RADAR SITE IN SIBERIA MOST CRITICAL PACT BREACH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 11, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270014-4
ARTI CI,E
ON PAGE
most critical
BOSTON GLOBE
ii May 19b5
in Siberia
By Fred Kaplan I
`Globe Staff J:, - .. .
i WASHINGTON - President Ronald Reagan's
statement yesterday that he might suspend US
observance of the SALT II arms control treaty
raises anew questions about
IXPLAINER whether the Soviets have al=
ready violated this and other
agreements.
In January 1984, the White House released a..
study accusing the Soviets of violating five pro-
visions of various arms control treaties and.of
"almost certainly" or "probably" violating four
more. ~.: ~ ; ?
The most critical violation - and the one that
has attracted the most discussion since in-
volved the Soviets' constructing a huge radar
site in Siberia, in apparent violation of the 1972
ABM treaty.
. The treaty prohibits new radars unless they
are built "'along the periphery of . . : national
territory" and facing outward. The Siberian ilk-
dar is about 600 miles inside Soviet borders,
and so seems inconsistent with the treaty's
pact breac
terms.
to track object
s in space. a mission for which
the ABM treaty does allow an unlimited number
of new radars. However, said a high-ranking
State Department official, "It's neither the kind
of radar they use for space tracking nor is It in
the, right location." Several outside. technical
specialists agree with this assessment.
However, aides and specialists also said
there is no evidence that the radar is designed to
assist the operations of an antiballistic missile -
(ABM) system. ,;.,. .._
h--
In fact, a 1984 classified CIA report - uncov-
ered by the National Journal magazine - con-
cluded it is not an ABM radar. According
rt, t e ra ar is inted in the wro
re
tion to trac Incomin US intercontinental bat-
s c missi . It wi operate te at a frequency that
makes the radar vulnerable to several effects of
a nuclear explosion - hardly a desirable feature
for a system designed to defend against a nucle-
ar attack. And the radar has only one face, not
, the four on other Soviet ABM radars.,:,, US intelli nce officials said 'it is most Sikes
-an ear -warn n radar, ui o i a a in the
Soviets coverage o attacks from the northern
Pacific Lxvan, especially from ,n ent s -
roes the US Navy has recently begun to deplo '
These officials=said.the radar nvas probay
built so far inland for a simple logistical reason
Had it; been constructed much closer to the
coast, It would be stuck in the frozen-tundra'of
eastern Siberia, which would make sustained
maintenance and support very difficult if not
impossible.
Still, officials said, this possible explanation
does not contradict the fact `that the radar does-
constitute a violation of the ABM treaty. Wheth-;:
er it calls for the United States following suit
and also breaking the treaty, is another ques
tion: .,r 1' 5I'N , ~.?.. .
,. The White House report o ;'January 1984'
also'accused the Soviets of-committtng a "prob
able, violation" of SALT II provisions banning
mobile intercontinental ballistic; missiles` and,.
more than one "new type" of ICBM.
;r.
This charge referred to some evidence. that
the Soviets had deployed SS 16 missiles; - which
are mobile, and that two new missiles, still un-
der development, the SSX24 and SSX25. both
depart significantly from the technical features
of existing missiles, making them "new types."
The Soviets have denied deploying SS16s. US
intelligence officials said the SS16 testin
program was a failure and that. in any case. no
M 6s have SR-n-t-es-te-d in 10 years.. The view
said the is a legal modification of their
SS13 missile. US officials said the Soviets,:at the.
very least, have taken full advantage of a loop-
hole in the treaty. The White House report.said
the evidence of SALT violation on these points.
.'' ??~i-~
is "somewhat ambiguous
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403270014-4