NEW EVIDENCE BACKS EX-ENVOY ON HIS ROLE IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830047-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: February 9, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Releasse
2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830047-7 A
Moe
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000402830047-7 .
p, ea NEW YORK TIMES
*B PAo9 FEBRUARY 1981
New Evidence Backs Ex-Envoy on His Role in Chile
Fple,
an i'eyes only" internal C.IA. re.
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
port, filed In early 1971 and not provided
For six years Edward M. Korry, to the Intelligence Committee, shows that
United States Ambassador to Chile from I senior agency officials were aware that
1967 to 1971, has insisted that he. was not , passport had and entered under
involved in and indeed tried to stop White false n and making as act a member
aver of
of
House efforts to induce a military coup in the
lend. forces
National Security Interests
Yet, he said, his story is not just an-
other account of a frustrated "whistle.
blower," nor is it simply another "Wash-
ington morality story." The inability of
the press and the Senate investigators to
reach the truth about his involvement, he
Chile in 1970-to prevent Dr. Salvador Al- , In another internal 1971 report, William i insisted, "tells about our country and the
lende Gossens, a Marxist, from assuming V. Broe, then chief of the agency's clan- i way Washington really works when the
the presidenc idency. destine service in Latin America, was ambitions of. its most important people
Evidence has come td light suggesting formally advised that an operative had, and the interests of its most powerful
that Mr. Korry, despite his strong OPP~- posed. as- a representative of the Ford i groups come into conflict with the na-
tion to the Allende candidacy. was frozen Foundation and the Rockefeller Founds- tional security interests."
outof the planning fbr a proposed mill-. lion while on special assignment to Chile Mr. Korry, who is 59 years old, was a
tary coup and warned the White House in October 1970-a tactic in violation of a foreign correspondent for United Press
that it would be risking another "Bay of Presidential prohibition against the use and went on to Look magazine, where he
Pigs" if it got involved in military,plots to of American educational and philan- served as European editor. In 1982 he was
stop Dr. Allende's election. thropic foundations as covers. The opera- designated Ambassador to Ethiopia by
Mr. Korry has not worked in his profes- Live, in later meetings with Chilean busi- President John F. Kennedy, serving
slops, journalism or public affairs, since nessmen, made it clear, according to the, there with distinction, by all accounts,
Jack C.I.A. documents, that "as a represents-, until his assignment to Chile.
1974, two years after the columnist the of American business interests," he : His moment in the greatest glare of
Anderson published International Tele- was eager "to activate a military take-' publicity came in September 1974, soon
and Telegraph Corporation docu over of the Chilean Government." after The New York Times disclosed that
,.hone that seemingly linked Mr. Korryto None of this, it is now evident, was the C.I.A. had spent at least $8 million in
joint I.T.T. Central';Intelligence Agency known to Ambassador Korry. Chile in an effort to prevent Dr. Allende's
operations to block Dr. Allende's elegy Not Considered Trustworthy election and, failing in that, sought to
In interviews make it impossible for him to govern. Mr.
, a number of C.I.A. offiJ
lion. +`. Korry, with Richard M. Helms, then Dt-
Mr. Korry expressed particular bitter- cials directly involved in the anti-Allendeimr of Central Intelligence, and two
ness toward The,New York Times for operations emphasized that Mr. Korryj senior State Department officials, was
was not, considered trustworthy by, the
what he said was unfair reporting about. `accused by members of the Senate staff
White House or by C.I.A. headquarers. of having provided misleading testimony
his role in articles in 1974 that revealed Korry never did know anything," said
i the C.IA.'a later ye activities in despite his and . .en- ' . an intelligence operative who worked in tee the of the Foreign Relations Committee,
trisin to investigate tug acuons a seen- the embassy under Mr. Korey in 1970. headed by Frank Church, Democrat of rately. While he was in Chile, Mr. Korry was Idaho, which held hearings in March and
treaties,
Mr. Korry, who lives with his wife in known in the Nixon Administration for April 1973 into I.T.T.'s held hearings
involvement with
Stonington. Conn, insists that his sullied his outspoken hostility to Dr. Allende and the Chilean election.
reputation and his early inability to get his harsh anti-Communist stance. Mr. During the hearings Mr. Korry testi-
appropriate work stem from publication [{orry, who acknowledges the severity of tied that the United States maintained a
of the I.T.T. documents and from two his views on Dr. Allende, was active in ..total hands off" policy toward the mili-
subsequent widely publicized investiga- lobbying for a $400,000 C.I.A. propaganda tary during the campaign for the elect
lions by Senate committees. He is now a effort against him and his Marxist views tion, which Dr. Allende won in a three-
visiting professor of international eels- that was authorized by the Nixon Admin- way race by only 30,000 votes of three mil-
lions at Connecticut College in New Lou- Istration in the spring and summer, of lion cast. Mr. Korry denied knowledge of
don. . . 1970. the I.T.T. cablegram that became a focal
Nonetheless, Mr. Korry insists that he
Much the new evidence, including of much of the hearings - a report
highly classified internal C.I.A. docu- repeatedly advised Washington not to from point two I.T.T. officials in Santiago that
ments, was provided by a former inteW- take any steps toward a military solution the Ambassador had finally received
gene official who had direct knowledge of the Allende problem. On Oct. 9, 1970, ,the green light to move in the name of
of the agency's activities against Dr. Al- for example, he told the White House in a Richard Nixon" against the new Presi-
lends. who died in the course of a military direct message made available to The dent.
uprising against him in 1973. Corroborat- New York Times that he was appalled to Repeatedly refusing to answer many
ing information was obtained in inter- learn that unauthorized contact had been queries in full from the senators and the
views with other C.I.A. and White House made by the C.I.A. station in Santiago subcommittee staff director, Jerome I.
officials. Internal documents provided by with Patria y Libertad, a right-wing ex- Levinson, Mr. Korry insisted that to de-
the C.I.A. to the Senate Select Committee tremist group advocating scribe confidential communications and
on intelligence - and not published by overthrow of the Government. "I think official orders would be "contrary to the
attempt on our part actively to en-
n
975
on a
y
the committee to its reports in 1
Chile - have also been obtained. Finally, courage a coup could lead us to a Bay of
Mr. Korry made available some of his Pigs failure," he added in the "eyes
private communications with Washing- only" cablegram.
ton during the 1970 election period. In the Interviews Mr. Korry constantly
These materials raise new questions focused on his inability to get newspapers
about the extent of C.I.A. operations 'in to publish his view of events after he left
Chile in 1970 and the efficacy of the Sep- Chile. But be says that he perhaps waited
ate committee's investigation. For exam- too long, until 1976, to begin to tell all he
knew of the role of the Nixon Administra-
tion andItspredeceseQWinChile. ,, .
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. The -former Ambassador defends 'his
role in Track I as constitutional and
entire moral contract,. be had entered maintains that it did not call for military
into with the Presidents under whom he overthrow. In this period, he said, he
served. worked closely, with Dr. Eduardo Frei
After The Times account of C.I.A. in. Montalva, the outgoing President, and it
volvement, he sent a barrage of letters to was reluctance to mention Dr. Frei's in-
editors and reporters, pourttag to what he volvement that posed problems In the
cited. as errors in the newspaper's cover- 1973 Senate hearing. '
age and insisting that his testimony was Mr. Korry's testimony before the Intel-
honestly rendered and that his reluctance ligence Committee, which he concedes
to testify more frilly -was not basedi''as was! incomplete, clearly contribute& to
was widely assumed, on, inside kmwl- his credibility problem. While be denied
edge of C.I.A. and I.T.T.activitles, : receiving the green-light message, he re-
Because it was difficult to believe that peatedly refused to answer when he was
Mr. Korey, as Ambassador, could not asked about his instructions regarding
have been privy to the Administration's Dr. Allende. He did not claim executive
plans, few members of the committee privilege; telling the subcommittee: "I
chose to believe his assertion that he had am not falling back on any legal rights. I
not received the "green light'` cable. But. am speaking entirely of my own personal
C.I.A. documents summarized. by the perception of my moral responsibility to
Justice Department in,, IM court pro- the ; Presidents.: I. cannot in good con-
cceedin but widely ignored at the time ? science wreck an institutional process for
that Henry .;D. Hecksher, the inyveasan that I can think of here "
C.I_A_ station chief in- Santiago,: had ro- ,Belated Recognition of Bad Choice
delved the message; and,. through Hal ti , rIsch
Hendrix and Robert Berrellez, public x ?. Mr.7Kory concedes now that he might
relations representatives for,I.T.T. In have been guilty of poor Judgment by not
Santiago, had forwarded it to the multi- .testifying more openly before the multi-
nationalcorporation'shome office, national subcommittee and also by not
IS, n more candid with the press about
Helms VNwed as Part of plot
A_ some of. the suspicions he had then about
-Justice Department investigators con- 'American,..'-;involvement in activities
chided that Mr. Hendrix, Mr. Berrellez against Dr..Allende. Those suspicions, for
and other I.T.T. officials had conspired which he had no direct evidence, were
with Mr. Helms and other C.I.A. officials heightened, he said, when he was repeat-
to commit perjury before the Senate mul- edly complimented by senior Govern-
tinational subcommittee in' 1973. Mr., ment officials after the 1973 hearings.
Korry, it appears, was in the position of .'Everybody was pleased as pink with my
telling the truth about his lack of knowl- testimony," he explained. - "They be-
edge of I.T.T. and C.IA operations at a lieved I lied."
time when other witnesses were concoct- He recalled his sorrow and distress at
ing diversionary stories. - . -.. being informed in July 1975 by a staff
Mr. Helms, later Ambassador to Iran. member of the Senate Intelligence Com-,
and Mr. Hendrix were eventuially con- mittee of the Track II efforts. The C.I.A.
victed on misdemeanor charges for their. program, as the committee later report-
testimony. ,`r ed, indirectly led to the assassination of
In Mr. Korry's view, the assumption Gen.. Rene Schneider, commander of the
that he was not telling the truth persisted Chilean Army, a constitutionalist oonsid-
in the 1975 investigation by the Senate Se- Bred an obstacle to a coup.
lect Committee an Intelligence. which "Until that date," Mr. Korry said, 'I'
was also headed by Senator Church, Into had naively assumed I.T.T. was mis-
lllegal activities of the C.I.A.-Mr. Korry taken about my activities in Chile" - in
was only permitted to testify fora few its various messages and reports that
moments before a public hearing, be re- wereobtalned and published by Jack An-
lated, and that testimony was not sought derson. ' y was apparent to me-
until the committee had published two re- that there a calculated scheme to lay
ports an C.I.A. activities in Chile, both of 'off the blame for Chile upon me," he went
them critical of his term as envoy.: on. "This . disclosure shook a reference
His pleas of innocence and his protesta- point in my life. In other words, the I.T.T.
tions against what be describes as unfair green-light cable had `been true In sub-
treatment by Congress and the press stand, ? if wrong about me. I.T.T. plus
have generally been ignored. t' a C.LA. officials and others in government.
Direct Order for Interventioo~' ..:? had in. fact lied under oath to the Senate
T
and had then conspired to bide from the
+
In published reports
the Sente' atelli public and me its activities.
genes Committee disclosed that Presh.- Approaching reporters again, ".'Mr.
dent Richard M. Nixon, at an Oval Office Key was determined to tell his hill
meeting an Sept.. 13,"1970; ordered, Mr.. story. But with the exception of a series of
Helms to prevent Dr. Allende's accession articles in 1976 and 1977 by J. Trento of
to power. He was told that he was tooper The Now Journal of Wilmington, Del.,
ate-in great secrecy and not to-Info his account` was ,ignored. This come
anyone is the State Department, molar spondent, in long conversations with Mr.
ing Ambassador Korey.. of hisorders: ?:?:. Korry in 1975, concluded his account was
This effort was called Track II by the too self-serving to be credible.
committee to distinguish it from the so- In the recent interviews Mr. Korry ac-
called Track I... essentially a series o! knowledged that he was concealing infor-
political maneuvers also aimed at pre nation about C.I.A. operations in Chile
ventinz Dr. Allende's election. that were when he refused to testify before the Sen-
carriaedd out with mr. Korry's knowledge - ate subcommittee in 1973, but his special
and approval. knowledge dealt not with 1970 and Dr. Al-
lende but.wtth the extent of C.I.A. pens
tratlon of all aspects of Chilean society
unolSr the Kand Johnson Admirers-
tratima. Those C.I.A:' activities were
known to Ralph A. Dungan. his predecea-
snr as Ambassador. Mr. Korrv said. and
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Lto President. Frei, head of the Christian
Democratic Party, which had C.I.A. sup.
port.
was concerned In 1973, be said, that
If be began talking about intelligence ac-
tivities, he would lose the right to with-
hold such potentially embarrassing
points of information as these:
.9American funding in support of the
Frei presidential campaign in 1964 to-
taled well over $20 million, much of it fun-
neled through C.I.A. and Agency for in-
ternational Development conduits, not
the $3 million reported by the C.I.A. to the
Senate Intelligence Committee.
9With the full knowledge of Chile and
the United States, millions in C.I.A. and
A.I.D. funds were allocated to Roman
Catholic groups opposed, to "laicism,
Protestantism. and Communism."- Key
unions also received election funds.
1President Kennedy was personally In-
volved In urging large United States cor-
porations.- Including I.T T:,` and the
Kennecott andAn~y;copper con-
cerns, which had big and profitable hold-
ellliig in-
telligence gento work cy in bribing local offi-
cials and supporting political parties to
further American foreign policy.
Hush money was paid to senior Chil-
ean politicans who aided the White House
in its pro-Frei programs In 1984. One of
the defeated candidates In the 1964 elec-
tion was Dr. Allende.
Predecessor Supports Account
9Ambassador Dungan, on leaving
Chile, provided Mr. Korry with the
names of 15 residents of Santiago whose
companionship and friendship he particu-
larly commended. All, among them three
clergymen, had been "funnels and instru
ments of important C.I.A. programs."
Mr. Dungan. told of Mr.,Korry's re-
CONTIX=
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marks, commented: "That's true. Any
ambassador who wasn't aware of C.I.A.
activities in his country wasn't worth a
hoot." The former envoy, now a United
States executive, director of the Inter-
American Development Bank; added that
he consistently sought to make the Chris-
tian Democratic Party more viable while
he was in Chile in the mid-1960's in an ef-
fort to reduce the scope of the C.I.A.
Mr. Korry is most critical now of the
Senate Intelligence Committee investiga-
tion, which he insist$ was biased, incom-
plete and distorted. He was not permitted
to testify fully about his extensive knowl-
edge of earlier C.I.A. activities until Feb.
ruary 1976, he said, when he appeared be-
fore an executive session largely at-
tended by staff members. His full state-
ment was not made public, nor, he said,
has he been able to obtain a transcript of
his remarks. He maintained that Mr..
Church and other Democrats on the com-
mittee deliberately suppressed his testi-
mony about C.I.A. activities in the early
1960's to shield,the reputation of, Presi-
dent Kennedy as well as to prevent em-
barrassment to the Roman Catholic
Church and unions. -
"No one in authority," Mr. Korry said,
"wished the full 11-member committee,
even in secret session, to be compelled to
confront the past."
Senator Church has repeatedly denied
Mr. Korry's allegations.
Mr. Korry also accused the committee
of suppressing hundreds of his confiden-
tial cables that he turned over in 1975 and
that show, he maintains, that while Am-
bassador he sought to reach a "fair un-
derstanding" with Dr. Allende on many
key issues.
A Charge of Suppression
The committee, Mr. Korry maintained,
also suppressed evidence showing that in
the fall of 1970 he repeatedly urged Presi-
dent Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then
the President's national security adviser,
not to get involved in scheming with the
Chilean military. Mr. Korry has copies of
documents that appear to demonstrate
that he did give the Whitd House such ad-
vice, but no mention of this aspect of his
role was included in the committee's final j
reports on Chile. Mr. Korry also asserted
that committee staff members made no
effort before publication to discuss with
him the messages and other documenta-
tion about his role, with the result that the
official record was often distorted. I.. I
Mr. Korry emphasized that he did not
believe any individual or group conspired
to deny him a chance to get his views
known. What did happen, he said, is that
those who were being investigated and
those who were investigating set limits on
the extent of the facts they wanted known
and thus "conspired to save each other."
"Their common interest in preventing
the full Senate committee from having
them confront the truths I would tell in se-
cret led to my exclusion as a witness and
to the issuance of reports concerning
Chile which coupled each truth with a lie,
with a half truth or with a deliberately
misleading statement," he said.
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