CODES PROTECTED POORLY, PENTAGON PANEL WARNS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 25, 2012
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 22, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9.pdf80.84 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9 9A BALTIMORE SUN 22 November 1985 Codes protected poorly, Pentagon panel warns By Vernon A. Guidry Jr. er the other recommendations indi- WASHINGTON - Although U.S. military codes and coding apparatus are among the most important se- crets an enemy could steal, the armed services have no special con- trols to keep them secret, a Pentagon commission said yesterday. "There are no special eligibility criteria for personnel handling cryp- tographic materials despite their transcendent importance to an ad- versary," according to a report of the commission appointed to study secu- rity issues in the wake of the Walker spy case. Only those individuals who have access to nuclear weapons are currently monitored formally for trustworthiness and stability." While "crypto," or code, material is subject to normal classification procedures, the panel found those procedures inadequate. "Crypto- graphic information continues to have crucial significance inasmuch as its compromise to hostile inteW- gence services can, in turn, lead to the compromise of any classified in- formation being transmitted over se- cure voice or secure data channels," the panel's report said. The panel said that a special ac- cess program for cryptographic work should be established, limiting it to U.S. citizens and making access de- pendent on willingness to take a lie- detector test. That was one of a number of se- curity recommendations in the re- port made public yesterday. Only one of the recommendations by the panel, which was appointed by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, prompted immediate action. Mr. Weinberger ordered a one-time, "top-to-bottom" security inspection of all armed forces and Pentagon civilian operations that handle classified information. He told the services and the civilian de- fense agencies to report back to him by Oct. 1, 1986, with an overall as- sessment of security for classified in- formation and recommendations for any further steps needed to safe- guard it. Robert B. Sims, spokesman for the secretary, said Mr. Weinberger "indicated general endorsement" of the panel's report and would consid- vidually. The commission said that overall Pentagon performance in adhering to existing security regulations "must be considered uneven at best." While saying that it was hard to determine how damaging lax en- forcement might be. the panel found examples of such laxity. "Some commanders and supervi- sors show a clear disdain for securi- tY, leaving compliance to clerks and secretaries. When security require- ments become an impediment, they are ignored either for reasons of per- sonal convenience, or to facilitate job Performance," the report said. The panel made no explicit men- tion of the Walker spy case. A for- mer Navy warrant officer, John A. Walker Jr., and his sailor son, Mi- chael, have pleaded guilty to espio- nage. John Walker's brother, Ar- thur, has been convicted of spying, and a fourth man awaits trial on the West Coast on charges of spying for Walker and Moscow. The chief damage the spy ring is said to have caused involves passing Navy codes and code-making appa- ratus to the Soviet Union. Retired Army Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, head of the panel, told re- porters yesterday that he believed that had a special scrutiny crypto program been in place, the spies might have been deterred, or at least caught sooner. The Walker ring is said to have operated for nearly 20 years. More generally, the panel said the Pentagon must put more money and effort into information security "even at the expense of other ... pro- grams." The department "must be willing to pay a higher price, in terms of both resources and opera- tional convenience, to protect its classified information," the report concluded. It echoed other critics on such is- sues as permitting too many security clearances and conducting too few investigations and re-investigations of security-clearance holders. It also pointed out that there was little or no research on the psychological and behavioral aspects of human se- curity problems. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/25: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302590007-9