K.G.B. DEFECTOR HELPED THE C.I.A. BRIEF REAGAN BEFORE SUMMIT TALKS

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CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0
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RIFPUB
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K
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2
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December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 14, 2012
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4
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Publication Date: 
August 9, 1986
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OPEN SOURCE
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5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0 PILVI YORK TIMES 9 August 1986 K.G.B. Defector Helped the C.I.A. Brief Reagan Before Summit Talks The following article is based on reporting by Lulls H. and Ph_lip Shenon and was written by Mr. Gelb. Special to The New York Thou WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 ? A Soviet intelligence agent who defected to the West last year provided President Rea- gan with important insights into Mi- khail S. Gorbachev and Soviet policy only weeks before Mr. Reagan met the Soviet leader in Geneva in November, American officials say. The officials said the defector, a for- mer K.G.B. official named Oleg G. Gordiyevsky, had advised Washington that Soviet leaders, although relentless In trying to expand their nation's influ- ence, were ready to bargain seriously. Mr. Gordiyevsky, who was once the London station chief for the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence and internal se- curity agency, and who is its highest- ranking officer to remain in the West, .also told American officials that al- though Washington had cause to worry about Moscow, Soviet leaders were i perhaps even more concerned about the directions taken by the Reagan Ad- Ministration. Endorsed Defector's Views This complicated picture of Soviet thinking came at a time when officials said Mr. Reagan was just beginning to emerge from his unclouded sense of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire." Mr. Gordiyevsky reinforced the views of other defectors like Arkady N. Shev- chenko, the former high-level Soviet of- ficial at the United Nations who sought asylum in 1978. To get this information and a per- sonal impression of Mr. Gorbachev, V% William J. Casey, the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, flew secretly to Lon- don last fall to meet with Mr. Gordiyev- sky. Information provided by the de- fector was then used liberally in the Central Intelligence Agency's profile of the Soviet leader prepared for Mr. Rea- gan before the summit meeting in Geneva, sources said. But the sources said there was an im- portant piece of information that Mr. Gordiyevsky provided to his British in- telligence "handlers" in 1981 that Lon- don apparently did not pass on to Wash- ington for some time. Believed U.S. Would Attack Soviet leaders, he told them, believed that Mr. Reagan intended to order an attack against the Soviet Union or one of its close allies, perhaps Cuba. Mr. Reagan was said to have been apprised of this Soviet belief by the time of Mr. Casey's visit. For over 13 years, Mr. Gordiyevsky was a double agent, a spy for Britain and, for a time, Denmark. He began spying for Britain while serving as a junior K.G.B. officer in Copenhagen in 1908, his first foreign assignment. His last days as a double agent were marked by what sources said was one of the most creative and daring es- capes from the Soviet Union. Contrary to information made public last fall when Mr. Gordiyevsky's defection VMS announced by the British Government, he did not defect in Britain. In the jargon of espionage, his escape was a "clandestine exfiltration." The sources said this was not the first time that double agents had been smuggled out of the Soviet Union. Information provided by Mr. Gor- diyevsky since the early 1970's seri- ously disrupted K.G.B. activities in Britain and Scandinavia, sources said. His information was also instrumental, they said, in the arrest and conviction of Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian diplomat who was sentenced to 20 years in prison for spying for the Soviet Union. Although it has been widely dis- cussed in the British press, the story behind Mr. Gordiyevsky's long career as a double agent and his defection con- tinue to fascinate and perplex Western intelligence specialists. The case, they say, raises important questions about the nature of modern-day espionage by the great powers. No Doubts of Authenticity . None of the current and former intel- ligence specialists interviewed raised serious doubts about Mr. Gordiyev- sky's authenticity as a double agent and defector. But they raised and tried to answer some of the mysteries about a career that has been closely guarded by British intelligence. These are among the questions: eWhy did he choose to spy for the British M.1.4 counterintelligence branch rather than the C.I.A. or other Western intelligence organizations? eHow did he fool Soviet intelligence for so long, or is it possible that he masqueraded as a British agent while continuing to serve the Soviet Union? What kind of information has he provided over the years, and what was its value? eHow did he escape from the Soviet Union, and why? Despite early press reports, intelli- gence sources say, Mr. Gordiyevsky at first worked exclusively as a double agent for Britain. He was recruited by British intelligence, they say, during his diplomatic service for the Soviet Union in Copenhagen in the late 1980's. Shortly after his defection, Danish of- ficials indicated that Mr. Gordiyevsky had also worked directly for Den- mark's intelligence service from the start, but American sources discount those accounts. Britain, they said, knew that it could not oversee Mr. Gordiyevsky in Den- mark without the logistical help of the Danish Government. That understand- ing later prompted British officials to reveal his identity to the Danes and permit them direct contact with the Soviet official. Sometime during his years in Copen- hagen, American officials said, Mr. Gordiyevsky faced the choice of work- ing for M.I.4 or the C.I.A. A former key intelligence official said there was substantial competition between M.I.4 and the C.I.A.'s deputy directorate for operations, which han- dles secret agents. He pointed out that the two agencies often compete for the same sources, particularly in the Mid- dle East, where the agencies tried to steal each other's agents. British Reputation Cited C.I.A, officials say that over the years many K.G.B. agents have de- fected to the United States and worked with the agency. The agents chose the United States, the officials said, be- cause of their feeling that British intel- ligence had been penetrated over the years by the K.G.B. This perception notwithstanding, in- telligence officiabt in Washington said M.I.4 had an international reputation for high professionalism in handling spies. Thereputation of the British intelli- gence services for sophistication and discretion is believed to be the chief reason Mr. Gordievsky decided to spy for the British rather than other intelli- gence services, the sources said. Mr. Gordiyevsky, they said, doubt- less appreciated efforts to place him in the company of Russian-speaking Brit- ish agents and to provide little informa- tion to journalists after aimouncement of his defection. Yurchenko Treatment a Cadent His treatment contrasted sharply with the American handling of Vita Yurchenko, a K.B.G. official of higher rank than Mr. Gordiyevsky who de- fected to the United States last year but later escaped from C.I.A. custody and returned to Moscow. Mr. Yurchenko and other defectors who have been handled by the C.I.A. have complained bitterly about Amer- ican treatment, saying that they were rarely allowed to converse in Russian and that details of their escapee were often leaked by official sources. Mr. Yurchenko, for example, was said to be furious that his defection was de- ? scribed in detail in American newspa- pers. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0 COrTtitnA Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0 . The sources said British handling at Mr. Gordiyevsky was a good part of the explanation of bow he managed to evade detection by the K.G.B. for so many years. The danger to any double agent comes primarily, the sources said, , from his handlers' taking advantage of his inside information too hastily. But the British showed tremendous re- straint. For instance, they did not move against other K.G.B. agents whose identities were disclosed by Mr. Gordiyevsky. Doing so would have led the K.G.B. quickly back to him. There is a belief in the international Intelligence community that American officials will occasionally f political concerm and move too quickly against Soviet operatives identified by 1 a double agent. But the story of Mr. Gordiyevsky's decision to spy for Britain does not solve another puzzle for current and former intelligence officials. They , noted that when a K.G.B. agent of Mr. Gordiyevsky's status defects, the wel- coming Government usually takes ac- tion against its own citizens who are spying for Moscow. But in the Gordiyevsky case, the only action taken by the British Govern- ment was to expel 31 Soviet diplomats, journalists and other aides, an action that prompted the Soviets to retaliate in equal measure. Two sources said Mr. Gordiyevsky had identified several British citizens who spied for the Soviet Union. They further indicated that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her aides de- cided against prosecuting them for fear that their case would not be conclusive In the courts and that opposition politi- cians would criticize the Government for playing politics with the delicate subject of spying. iAnother source said he believed that Mr. Gordiyevsky might have identified British citizens who were nevertheless not paid agents. Still other sources offered an even , more intriguing explanation. They rea- soned that Mr. Gorcliyevsky has been ! holding back some information to pro- tect his family, all or most of whom are ) still said to be in the Soviet Union. I Triple Agents Called Rare Nonetheless, the judgment of British and American intelligence officials is that Mr. Gordiyevsky was a genuine double agent and is a genuine defector. In general, these experts say they be- lieve that so-called triple agents ? for example, a K.G.B. officer masquerad- ing as a British agent who actually con- tinues to serve Moscow ? are a great rarity. Triple agents, they said, must pro- vide a great deal of important informa- prey f Another former key intelligence offi- cial said London and Washington "will share information but not details on the source itself." Mr. Gordiyevsky's intimate knowl- edge of the Kremlin leadership was what led Mr. Casey to travel to London last fall. Mr. Gordiyevsky was twice assigned to Denmark, from 1988 to 1970 as an attache in the Soviet Consulate in Co- penhagen, and from 1972 to 1978 in a variety of posts at the Soviet Embassy. He was later transfered to London as head of the political section of the K.G.B. in the Soviet Embassy. In the spring 1885, he was elevated to K.G.B. station chief in London. Shortly after his promotion, sources said, he was unexpectedly summoned back to Moscow. There was said to be considerable discussion among his British handlers over whether to let him go. The sources said the handlers clearly remembered Oleg V. Penkovsky, a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer who provided important information to the British in the early 1980's. He, too, was called home, and his British handlers allowed him to return. By that time, however, the K.G.B. had discovered that he was a double agent. He was imprisoned in Moscow and exe- cuted in 1963. Mr. Gordiyevsky went back. Accord- ing to sources, he quickly determined that he was in danger in Moscow and signaled his handlers that he was in trouble. The British then set in motion an elaborate plan to spirit him out of he country, sources said. Similar plans had been used before, and details about Ithem have been guarded with the ut- most secrecy. tion to establish their Credibility. All o this is given, in the case of a triple agent, for the sake of propounding some important piece of misinforma- tion later on. A former intelligence agent, reflect- ing the views of most of his colleagues, id tn? gems were almost always "not worth it" and "romantic movie fiction." The consensus in London and Wash- ington is that the information Mr. Gor- diyevsky provided has been sound and useful. Government sources in Wash- ington said he had provided intelli- gence agencies with details of K.G.B. operations in Scandinavia and Britain, which are known as major intelligence- gathering outlets for the Russians. Called Familar With Politburo They said he also had a strong knowl- edge of the workings and policies of the Soviet Politburo, the policy-making body of the Communist Party. The Potitburo, the sources noted, outlines the policies followed by the K.G.B. and its agents. According to the Government sources, Mr. Gordlyevsky was of enor- mous help when Mr. Yurchenko de- fected to the United States last year. This defection set off an animinated de- bate in the intelligence community over whether Mr. Yurchenko was actu- ally a high-ranking K.G.B. officer. Mr. Gordiyhvsky, sources said, was one of the first to confirm that Mr. Yur- chenko was who he said he was. Described as sophisticated and per- ceptive by those who knew him in Co- penhagen and London, Mr. Gordiyev- sky is also thought to have provided Western intelligence officers with in- sight into the thinking of key Soviet leaders, including Mr. Gorbachev. As the K.G.B. station chief in London, he helped plan and run Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Britain in the spring of 1985 to meet with Mrs. Thatcher. It could not be learned what informa- tion, if any, he provided about the as- cendancy of the former head of the K.G.B., Yuri V. Andropov, to the lead- ership of the Communist Party in 1982. Mr. Andropov died in 1981. Soviet Paranoia Seen Much of what Mr. Gordiyevsky said over the years underlined Soviet para- noia about the United States, particu- larly Moscow's fear over the intentions of the Reagan Administration. Officials are of two minds about his disclosure in 1981 of Moscow's con- cerns that Washington was planning military action against the Soviet Union or its allies. Although a few Brit- ish officials were said to believe that the Russians did indeed fear an attack, other intelligence agents discounted this, noting that Soviet military forces did not take steps indicating they were preparing for war. It is not clear how much of what Mr. Gordiyevsky told the British was passed on to Washington, although there are strong indications that his identity was not revealed. Adm. Stens- field Turner, a former Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, said, "It's accepted practice to be very circumspect in de- scribing a source, but I'm not com- menting on this case." Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240004-0