REMOVAL OF MARCOS WAS A TRIUMPH FOR REAGAN'S 'AD-HOCISM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
WASHINGTON POST
2 March 1986
Removal of Marcos
Was a Triumph for
Reagan's `Ad-Hocism'
H OW COULD IT have happened?
How could Ronald Reagan, of all
people, end up telling Ferdinand
Marcos that he would have to give up the
presidency of the Philippines to a group of
rebellious military leaders and a woman
who, 75 days ago, described herself as a
housewife? How did Ferdinand Marcos, at
the end of a lifelong relationship with Amer.
ica, find himself in a public confrontation
with a conservative president who, he had
thought, would be his best friend in the
White House since Lyndon Johnson?
Should anyone take credit, other than the
Philippine people? Did the U.S. finally learn
something about dealing with dictators on
the decline, or did we simply luck out?
The clearest thing that can be said about
the Reagan policy is that, despite its occa-
sional imprecision, it worked-with perhaps
a better outcome than in any similar crisis
in postwar American history. Why? Several
reasons are evident
? In the Philippines, there was a democrat.
ic alternative to the traditional choice be-
tween the strongman and the radicals-a
key difference between the Philippines on
one hand and Iran, Nicaragua and South
Vietnam on the other.
^ After a rocky start, our Philippines policy
gathered bipartisan support, with a conser-
vative president following an ultimately lib-
eral policy while incorporating the symbol-
ism and ideology of his own past. The Dem-
ocrats not only supported Reagan but for
the most part left him room to maneuver.
a The administration benefited from the
relative uninvolvement of Reagan himself.
which left his aides free to craft a policy
that could respond quickly to events-a
foreign.policy approach that might best be
described as "ad-hocism:
? As the end near rd, there was a consen-
sus within the administration, across ideo-
logical lines, that Marcos could no longer
govern effectively. This consensus checked
the usual inter-agency bickering.
^ Marcos'. fall came quickly, before the
American right could regroup around an
alternative to Marcos, or a catastrophe in
Manila could produce second-guessing in
Washington and the usual finger-pointing
recriminations.
? Marcos self-destructed on American tele-
vision. while Corazon Aquino, after a slow
start, captured the imagination of the
American public. Television increased the
immediacy of the Philippines crisis in the
United States and the sense that the U.S.
had a stake in its outcome.
Aquino's victory, whatever the complex
set of factors that produced it, is a signif-
icant gain for American interests. Though
she is wholly untested as a leader of a gov-
ernment. President Aquino has a better
chance to solve the pressing problems of
the Philippines than did her predecessor.
For by the end, his early promise and bril-
liance were long-forgotten and his once-leg-
endary force and dynamism were gone. The
economy was falling apart and communist
guerrillas were gaining a foothold in the
countryside. It would be hard for Aquino to
do worse.
Still, the Philippines remains a very sick
nation. It would take miracles to turn
around the rocky economic and political sit-
uation quickly, and not even Aquino, the
devout, determined Catholic, promises mir-
acles. But a bit of divine intervention may
come her way in the form of the hierarchy
of the Roman Catholic church. The church
is a commanding force in this very Catholic
country. In recent years, church leaders
expressed open contempt for Marcos, and
some priests even flirted with the commu-
nist guerrilla movement.
Now the church-especially if it can
work peacefully with the army-can serve
as the government's most powerful ally
against the New People's Army, the com-
munist guerrilla movement. The threat is
serious. American intelligence agencies
have warned that the :PA guerriUis could
take over the country in three to five years.
Wailing around for miracles, of
course, will not be enough. The
United States played a critical role
in the downfall of Marcos and the rise of
Aquino. We cannot turn away from our re-
sponsibilities now, after linking our strate-
gic interests so publicly to a democratic
Philippines. Massive economic and military
assistance must be offered to the Philip-
pines, notwithstanding the grim reaper
called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
Aquino's honeymoon with the Philippine
and American people will not last forever.
Real problems cannot be swept indefinitely
aside on an endless wave of euphoria. But
where there's romance, there's hope, and
for at least the next few months the Phil-
ippine people may remain a nation in love,
giving her at least a chance to turn things
around.
The U.S., for a change, can share in the
celebration- Finally, this country rode in
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
tandem with an ally through its diaategra.
don and came out on the aide of the people
rind their wishes-rather than trapped by
history in a suicide pact with a leader who
no longer had popular support. However
reluctantly at certain stages, the U.S. ended
up putting its policy where its rhetoric is.
and emerged as a champion of democracy.
little wonder that in recent days, the ad-
ministration has won rave reviews from
everyone from Edward M. Kennedy to The
Wall Street Journal.
Only a small band of people stand in si-
lence, refusing to cheer the administration's
performance-far-right supporters of Mar-
Cos, and some once-proud practitioners of
rao/pdiM who think the conflict between
unbending support of old friends and the
risky process of deaaovatic change must
always be resolved on the side of the old
regime. These people are left defending to
the bitter end every discredited old friend,
from Somoza to the shah and now Marcos.
J any people-haunted by the fall of
Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in
1963, the shah and Somoza-may
recoil reflexively from the spectacle of a
great nation diaeagapng from a belea-
guered autocrat who once exchanged warm
toasts at state banquets with American
presidents. The acts and wads that accoro-
pany such a shift in policy may lave a bitter
tats in some mouths. But in the Philippines
the choice was between a friendly strong-
man and a potentially friendly movement
seeking the revival of democracy. Given
Marcos' long and close ties to the United
6tates, it was inevitable that for some-un-
doubtedly including Reagan-the taste was
bitter. But let's not be too sentimental: The
fault for what happened lies with Marcos.
whose behavior left Washington no other
choice.
The evidence strongly suggests that the
administration changed its policy not
through a carefully thought-out process or
any formal decision but as a result of a se-
ries of tactical decisions, often seemingly
gate small. that were reactions to events in
the Philippines. Although not every reaction
.was consistent with the others. they led
i exorably to a simple, final position that
Marcos had to go.
The man who had come to office attack-
ing his predecessor for undermining So-
moza and the shah did not want to have to
tell Marcos to leave. Reagan no doubt
hoped to the end that Marcos would reach
that conclusion on his own without either
private or, even worse, public advice from
the administration. Yet in the end, when
them was no other choice, Reagan did what
he had to do, and what many people thought
he would never do. Of course, the central
drama was played out in Manila, and it was
the Philippine people themselves who
brought Marcos down. But it was actions
and statements by top American officials
that turned the tide finally and irrevocably
against Marcos.
Some critics have charged that the Rea-
gan Administration moved too slowly, ea-
pecially in the early stages, in making clear
where it stood: these critics argue now that
we were lucky that things didn't turn out
badly, given official ambivalence over Mar-
cos. There is probably some truth to this
view, but after a policy success of these
dimensions, such considerations seem triv-
ial.
What was critical to the success of the
policy was its extraordinary degree of bi-
partisan support. It is doubtful if conserva-
tives would have supported a Democratic
president following similar policies, and in
that sense it was clearly easier for a Repub-
lican to do what had to be done than it
would have been for a Democrat.
Key Democrats like Stephen J. Solarz
(N.Y.), chairman of the House foreign af-
fairs subcommittee on East Asian Affairs,
and John Murtha (Pa.). co-chairman of the
election observer group, worked closely
with men like Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Inds.
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and leader of the observer
group. Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kea.)
and Democrat Sam Nunn (D-(a.) made par-
allel statements that made clear to Manila
and the White House alike that on this is-
sue, the Congress was going to speak with a
single voice. Lugar also worked closely with
Secretary of State George Shults, who
played a masterful role in guiding policy.
There are precious few recent exam-
ples of such bipartisanship on a mayor
foreign policy issue. But it had dear
value: The absence of a bitter public debate
over policy greatly strengthened the impact
of the American role in Manila. Filipinos on
both sides constantly looked to Washington
for signals. Had these remained mixed, as
they did briefly just alter the Ptulippiae
election. it might have sect Macula a dan-
gerously confused message.
Lugar's tvis was important in establish-
ing a consensus that the election itself had
been a sham, but it was his fellow Repub-
lican, Paul Laxalt of Nevada, who played the
most complicated role.
Although a member of the U.S. Senate.
Laxalt really functioned as a member of the
executive branch on a special mission for
his close friend, the president. It is not clear
what he, or, for that matter, the president
thought Laxalt was doing during his trip to
Manila last year, but the practical effect of
his trip was to remove bureaucratic barri-
ers between Presidents Reagan and Marcos
and sharply increase the pressure on Mar-
at
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08 :
laving; all he thought be was d=g was
telling Macooa to reform. But to know Mar-
cos was to know that reform for a strong-
man in his 20th year in power was an m-
possibility. He would either continue his old
ways, or be would leave. Marcos now made
his fatal mistake and called for an election.
Did he think that this would satisfy Reagan
and Laxalt? Did he believe he could really
win an honest vote? Did Laxalt suggest it or
indicate his approval of the idea? These are
among the most important remaining Usk.
answered questions about the events of the
last year.
Whether or not Laxalt encouraged Mar-
cos to cad the special election, it is clear
that the election was a direct response to
the pressures Maroon felt were building up
following the Lanlt mission. Near the and
of a hMlong relationship with Amenca-a
nation be admires deeply but doesn't under-
stand. a nation he wishes would love his
but which never has-Maros offered
America a bturre parody of our own pres.
idential elections, thinking, apparently, that
it would please and satisfy us. But his un-
itation of America, like so many other as-
pects of the Marcos style, ignored the con-
sequences of trying to imitate us.
M arcoe did not tmderstand that this
election, unlike several other leg-
islative elections he had conducted
for similar reasons in recent years. would
be different-by virtue of the growing con-
cern in Washington over the NPA and Mar-
cos' health. and because of the unresolved
legacy of Ninoy Aquino's death Marcos did
not understand that this election was des-
tined to be a referendum on dictatorship
versus democracy. His miscalculation be-
came complete when Corazan Aquino's can-
didacy unleashed the pent-up passions of
the Philippine people and turned a campaign
into a crusade.
Reagan may have also miscalculated the
effect of Marcos' decision to call the elec-
tion. It is doubtful that he understood fully
what surely occured to his advisers at the
State Department: That the election itself
would reduce Reagan's options. Without an
election, the press and liberal critics could
bash him and Marcos all they wanted to, but
the choice would still have appeared to be
between an old friend and the unknown.
Now. suddenly, it became a real choice.
and for Reagan, a real dilemma. The elec-
tion in Manila took on a clear symbolic pow-
er, and Ronald Reagan understands sym-
bola. He had to declare, as he did well be-
fore the election, that we would insist on a
fair and honest vote. Any other position
would have undercut his global rhetonc
about spreading freedom and democracy.
The decision to send the Lugar-Murtha
observer mission than followed, again not
without some internal arguments. It was
another critical milepost on the road to rev-
olution, because Lugar and Murtha legit-
and made it impossible for those, like White
Howe chief of staff Donald Regan. who may
have wanted to look the other way. Once he
had seen the fraud 6rstband. Lugar, a man
of impeccable conservative credentials, had
either to oppea Marcos or become an ac-
complice in the ciie .
Wldm t le executive branch. those who
knew the region had eonchrded that the
time tied come to try to get Marcos out.
They were not liberals, as charged in a few
newspaper ookanna, but professionalg, in-
cluding the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., who felt
that if Marcos survived this challenge, the
only bene&jary over time would be the
communists. They too made common cause
with Lugar, at they had the strong support
of Shults.
he policy was now c loft lostng In on Rea-
gao, Just as events were closing in on
Marcos. Reagan may have hoped to
keep out of the whole mess, but once the
voting was over and the world had judged it
fraudulent, he carldn't stay clear. His first
forays onto the public record were confused
and almost disastrous, but they revealed
how deeply be wanted to avoid having to Wt
against Marcos. How much cleaner it would
be, he undoubtedly hoped, if Marcos could
just reach the nght conclusions on his own,
Perhaps to encourage that process, he sent
still another special emis ary, Philip Habib,
to Manila, with deliberately vague instruc-
tions.
But despite all Reagan's efforts to avoid a
personal involvement, despite all the skill
shown by men like Habib and Lugar, Am-
bassador Stephen Bosworth in Manila and
Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost.
in the end it came down to this. Marcos
would not leave his palace-turned-bunker
until he understood clearly that it was the
American president's personal belief that
he should do so. The colonial legacy was
still alive and had served, for once, a useful
purpose.
In the end, the policy worked because it
succeeded, not because it was nght. But
such tautologies have limited value for
those seeking gurdelroes for the next crisis.
Could we succeed in other countries with
similar involvements?
The answer, unfortunately, is the diplo-
mat's delight but frustrating for the rest of
us. Each country is different. Amen can in-
terests and potential influence are different
in each country. What word in Manila will
not work automatically in, for example,
Seoul, where a different tradition and his-
tory are at work.
Everyone loves to cheer a winner and
this time we have both Ronald Reagan and
Corazon Aquino to applaud. And it will per-
haps be Reagan's good fortune, once again.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5
+V
that by the time the Philippines' endemic
problems of poverty and communist insur-
gencY next dominate the headlines.
Aquino--but not Ronald Reagan-will have
to face dhem. For better or worse. Amer,
ica's role in our former colony is not over.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402650030-5