LET'S MAKE A DEAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000402990003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 20, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000402990003-8
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WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1985
Let's Make a Deal
For Once, We Have a Summit When Both Sides Badly Need Arms Cuts
By .Jerry F. Hough
F OR THE FIRST TIME since arms-
control negotiations began, political,
economic and strategic cycles in both
the United States and the Soviet Union have
simultaneously swung in a direction that
should favor productive negotiations. The
question is -- will both sides' leaders recog-
nize that the timing is perfect?
On the Soviet side, the immediate change
affecting arms-control prospects has been
the selection of a vigorous, younger general
secretary - Mikhail Gorbachev. For the
past 10 years, no Soviet Union leader has
had an incentive to take risks for long-range
gains, because none had any reason to think
he would be around long enough to see the
results. Gorbachev will only be 69 in the
year 2000. A man with such a time perspec-
tive must have very different priorities than,
the previous leaders.
Gorbachov's most important problem is
Soviet technological backwardness. Russia
and Japan began industrialization at the same
time. Japan's capacity to produce was rav-
aged just as much as Russia's in World War
II. (An article in Pravda in August reminded
Soviet readers that 3 million Japanese died
and 10 million lost their homes in the war.)
In 30 years, the Japanese economy has been
transformed. For that matter in the last 15
years the same has been happening in Tai-
wan and South Korea. But the Soviet Union
did not make the same transition, and that is
having disastrous consequences.
First, technological backwardness under-
cuts Soviet foreign policy. The ineffective-
ness of the Soviet economic model means
that industrializing Third World countries
must turn to Western development models.
And it means that neighboring regions that
logically should be in the Soviet orbit -
such as the Middle East - rely on Japan and
the West for their technology, instead.
It also undercuts Soviet military power.
The Soviet defense industry has been able to
produce high-technology items when it con-
centrated its efforts (e.g., guidance systems-
for nuclear warheads), but its overall record
is poor. It was 20 years behind the United
States in producing a solid-fuel interconti-
nental rocket, in developing the ability to clear forces is already becoming senseless."
catch film ejected from a satellite, and in The same applies to the Soviet Union, which
placing satellites in high orbit. Soviet nuclear could save a lot of money by declaring that it
submarines are extremely noisy and easy to already has more than enough.
detect and the real computerization of the. The large Soviet missiles that have been
armed forces has hardly begun compared to., so frightening to Americans who see them
the West. as potential first-strike weapons are them-
selves vulnerable to an American first strike
For these reasons, technological back- because they are land-based and stationary.
wardness weakens the Soviet Union's politi- Thus the Soviet Union wants to replace (or
cal stability. It undercuts the Communist at.least supplement) them with missiles that
Party's ideological claims about the superi- are less vulnerable. A gradual program of
ority of socialism to capitalism. It also ham- deploying the mobile SS-25 over 10 years
pers the long-term party effort to tie itself in would be the inexpensive way of meeting the
the eyes of the population to the accomplish- problem. This could be done even as a uni-
ment of Russia's national goals (for example, lateral step, although a rapid dismantling of
victory in World War II). If Russians get the the big multiwarhead rockets might require
idea that the Soviet Union is doomed to be- a more rapid and more expensive deploy-
come the last . Third World country, this ment of SS-25s.
would be highly destabilizing. Nevertheless, an arms-control agreement
would have advantages. It would not be
Addressing this problem will not be inex- crushingly expensive for the Soviets to
pensive for Gorbachev, however. A techno- counter America's Strategic Defense Initia-
logical reconstruction of the Soviet economy tive ("Star Wars"). One of the things they
requires major investment in computers, could do is simply retain old missiles while
communications and advanced machinery . building new ones to overwhelm it. How-
In addition, for political reasons, the prod- ever, Gorbachev doubtless would be happy
uction of consumer goods needs to be in- to forego that expense.
creased. Revitalizing the Soviet Union's eco- And for internal political reasons Gorba-
nomic structure could easily require steps chev will have to negotiate in good faith with
similar to the ones China is approaching, the United States. Former foreign minister
such as legalizing the black market or modi- Andrei Gromyko has always proclaimed that
fying the disastrous policies of collectivized relations with America should be the center-
agriculture. Such measures could be disrup- piece of Soviet foreign policy. Many signs in-
tive because people who are winners under dicate Gorbachev would rather concentrate
the current system could become losers on improving relations with Europe and
under a more rationalized one. Spreading Japan at the expense of the United States.
consumer goods around could ease that - But the opinions of Gromyko, now president
strain. f th S
U - .is
o e
t
To achieve these goals, the country really
does need the 4.7 percent annual growth
that Gorbachov promised in a speech last
week. Such very high growth in what has
been up until now a very sluggish economy
will be extremely difficult. It is totally
preposterous if Gorbachov is looking for a
big increase in military spending as well.
The most expensive part of a military es-
tablishment.is troops, but there are savings
that can be made in the strategic realm. A
number of Soviet strategic programs are
about to be deployed: the large SS-24 missile
(the Soviet equivalent of the MX), the SS-25
(a single-warhead, mobile missile), a new nu-
clear submarine (the Typhoon) and a new
cruise missile system.
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has already said
of the American nuclear force, "One does
not have to be a military man or a scholar to
know that a further increase of strategic nu-
o
ve
mon, sh command respect
because he is the only man on the Politburo
with foreign policy experience.
In order to prove Gromyko's ideas wrong,
Gorbachev will have to prove that such ne-
gotiations with America are genuinely futile.
Of course if, to his surprise, Gorbachev dogs
get an agreement, it would strengthen his
authority enormously within the party. For
him, negotiating seriously with America is a
no-lose situation.
The obstacles to major arms control
have been many, but none has been
greater than the pervasive Soviet sec-
recy - especially because of its psychologi-
cal impact in the West. Soviet secrecy shows
the Soviet leaders have something to hide,
and a prudent person assumes that that
something is probably dangerous..:So long,aa.
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the secrecy remains, rightly or wrongly, the
Soviet Union will never be trusted. 00t' That will require far more CO"'
In actuality, the real reason for the great tact with the outside world.
secrecy has almost surely been a. desire to Second, full-scale computerization is going
hide weakness. The Brezhnev-Gromyko gen- to have to be accompanied by accurate infor-y
eration based much of their legitimacy with mation, lest the most famous law of cyber-
the Russian people on their claim of having netics - "Garbage In, Garbage Out" -
achieved superpower status' arA military render the modernization meaningless..
equality with the West. In large part, it was Word processors will also make easier the
a hollow claim distribution of unorthodox ideas. The regime
testing, he has stimulated a forthcoming
Soviet response. By testing antisatellite
weapons, he has silenced right-wing critics
who say that we were behind in that area.
By creating doubts about the interpretation
of the ABM treaty, he has created the need
and possibility for limits on testing through
an agreement on the precise definition of the
terms of the ABM treaty.
The Brezhnev generation did develop going to be forced to take a more relaxed
enough missiles and nuclear weapons to . attitude toward both these developments. he president has maneuvered himself
match or exceed U.S. arsenals at least nu- Finally, meaningful economic reform wiw into a position where he can accept
merically. They accumulated enough con- be politically very difficult because of the en- limits on SDI testing that could not be
ventional weapons to give NATO command- trenched interests it will jar. The sacrifice it reached technologically anyway during his
ers sleepless nights. entails need to be just", and the needs of administration. He can thereby ensure a new
Yet, in the nuclear age, national power has national defense are the logical appeal. That 'relationship with the Soviet Union while
come to rest increasingly on economic requires more openness about the problems creating conditions for a solid prosperity. It
power, and here the Soviet leadership has_ that Brezhnev left the country. could go down as one of the truly great dip.
rmances.
been unsuccessful. It was able to raise living k miatic and political perfo ~ And, yet, as one follows the course of
standards (the Brezhnev era was one of n the United States, too, the political-
mass acquisition of appliances), but it did not 7 economic cycles should be extremely developments in Soviet-American relations,
solve the problem of matching the First favorable to an arms-control agreement. the thought keeps arising that if President
World. The Brezhnev solution to the prob- ? First, Ronald Reagna always said that he Reagan is planning to compromise on SDI,
lem - large-scale importation of Western was arming, in- order to disarm. The.Soviet he really is a first-class actor - better than
technology - did not work. Union was a threat in the way it handled its he was ever given credit for in Hollywood.
The leadership's solution to its failure to military buildup in the 1970s. The ~ Western He does create the strong impression that,
create equality was to pretend to do so. The response accoinplished its purpose and ? in the words of his biographer, Lou Cannon,
early American exaggerations of Soviet demonstrated to the Soviet Union the hope- he thinks SDI is the Second Coming.
lesaness of any drive for military
strength The disturbing thing if. in faM an gap and the ABM gap were substantially the If, as a consequence, the Soviet Union is opportunity for meaningful arms control is at
result of deliberate Soviet disinformation. In now willing to put a cap on its military hand,- is that the administration's approach
the Brezhnev era, the leadership simply spending, restrict its strategic forces, reduce. to defense spending and arms control is sio
secrec to hide the end of the owth in mill- 'its secrecy and accept more verification, the inconsistent, and the president's mastery Of
tary procurement that William Ca9Ws CIA United States can say that it has really ac= the subject is so apparently lacking.
says occurred from 1977 through 1982.
complished something with its expensive de- When the president announced his deter-
f
ence program. mination not to bargain on SDI, he. argued
The more the United States exaggerated
the Soviet threat - remember the "window
of vulnerability"? - the more the Soviet
leadership could persuade the Soviet popula-
tion that it had at least achieved equality
with the West, thereby preserving the stabil-
ity of the Soviet system.
The real indication of Soviet motivation
came when the CIA lowered its estimate of
the XE24h in Soviet military spending in
1982. Although this would seem to be grist
for Soviet propaganda, the Soviet news
agencies never reported this development to
the Soviet reader. The leaders did not want
the Soviet reader to know that they were
not meeting the Western buildup.
Brezhnev and his ailing successors had no
reason to worry if their secrecy stimulated a
Western defense program. They knew that
they would not live long enough for it to
harm them. As with the plight of their econ-
omy, doing nothing was the path of least
resistance. Gorbachev, however, is in a very
different position. He has to worry about the
Western military posture 15 years from the man who complacently presided over the that could destroy the space stations.
now. If he wants to curb Western military 'happy prelude to economic disaster. Or he It is a good question. Does the president
spending, he needs to reduce the Western could use the victory his arms buildup has understand that the natural and inexpensive
sense of the Soviet Union as a threat. A created to cut military expenditures in a sub- response of the Soviets to orbiting defense
sharp: reduction in secrecy is necessary for', stantial way. It is obvious what the integh- stations is to blow them up?
that. gent answer to the dilemma is. Similarly, the space stations under amsid-
Other consideration also lead Gorbachev Third, the president has played the arms- eration only destroy missiles in outer space.
T
hey cannot deal with low-flying cruise mis-
towards an aceeptaace.of a new information control issue in brilliant bargaining fashion if
poicy. First, the attack on technological he is, indeed, seeking an agreement. his saes in the atmosphere. Yet, the United
backwardness is not possible without sub- seemingly By States is not trying to restrict. cruise .mis..
implacable commitment to SDI
jecting Soviet manufacturers to foreign
Second, the $200 billion annual deficit is. that it was far too important to trade off for
being directly and indirectly financed by for- "a different number of nuclear missiles when
eign borrowing of some $110 billion a year, there are already more than enough to blow
$50 billion to $60 billion of it from Japan. both countries out of the world.1' It is a de-
Even at 9 percent interest rates, that means fensible point. Even a 50-percent reduction
the country is paying foreigners $10 billion a will leave both sides with overkill.
year cumulatively for each year we carry But why then is the United States wasting
such a deficit. money on a new MX and a new B-1 bomber
To create a balance in its foreign pay- and a Stealth bomber and a new Trident
ments, the. United States has to sell enough submarine missile and several new cruise
extra to foreigners to cover the interest pay- missile programs and a forthcoming Midget.
ments. That, is impossible without a major man missile and an expansion in nuclear u
and continuing decline in the value of the warheads to go with them? It doesn't make Z.
dollar. With such a decline will come inflation sense.
and a rise in interest rates, for foreign;' In arms control, the same inconsistence .
are not going to keep loaning us money if the abound. A congressional delegation headed'
decline in the value of the dollar eats up by Democratic Reps. Edward Markey of
profits from interest rates. Massachusetts and Robert Mrazec of New
As a result, president Reagan faces a di- York was recently in Moscow. In one inter-
lemma. He could bring the deficit under con- view it was asked by a top Soviet scientist,.'
trol by repudiating his tax cut. He could be Evgeny Velikhov, to explain why the presi-
content to go down in history as the Calvin dent favors space defense stations but op-
Q
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v
sites. Does the president know that space
stations cannot hit cruise missiles?
The one explanation that makes sense or.,
the almost mindless quality of the American
buildup is a belief that the Soviet Union will
be forced to respond to all our measures and
will strain its economy. Unfortunately, Gor-
bachev does not have to play the game. He
can cut military expenditures without an
agreement, if needed. He can do this while
using SDI to spur economic growth, saying
the entire Soviet Union must computerize in.
order to match the American threat.
And unless the United States raises taxes-
to pay for its program, it will be the one
spent into bankruptcy, not the Soviets.
Jerry Hwtgi is a p-vfresor of political science
at Dales Uxiversity and a staff member of the
Brookings Ixatitxtiox.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000402990003-8