'85 REAGAN RULING ON AFGHANS CITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

I I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240006-8
ARTICLE APPKA1D
ON PAGE o'N
'85 REAGAN RULING
ON AFGHANS CITED
He Reportedly Told Congress
Policy Is to Expel Russians
'by All Means Available'
By MIBLiltiilat
Special es no New Yak Mau
WASHINGTON, June 18 ?
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Interviews today
that it was recognized at the time that
the "all mains available" was ambiguous. But they said language
sentations to the committees were nor-
mally in broad strokes.
This particular presentation, made
In late 1986 or early 18811, was in the
form of either a written memorandum
or an oral briefing, and the ambiguous
served two purposes, officials
language provided justification for sup-
plying more and better arms to the
? and it signaled to those in Con-
gress who wanted to do more that Mr.
Reagan was on their side.
Other officials said the presentadon,
based on a Presidential decision of
April 1985, was being interpreted more
ambitiously by some people in the
White House, the Pentagon and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Maneuvering by Coeservatives
These interpretations, in turn, are
said to be at the root of maneuvering
over whether to extend diplomatic
recognition to the Afghan rebels and to
cut relations with the Afghan Govern-
ment.
The officials said that redognition
could have the effect of undercutting
United Nations-sponsored talks be-
tween Pakistan and the Afghan Gov-
ernment aimed at a Af-
ghanistan, Afghan self-determination,
the return of refugees from Pakistan
and the withdrawal of Soviet forces.
Larry Speak's, the White House
spokesman, reacted sharply today to
reports that thought was being given to
recognizing the rebels. He reiterated
what he said Monday, that this would
be "premature."
Charles E. Redman, a State Depart-
ment spokesman, in endorsing the
United Nations talks, said, "We have
consistently supported the position and
principles of the United Nations in
bringing an end to this conflict."
NEW YORK TIMES
19 June 1986
Ns News Resdied Rebels
Meanwhile, Administration officials
confirmed that Stinpr shoulder-fired
antiaircraft missiles reportedly sent to
the rebels two months ago had never
reached them. Several days ago, rebel
leaders visiting here said the missiles
had never even been promised to them.
Officials said that a deon by Mr.
Reagan in February or March to send
the Stingers still stood and that the
delay was occasioned by
"temporary"
problems such as the needllomtPrawargein
rebels, the need for assurances that the
missiles would not be diverted to ter-
rorists, and the need to make Paki-
stan's role in the delivery less visible.
A Pentagon official said there was
also a problem of "other countries and
grows who have asked for Stingers
and been denied them saying to us, 'It
the Afghan rebels get them, we are en-
titled, too."
One Administration official said
there was a chance that the Afghan
rebels would never get Stingers.
"Temporary problems have a way of
becoming permanent." he said.
The Stinger missiles have been given
mainly to the NATO allies, but also to
Paidstan and the Angolan rebels. The
Nicaraguan rebels have been denied
these weapons.
Lens a Matter el Debate
The issue of supplying Stingers to the
Afghan rebels has been a matter of de-
bate within the Administration for
some time. For about a year, the
United States has been supplying the
rebels with Soviet-made SAM-7 port-
able antiaircraft missiles, which are
said to perform unevenly.
Today officials said that under the
decision earlier this year to send Sting-
ers, Mr. Reagan intended to supply 150
Stinger launchers with 300 missiles.
This is less than the numbers hinted at
by Administration officials at the time.
The officials also said that Mr. Rea-
gan chose the original Stinger rather
than the newer Stinger Post. The origi-
nal Stinger is said to have problems in
that helicopter gunships can deflect its
n
heat-eldul system by firing
a flare. The Stinger Post is said to be
able to overcome such defenses.
According to Administration offi-
cials, the Stingers were part of an aid
worth $300 million to $350 mil-
lion for the current fiscal year. This,
too, was well below earlier hints from
officials. In the fiscal year 1985, the
total was $280 million. Most of the funds
are spent on small arms, ammunition,
support equipment and clothing
shipped through Pakistan.
Need for Greater Aid Is Sees
According to officials, a Government
study in April ISIS found that the Soviet
forces were gradually wearing down
the rebels, leading Mr. Reagan to
broaden the objectives of theartert aid
program. Hs issued a document, Na-
tional Security Decision Directive HI,
that called for driving Soviet forces
from Afghenistan "by all means avail-
able."
The directive, in turn, became the
basis of the presentation to Congress,
and the Administration also informed
the intelligence committees of its inten-
tion to provide Stingers.
Some legislators resisted on the
ground that the missiles might fall into
terrorist bends and might provoke an
increase in Soviet activity. ?
But the hesitations acp said to have
been overcome by a maid= of sena-
tors including Malcolm Wallop, Repub-
lican of Wyoming, and Bill Bradley,
Democrat of New Jersey. Since then,
Mr. Bradley has besn in the forefront of
a group diplomatk
ebels recognition
of the Afghan r ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240006-8