INTELLIGENCE PANEL CONSIDERED A NEW PROBE OF MONDALE AIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302330085-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: September 10, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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14 ,
RIED 11111111 -~ r NEW YORK TRIBUNE
10 September 1984
Inteffigence panel cOnsi( er ed]
a new probe of Mondale aide
Ex-Carter official tied to loss of spy in Moscow
Political interference
cited in 1980 inquiry,
By Bill Gertz
NEW YORK TRIBUNE STAFF
01984 New York Tribune
WASHINGTON - The Senate
Intelligence Committee recently
weighed a congressional request to
reopen its ultra-sensitive 1980
probe of Walter Mondale's top for-
eign policy adviser.
The committee denied the
request despite charges that the
investigation was obstructed -by
political tampering and unwilling-
ness to air explosive, top-secret
information, according to intelli-
gence sources and congressional
documents made available to the
New York Tribune.
The investigation 4 years ago
reportedly cleared the Mondale
aide, David Aaron, of charges he
revealed information that led to the
loss of a deep-cover American spy
working in the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry in Moscow.
At the time, Aaron was Pres-
ident Carter's deputy national
security adviser. He is currently a
close adviser on foreign affairs to
the Democratic presidential nomi-
nee.
Aaron, in a telephone interview,
would not comment on the allega-
tion. He confirmed that there was
an "extensive investigation;' but he
denied that it was "an investigation
of me:' He referred questions to
the office of Sen. Barry Goldwater,
R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
"He's the man who made the
David Aaron, left, was investigated by the Senate Intelligence Committee, UPI
chaired by Sen. Barry Goldwater, after the loss of a key CIA agent in Moscow
important foreign policy adviser,
earlier served as his staff assistant
on the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee when it was headed by the late
Sen. Frank Church. He recently
returned from Israel where,
according to a report in the New
York Times, Aaron attempted to
improve both Mondale's and his
own relations with the Israelis.
In October 1983, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
was first asked to provide records
of the Aaron investigation by the
House Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice subcommittee on human
resources. A letter from subcom-
decision;" Aaron said of the com-
mittee's recent determination not
to reopen the 1980 probe. Gold-
water could not be reached for'i
comment.
A spokesman for the Mondale
Ferraro campaign refused to com-
ment on the report. Aaron, who has
been described as Mondale's most
mittee Chairman Don Albosta,
D-Mich., and the subcommittee's
minority leader Dan Crane, R-Ill.,
requested records "relating to the
possible compromise of highly
classified information" involving
"high-level personnel of the
National Security Council at that
time [1980]'
Report on leaks
In May, the subcommittee.
released its report on unauthorized
disclosures during the 1980 elec-
tion, -specifically covering the
transfer of former president
Jimmy Carter's debate notes to the
Reagan campaign. The leaks were
traced to Carter's National Secu-
rity Council (NSC).
According to congressional
sources close to the investigation,
"numerous allegations" of Carter
NSC leaks during the subcommit-
tee probe were ignored. The sub-
committee's final report was
described as "highly partisan" and
incomplete. The report mentioned
Aaron as the person responsible
for preparing the foreign policy
section of the purloined Carter
briefing book.
A House staff member who pur-
sued the NSC leaks on behalf of
Crane was told by Intelligence
Committee staff director Rob Sim-
mons last June 22 that committee
records were "too extensive to per-
mit perusal -by , outsiders;' includ-
ing investigators with top-level
security clearances. Simmons did
not see the subcommittee's Octo-
. ber request from Albosta and
Crane, sources said.
Intelligence Committee Chair-
man Goldwater, in a reply to Crane
. fGDntinue0 ;
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2
on June 27, revealed that the 1980
investigation involved allegations
that "an official-of President Cart-
er's National Security Council was
responsible, through mishandling
sensitive intelligence information
in early 1977, for the loss of a
valuable intelligence source:'
No `direct' evidence
Goldwater said the committee
Qtg t an from pfficials of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) ad the National Securit
Agency (NSA) had concluded at
no "direct" information wasuncQy-
A recent staff review of the
case, apparently in response to
Crane's request, produced "no
credible information" to warrant
further investigation, the Gold-
water reply stated.
Simmons confirmed Gold-
water's reply in an interview with
the Tribune. He said "there's no
interest in pursuing it"
"Somebody could ask me to pro-
ceed at any time;' Simmons said,
"but that's where the matter lies at
the present time:'
However, a reply to' Goldwater
from Crane of July 13 states that "I
believe evidence exists that the
staff person conducting the
inquiry [in 19801 was closely con-
nected to the subject of the inquiry.
Such a close linkage would, of
course, affect the objectivity of the
review' Simmons had no knowl-
edge of the letter.
The intelligence sources said
that the staff director of the Intel-
ligence Committee in 1980, William
Miller, was a "friend ... and long-
time associate with Aaron at the
Institute for Policy Studies [IPSI?'
The IPS is a leftist research insti-
tute in Washington. Aaron has
served as a consultant to the Center
for International Policy, a related
organization sponsored by the
Fund for Peace.
Miller, currently an associate
dean at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, "stayed in daily
contact with Aaron" during the
committee's investigation, intelli-
gence sources said. Congressional
sources said Miller was the only
staff member present during a
committee hearing connected with
the investigation in late 1980 that
was the subject of the request from
Albosta and Crane. Miller could not
be reached for comment.
Aide to Brzezinski
Another political ally who
reportedly kept Aaron informed of
developments during the investiga-
tion was Karl (Rick) Inderfurth, a
former aide to Zbigniew Brzezinski
at the NSC and currently with ABC
News. Inderfurth denied knowing
about the Aaron investigation,
although the House subcommittee
on human resources report iden-
tifies Inderfurth as Aaron's chosen
volunteer who helped prepare the
Carter briefing book in September
and October of 1980.
"I've worked with David, and it
just didn't sound like the David
Aaron that I know," Inderfurth said
of the allegations regarding the
loss of an agent.
Unauthorized disclosure of sen-
sitive information - some of it
classified - was rampant in the
Carter administration. Carter, in
his memoirs, admits "we could not
solve the problem of deliberate
leaks." It reached the point where
Carter even considered "publish-
ing the minutes" of high-level
meetings.
lntelli?ence sources revealed
that during the Carter administra-
tinnthe FBI cos 1u 1e 10 sec]I.riy
invests ga tions of the White Hopgg
st~~concerning the disclosure of
c asst feT materials.. wive of the
inves ti at ons_ foused_ op._Aaron,
sources said.
The 'Ilrigon case
The most controversial robe
invo vi ron became a cause
c8lebre among- conservatives and
_c0aus d sh-rLC1 ions
~itbiu_IheU .inteJlis nc am-
munit over the issue of technical
versus an ante i& nce_
ag thering _Methods. T se
involved an American CIA agent in
Moscow code-named 'Irigon.
The following account of Aar-
on's role in the TYigon case is based
on published reports, congres-
sional documents, and information
confirmed by intelligence sources.
Trigon was a Soviet embassy
clerk in Bogota. Colombia whe he
was recruited b the CIA in. 1974,
accrdin to John Barron a , hor_
o t e book KGB Tbday. The New
York Times reported that Trigon
was recruited in Argentina some-.
time in the earl 11 970s.
Recent information based on a
KGB agent's defection in 1979 indi-
cates that Trigon was Aleksandr
Ogorodnik. Other published
accounts said Trigon was Anatoli
Filatov. Both men worked inside
the Soviet bureaucracy in Moscow
during the late 1970s.
From 1975 until the Soviets dis-
covered him in the spring of 1977,
Trigon worked in the Global Affairs
Department of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry. He was in the unique
position - for espionage - to han-
dle incoming cables from Soviet
ambassadors around the, world.
jrigon's last report to the CIA
was the transcript of a cable from
Soviet Ambassador to e , nifed
States Anatoly Dobrynin
describing an April 1977 breakfast
meeting m as m on b fween
pgbrv na ertiecretaty of
State Henry Kissing T gon's
transcri pt ofthecable quoted Kiss-
inger crittictz_uig_a darter adminis-
tration arms control o f er to reduce
strategic weapons. Kissinge later
acknowledged meeun Dobrynin
on April u enie crit-
ici ing t the Carter p an. '1 h New
York Times reported that the CIA
verified through the NSA that the
cable was ent from the Sit
.
embassy that clay,
Aaron's dinner disclosures
Details of the Trigon cable -
which has since eared from
the CIA's files - were circulated
among_top U. inte igence 9P i_
vials and the National Security
CouncJLSbme time in p`ri1,
reportedly during a dinner party in
Washington at the Jordanian
embassy, Aaron allegedly men-
tioned some details of the cable
during a conversation with an East
European diplomat. The Times
reported that the conversation
involved a Romanian diplomat. An
unidentified "Third World diplo-
mat" overheard Aaron's remark,
according to intelligence sources.
Some time after the THgon
information was leaked, the NSA
obtained evidence of the conversa-
tion which originated from either
the Romanians or from the
unnamed diplomat. Columnist
Jack Anderson reported the infor-
mation concerned Warsaw Pact
nuclear weapons.
Gen. Ion Pacepa, a former dep-
u cc ieoff counter-intelligence,
or the omanian securit services
confiriiiecl t-lie v jdgy aLcx -
dence when he was debriefed by
the CIA after defecting. in 1978
according to intelligence__sourcejL
acepa was in a position which
gave him access to Warsaw Pact
secrets.
CIA probe
The NSA indinas sparked a CIA
ij y stigation o The White House
staff fbcusing-9_rL-Aar-o-A'[A1cgcd
leak and the loss of Trion. As the
first step, all top- eve White House
access to secret reports was cur-
tailed. Clearances were reinstated
as those under scrutiny were
cleared.
CIA Deputy Chief of Counterin-
telfgence nar c ov con-
ucte3 an_`n anti na a a v i 10f _ _
WtinA
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the Triaon disclosure. According to
reliable intelligence sources,the
analysis was never used d idn the_
Senate investigation of Aaron in
1980; The analysis renortedlv-qpn
cries that Aaron was the cause4,f
3kl2on's demise. A CIA spokesman
would neither confirm nor den
cCoy's emp oyment with t e
agency..,
Intelligence sources identified a
"special assistant" to then National
Intelligence Officer (NIO) Howard
Stoertz, who reportedly informed
some members of the intelligence
community that White House secu-
rity clearances were canceled
because Aaron had uncovered the
identity of an agent. CIA spokes-
woman Kathy Furson confirmed
that oe z a p ica appom ee,
was an NIO for strategic programs
Bunn the time in question. She
-id- rg~tiis no 1onaer wi the
agency.
Moscow contact arrested
In July 1977, Martha Peterson,
who according to Newsweek acted,
as THgon's American contact in
Moscow, was arrested by the KGB
in the process of contacting an
agent. Soviet press accounts said
Peterson left oison ampules or an
-"`innocent Soviet citizen .,w o was
allegedly poisone to eat or
oc ing a -=run espiona a rin
Following Peterson's ex ulsion
from the Soviet Union, the NSC
ordered the CIA to "curtail all
agent operations in t e Soviet
Union _pending the o eratlQ aJ,
ssessment_, being completed-by
McCoy" intelligence sources sai .
"However, while this was occur-
ring investigation was
'rolled up' by CIA officials:' the
sources stated.
On the eve of the 1980 Republi-
can National Convention, News-
week correspondent David Martin,
citing intelligence "experts," was
the first to reveal publicly that an
American spy inside the Soviet
Foreign Ministry was believed to
be a "double agent:' He reported
that "suspicions heightened in the
early months of the Carter admin-
istration." Kissinger told Martin
that the Carter administration
leaked the Trigon story in an effort
to embarrass him at the ce? . _ation
which was held the week the story
appeared.
Martin linked the loss of the
Moscow agent with the arrest of
Peterson. He reported that the CIA_
believed Trigon "committed sui-
cide:'
Following press reports linking
Aaron with the disclosure of
Trigon, the White House labeled
the allegations "completely
unfounded" A Jack Anderson col-
umn reported that the FBI and CIA
had "dutifully confirmed"
-
--
al
XVM~te
-n3
ojz .
de erase o Aaron.
Intelligence sources close to the
case report that the FBI denied
investigating any member of the
NSC in connection with the Trigon
disclosure probe. The CIA, sources
said, declared that no American
had been involved in the loss of
TrigQQ~
As a result of press exposure, in
1980 Sens. Malcom Wallop, R-Wyo.,
and Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y., for-
mally requested an Intelligence
Committee investigation of the
Trigon loss. The request reported
there may have been "a major intel-
ligence failure" related to "a senior
government official"
The Senate investigation began
in September and concluded in
December 1980, having found no
"direct" information. implicating
Aaron.
However, in addition to the fact
that Aaron's political friends ran
the probe - Aaron had worked on
the staff of the Intelligence Com-
mittee- the investigation was con-
fronted with an insurmountable
security obstacle. According to
intelligence sources, CIA Director
ins field 'Ilirner withheld infor-
mation about Aaron obtained by
the NSA. Under Carter's Pres-
lenDirective/NS -2. 'Ilirn~e-
reported daily intelligence directly
to Aaron.) Rather than pursue the
leads contained in the NSA infor-
mation, committee . members
agreed to limit the investigation,
intelligence sources said.
Data `ordered destroyed'
The NSA reportedly obtained a
communication from a foreign
national whose country does not
know the extent of the agency's
intelligence-gathering cap-
abilities. Washington Post colum-
nist Jack Anderson, citing
"scrupulously accurate" intelli-
gence sources, wrote that the
White House ordered the
destruction of the information
"under an executive order for the
protection of private individuals."
Anderson wrote that a copy of the
NSA document(s) still exists.
Accounts vary as to what finally
happened to Trigon. Two CIA
agents under deep cover in thg
SQyieL_governme LeteJQ t lur-
ing the Carter administration, both
oVw1 omcovaru-a-r ve been 'Irig4t?i,
Filatov was iously reported as a
colonel in the Soviet military intel-
ligence, the GRU, and as a senior
official in the Soviet Foreign Min-
istry. Soviet press accounts in 1978
3,
reported that Filatov was sen-
tenced to death by a "military
court" for spying for an unnamed
foreign power, lending support for
Filatov's identity as a GRU officer.
A_fcrmer 1B-9ffMFeLW1Le
defected_ in_.1979, Stanislav Lev-
chenkQ. testified that a "Line X'
KGB officer- involved with scien-
tific and technical e ions e -
-gd
knew about Fi atl ov and or o .
Flatov _reportedly supplied the
CIA with detailed rote igence on
Soviet milarv capabilities, includ-
ing support for terrorism and "lib-
waxs w i a wor in eiL
QRU _headquartw, Levchenko
said he was told Filatov was caught
by KGB surveillants while making
a "drop" for his American contact.
Spy's life spared
Filatov's death sentence was
commuted to a 15-year prison term
as the result of a deal between
Brzezinski and Dobrynin. Brzezin-
ski, in his memoirs, recalls bar-
gaining with Dobrynin over saving
the life of an American spy,
believed to have been Filatov. He
told Dobrynin "the execution of the
Soviet citizen would jeopardize any
possible deal on the [return of two]
Soviet spies:' The two spies were
traded in 1978 for five Soviet dissi-.
dents as part of a Soviet effort to
gain American support for the pro-
posed SALT II arms treaty.
Levchenko also testified that the
Line X officer told him about
Ogorodnik - a more likely source
for the Trigon material. Levchenko
told author John Barron that
,Ogorodnik was captured by the
KGB after he was filmed copying
documents in the Soviet Foreign
Ministry. Barron wrote that
Ogorodnik had access to cables
from all Soviet ambassadors for a
period of 20 months until the sum-
mer of 1977. Hundreds of these
cables were turned over tort a CIA
which then circulated e m orma-
on to the White use a- tonal
SecuntCounci and State
et rtment.
Barron notes. that the Soviets
failed to discover the source of the
foreign policy disclosures until the
KGB "more precisely defined the
intelligence being discussed in
Washington" After that determina-
tion was made, the KGB traced the
source to the Foreign Ministry and
Ogorodnik, Levchenko said.
Ogorodnik committed suicide,
Barron reports, after swallowing
poison hidden inside his Mont
Blanc pen - a pen that was to be
used for writing his confession.
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