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Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 12, 2012
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Publication Date: 
May 4, 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310016-9 STAT ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE T Bureaucrats resist efforts to fight back against spies By Bill Gertz THE NMSHINGTON TIMES When a Romanian intelligence of- ficer defected to the United States in 1978, U.S. officials said he made a startling disclosure: The wife of an American ambassador posted to an Eastern bloc capital had been se- duced by an undercover operative posing as the ambassador's chauf- feur. According to the State Depart- ment, an investigation revealed the tryst had not compromised U.S. se- crets. But to protect the ambassador, the department withheld all details of the affair from senior Reagan ad- ministration officials. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which confirmed the mbassador for posts in 1981 and 98# also was not informed. "The files were sealed to prevent viofi~tting privacy laws," a State De- artment official said last week in confirming the affair. "People in this Administration didn't even know about it." During a 1985 confirmation hear- ing, the ambassador was asked a standard question about whether #nything in his past might embar- tass the United States, and he told the panel "no," according to congres- iional sources. State Department handling of the incident has been cited by adminis- tration security officials as an exam- le of the "systemic" bureaucratic apposition to counterespionage and security efforts stretching back for decades. In the past, such "hardball tac- tics.. by Soviet intelligence services were used to blackmail diplomats, military officials and journalists. But State Department colleagues vvho defended the current ambassa- fior to Chile, Harry G. Barnes Jr., regard his wife's indiscretion while he was ambassador to Romania as pothing more than "a personal trag- edy" and not a security vulnerabil- ity, according to U.S. officials. WASHINGTON TIMES 4 May 1987 Bureaucratic resistance extends beyond individuals or agencies and Is So strong that prospects for cor- ecting the problem in government (remain dim despite the current pub- lic outcry over the Marine security uard sex-and-espionage scandal hat began unfolding in Moscow late last year, according to several ad- ;ministration security officials. "The main problem is that, in gov- trnment, there is a basic aversion to fiounterintelligence;' said one offi- cial. "It's the least popular yet the most difficult aspect of intelligence because you're dealing with the dark side of human nature - betrayal, revenge and lust." During the past six years of the Reagan administration, which vowed in 1980 to rebuild U.S. counterintelligence capabilities, the State Department and its Foreign Service successfully resisted White House attempts to initiate counter- espionage reforms, according to of- ficials involved in the debate. Another intelligence official said the recent security breakdowns and loss of national secrets in Moscow represent "the tip of the iceberg" in a governmentwide problem stem- ming from a weak counterintelli- gence capability and failure to im- prove it. "This subject has been studied to death;' the,official said. "Yet realis- tic appraisals of [U.S. government] security vulnerabilities have been largely ignored." The President's ^ oreinn Intelli- gence Advtso oarda group of e s from outside the adminis- tration, made more than 100 recom- mendations for improving counter- intelligence in a 1985 report, the official said. These included banning foreign nationals from working at U.S. em- bassies in the Soviet bloc, reducing the thousands of hostile spies oper- ating in the United States, develop- ing countermeasures against elec- tronic espionage targeted at U.S. agencies and individuals, and pre- venting the loss of U.S. technological data, the official said. Robert Lamb, the State De- partment's diplomatic security chief, said in a recent interview that past Foreign Service resistance to counterintelligence policies re- flected a general distate for secrecy and a suspicion about spying shared by American society as a whole. "We live in a very open society, we trust our neighbors and it is very difficult to transplant a person with this very typically American atti- tude into a place that is as very di- rectly and systematically hostile, from an intelligence point of view, as the Soviet Union;' Mr. Lamb said. As a result of the Moscow em- bassy failures, the department has begun a review of its security pro- gram "from top to bottom;' he said. Security lapses at U.S. embassies have led to numerous sexual entrap- ment operations in communist coun- tries and widespread electronic eavesdropping on embassy facili- ties, officials said. Two Marine guards once posted in Moscow were charged earlier this year with allowing Soviet agents in- side the most sensitive areas of the U.S. Embassy. The Marines appar- ently were seduced by female Soviet agents employed by the embassy. esides being U. diplomatic outpost, the Moscow em ss serves as one of the most important US. intelligence collec- ion facilities in the world, officials said, Administration security officials, who agreed to discuss the issue on condition of anonymity, placed most blame on the White House for its failure to overcome bureaucratic op- position to strong counterespionage policies. President Reagan, the officials said, delegated authority freely to Cabinet subordinates and fre- quently deferred to Secretary of State George Shultz on the issue of embassy security. It was Mr. Shultz, according to the officials, who set the tone for State Department anti-security attitudes in 1985 by threatening to resign in protest against a National Security Council counterintelligence plan to require departmentwide lie-detec- tor tests. Last week, Ronald I. Spiers, un- dersecretary of state for manage- ment, defended Mr. Shultz in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said Mr. Shultz has backed security reforms over the past several years. As part of a counterterrorist secu- rity program set up in 1984, the State Department opened the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, expanded its recruitment of security officiers and collaborated with U.S. intelli- gence agencies to counter electronic espionage, Mr. Spiers said. He said the State Department "took steps to change the Foreign Service culture to increase the secu- l~?ntt,"1 t Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310016-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310016-9 2. rity sensitivity of our colleagues, many of whom felt security contra- dicted the traditional mission of the State Department, mainly to get out and make contacts and penetrate other cultures and societies." But an administration intelli- gence official said Mr. Shultz op- posed the 1983 counterintelligence operation that flushed out Soviet electronic "bugs" planted inside typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow "Sweepers" from the National Se- cure Agency, the supersecret intel- ligence agency responsible f countering electronic sn in were dispatched to Moscow to ferret out e suspected- pewriter bugs, the official said. The NSA agents discovered tiny transmitters hidden inside IBM typewriters, including one in the embassy suite of then-Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman, that were able to read the most sensitive, typewritten diplomatic messages. Mr. Shultz reacted to the opera- tion by complaining to the White House that the search "was like al- lowing foxes inside the henhouse," the official said. White House intelligence off' then confronted Mr. Shultz, s~yine. "Wait a minute, isn't the KGB the fox and we're all the chickens?" the offi- ce said. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310016-9