A FORMER ENVOY SAYS BRZEZINSKI HURT U.S. IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640103-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 103
• Publication Date: September 7, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640103-6
ARTICLE EARED NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE -"Ro 7 SEPTEMBER 1980
A Former Envoy
Says Brzezinski
Hurt U.S. in Iran
Sullivan Accuses Aide of
Pressing for Use of Force
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6 ? The last
United States Ambassador to Iran has ac-
cused Zbigniew Brzezinski, President
Carter's national security adviser, of un-
dermining American interests in Iran by
urging the Shah and his army to use force
against the Iranian revolution rather
than reach an accommodation with it.
An aide to Mr. Brzezinski said the arti-
cle was self-serving and incorrect.
In an article certain to fuel the contro-
versy over whether Washington could
have avoided the hostage crisis in Iran,
former Ambassador William H. Sullivan
said Mr. Brzezinski disregarded the ad-
vice---7,01-1 e eiL---i-b?.1.asDepart-
ment and the Central Intelligence Agency
in a vain effort to Keep Shah Nlbhammed
Riza Pahlevi and his designated succes-
sor, Dr. Shahpur Bakhtiar, in power.
Mr. Sullivan's article, in the current
issue of the magazine Foreign Policy, is
the first published account by an Ameri-
can official involved in the chaotic Ira-
nian events of 1978-79. It is a bitter attack
on Mr. Brzezinski, with whom Mr. Sulli-
van said he had "increasingly acerbic"
exchanges in the days preceding and fol-
lowing the takeover by Ayatollah Ruhol-
lah Khomeini's followers.
Accuracy Questioned by Aide
Asked to comment on Mr. Sullivan's ar-
ticle, Alfred Friendly Jr., a spokesman
for Mr. Brzezinski, said: "The article is
self-serving and factually inaccurate.
But this is not an appropriate time to de-
bate such allegations in detail."
A White House official said: "When the
history of the period is written it is cer-
tain to reveal at least one conclusion:
none of the participants was blessed with
infallibility. 1
"The reconstruction of those events
identifying Ambassador Sullivan as
uniquely farsighted could and would have
been written by only one man," the offi-
cial, who asked not to be identified, went
on. "At some point, we will have to have a
systematic evaluation of the events and
policies surrounding the fall of the Shah,
but until the safe release of the hostages,
it would probably be better if everybody
could restrain his eagerness to make per-
sonal versions of history part of the pub-
lic record." ? ,..., - , -.-4?Art.ii..ik.1;-N
Head of Nonprofit Organization
Mr. Sullivan, a veteran diplomat, saidl
that he decided to resign after he re-
ceived a message that contained "an in- ,
suiting aspersion upon my loyalty." He is
now president of the American Assem-
bly, a nonprofit organization.
The article is not so much a detailed
history of the events as much as an at-
tempt to defend his recommendations to
Washington, which he says could have led
to an American-supported transfer of
power to Mehdi Bazargan. He called Mr.
Bazargan "a benevolent social demo-
crat." Mr. Bazargan became Prime
Minister after the fall of the Bakhtiar
Government but was forced to resign by
radicals after the American hostages
were seized on Nov. 4.
Mr. Sullivan said that on Nov. 9, 1978,
while the Shah was still in power, he ca-
bled Washington that if the Shah fell the
United States should "broker an arrange-
ment" so that the armed forces would re-
main intact and be under the direction of
a government "that would have the bless-
ing of Khomeini."
He said he never received a replay.
"Instead," he wrote, "it soon became ap-
parent that my views were no longer wel-
come at the White House."
He said he regularly reported to Wash-
ington that the Shah had told him force
would not be used to quell the mounting
revolution. But Mr. Brzezinski and
others, he said, apparently thought he I
was "tailoring my telegrams to fit what
they conceived to be the mood of the State,
Department."
-
When the Shah decided to leave and r
turn over power to Dr. Bakhtiar ? who
Mr. Sullivan said had no popular support
? "I proposed that an authoritative emis-
sary be sent from Washington to consult
with Khomeini."
He said that Cyrus R. Vance, then the
Secretary of State, approved the idea and
named Theodore L. Eliot Jr., then the In-
spector General of the Foreign Service,
who spoke Persian, as the emissary. Mr.
Sullivan said that this mission to the Aya-
tollah, which he maintained had the
Shah's support, could have conveyed
American sincerity toward the revolu-
tion.
"I believed the revolutionary transition
could occur peacefully," . Mr. Sullivan
said, and the United States could "help
the new regime in its economic and se-
curity programs."
Mission Suddenly Canceled
But Mr. Sullivan: said that while Presi-
dent Carter was at a meeting of allied
leader in Guadeloupe, where he was ac-
companied by Mr. Brzezinski, he sud-
denly canceled the Eliot mission. Mr. Sul-
livan's appeal was rejected and the Shah
"reacted with incredulity and asked how
thee United States expected to influence
'these people' if it would not even deal
with them.,
He said that Mr. Brzezinski then sent
Gen. Robert E. Huyser, deputy com-
mander of American forces in Europe, STAT
Iran to try to persuade the armed forces
to transfer their loyalty to Dr. Bakhtiar.
Mr. Sullivan said that "I received terse
instructions telling me that the policy of
the United States Government was to
support the Bakhtiar Government with-
out reservation and to assist its surviv-
al." He said Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr.,
then the American commander in Eu-
rope, resigned inprotest over the Huyser
mission.
Mr. Sullivan said he told Washington
that the Bakhtiar Government was a chi-
mera that would be swept aside when
Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Teheran.
"Moreover," he said, "I argued that it
would be feckless to transfer the loyalty
of the armed forces to Bakhtiar because
this would cause the destructive confron-
tation between the armed forces and the
revolutionaries that we hoped to avoid. It
would result in the disintegration of the
armed forces and eventually in the disin-
tegration of Iran. It would be directly
contrary to United States interests." ,.
Mutiny by Enlisted Men
He said the confrontation he had feared
took place when the junior officers and
enlisted men at an air base in Teheran
mutinied and overwhelmed an armored
unit of the Imperial Guard.
The situation was chaotic, Mr. Sullivan
said, and he was trying to save Ameri-
cans trapped in the fighting. "I received
a telephone call in the clear from Wash-
ington relaying a message from Brzezin-
ski, who asked wheih-e-Irthought ?uid
arrange a military coup against the revo-i
lution," he said. "I regret that the reply II
made is unprintable."
"Thus, chaos descended on Iran," hel
continued. "The armed forces disinte-
grated, their weapons fell into the hands '
of all those disparate elements in the
revolution who in turn fell to-fighting
among themselves once the Shah had
gone. Bazargan and his Government had
no means to enforce order; and Khomei-
ni, in his desire to remain the nominal
leader of the revolution, would issue no
directions that would be substantially
disobeyed. This situation meant that the
extremists would be able to set the pace,
and in most matters, that has been the
pattern ever since. The disintegration of
the nation is well-advanced and a grow-
ing dependence on the Soviet Union has
begun."
? -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640103-6