BOOK: US MISLED PUBLIC ON KAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 4, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

UTLDeclassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270004-5
BOSTON GLOBE FIlE ONLY
4 September 1986
Book: US misled public on KAL
Tapes said to show
Soviet confusion
By Fred Kaplan
Globe Staff
WASHINGTON - US officials
knowingly misled the public
after the Soviets shot down Kore-
an Air Lines Flight 007 three.
years ago, and waged a world-
wide campaign against Soviet
"barbarism" even though they
knew the Soviet officers who or-
dered the attack did not know
they were firing on a commercial
airliner, according to a new book
on the subject.
The book, "The Target Is De-
stroyed" by Seymour M. Hersh, a
prize-winning New York Times
investigative reporter, concludes
that KAL 007 was not on a spy
mission, contrary to Soviet state-
ments and articles by some
Western writers. However, Hersh
also concludes that the Soviets
believed the airliner was a spy
plane.
Hersh also describes in great-
er detail than previously pub-
lished what goes on inside the
overseas listening posts of the
National Security Agency.
Most of the material in the
book appears to come from inter-
views with NSA officials, many
of whom. Hersh says. have never
before talked with reporters. He
says that some of them agreed to
be Interviewed because they
were outraged at how the Rea-
gan Administration misused
sensitive intelligence data for po-
litical purposes.
The book also relies on classi-
fied documents, including the of-
ficial NSA "after-action" report
on the KAL attack. Hersh also
interviewed high-level White
House and State Department of-
ficials, who gave him new infor-
mation on how the administra-
tion formulated its policy follow-
; Ing the downing of the jetliner.
An NSA spokesman said yes-
i terday he could not comment on
-anything mentioned in the book.
Hersh reports'that:
? A colonel' monitoring Soviet
communications at an NSA com-
pound heard a Soviet pilot say he
was firing a missile and that the
target was destroyed, but the
(15K officer had no way of know-
ing what was being shot or of re-
laying word to US officials.
This was because the analyst
was working at an NSA com-
pound at Wakkani. Japan.
known as Project CLEF,-a place
sq secretive that neither the
highest Japanese officials nor
much of the US government
knew of its existence. The offi-
cials called other NSA officers, at
Misawa. Japan. over an open
telephone line to tell them about
the attack, and a plane was sent
to Wakkani to pick up the tape.
? Officers at Misawa sent
NSA headquarters a "CRITIC"
message, the highest alert mes-
sage, which is supposed to be put
in the hands of the president
within 10 minutes, but the mes-
sage was rescinded by headquar-
ters, as was a second CRITIC ca-
ble sent an hour later.
? After it became clear a Sovi-
et plane had shot down the Kore-
an flight, a US Air Force com-
mander in the Pacific, without
the knowledge of anyone in
Washington, assigned six Air
Force F-15 jets and an AWACS
surveillance plane to Misawa
and ordered them to try to pro-
voke an incident near Soviet ter-
ritory. He also Asked an officer in
the Pacific to forward a fraudu-
lent Intelligence report to the
Pentagon designed to justify pro-
vocative acts against the Soviet
Union. Hersh writes the officer
reportedly told the commander
"to go to hell."
? Contrary to administration
assertions after the attack, a
Boeing 747 - the type of plane
used by KAL - is not easy to dis
tinguish at night from an RC-
135 spy plane, which is a modi-
fied Boeing 707. One US tanker
pilot told Hersh he once flew 500
yards from a Japan Air Line 747
before realizing the plane was
not the RC-135 he was supposed
to refuel.
? Secretary of State George
Shultz rushed to declare at a
press conference the morning
after the incident that the Soviet
pilot saw KAL 007 was a civilian
airliner, even though NSA ana-
lysts warned that their intelli-
gence was still raw and not fully
translated or analyzed. Shultz
did so at the urging of Lawrence
Eagleburger, the deputy secre-
tary of state, and Richard Burt,
the assistant secretary. who saw
it as a golden opportunity for
Shultz to improve his standing
among White House hardliners.
Officers at NSA listening
posts who watched Shultz on
television were "appalled" by his
statement, as were Japanese of-
ficials, including Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone.
? An analysis by Air Force In-
telligence, within a day of the at-
tack, concluded the Soviets shot
down the Korean airliner not in
cold blood but by mistake. This
analysis, however, was not seen
by administration officials until
after Shultz gave his press con-
ference. When President Reagan
endorsed Shultz' claim the next
day, he had received no intelli-
gence briefings at all.
The day after the attack, a
Soviet pilot involved in the
downing was overheard by a US
satellite as calling the aircraft as
an RC-135, giving the Air Force
analysis further credibility.
By the end of the first week,
as everyone discovered that an
RC-135 had flown in the area
earlier that evening, the Air
Force analysis was accepted
throughout the government. Ad-
ministration officials, however,
made no effort to straighten the
record or adjust their rhetoric. A
member of Vice President George
Bush's special crisis group said
the attitude was, "Why find rea-
sons to excuse the Soviets?"
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270004-5