USE OF DISCLOSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240008-6
ART Ica ,:p.NW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE
2 June 1986
Use of Disclosures
Administration Often Unveils Secrets,
At Risk to Security, for Sake of Policy
By LIBLIZ IL MI
!pedal to Mt New York Timm
The disclosures also include an fact-
WASHINGTON, June 1 ? The Rea- dent last year in which the Central In-
a Pattern of disclosing highly classified
aLl tailed inftrmation provided by one of.
information to ouPPori fcs= the highest-ranking Soviet defectors of
cies, even though a ninnber of
tration officials say these disclosures
have endangered intelli-
gence sources and meth
-
Nom ods. This fits the well-es-
Altair& tablished practice of its
predecessors, with two im-
portant variations: In the
memory of a number of past and
present officials, the Reagan team
does it more often. And this Adm
traits has been more aggressive in
threatening the news media witliprose-
cotton for conveying similar intent-
. gence information to the American
people.
; This has set off a struggle between
press *lid govenunent over what
lntl-
ligence data should be made public and
who should decide. William J. Casey,
the Director of Central Intelligence,
once again highlighted those issues
with more threats to the press last
week concerning coverage of the trial
of Ronald W. Pellets, a former official
of the National Security Agency who is
accused of spying for the Soviet Union.
By the week's end the White House had
moved to soften the threat somewhat.
Today, in separate television inter-
views, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar
; W. Weinberger, while supporting the
view that journalists who break the law
on disclosing intelligence secrets
' should be prosecuted, called for volun-
tary restraints and appeals to journal-
ists' sense of responsibility.
While the Administration's thrust
has been to bear down on the press,
with freqiient warnings in recent
weeks, its own role and reasons in di-"
willing such information have re-
ceived scant attention.
As Representative Lee Aspin, chair-
man of the House Armed Services
Committee, put it: "Every administra-
tion wants to have it both wan ? to
keep its secrets, and to reveal them
whenever doing so is useful for their
politics and policies." The Wisconsin
Democrat, a former Intelligence Com-
mittee member, added that in his Judg-
ment a number of Administration dis-
closures have been "more damaging to
our gaining necessary informatics
than the press disclosures the Adminis-
tration is complaining about."
Administration disclosures include
revealing the most sensitive communi-
cations Interceptions in the recent came
of Libya and the Soviet Union on a num-
ber of occasions, as well as releasing
satellite photographs regarding Nica-
ragua in 1902.
recent times.
Testimony at Spy Trial
Lest week the disclosures entailed a
Federal prosecutor, for the first time
using information supplied by the
United States intelligence community,
speaking inaantrial of the general,
American capability to "exploit,'
"process," "analyze" Soviet mes-
MPS.
In each instance, according to Ad-
ministration officials, intelligence offi-
cers and others have against
disclosure an the that adver-
saries, knowing they were being seen
and heard, could take steps to block
these processes In the future.
To some Administration officials and
others, these authorised dislasures
have been more damaging to intelli-
gence collection than the unauthorized
pm. disclosures of recent weeks that
have so exercised Administration lead-
en. These include press accounts of the
details of Libyan messages atter Presi-
dent Reagan had talked publicly about
the substance of those messages re-
garding terrorist activities in Berlin.
Of the greatest concern to the Admin-
istration were reports that an Amer-
ican spy had told Moscow that United
States submarines were involved in lis-
tening to Soviet communications, infor-
mation presumably already in Mos-
cow's poesession..
_
When to Go Public?
Nonetheless, the weight of opinion
expressed by officials of past and
meson Presidential administrations is
that the one in power has the right to
decide when intelligence must be com-
promised to advance policy.
"I've always been of the view that an
administration has to be able to make
the Judgment when to disclose, even if
Intelligence people are opposed," said
McGeorge Bundy, President Ken-
nedy's national security adviser. He re-
called Kennedy's decision to reveal
satellite photographs of Soviet missiles
In Cuba in 1963 ass legitimate exercise
of this right. '
1)Ivho was. President Carter's
Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral
Intelli-
gence chief, went further, saying that
"we always have, to make compro-
mises" in balancing intelligence
sources with policy considerations.
But, he said, it "impossible to make
this jucigment frri outside the Govern-
ment."
the right to publish unauthorglisminion-
madam But Admiral Minter insisted:
that the press then had to accept the
risks of prosecution.
In 1982, the Administration made
public aerial reconnaissance photo-
graphs that teteiligenee officials said
proved Nicaragua, with Soviet and
Cuban aid, was assembling the largest
military force in Central America and
was supplying Salvadoran guerrillas.
At the time, a senior Administration of-
ficial said: "It's a no-win pituallon. tlf4
we go public with the Information, we
may lose our ability to continue colrect-
ing in the field. If we don't, we may leas
our chance to build public support fdr
the policy."
As it turned out, aworftg to offi-
cials, the Administration neither last
Its Intelligence access nor convinced
many of the extent of the military
threat. But thephotographs might have
been useful to Soviet intelligence.
In 1963, after the Soviet Union shot '
down a Korean airliner, killing XS peo-
ple aboard, Secretary Shultz revealed
that American 'fistaidng posts had in-
tercepted the radio canversallons be-
twain the Soviet pilot and his control.
len.
The disclosure may have failed to
prove his point that the Soviets knew
the plane was not an intelligence air-
craft and, as far as many intelligence
officers were concerned, told Moscow
that the United States could intercept
Important Soviet military connnunica-
tions.
The Case of the Defector
In late 1905. the Central Intelligence
made a determined effort to
Agency
details about their inter-
rogation of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a key
Soviet Intelligence agent who appar-
ently defected and then slipped out of
American control and returned to Mos-
cow. The C.I.A. told its side, as some of
Its officials acknowledged at the time,
to show that he had been a valuable in-
former, contrary to White House user-
dons of his uselessness.
A number of Administration officials
at the time maintained that these
C.I.A. disclosures tipped off Moscow to
what Mr. Yurchenlw had divulged, in
the same way that Mr. Casey is seeking
to prevent the press from telling Mos-
cow and the American public about Mr.
Pelton's alleged disclosures.
Earlier this year, Mr. Reagan pub-
licly spoke of the Administration's
knowledge of messages sent to and
from Tripoli and its diplomatic posts.
He said these proved Libyan involve-
meat in the terrorist attack April 5
=Ia discotheque in West Berlin, in
wo people were killed and 230
others wounded.
Several intelligence officials thought
the disclosure would allow the Libyans
to prevent similar interception in the
future.
As to the decision to make disclo-
sures at the Pelton trial, Edward P.
Djerijian, a White House spokesman,
said last week that it was "made by ap-
propriate Government authorities
after careful consideration of the de-
mands of trial and the potential harm
that release of this selected data may
cause the national security?'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/14: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302240008-6