REAGAN FACING TEST ON SALT II RULING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330075-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: June 7, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330075-2
WASHINGTON TIMES
7 June 1985
Reagan facing test
on SALT II ruln~g
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
President Reagan faces a key
decision Monday on goat?ued com-
pliance with the terms of the unrat-
ified SALT II treaty.
The options before him range
from a complete scrapping of the
treaty limits to a strict adherence to
its terms, with both advocates and
opponents of compliance advising
that either choice risks national
security.
Backers of coengliaQCe warn that
the Soviets would outrace the United
States in building up offensive
nuclear arms if the SALT II
restraints were removed.
Opponents, on the other hand,
argue that the restraints only tie the
hands of the United States while the
Soviets build their nuclear machine
at their own tempo regardless of
SALT: - -
The debate over the issue reached
new heights this week as friends and
foes within the administration and
on Capitol Hill grappled with this
key national security issue. -
The Senate Wednesday reached a
compromise on an amendment to a
defense authorization bill. The legis-
lators modified the amendment -
which .would have committed the
administration to continue a policy
of "not undercutting" the treaty lim-
itsthrough 1986 - by permitting the
United States to respond to Soviet
violations through huitdit~ s near
type of intercontinental baPCstic
missile.
Last year's defense authorization
bill requires the president to report
to Congress on the administration's
plans for continuing to abide by the
1979 treaty under what has been
referred to as a "no undercut" policy.
A week ago Mr. Reagan notified Con-
gress that the report will be pre-
sented June 10.
On one side of the debate are arms
control skeptics who see a gruwirrg
nuclear imbalance leaving the
United States less secure militarily.
They foresee a Soviet strategic edge
that would permit increased global
adventurism.
Instances of Soviet noncom-
pliance with arms agreements have
provided arms control critics with
'arguments that urge the United
States to abandon what they con-
sider an ambiguously worded and
unratified treaty. It is, therefore, art
agreement they see as perrttitting
,large increases in weapons. They
favor a more clearly defined process
aimed at reducing ttttcleer arms.
Arras comroi advocates counter
.those arguments saying, in effect,
"some limits are better than no lim-
its". They question the seriousness
of Soviet violations as technicalities.
These, they feel, should not be used
;as pretexts for abeandonazg the only
process that could provide a com?-
mori ground for managing super-
power weapons.
Since the Senate never ratified
SALT II, the question of continuerI
compliance and Soviet aoncom-
pliance is complicated. Both sides
agreed in 1981 to observe the tc~ty
limits through programs that do not
undercut the provisions.
'Treaty opponents argue that the
administration's commitment to fol-
low SALT II guidelines violates the
Senate's authority to ratify treaties.
Proponents counter that Soviet
treaty violations -the basis :for
opposition to continuing the no
undercut policy -can not be ~~nsed-
eyed. violations if the ireatq was
never in force.
New Soviet weapons deployments
are the main factor in the argument
against further cnm~~nru The
administration, backed by con-
serr:tirea, teas p=vdrt>aod seaerai
reporES that detail Soviet noncom-
Pence with arms control agree-
; ments. Besides unrelated Soviet
arms control violations, the admin-
istration found six instances where
Soviets actions exceeded SALT II
provisions, only two of which are
broadly agreed to be significant.
They are the Soviet deployment of
the SS-25 intercontinental ballistic
missile in violation of the SALT 11
prohibition against more than one
new type of missile and the coding
of missile test data called telemetry
encryption. Other suggested infrac-
tions are the production of Backfire
bombers beyond the Brezhnev
promise of ~ per year, violation of
the "heavy" missile limit on throw-
weight for the SS-NX 23, deployment
of the SS-16 ICBM at the Soviet test
site at Plesetsk, and the failure to
build down to the agreed level of
2,250 nuclear launchers.
The Soviets have "probably" vio-
lated SALT II restrictions on the
Backfire bomber by basing
squadrons within striking range of
the United States and by providing
the Backfire with a refueling cap-
~ ability,- the administration has
S mes McClure, R.-Idaho, a
leading critic of administration stra-
tegic arms policy, believes Soviet
vioiatiene ere screens enough that
the United States should end what he
considers unilateral compliance.
"It is a fact that the Soviets are
over every one of the six ceilings of
SALT II, except one, and the Soviets
will probably go over this ceiling in
2986," the senator said.
Within the administration. Secre-
tary of Defense Ca ar W. Wein-
berger an erector i lam
sey ve een among t e rs
? trying to perstra e e press en to
jettison t e r-o un ercut po icy. A~
enta ono tcia on t s si a is ic-
e, as~sLaetaryef
-efense~or Internati Security
A airs.
Mr. Perle's statement to the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee last
year sums up the opposition view:
"Arms control without Soviet com-
pliance is nothing more than an
exercise in unilateral disarmament"
In testimony before the commit-
tee he charged that the ambiguities
in SAID' II leave room for circum-
vention "without a legally provable
instance of violation," he said.
A senior administration official,
speaking on background, called the
no undercut policy "a contingent
.policy" cohere UaiLed Stales adher-
ence is contingent upon Soviet
adherence.
"And they have not adhered," the
official said.
The afficial dismissed the threat
of a massive Soviet weapons
increase as a result a SALT IT
breakout as "pure fiction" .
He said that the most compelling
reason not to continue SALT II is the
effect- of presidea-Ys decision on
Moscow If the president, who is on
record as opposed to the treaty,
changes his mind and agrees to con-
tinue its limits, ii would be inter-
preted by the Soviets as "a sign of
weakness."
Administration officials on thee,
pro-SALT II side are Secretary of ,
State George P. Shultz and National ~ ~\
Security adviser Robert McFarlane
who argue against abandoning the
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~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330075-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330075-2
SALT limits since it would ulti-
mately beagainst U.S. national secu-
rity interests.
They and their supporters argue
that a decision to ignore the current
policy of not undercutting SALT II
would provide the Soviets with a pro-
' paganda windfall with which to
incite various European publics and
place new strains on the NATO alli-
ance.
At issue in the debate are num-
I bers on SALT II ceilings for nuclear
weapons. The administration will be
faced with its first challenge to the
limits in September when sea trials
begin for a new Ziident-class subma-
rine, the USS Alaska. Tbsting -.the
Alaska will place the United States
in violation of the SALT limit on the
I! number of submarine missile
launchers unless a Poseidon subma-
nine is deactivated so that Soviet spy
satellites can detect that its missiles
tubes are empty.
. Paul Warnke, one of the SALT FI
negotiators, believes that the United
States has more to gain from
sticking to the .agreement than by
breaking out of the treaty levels. In
an interview, he compared the two
sides' capability to go beyond the
SALT II levels and said the Soviet
Union could triple the number of
warheads in its arsenal. ~
"The Soviet Union could go? from
about 9,800 strategic warheads
today to 28,000 within ten years," Mr.
Warnke said. '
The rapid Soviet buildup without
SALT II, he said, would defeat U.S.
1 verification efforts.
' As a consequence there would be
a growing Soviet nuclear threat and
we wouldn't even know how big it
i was," Mr. Warnke said.
Raymond Garthoff, a former
SALT negotiator now with the
Brookings Institution, also believes
i the United States will be better off .
under continued SALT II constraints
because of the Soviet capability t4
rapidly build up its forces.
Mr. Garthoff said the United
States should respond to Soviet vio-
~ lations by matching them with U.S.
programs. For example, the Soviet
deployment of the SS-X-25 should be
matched with a U.S. decision to
' deploy the mobile, single warhead
Midgetman.
2,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10 :CIA-RDP90-009658000302330075-2