only weeks before Mr. Reagan met the
Soviet leader in Geneva in November,
American officials say.
The officials said the defector, a for-
mer K.G.B. official named Oleg G.
Gordiyevsky, had advised Washington
that Soviet leaders, although relentless
In trying to expand their nation's influ-
ence, were ready to bargain seriously.
Mr. Gordiyevsky, who was once the
London station chief for the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence and internal se-
curity agency, and who is its highest-
ranking officer to remain in the West,
.also told American officials that al-
though Washington had cause to worry
about Moscow, Soviet leaders were
i perhaps even more concerned about
the directions taken by the Reagan Ad-
Ministration.
Endorsed Defector's Views
This complicated picture of Soviet
thinking came at a time when officials
said Mr. Reagan was just beginning to
emerge from his unclouded sense of the
Soviet Union as the "evil empire." Mr.
Gordiyevsky reinforced the views of
other defectors like Arkady N. Shev-
chenko, the former high-level Soviet of-
ficial at the United Nations who sought
asylum in 1978.
To get this information and a per-
sonal impression of Mr. Gorbachev,
V% William J. Casey, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, flew secretly to Lon-
don last fall to meet with Mr. Gordiyev-
sky. Information provided by the de-
fector was then used liberally in the
Central Intelligence Agency's profile of
the Soviet leader prepared for Mr. Rea-
gan before the summit meeting in
Geneva, sources said.
But the sources said there was an im-
portant piece of information that Mr.
Gordiyevsky provided to his British in-
telligence "handlers" in 1981 that Lon-
don apparently did not pass on to Wash-
ington for some time.
Believed U.S. Would Attack
Soviet leaders, he told them, believed
that Mr. Reagan intended to order an
attack against the Soviet Union or one
of its close allies, perhaps Cuba.
Mr. Reagan was said to have been
apprised of this Soviet belief by the
time of Mr. Casey's visit.
For over 13 years, Mr. Gordiyevsky
was a double agent, a spy for Britain
and, for a time, Denmark. He began
spying for Britain while serving as a
junior K.G.B. officer in Copenhagen in
1908, his first foreign assignment.
His last days as a double agent were
marked by what sources said was one
of the most creative and daring es-
capes from the Soviet Union. Contrary
to information made public last fall
when Mr. Gordiyevsky's defection VMS
announced by the British Government,
he did not defect in Britain.
In the jargon of espionage, his escape
was a "clandestine exfiltration." The
sources said this was not the first time
that double agents had been smuggled
out of the Soviet Union.
Information provided by Mr. Gor-
diyevsky since the early 1970's seri-
ously disrupted K.G.B. activities in
Britain and Scandinavia, sources said.
His information was also instrumental,
they said, in the arrest and conviction
of Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian
diplomat who was sentenced to 20
years in prison for spying for the Soviet
Union.
Although it has been widely dis-
cussed in the British press, the story
behind Mr. Gordiyevsky's long career
as a double agent and his defection con-
tinue to fascinate and perplex Western
intelligence specialists. The case, they
say, raises important questions about
the nature of modern-day espionage by
the great powers.
No Doubts of Authenticity .
None of the current and former intel-
ligence specialists interviewed raised
serious doubts about Mr. Gordiyev-
sky's authenticity as a double agent
and defector. But they raised and tried
to answer some of the mysteries about
a career that has been closely guarded
by British intelligence.
These are among the questions:
eWhy did he choose to spy for the
British M.1.4 counterintelligence
branch rather than the C.I.A. or other
Western intelligence organizations?
eHow did he fool Soviet intelligence
for so long, or is it possible that he
masqueraded as a British agent while
continuing to serve the Soviet Union?
What kind of information has he
provided over the years, and what was
its value?
eHow did he escape from the Soviet
Union, and why?
Despite early press reports, intelli-
gence sources say, Mr. Gordiyevsky at
first worked exclusively as a double
agent for Britain. He was recruited by
British intelligence, they say, during
his diplomatic service for the Soviet
Union in Copenhagen in the late 1980's.
Shortly after his defection, Danish of-
ficials indicated that Mr. Gordiyevsky
had also worked directly for Den-
mark's intelligence service from the
start, but American sources discount
those accounts.
Britain, they said, knew that it could
not oversee Mr. Gordiyevsky in Den-
mark without the logistical help of the
Danish Government. That understand-
ing later prompted British officials to
reveal his identity to the Danes and
permit them direct contact with the
Soviet official.
Sometime during his years in Copen-
hagen, American officials said, Mr.
Gordiyevsky faced the choice of work-
ing for M.I.4 or the C.I.A.
A former key intelligence official
said there was substantial competition
between M.I.4 and the C.I.A.'s
deputy
directorate for operations, which
han-
dles secret agents. He pointed out that
the two agencies often compete for the
same sources, particularly in the Mid-
dle East, where the agencies tried to
steal each other's agents.
British Reputation Cited
C.I.A, officials say that over the
years many K.G.B. agents have de-
fected to the United States and worked
with the agency. The agents chose the
United States, the officials said, be-
cause of their feeling that British intel-
ligence had been penetrated over the
years by the K.G.B.
This perception notwithstanding, in-
telligence officiabt in Washington said
M.I.4 had an international reputation
for high professionalism in handling
spies.
Thereputation of the British intelli-
gence services for sophistication and
discretion is believed to be the chief
reason Mr. Gordievsky decided to spy
for the British rather than other intelli-
gence services, the sources said.
Mr. Gordiyevsky, they said, doubt-
less appreciated efforts to place him in
the company of Russian-speaking Brit-
ish agents and to provide little informa-
tion to journalists after aimouncement
of his defection.
Yurchenko Treatment a Cadent
His treatment contrasted sharply
with the American handling of Vita
Yurchenko, a K.B.G. official of higher
rank than Mr. Gordiyevsky who de-
fected to the United States last year but
later escaped from C.I.A. custody and
returned to Moscow.
Mr. Yurchenko and other defectors
who have been handled by the C.I.A.
have complained bitterly about Amer-
ican treatment, saying that they were
rarely allowed to converse in Russian
and that details of their escapee were
often leaked by official sources. Mr.
Yurchenko, for example, was said to be
furious that his defection was de-
? scribed in detail in American newspa-
pers.
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COrTtitnA
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.
The sources said British handling at
Mr. Gordiyevsky was a good part of the
explanation of bow he managed to
evade detection by the K.G.B. for so
many years.
The danger to any double agent
comes primarily, the sources said,
, from his handlers' taking advantage of
his inside information too hastily. But
the British showed tremendous re-
straint. For instance, they did not
move against other K.G.B. agents
whose identities were disclosed by Mr.
Gordiyevsky. Doing so would have led
the K.G.B. quickly back to him.
There is a belief in the international
Intelligence community that American
officials will occasionally f
political concerm and move too quickly
against Soviet operatives identified by
1 a double agent.
But the story of Mr. Gordiyevsky's
decision to spy for Britain does not
solve another puzzle for current and
former intelligence officials. They
, noted that when a K.G.B. agent of Mr.
Gordiyevsky's status defects, the wel-
coming Government usually takes ac-
tion against its own citizens who are
spying for Moscow.
But in the Gordiyevsky case, the only
action taken by the British Govern-
ment was to expel 31 Soviet diplomats,
journalists and other aides, an action
that prompted the Soviets to retaliate
in equal measure.
Two sources said Mr. Gordiyevsky
had identified several British citizens
who spied for the Soviet Union. They
further indicated that Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and her aides de-
cided against prosecuting them for fear
that their case would not be conclusive
In the courts and that opposition politi-
cians would criticize the Government
for playing politics with the delicate
subject of spying.
iAnother source said he believed that
Mr. Gordiyevsky might have identified
British citizens who were nevertheless
not paid agents.
Still other sources offered an even
, more intriguing explanation. They rea-
soned that Mr. Gorcliyevsky has been
! holding back some information to pro-
tect his family, all or most of whom are
) still said to be in the Soviet Union.
I Triple Agents Called Rare
Nonetheless, the judgment of British
and American intelligence officials is
that Mr. Gordiyevsky was a genuine
double agent and is a genuine defector.
In general, these experts say they be-
lieve that so-called triple agents ? for
example, a K.G.B. officer masquerad-
ing as a British agent who actually con-
tinues to serve Moscow ? are a great
rarity.
Triple agents, they said, must pro-
vide a great deal of important informa-
prey
f Another former key intelligence offi-
cial said London and Washington "will
share information but not details on the
source itself."
Mr. Gordiyevsky's intimate knowl-
edge of the Kremlin leadership was
what led Mr. Casey to travel to London
last fall.
Mr. Gordiyevsky was twice assigned
to Denmark, from 1988 to 1970 as an
attache in the Soviet Consulate in Co-
penhagen, and from 1972 to 1978 in a
variety of posts at the Soviet Embassy.
He was later transfered to London as
head of the political section of the
K.G.B. in the Soviet Embassy. In the
spring 1885, he was elevated to
K.G.B. station chief in London.
Shortly after his promotion, sources
said, he was unexpectedly summoned
back to Moscow.
There was said to be considerable
discussion among his British handlers
over whether to let him go. The sources
said the handlers clearly remembered
Oleg V. Penkovsky, a high-ranking
Soviet military intelligence officer who
provided important information to the
British in the early 1980's.
He, too, was called home, and his
British handlers allowed him to return.
By that time, however, the K.G.B. had
discovered that he was a double agent.
He was imprisoned in Moscow and exe-
cuted in 1963.
Mr. Gordiyevsky went back. Accord-
ing to sources, he quickly determined
that he was in danger in Moscow and
signaled his handlers that he was in
trouble. The British then set in motion
an elaborate plan to spirit him out of he
country, sources said. Similar plans
had been used before, and details about
Ithem have been guarded with the ut-
most secrecy.
tion to establish their Credibility. All o
this is given, in the case of a triple
agent, for the sake of propounding
some important piece of misinforma-
tion later on.
A former intelligence agent, reflect-
ing the views of most of his colleagues,
id tn?
gems were almost always
"not worth it" and "romantic movie
fiction."
The consensus in London and Wash-
ington is that the information Mr. Gor-
diyevsky provided has been sound and
useful. Government sources in Wash-
ington said he had provided intelli-
gence agencies with details of K.G.B.
operations in Scandinavia and Britain,
which are known as major intelligence-
gathering outlets for the Russians.
Called Familar With Politburo
They said he also had a strong knowl-
edge of the workings and policies of the
Soviet Politburo, the policy-making
body of the Communist Party. The
Potitburo, the sources noted, outlines
the policies followed by the K.G.B. and
its agents.
According to the Government
sources, Mr. Gordlyevsky was of enor-
mous help when Mr. Yurchenko de-
fected to the United States last year.
This defection set off an animinated de-
bate in the intelligence community
over whether Mr. Yurchenko was actu-
ally a high-ranking K.G.B. officer.
Mr. Gordiyhvsky, sources said, was
one of the first to confirm that Mr. Yur-
chenko was who he said he was.
Described as sophisticated and per-
ceptive by those who knew him in Co-
penhagen and London, Mr. Gordiyev-
sky is also thought to have provided
Western intelligence officers with in-
sight into the thinking of key Soviet
leaders, including Mr. Gorbachev. As
the K.G.B. station chief in London, he
helped plan and run Mr. Gorbachev's
visit to Britain in the spring of 1985 to
meet with Mrs. Thatcher.
It could not be learned what informa-
tion, if any, he provided about the as-
cendancy of the former head of the
K.G.B., Yuri V. Andropov, to the lead-
ership of the Communist Party in 1982.
Mr. Andropov died in 1981.
Soviet Paranoia Seen
Much of what Mr. Gordiyevsky said
over the years underlined Soviet para-
noia about the United States, particu-
larly Moscow's fear over the intentions
of the Reagan Administration.
Officials are of two minds about his
disclosure in 1981 of Moscow's con-
cerns that Washington was planning
military action against the Soviet
Union or its allies. Although a few Brit-
ish officials were said to believe that
the Russians did indeed fear an attack,
other intelligence agents discounted
this, noting that Soviet military forces
did not take steps indicating they were
preparing for war.
It is not clear how much of what Mr.
Gordiyevsky told the British was
passed on to Washington, although
there are strong indications that his
identity was not revealed. Adm. Stens-
field Turner, a former Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, said, "It's accepted
practice to be very circumspect in de-
scribing a source, but I'm not com-
menting on this case."
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