PENTAGON REASSESSES SOVIET BOMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302430033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302430033-7
NEW YORK TIMES
ARTICLE APPEARED A 1 October 1985
ON PAGE__
Pentagon Reassesses Soviet omiei?
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 ? Thog,
De-
fense Intelligence Agency has s n
canny lowered its estimate ? the
range or a Soviet bomber that has fig-
ured in the Geneva arms talks, Reagan
Aarnmi.stratiOn officials said today.
At1M1/11Stratran experts said the new
estimate reinforced the contention by
some arms-control proponents that the
bomber, known in the West as the
Backfire, was designed to attack ships
and targets in Europe and Asia, not in
the United States.
The new, lower intelligence agency.
estimate of the bomber's range raises
questions about the Administration's
decision to treat the Backfire as part of
Moscow's long-range nuclear arsenal
In the Geneva talks.
But some Administration officials
said they expected the United States to
keep to its position that the Backfire
should be limited by any future arms
control agreement because the Soviet
Union could add to the bomber's refuel-
ing capabilities.
Potential Threat Debated
The potential threat of the Backfire
to the United States mainland was
hotly debated in the late 1970's by sup-
porters and opponents of the 1979 treaty
to limit strategic nuclear arms.
The Backfire was not defined as a
"heavy bomber" in that treaty. In re-
turn the Soviet Union assured the
United States in a side agreement that
?
the production rate of the bomber
would not exceed 30 a year, and that
Moscow would not give the Backfire
the capability to carry out interconti-
nental missions.
During the treaty debate, Carter Ad-
ministration officials said that the
bomber's ability to carry out intercon-
tinental strikes was limited. They also
maintained That any effort to classify
the Backfire as a strategic bomber
would lead the Soviet Union to step up
its demands for limits on American air-
caft based in Europe, a restriction op-
posed by the United States.
But critics of the 1979 treaty said that
the Backfire should be treated as a
heavy bomber, saying the plane could
carry a heavy weapons load to attack
the United States and then return to the
Soviet or land at Cuban airfields.
Intelligence Agencies Differ
Adding fuel to the con was a
split between the Defense
i '1f.
, over the bomber's rano.
L. .A. the less threatening View of
the bomber's range and armament.
me soviet Union insisted throughout
the treaty talks and since that the
bomber lacked the range to mount a
credible threat to the United States.
The Reagan Administration's posi-
tion at the Geneva arms talks has been
that the Backfire should be counted nu .ted
a heavy bomber. And the P
latest rt on , TI
s.
out midair refueling. They also said the
new estimates implied that it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, for the
aircraft to carry a large payload on a
one-way mission and then land in Cuba
after dropping its bombs.
dant tieintla=celaMositsneciar913;
heeded for refueling. The din-
cials added that the Soviet Union in any
case did not have enough aerial tankers
to refuel the Backfire and other air-
craft on very long-range missiohs.
But they said it was not known
whether the aircraft has the internal
mechanism to handle in-flight fueling
should pribes?be added to the plane and
new tankers built.
Arms experts differed over the sig-
nificance of the new estimates. "It does
put Soviet intransigence on this issue in
a different light," said Raymond L.
Garthoff, a senior fellow at the Brook-
ings Institution and a longtime arms
control expert. He said it showed that
the Soviet position was more reason-
able than some American officials had
er 1 ense Intelli-
gence Agency view that the' Backfire
M112 a tInrelbeien 'commit range or
about 3,000 miles. That range assumes
the bomber will fly at a high altitude to
conserve fuel, came in low for an at-
tack and then resume its high-altitude
flight. Some military analysts say that
tactic is unrealistic because it would
make the bomber easier to detect and
i to destroy.
With the revision, "the Defense Intel-
ligenceM't .-1:1?11EM.2 su
aAZtitnt
tsneairection of the C.I.A.," an
non official said. Another
official described theiltuation as ot?r?dre
"basic harm?? "for the American in-
ties, although the two aircraft's differ slightly on the
Range estimates depend several
variables, on tn, including the amount of
weapons carried and the flight altitude.
Officials were relucant to give specific
estimates of the bomber's revised
range, but one ventured it could be
about 20 percent less when fully loaded
than the previous military intelligence
figure.
The revised estimate stems from
several factors, officials said, includ-
ing new information about the plane's
fuel consumption. Pentagon officials
said the new projections indicated the
plane could not carry out a round-trip
inission against the United States with-
thought.
don official ar ed
- 11 - report set
that
1 over he bomber
2==t
should not Ina in
the "stratesdc category."
But a Pentagon official disagreed,
saying: "While the question of the
bomber range may be an important de-
bating point for analysts, it is not cen-
tral to the military significance of the,
aircraft. Nobody claims that the Back-
fire cannot reach the U.S. if based in.
artic regions and if it is refueled."
He added that the new range figures
showed "the uncertain nature we have
even today of Soviet systems and the
problems inherent in intelligence gath-
ering."
Another official said, "It remains a
heavy bomber and something we can-
not ignore in our total assessment e
Soviet strategic capabilities."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302430033-7