CODES PROTECTED POORLY, PENTAGON PANEL WARNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 22, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9
9A
BALTIMORE SUN
22 November 1985
Codes protected poorly, Pentagon panel warns
By Vernon A. Guidry Jr. er the other recommendations indi-
WASHINGTON - Although U.S.
military codes and coding apparatus
are among the most important se-
crets an enemy could steal, the
armed services have no special con-
trols to keep them secret, a Pentagon
commission said yesterday.
"There are no special eligibility
criteria for personnel handling cryp-
tographic materials despite their
transcendent importance to an ad-
versary," according to a report of the
commission appointed to study secu-
rity issues in the wake of the Walker
spy case. Only those individuals
who have access to nuclear weapons
are currently monitored formally for
trustworthiness and stability."
While "crypto," or code, material
is subject to normal classification
procedures, the panel found those
procedures inadequate. "Crypto-
graphic information continues to
have crucial significance inasmuch
as its compromise to hostile inteW-
gence services can, in turn, lead to
the compromise of any classified in-
formation being transmitted over se-
cure voice or secure data channels,"
the panel's report said.
The panel said that a special ac-
cess program for cryptographic work
should be established, limiting it to
U.S. citizens and making access de-
pendent on willingness to take a lie-
detector test.
That was one of a number of se-
curity recommendations in the re-
port made public yesterday.
Only one of the recommendations
by the panel, which was appointed
by Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger, prompted immediate
action. Mr. Weinberger ordered a
one-time, "top-to-bottom" security
inspection of all armed forces and
Pentagon civilian operations that
handle classified information. He
told the services and the civilian de-
fense agencies to report back to him
by Oct. 1, 1986, with an overall as-
sessment of security for classified in-
formation and recommendations for
any further steps needed to safe-
guard it.
Robert B. Sims, spokesman for
the secretary, said Mr. Weinberger
"indicated general endorsement" of
the panel's report and would consid-
vidually.
The commission said that overall
Pentagon performance in adhering
to existing security regulations
"must be considered uneven at best."
While saying that it was hard to
determine how damaging lax en-
forcement might be. the panel found
examples of such laxity.
"Some commanders and supervi-
sors show a clear disdain for securi-
tY, leaving compliance to clerks and
secretaries. When security require-
ments become an impediment, they
are ignored either for reasons of per-
sonal convenience, or to facilitate job
Performance," the report said.
The panel made no explicit men-
tion of the Walker spy case. A for-
mer Navy warrant officer, John A.
Walker Jr., and his sailor son, Mi-
chael, have pleaded guilty to espio-
nage. John Walker's brother, Ar-
thur, has been convicted of spying,
and a fourth man awaits trial on the
West Coast on charges of spying for
Walker and Moscow.
The chief damage the spy ring is
said to have caused involves passing
Navy codes and code-making appa-
ratus to the Soviet Union.
Retired Army Gen. Richard G.
Stilwell, head of the panel, told re-
porters yesterday that he believed
that had a special scrutiny crypto
program been in place, the spies
might have been deterred, or at least
caught sooner. The Walker ring is
said to have operated for nearly 20
years.
More generally, the panel said the
Pentagon must put more money and
effort into information security "even
at the expense of other ... pro-
grams." The department "must be
willing to pay a higher price, in
terms of both resources and opera-
tional convenience, to protect its
classified information," the report
concluded.
It echoed other critics on such is-
sues as permitting too many security
clearances and conducting too few
investigations and re-investigations
of security-clearance holders. It also
pointed out that there was little or
no research on the psychological
and behavioral aspects of human se-
curity problems.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9